THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

MAKING A TANTRA IN MEDIEVAL SOUTH INDIA: THE MAHĀRTHAMAÑJARĪ AND THE TEXTUAL CULTURE OF CŌḺA CIDAMBARAM

VOLUME 1

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO
THE FACULTY OF THE DIVISION OF THE HUMANITIES
IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

DEPARTMENT OF SOUTH ASIAN LANGUAGES AND CIVILIZATIONS

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CHICAGO, ILLINOIS
DECEMBER 2006

For Suzanne,
of course

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation centers on the *Mahārthamañjarī* ("The Flower-Cluster of the Great Purpose") of Maheśvarānanda, a unique and unjustly neglected text composed in the South Indian city of Cidambaram around the beginning of the thirteenth century. The work is an amalgam of philosophical treatise, liturgical guidebook, and visionary literary essay, cast in a highly unusual, bilingual form. Unravelling the formal and rhetorical details of the text forms a primary task of this thesis. This is partly founded on a text-critical study of the *Mahārthamañjarī*, which reveals previously unnoticed features of the work's history of transmission and reception.

The *Mahārthamañjarī* also provides the occasion for an inquiry into what I refer to as Cidambaram's textual culture, the wider set of institutions and presuppositions that governed texts and their users in this time and place. The city's rise to prominence over the course of the twelfth century can be best understood as contingent upon transformations in the ways in which the city's literate elites used and created works of textualized language. In turn, the public claims enunciated by the other Cidambaram texts surveyed here find an analog in the *Mahārthamañjarī*'s efforts to fashion its own community of reception, a project founded on an unprecedented synthesis and extension of ideas associated with earlier Sanskrit literary criticism.

The study of this single textual culture raises larger questions about the historical and civilizational presumptions that guide the study of the Indian past, questions that are explored in this dissertation's conclusion.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Given that this is a dissertation about the social nature of the seemingly solitary work of text-making, I hope that I can be forgiven an inordinately long list of acknowledgements. Thanks first of all to the members of my committee: Sheldon Pollock, my advisor and chair, has encouraged my research since its inception, while providing a model for engaged and critical scholarship. David Shulman, Kathleen Morrison, and Yigal Bronner have cheerfully read and commented on rambling drafts and half-thought ideas, and have been unstinting in their enthusiasm and support. Among the many other teachers I had the good fortune to study with at Chicago, I would like to especially thank Ronald Inden, Lawrence McCrea, and Wendy Doniger.

I conducted much of the basic research for this project in Chennai and Pondicherry thanks to a Fulbright-Hays DDRA fellowship during 2002–2003. In Chennai I was affiliated with the Kuppuswami Sastri Research Institute; I would like to thank the institute's acting Director V. Kameswari and its Librarian S. Lalitha. I am greatly indebted to my two principal guides in Chennai, Dr. K. Srinivasan of Vivekananda College and Dr. R. Vijayalakshmy. Both of these gifted scholars not only patiently led me through hundreds of pages of text, but also welcomed me into their homes with a rare generosity and kindness. It was also my great fortune to have Dr. R. Nagaswami as my neighbor in Besant Nagar, who shared with me his inimitable knowledge and enthusiasm for the study of Śaivism and the Cōḻas, and gave me the run of his remarkable private library.

It is hard to express the extent of my gratitude to Dr. Dominic Goodall, the Head

of the École Française d'Extrême-Orient, Centre de Pondichéry. Not only was he a a critical sounding board for many of my ideas, but as my host and guide during my stay in Pondichery, he was a model of hospitality and scholarly integrity. Also in Pondicherry, at the French Institute, Dr. V. Venugopal ably lead me through the Cidambaram epigraphical record, while it was a pleasure and an honor to read classical and medieval Tamil with Pandit T. V. Gopal Iyer. The head of the Department of Sanskrit at the University of Madras, Professor Siniruddha Dash allowed me access to the unpublished card files of the *New Catalogus Catalogorum*, and the staff of the Adyar Library were especially helpful in providing me access to their manuscripts holdings. Thanks are also due to the Oriental Research Institute (Mysore), Benares Hindu University, and the University of Lucknow for supplying copies of MSS.

Much of this dissertation was written while I was teaching in the Department of South Asia Studies, University of Pennsylvania. Many thanks to my former colleagues there, among them Aditya Behl, George Cardona, Sunila Kale, Ann Matter, David Nelson, and Rosane Rocher. Special thanks are due to Christian Novetzke, with whom I had countless illuminating and delightful conversations, and to Harunaga Isaacson, who devoted many hours to helping me to improve the edition and translation that accompany this thesis (the many obscurities and misunderstandings that no doubt remain are my own). Further afield, thanks to the friends, colleagues, and teachers who have helped me along the way, among them Daud Ali, Sascha Ebeling (now of the University of Chicago), Layne Little, John Nemic, Leslie Orr, Alexis Sanderson, A. R. Venkatachalapathy, Archana Venkatesan, Alex Watson, and Eva Wilden.

At Chicago, I have been very fortunate in my friends. I could honestly list dozens of names of the extraordinary group of my fellow students; I will limit myself to just a handful. Thanks to Manan Ahmed, Barney Bate, Prithvidatta Chandrashobhi, Lisa Knight, Jesse Knutson, Ethan Kroll, Spencer Leonard, Ajay Rao, Nikhil Rao, Ananya Vajpeyi, Rick Weiss, and Ed Yazijian. To further single out four friends whose help, encouragement, and comradely criticism have been especially important to me: Dan Arnold, Rajeev Kinra, Bali Sahota, and, *ellārukkum mēlē*, Blake Wentworth.

Two men that I had most wanted to read this thesis did not see it completed. Norman Cutler's sudden death in February of 2002 robbed me, as it did us all, of a wise teacher and friend. In June of that same year I lost my father, Kenneth Cox. I miss him more than I can say. Throughout the long years of my education, my family's support has been constant and unstinting. It is with love and gratitude that I would like to thank my mother Meredith Sabol, my sister Hillary Bochniak, and my stepmother Rosemary Cox. Above all else, my thanks to my wife Suzanne and our son Peter Kenneth. Anything of worth in these pages I owe to them.

CHAPTER 1
MAHEŚVARĀNANDA, THE *MAHĀRTHAMAÑJARĪ*, AND THE IDEA OF TEXTUAL CULTURE

1.1 The Dream

It would have been dark, perhaps after the moon had set, late that night in the temple. The adept would have been sitting, more in shadow than in the meager light the lamps afforded, surrounded by the accoutrements of his ritual discipline. Perhaps only the rustle of cloth nearby was there to remind him of the woman, who had joined him in his worship, as she sat nearby. Full of palm liquor, he would have settled into a reverie: there in the deserted precincts of the temple, the adept surely wasn't anticipating any visitors. Such quiet stillness was exactly what his devotions called for, a moment outside of time. And so it was then that the goddess came.

She bore the marks of another member of his faith: the thin mendicant's rags, the trident that set her out as a votary of Śiva, perhaps the matted hair through which one could see the bright stroke of vermillion on her brow. More telling still was her beggar's bowl: it was a human skull, inverted. He suspected that she was more than she appeared, that she was unearthly. Fumbling, he paid her reverence, and ordered the woman there at his side to find some coins as a guest-gift. Perhaps he did this too hastily, for his visitor's mood seemed suddenly to darken: she dismissed the offered gift, and flashed her hand before him—her thumb perhaps resting on the first joint of her middle finger. Then, with a smile, she spoke: not in the tongue of his country, nor in Sanskrit, but in the cooing tones of the language of Mahārāṣṭra. Perhaps the

adept now grew suspicious—who would speak in Māhārāṣṭrī, a language of the songs women sing in the theatre?—but he would have had little time to ponder this before the mysterious woman touched her skull-bowl to his forehead, and just as quickly vanished. Mind dimmed with toddy, late in the night, the man must have wondered: was it all a dream?

This Śaiva adept, a brahman of the Cōḻa country, has a name: Gorakṣa, son of Mādhava, better known to history as Maheśvarānanda, the name he adopted at his initiation. He tells his readers the curious story of this visitation by way of explaining the inspiration for his masterpiece, the *Mahārthamañjarī* (*The Flower-Cluster of the Great Purpose*). Though in the pages ahead we will have cause to look far afield of Maheśvarānanda, one question will remain: how did this text come into being? How did this single and perhaps imagined moment provide the impetus for this particular work?

We dream in images—striking, sometimes haunting images—but also in language, and so in texts. Our dreams are thus often the detritus of others' prior imaginings. Standing behind Maheśvarānanda's dream is a story with which he was intimately familiar, that of the visionary moment of inception of his own tradition, the lineage of Śaiva teachers called the Krama ('Sequence'). Centuries before in the far northern 'seat' of Oḍḍiyāna (*oḍḍiyānapīṭha*), the originary dispensation of the knowledge of the Krama was made by another goddess figure, Maṅgalādevī, to a man whom Maheśvarānanda names Śivānanda.[1]

[1]See the fourth invocatory verse to the text (translated and discussed in Appendix B) and p. 95 (*ad gāthā* 38cd) of Vrajavallabha Dviveda's edition (hereafter referred to by the siglum E_V). This

This story—handed down in the texts and teachings of the Krama and commemorated in their liturgy—is itself a part of a much wider network of narratives from across southern Asia, where a feminine figure arrives in a dream to endow or to incite the creation of a new text. Such a dream inspired the ninth century Kashmirian poet and critic Ānandavardhana to compose his *Devīśataka*, and these visionary meetings became the core narrative element in the massive corpus of Tibetan revelations called *gter ma* or 'treasures,' offering a series of striking parallels to Maheśvarānanda's story, in which goddess figures—there called *ḍākinī*s as opposed to M.'s *yoginī*—transmit scriptural texts through both mysterious language and significant gestures.[2] Maheśvarānanda's dream (if dream it was) possessed a long and diffuse ancestry stretching the breadth of the subcontinent and including worshippers of Viṣṇu and the Buddha as well as his fellow Śaivas.

It is not this dream, but rather the text it provoked that will provide my theme in the pages that follow. Beginning with the dream, however, serves to focus some of the thoughts that guide this opening chapter. Works of language begin in the supposed privacy of an individual's mind before stretching forth into their worldly dissemination. So too dreams are at least naïvely considered to form our innermost domain of experience. But these moments of supposedly solitary reverie are subject—in fact, intensely subject—to the play of language, history, and sociality. Where

is also the name recorded in Arṇasiṃha's *Mahānayaprakāśa* (ed. Dyzckowski vs. 153). Earlier in the same text, the man is called Jñānanetranātha (vs. 135); a similar name, (Antar-)netranātha, is found in the anonymous work also entitled *Mahānayaprakāśa* published in the Trivandrum Sanskrit Series, 2.36 (*cf.* Sanderson 2001, p. 15 n.).

[2]On the *Devīśataka*, see Ingalls 1989; on the Tibetan treasure tradition, see Gyatso 1986 and 1991.

Borges could muse about whether all men share one another's dreams, we may instead take as a point of departure the common fund of material and the infinitely inflected, differing results of the imaginative labor of dream-making.

This truth about our dreams points us towards a fundamental axiom of language and the making of texts: no one begins to speak or to write in exile from the fact of the social. Taking textual language as the focus of this study, the immediate task is two-fold: accounting for the social and semiotic processes that induce or incite textual creation, and attending to the effective nature of such creation, the ways in which text-making turns back creatively on these very social and semiotic processes. Parallel to and coextensive with this theoretical project is a historical and philological one, that of understanding and explaining the style, genre, and content of the *Mahārthamañjarī*, this unique and unduly neglected work of sophisticated Sanskrit systematic thought, as well as describing the several contexts within which it must be necessarily placed.

1.2 Beginning at the End

Let us return to Maheśvarānanda's description of the inception of his text, looking more closely at the sequel of the momentous night where we left him. We begin at the end of the *Mahārthamañjarī* (MM)—properly speaking, at the end of the *Mahārthamañjarīparimala* (MMP), the *Fragrance of the Flower-Cluster of the Great Purpose*, the Sanskrit autocommentary that forms the major part of Maheśvarānanda's complex text. This might seem a strange way to begin the study of the work, but this

is after all what we always do when we take up a new text, beginning not with the author's first vagrant thought caught up on palm leaf or paper, but instead with the finished (or 'perfected' or 'completed' or simply abandoned) product. But let's not get too far ahead of ourselves, and let us imagine that we have finished the *Mahārtha-mañjarī* proper, and are now settled into this narrative of the text's own becoming (E_V p. 191, ln. 8–p. 192, ln. 10):

> So, while still thinking over that great marvel, the great-minded man
> had the remaining offerings done, and so passed the entire night.
> At daybreak, he went to his teacher's house
> and once he had worshipped the teacher's feet
> with folded hands, he related the night's events with courteous words.
> And so his teacher pondered the matter and resolved it right away,
> delighted (as this was a joyous occasion), the honorable man spoke to his pupil:
> "No need to multiply meanings, the meaning, in its essence, is clear:
> the fact that this *siddhayoginī* said, 'Away with these things,'
> and the fact that while she was making the number 'seven'
> on the blossom that is her hand,
> she said, 'Let this be brought to fruition by one who understands the nature of things,'
> this means that she has gone beyond [any] material gift [*ārthīṃ sṛṣṭiṃ*],
> and desires some [gift] in the form of language [*śābdīṃ...kāñcit*],
> whereby the Supreme Goddess can be worshipped
> by words that are as good as *mantra*s.
> Surely the goddess Saptakoṭīśvarī is venerated by her,
> otherwise, she wouldn't have made such a gesture.
> Thus you, in your vast eloquence, must compile seventy sūtras, pregnant with *mantra*s,
> into a *tantra*, containing the Great Purpose.
> From your own mouth, purified by *In praise of the sandals*,[3]
> a great book must at once be published, one similar to the ancient scriptures.
> Furthermore, in this [*tantra*] her language alone,
> an outpouring of sweet ambrosia, itself like to a powerful *mantra*,
> would add further still to its grandeur."
> Taking this order of his compassionate teacher to heart,
> with an independent mind, he did for some days compose this tantra,
> a mirror of consciousness called *The Flower-Cluster of the Great Purpose*:
> For the great, a task begun without hesitation is bound to be fruitful.
> And so he did relate this churning of the ocean that is the Great Purpose to his teacher,
> one learned in all the Vedas, *śāstra*s and arts in this world.
> And that clear-sighted one did himself explain that wisdom,
> at the urging of his disciples, owing to their desire for self-reflection.

[3] *pādukodāya*, another work of Maheśvarānanda's, cited numerous times throughout the MMP (see the references in Dwivedi's citation index, p. 200). The 'sandals' of the text's title is metonomy for the feet of the lineage of Krama teachers that are successively worshipped during *pūjā*.

> For, just as there is a fragrance which is perceived in a flower's bloom,
> so in this [*Flower-Cluster*] too, a commentary called *The Fragrance* should be there for the taking.

To unpack this a bit, we can already see the several stages through which the work-in-progress of the *Mahārthamañjarī* is said to traverse:

- The private dream encounter.
- Interpretation and authorization by Mahāprakāśa, Maheśvara's here-unnamed teacher.
- Composition of the Prakrit *mūla* or root-text.
- Initial circulation of this *mūla*, and the subsequent request by Maheśvarānanda's own students for a definitive explanation.
- Composition of the commentary (the text that we are in fact reading as we learn of this account).
- Final dissemination of the complex text (*mūla*+commentary).[4]

We can begin to trace the complex process whereby the *Mahārthamañjarī* comes to its readers, the durational event from inception to transmission. This is the case for any piece of textualized language, yet it is the singular virtue of this work that it makes explicit this itinerary. The conclusion of the work, along with other testimonies

[4]With the significant caveat that this 'final' version of the text was itself subject to variation in transmission as well as possible authorial revision. See Appendix C.1 on the reconstruction of the textual history of the MM.

scattered throughout the MMP, allow us to state with some certainty the place and time in which Maheśvarānanda composed the work: in the great southern Śaiva temple-city of Cidambaram, around the turn of the thirteenth century. This location will be vitally important for the current study, which—as I have already mentioned—understands the several contexts in which the MMP was first disseminated to be significant for understanding the text and the work it was intended to perform.[5]

Another question that arises here at the outset is: what, in fact, *is* this text? What are the details of its structure and its self-presentation, of the informing preconditions of its reception? Again, the concluding verses of the work are very illustrative, although the text they describe is in several important ways a very unusual thing. There is on the one hand the *mūla* text, the *Mahārthamañjarī* itself. This is a relatively brief collection of seventy-one Māhārāṣṭrī verses, of which all but the final verse are cast in the *āryā* meter. In their metrical form, their number, and in certain characteristic turns of phrase, these seventy verses recall the foundational classic of Māhārāṣṭrī poetry, the *Gāhāsattasaī* (*Seven hundred lyrics*) attributed to the Sātavāhana king Hāla and commonly dated to the early centuries CE. This collection contains sometimes indirect, sometimes strikingly erotic poetry set within an imagined world of rural idyll.[6] In direct contrast, Maheśvarānanda's *gāthā*s are speculative and theological in nature, seemingly without any narrative content at all. The *Mahārthamañjarī* shares with its ancient model an allusive, underdetermined quality, due in large part to the

[5]The argument for locating the career of Maheśvarānanda in this time and place is set out in Appendix A.

[6]On the *Gāhāsattasaī*, see most recently Mehrotra 1991, Selby 2000, and Tieken 1995 and 2001.

nature of Māhārāṣṭrī as a literary language.

This extreme indeterminacy cries out for gloss and explanation and—as Maheśvarānanda coyly has it—his students were led to entreat him for an authoritative explanation, eventuating in the mixed prose and verse Sanskrit text of the *Parimala*. We may be suspicious of this claim: the Prakrit text of the *Mañjarī* is in certain cases unintelligible absent the Sanskrit explanation and elsewhere the straightforward meaning of the *mūla* seems to be given solely to provide an occasion for long digressions in the commentary. The commentary is lengthy (196 pages in its most recent printed edition; 115 palm leaf folios in Appendix C's A_1, a representative modern South Indian manuscript), full of both Maheśvarānanda's explanations substantiated by what amounts to an anthology of quotations from scriptural sources and earlier (often Kashmirian) authorities. These quotations are adduced at every turn in the text, both to justify the wording of the Prakrit *mūla* and to further expand on points raised within the commentary itself. They are a testament to the massive presence of these antecedent textual materials in the Cidambaram of Maheśvarānanda's day, as well as to his control over these materials. Beyond this patent level of citation, there is an altogether more thoroughgoing lamination at work in the commentary: time and again, when Maheśvarānanda composes in his own ornate style of Sanskrit, his writing is decisively grounded in the work of the earlier masters of his school. Maheśvara was no plagiarist, however; in cases where he had an earlier author before him as he composed, the end result is a genuine recasting of the source material, as the language of his models is transfigured to provide a basis for Maheśvarānanda's

own singular arguments.[7]

In its generic self-understanding, the text is unequivocal: it is a *tantra*, a work of scripture. In the passage cited above, Maheśvarānanda's master Mahāprakāśa is emphatic: *tvayā vidhātavyā...sūtrāṇāṃ saptatis tantre mahārthe mantragarbhiṇī*, "you must compile...seventy sūtras, pregnant with *mantra*s, into a *tantra* containing the Great Purpose." Tellingly, the *Parimala*'s concluding verse passage provides the work as a whole with a properly mythological pedigree, an *āyātikrama* beginning with a dialogue between Śiva and his consort (here, his *kriyāśakti* or hypostasized power of action), where questions from the goddess elicit the revelation of a new teaching by the god (E_V, pp. 188ff.). This sort of narrative framing is exactly the sort of thing one expects to see in the corpus of Śaiva scriptural texts called *tantra*s. However, the MMP is very unlike other texts that are so styled: these are works written entirely in simple verse, often in poor Sanskrit, in which the doctrinal and liturgical fundamentals of the Śaiva religion form the principal subject matter. Maheśvarānanda's creation—written largely in complex prose—while preoccupied with these matters is equally likely to be given over to questions of epistemology or literary theory, or to the powerful metaphysical idealism of the post-scriptural scholastic traditions of Kashmir. More importantly, the human authors of these scriptural works are always anonymous: to describe a text as a *tantra* is to invoke a claim to divine authorship, to assert that the text is a literal transcription of a supernatural conversation. None of this is the case with the *Mahārthamañjarī*, crafted on the model of a Prakrit literary anthology

[7]Several of these are discussed in Chapter 3; there are certainly many more of these to be unearthed from the text of the *Parimala*.

and glossed in a lengthy autocommentary in which the voice of the text's human author Maheśvarānanda is constantly asserting itself. There had never been a *tantra* like this when Maheśvarānanda began to draw up his text; that he was self-consciously aware of this is something that is implicit yet evident from the very first words of the text.

1.3 Beginning at the Beginning

A text that is doubled in its very conception, the MMP can properly be said to have two beginnings. The text of the *Parimala* begins with a series of thirteen verses written in various poetic meters, while the first Māhārāṣṭrī *gāthā* of the *Mahārthamañjarī* acts as an introduction to the root-text alone. The opening Sanskrit verses provide a narrative in miniature, one that propels the Krama teaching from its inception to its embodiment in the *Mahārthamañjarī*. This falls into two parts. In the first, the teaching enters the world in a flood at once liquid and luminous, as it passes through a series of poetic transformations: a lotus—the archetypal aquatic plant that is at the same time the god Gaṇeśa as he resides in the heart—becomes an ocean of nectar, becomes the pure, nacreous light incarnate as the Krama's earthly progenitor. In the pivotal fifth verse, the ensuing line of masters is again rendered liquid, into the 'great lake of the Anuttara' that provides a part of Maheśvarānanda's pedigree. The lake laps up, as it were, upon the feet of Mahāprakāśa, Maheśvarānanda's teacher, in whose august presence we will again find ourselves at the head of the Prakrit text. The center of the verses then becomes the author himself, and the intention and

design guiding his work (these verses are translated and annotated in Appendix B).

With these preliminary flourishes completed, the text of the commentary proper begins with a prose *incipit*, an intimation of the work which lies ahead:

> *atha yad etad ātmasvarūpāvibhinnaparameśvaraparāmarśopāyapratipādanapravṛttam abhyupagamasiddhāntasthityā tātparyataḥ pratijñādyavayavapañcakātmakaṃ mahārthamañjaryāhvayaṃ mahat tantram atra sūtrāyamāṇā gāthāḥ saptatir bhavanti*
>
> Here begins [*atha*] this great scripture [*tantram*] entitled *The Flower-Cluster of the Great Purpose*, which has been undertaken in order to explain the method whereby one may reflect on God as nondifferent from the real nature of individual identity. In line with the [logical procedure] of the conclusion by tentative admission, [this scripture] in the final analysis contains the five parts of a syllogism, beginning with the major proposition. In it, there are seventy lyric verses serving as *sūtra*s.

This sentence—the very first prose of the text—already presents an example of Maheśvarānanda's incorporative style. It is a collage or palimpsest of earlier texts, drawing upon orthodox philosophical discourse[8] as well as the particular history of Maheśvarānanda's own complex tradition[9] in the service of producing an argument for the text

[8]In speaking of *abhyupagamasiddhānta*°, Maheśvarānanda makes a direct gesture towards the canonical authority of Akṣapāda's *Nyāyasūtra* (1.1.31) and its commentaries. The *sūtra* reads *aparīkṣitābhyupagamāt tadviśeṣaparīkṣaṇam abhyupagamasiddhāntaḥ*, "The conclusion by tentative admission is the examination, based on the tentative admission of something that is not itself examined, of the particular features of that thing." In the *Nyāyabhāṣya ad loc*, Vātsyāyana explains that this term labels those axioms implicitly accepted within a *śāstra*, which go without saying in its fundamental text, for example the acceptance of the internal organ of attention (*manas*) by the Naiyāyikas. Here, I suggest, it is the syllogistic form itself, its efficacy as a form of communication, that is accepted and adopted.

[9]While one might expect the inspiration for the identification of the *Mahārthamañjarī* with a formally constituted syllogism to derive from the Nyāya as well, the claim that an entire text can act as such a structured argument draws not from the tradition of orthodox logic, but instead is based on the *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśiṇī*, Abhinavagupta's learned commentary on the earlier work of Utpaladeva, (p. 24ff of KSTS ed.; *evaṃ pratijñātavyasamastavastusaṃgrahanena idaṃ vākyam uddeśarūpaṃ pratijñāpiṇḍātmakaṃ ca, madhyagranthas tu hetvādinirūpakaḥ 'iti prakaṭito mayā'* (=ĪPK 4.3.16) *iti cāntyaśloko nigamanagrantha iti evaṃ* ***pañcāvayavātmakam idaṃ śāstraṃ*** *paravyutpattiphalam*, 'So, through the inclusion of all of the elements that are to be maintained [in the course of the work], this utterance serves both as a indicatory statement [of the contents of the work] as well as a major proposition. Further, the central portions of the text include the adduced reason [as well as the other two middle terms, the example (*udāharaṇa*) and its application (*upanayana*)], while the final verse, in declaring 'thus I have revealed it' supplies the concluding term. Thus this work is in fact a five membered syllogism that is directed towards the instruction of others [*i.e.* a *parārthānumāna*].') Note that Abhinava's commentary pointedly pertains to the domain of a *śāstra*, and not a scriptural work.

as an altogether novel textual artifact, at once revealed scripture and philosophical treatise.[10]

This complex generic identification is furthered in the comment upon the first Prakrit *gāthā*:

> *ṇamiūṇa ṇiccasuddhe guḷuṇo caḷane mahappaāsassa |*
> *gaṭṭhaï mahatthamaṃjarim imiṇaṃ surahiṃ mahesarāṇaṃdo ||*
>
> Bowing to the ever-pure feet of his master Mahāprakāśa, Maheśvarānanda now binds this fragrant *Flower-cluster of the Great Purpose*

The author and title of the work, coupled with a courteous invocation or dedication: the first verse seems entirely innocuous, not unlike a modern title page. In the comment that follows, this simple verse is subject to a series of ever more complex readings. Persistently referring to himself as the *tantrakṛt*, the author of the scripture, Maheśvara finds within this verse (as is typical of Sanskrit commentators) the set of four 'parameters' (*anubandha*s) thought to underlie a treatise, embedding this within an elaborate and surprising interpretation of the verse's central figure *mahāprakāśa* not as a proper noun, but as an abstraction (*viz.* 'the great illumination'). As this term is freighted with further theological meaning, the creation of the text itself is equated to the creation of the world (an idea that is to prove a commonplace throughout the

[10]In centrally predicating that the MM constitutes *avayavapañcakātmakaṃ...mahat tantram*, Maheśvarānanda obliquely invokes several earlier definitions of the form that a Śaiva scripture must take. In the *Mṛgendratantra*—a work of the dualist Śaivasiddhānta known to Aghoraśiva in Cidambaram in the mid-twelfth century and thus potentially available to Maheśvara as well—we find the definition *tripadārthaṃ catuṣpādaṃ mahātantraṃ* (*vidyāpāda* 2.2ab), 'a great scripture [contains] the three fundamental categories and [is divided into] four topics.' The *Svacchandatantra* (cited repeatedly in the MMP), by contrast, reads *catuṣpīṭhaṃ mahātantraṃ* (1.5c), 'a great scripture [contains] the four thrones' (*viz.* of *mantra*, *vidyā*, *maṇḍala*, and *mudrā*, according the Kṣemarāja *ad loc*). These enumerative definitions of what comprises a *mahātantra*, I suppose, provided the ground for Maheśvarānanda to effect the melange with the five-part syllogism, triggered by Abhinava's explanation of the global structure of the *Pratyabhijñā* cited in the previous note.

Parimala).[11] In keeping with certain readings of Prakrit literary texts, the verse is seen to bear more and more possible significations, until Maheśvarānanda summarily ends his commentary, while holding the verse out as an icon of the text as a whole.[12] Maheśvara thus combines with the scriptural claim to authority a possibility more in keeping with the literary, that of a potentially unlimited surplus of meaning welling up from within the text.

What is striking about this argument about textual genre is just how unprecedented it actually is. Although a great deal was made to pass for scripture within Maheśvarānanda's world of tantric Śaivism, even the most important of texts bearing authorial signatures never claimed for themselves more than merely secondary status. Even a text like Abhinavagupta's *Tantrāloka* (TĀ), which sought to provide a totalizing synthesis of the entirety of Śaiva theory and practice, made no claim to canonical authority or legitimacy. The case provided by Abhinava's monumental work is one which Maheśvara knew intimately, yet the contrast is massive:

> *santi paddhatayaś citrāḥ srotobhedeṣu bhūyasā* |
> *anuttaraṣaḍardhārthakrame tv ekāpi nekṣyate* ‖ (1.14)
>
> *ity ahaṃ bahuśaḥ sadbhiḥ śiṣyasabrahmacāribhiḥ* |
> *arthito racaye spaṣṭāṃ pūrṇārthāṃ prakriyām imām* ‖ (1.15)
>
> *na tad astīha yan na śrīmālinīvijayottare* |
> *devadevena nirdiṣṭaṃ svaśabdenātha liṅgataḥ* ‖ (1.17)

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[11] I return to this passage at greater length in Chapter 4, pp. 205ff.

[12] *ity alam upakrama eva prasaktānuprasaktikaprācūryeṇa. upari prapañcāyiṣyamāṇatantrārthasūkṣmaśarīraprāyeyaṃ gāthā. ata evātiprapañcyamāneyam atiprasaṅgāya bhaviṣyatīti saṃkṣiptyaiva vyākhyātā. uktārthaprapañcopādānaṃ ca tatra tatrāgrata udbhaviṣyate* 'Enough with this detailing of ever more tangential points here at the outset [of the text]. Further, this verse is as it were the subtle yogic body of all of the teachings that will be expanded upon later on in the *tantra*. For precisely this reason, were this verse to be laboriously explained now, it would only lead to an excessively long discussion; it has therefore only been explained briefly here. The meaning as it has been explained will crop up from time to time later in the text.'

ato 'trāntargataṃ sarvaṃ saṃpradāyojjhitair budhaiḥ |
adṛṣṭaṃ prakaṭīkurmo gurunāthājñayā vayam ‖ (1.19)

1.19c *adṛṣṭaṃ*] *corr.* *adṛṣṭa* Ed.

There are, in fact, many kinds of manuals about the different divisions of the streams [of Śaiva scripture], but none extant upon the ritual of the Trika tradition, of which there is none higher.

Therefore, since I've been repeatedly entreated by virtuous people—my students and my fellow-pupils alike—I now compose this clear and complete liturgical guide [*prakriyā*].

There is nothing here that was not taught either explicitly or by implication by the God of gods in the *Mālinīvijayottara*[-*tantra*].

So, here in this work, with the approval of my master, I make clear everything contained within [it], that has heretofore not been seen by those wise people who are outside of its tradition of teaching.

Here, Abhinava consciously crafted his work as a simple *prakriyā* or *paddhati*, a practical manual based on the teaching of one scripture. To be sure, there are complex rhetorical reasons for the modesty of Abhinava's claim,[13] reasons depending on the particular history of the Śaiva religion in eleventh century Kashmir, just as Maheśvara's bold innovation could only have made sense in a particular moment in the far South. Our question, then, in seeking to understand the latter work is to unearth the motivation for this decision to innovate, to excavate the context that enabled and allowed such boldness.

1.4 Conjuncture

Despite this apparent divergence between Abhinavagupta's conservative view of the Tantric canon and Maheśvarānanda's attempt to expand such a canon by the addition of his own work, the two authors are clearly part of a common tradition. Or, to be more precise, Maheśvarānanda explicitly affiliated himself with Abhinava and the

[13]See now the discussion in Sanderson 2005.

Kashmirian tradition that he represents. When in the closing verses of the *Parimala*, Maheśvara speaks of "the wish-giving trees that are none other than the revered teacher Abhinavagupta," he is not indulging in idle encomium.[14] The indebtedness of our author to the eleventh century master is evident everywhere in the text of the MMP: an armature of references to Abhinava's works runs through the text of the *Parimala*. This however is only an index to the wider influence of Kashmirian Śaiva authors upon Maheśvarānanda, something that he passingly acknowledges in the comment upon the text's final *gāthā*, quoting his teacher's teacher Śivānanda's notice of their tradition's origin in Kashmir (p. 186 *sampradāyasya kāśmīradeśodbhūtatvāt*).

This provides but a small testament to the massive importation of Śaiva texts, lineages, and practices of Kashmirian provenance into the far South in the generations prior to Maheśvarānanda. And this is itself only an index of a much larger cultural historical process, that of the dissemination of the distinctively Kashmirian Sanskrit culture throughout India, but especially to the southern peninsula. The rise and efflorescence of the Kashmirian Sanskritic renaissance (no better word suggests itself) has been a subject for scholarly reflection for many years: for over two centuries around the turn of the second millennium, the paṇḍits of Kashmir revolutionized much of the world of Sanskritic knowledge and expression, including seminal contributions in the realms of grammar (Vāmana's *Kāśikā*, Helārāja's *Vākyapadīya-vyākhyā*), logic and epistemology both Buddhist (Dharmottara, Śaṅkaranandana) and orthodox (Bhaṭṭajayanta), philosophical Vaiṣṇavism (Vāmanadatta), as well as

[14] E_V p. 195, ln. 9: °*kalpavṛkṣān ācāryān abhinavaguptanāthapādān*

the massive consolidation of *śaivaśāstra* both dualist and nondualist. This is not to even speak of what was perhaps the most pronounced (and well studied) field of innovation, that of poetics and belles-lettres, within which, of course, Abhinavagupta was himself a critically important figure.[15]

The history of the spread of this Kashmirian dispensation throughout India, but especially to the far South, remains a subject for detailed inquiry and research. Far too often, the movement of peoples and texts southward has been reductively explained as a consequence of the rise of Turkic power in northern India, and we have as yet no detailed prosopographical studies of the movement of intellectuals (or lineages) to new Southern homes to falsify this insufficient view. Beyond the interesting but anecdotal evidence provided by the poet Bilhaṇa's autobiographical description of his move to the court of the Cāḷukya kings, or the striking but as yet unexplained appearance of figures bearing the title *kāśmīrapaṇḍita* in the inscriptional records of the Kālamukha monasteries of medieval Karnataka there is very little with which to even begin to write such a history, of what is by any measure one of the most significant processes of cultural transmission in premodern India.[16]

For there can be no doubt at all that the knowledge-forms of Kashmir found

[15]On the Kashmirian revolution in *alaṃkāraśāstra* see McCrea 1998. The Kashmirian moment of high Sanskrit culture is one of the several cases discussed in Pollock 2001a, especially focusing on its swift decline after about 1200. See also Hanneder 2002 for a demur from Pollock's presentation, arguing for a continued vitality in the Valley into early modern times and indeed beyond. While Hanneder's evidence allows for a more nuanced view of the literary history—in contrast to Pollock's more schematic version of Sarasvatī's sudden flight—Pollock's main point, about the precipitous decline of major literary and śāstric genres after the end of the twelfth century remains essentially unchallenged.

[16]Bilhaṇa's travels are detailed in the eighteenth *sarga* of his *Vikramāṅkadevacarita*; on the Karnataka epigraphic evidence, see Lorenzen 1991, pp. 108ff. and the references cited there.

an especially favorable home in the far southern reaches of the peninsula, and in the process transformed the intellectual and cultural complexion of their new locale. This can be seen in the decisive importance of Kashmirian texts and authors to such characteristically southern cultural forms as the *viśiṣṭādvaita* of Rāmānuja, the southern tradition of *alaṃkāra* and, to return to our principle theme, the several distinctive trends of Śaiva religiosity, whether dualist or nondualist.[17]

It is worthwhile to pause for a moment and consider the massive human effort involved in this process. Unlike the case of the eleventh century importation and translation project in Tibet, there was no unified institutional effort to secure the Sanskritic largesse of the far North by southern polities or religious orders. Rather, we seem faced with an entirely decentralized investment of time and effort to import and domesticate the proponents of the many discrete sectors of the learned culture of Kashmir. The history of this movement of people, texts, and ideas is yet little known or understood, and the current study can only make the smallest of contributions towards this effort. Yet it is within this trajectory that the composition of the *Mahārthamañjarī* takes on some of its greatest significance.

There was another, more local history at play as Maheśvarānanda worried over his text, that of the changing world of the Cōḻa polity and of the place enjoyed therein by

[17]On the indebtedness of the Rāmānujīya *sampradāya* to Kashmir see now Sanderson 2001 on the southern genesis of the extant Pāñcarātra scriptural literature, and its relationship to the Śaiva exegetical writings of Kṣemarāja. On poetic and aesthetic writing, see the nuanced account of Shulman forthcoming, which argues that the Kashmirian tradition, while incredibly influential, fails to address some of the distinctiveness of Southern poetic practice and autochthonous theory, leaving the Southern legatees of Ānandavardhana, *et al* in an awkward, occasionally paradoxical situation (we will return to Shulman's argument in Chapter 4). See also Bronner 2002 on the later synthesis by Appaya Dīkṣita.

Cidambaram. For some two and a half centuries prior to Maheśvarānanda's time, the Cōḻa kings of Tañcāvūr had presided over the most expansive and powerful polity that the far South had ever seen. As the arguable high-water mark of South Indian cultural and political history, and as an epoch for which abundant documentation survives, the Cōḻa period has been subject to intense and ongoing historical scrutiny, yet even the basic fabric of Cōḻa political control remains controversial. For one influential line of interpretation (associated with the late Burton Stein), the Cōḻa kings ruled over a phantasm of empire, exerting real control over the immediate environs of the central Kāveri delta, and acting as little more than *primi inter pares* beyond that. What state that could be said to exist under Cōḻa authority was, on this view, the outcome of an ongoing jostling of regional magnates, tied to the ethnic and hydraulic enclaves of the many *nāṭu*s that were the real building blocks of polity and thus of history in the region; and the fiscal basis of the central institutions of Cōḻa rule was thought to depend almost solely on the income of desultory raids on neighboring kingdoms.[18]

In diametrical contrast, other interpreters of this period point to the seeming existence of a massive and multiplex system of land tenure and mensuration tied to the Cōḻa court and its chancellery. While not going so far as to see the Cōḻa kingdom as a managed, bureaucratic empire (as Nilakantha Sastri and his students, the earliest

[18]The initial statement of this theory is to be found in Stein 1977; it later formed to keynote to his classic *Peasant State and Society in Medieval South India* (Stein 1980). Among the host of historians whose work took its point of departure from Stein's reconstruction, Hall 1980 (on trade and fiscal institutions) and Spencer 1983 (on military expansion and the centrality of plunder for the Cōḻa state) are to be singled out, while Shulman 1985 is a literary and cultural historical study motivated in part by the consequences of Stein's segmentary model. For a thoughtful critique of Stein's application of the African ethnographer Aidan Southall's model of the segmentary lineage, see Cohn 1987.

serious historians of the period, were wont to), this more recent body of research has looked closely at the individual nodes in the Cōḻa power structure, and have seen not only the persistent presence of a royal officialdom (often identical with the ruling gentry of the *nāṭu*), but—here in contrast to Stein—patterns of consistent change, an evolution of the relation between royal center and outlying territory.[19]

While much remains to be studied and to be interpreted—most pressingly, a study of the composition and nature of the Brahman and Vēḷḷāla elite, of the sort begun by Heitzman (*op. cit*, pp. 181–216)—the social historical claims of the earlier interpretation must be substantially laid aside in light of more recent research. For all this, Stein's interpretation—the 'segmentary' nature of the Cōḻa state, to give its most popular shorthand—endures, and continues to demand the attention of the historian and the textual scholar of this period. For all that the work of Stein and his fellows has been falsified, their influence on questions of culture and of ideology remains salutary. Stein in particular is exemplary in his attention to the language of the self-presentation of the Cōḻa kings, of their desire to figure themselves as maintainers of *dharma*, and as firsts among equals.[20] Critical for my interests here is Stein's focus

[19]This line of research begins with Subbarayalu's classic monograph (1973), which ironically is one of the major bases of Stein's very different interpretation. Subbarayalu's influence in this school of Cōḻa history continues to be felt, especially through the collective projects undertaken with Karashima and others, including both reference works (Karashima, Subbarayalu, and Matsui 1978; Sitaraman, Karashima, and Subbarayalu 1976) and monographic studies (Karashima, Subbarayalu, and Shanmugan 1980). Two of Karashima's own individual contributions to the field are now available as Karashima 2001. Other significant studies employing these methods include Heitzman 1997 and Orr 2000.

[20]See especially Stein *op. cit*, pp. 321–365. This in large part explains the successes of Shulman's literary studies of Cōḻa period texts (Shulman *op. cit*). The image of the powerless ruler has a place in the literary works of the period, precisely because it was a part of the imaginative order underlying Cōḻa rule.

on the temples of Cōḻamaṇḍalam as the principal sites for the articulation of the sovereigns' self-projection, presenting these locales as the most important cultural fora in the region, where royal sponsorship provided a network of central institutions for the ongoing work of rule performed by officials, gentry, and intelligentsia, both Brahman and non-Brahman.

The Cōḻa period was not merely, however, a concatenation of enduring structural features, but the product of significant and recognizable events. The rule of Kulottuṅga I (r. 1070-1112) formed a watershed for any eventful history of the period, marking for the social historian as well as the historian of art the transition to the 'late Cōḻa.'[21] The contested accession of this king—who had previously ruled the Eastern Cāḷukya domains under the coronation name Rājendra—has been one of the most well-studied events of the political history of the dynasty, ever since Nilakantha Sastri first drew attention to it.[22] After the violence of his acquisition of the Cōḻa throne, Kulottuṅga had a long and active reign, one in which military setbacks (the final Cōḻa retreat from Sri Lanka) and territorial consolidation (the integration of much of the eastern coast into Cōḻa rule, culminating in the successful war against Kaliṅga in 1110, the subject of Cayaṅkoṇṭār's *Kaliṅkattupparaṇi*) were equally in evidence. Kulottuṅga I's reign also marks the real beginning of the epigraphic record in Cidambaram. In a way that may be seen as directly tied to Cidambaram's emergence

[21]See for example Balasubrahmanyam 1979, as well as the periodization scheme first introduced by Karashima 1984, p. xiv, and generally adopted since. On the use of the word 'eventful' here, see Sahlins 1991, polemically calquing on the Annaliste's 'événementielle'.

[22]Nilakantha Shastri 1955, pp. 285–298. See also Kulke 1993, pp. 192–206 (discussed further in Chapter 2, below) and Trautmann's brief but illuminating discussion (1981 pp. 387ff.)

as a regional center (see Chapter 2), the later years of the king's reign marked the beginning of a new and more fractious period in the Cōḻa polity. Quite possibly directly connected to the wrangles and intrigues at court under the elderly Kulottuṅga, the early twelfth century onward is marked by the sudden rise of local grandees' assertion of their own lordly control over territory, and of aristocratic lineages claiming for themselves greater stakes within the polity, prefiguring the warlordism that was to mark the final decline of Cōḻa authority in the first half of the 1200s.[23] It was as if the tides of political chaos, begun with the bold seizure of power by the young Cāḷukya-Cōḻa prince, returned at the end his long reign, only to rise ever higher after.

It is in these momentous times that Cidambaram's centrality surges. As the temple city was becoming a regional center of religious patronage and a significant site in the complicated power politics of the day, intellectuals residing there began a process of debate and contention on the nature of the Śaiva religion as both an argument about the nature of the world and as a system of efficacious observance. The Śaiva intellectuals who were the participants in these debates were the legatees of the Kashmirian Śaiva dispensation, and in this participants in the much wider dissemination of the Kashmirian high culture sketched out above. This is not to say that the Cidambaram arguments amounted to solely archivalist restagings of older Northern debates: far from it.[24] The influx of the texts and positions associated with

[23]Stein's synchronic focus leads him to understand this as a falling away from the pacific integration of the noon of the Cōḻa power, marking a breakdown of the old *nāṭu* autarky and the onset of the "transition to supralocal integration." See Karashima 1984, pp. 21–31 on the twelfth century consolidation of local power-holders, seen in the rise of individual landholding.

[24]Much of the detail here will be left to Chapters 2 and 3, particularly what is known of the influential Saiddhāntika thinker Aghoraśiva. On Aghora as well as Maheśvara's independence of

Kashmirian schoolmen was not the simple catalyst for the intellectual and cultural efflorescence that Cidambaram witnessed in this period; yet the contribution is evident and demonstrable. This contribution was to subsequently to play an important role in a profound transformation in the cultural history of the far South: it was Cidambaram that provided the venue for the reinvention of the pan-Indic Śaiva tradition in the form of the Tamil Caivacittāntam of Meykaṇṭār and his successors.

The post-Cōḻa era of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries also witnessed the production of an entirely new canon of Śaiva scriptures in Sanskrit,[25] works bearing the titles of more ancient *tantra*s but detailing the public worship in the Śaiva temples of Cōḻamaṇḍalam. The details of this massive reworking of the textual corpora of the Śaiva religion in the far south has only recently been made an object of research, and much of the detail remains to be discovered.[26] Yet one tentative conclusion that one may draw is that while Maheśvarānanda's description of his bilingual, mixed prose and verse masterpiece as a *tantra* may still seem an idiosyncratic decision, he was nevertheless part of a wider cultural moment in so doing.

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thought in a key area of Śaiva metaphysics, see especially Chapter 3.

[25]That is, if we adopt (as I believe we should) Goodall's "rough *terminus ante quem* of c. 1350 AD," given that many of these new texts are cited in the work of the anonymous great-great-grandson of Aghora's (mid 12th C.) contemporary Jñānaśiva, who himself knows none of these new works (Goodall 2000, p. 212). It is in Goodall's several recent publications (including also Goodall 2001 and 2004) that this textual history of the South Indian Sanskrit Śaiva Siddhānta has for the first time been detailed.

[26]An early intimation of this may be seen in Brunner 1964, who seems to have some awareness of the fact that the social reality described in the scriptural texts pertained exclusively to South India.

1.5 Textual culture as an object of study

The creation of the *Mahārthamañjarī* can be precisely situated at the intersection of these two trajectories, *viz.* the reception of the Kashmirian Sanskritic dispensation in the far South and the transformations that attended the breakdown of the authority of the Cōḻa imperium. These two macrohistorical contexts, however, are by no means sufficient conditions to account for Maheśvarānanda's work. There is a plurality of other, more local and more distant contexts within which the *Mahārthamañjarī* may potentially be situated, and the work cannot and should not anyway be mechanically reduced to the historical forces influencing its creation. Texts of any kind—as complexly organized instances of language use—are not simply the detritus of their historical moment; it is rather the case that texts, in their very process of becoming, serve to rearrange and to transform the context in which they arise.

As a result, in the chapters which follow, the emergence of Maheśvarānanda's MM as an isolate piece of textualized language will be continuously displaced, and those features that distinguish it as a novel piece of Sanskrit writing will frequently be seen as the outcome of borrowings from, transactions with, and reflections of other texts. That many of the texts so juxtaposed with the *Mahārthamañjarī* were the products of the same time and place (and that *ex hypothesi* any such texts were present to hand at the time of Maheśvarānanda's writing) has led me to reflect on the influence of context for the practice of an historical philology. I will thus in the course of this study have occasion to refer to the *textual culture* within which the MM emerged. By

this I mean not to make any extravagant claim for a new theory of the relation of text and context; I simply wish to unpack, in as transparent a way as possible, some of the guiding presumptions that have governed the course of my thought and research.

Save perhaps a hypothetical case of an island castaway composing a private opus in a cypher known only to himself, all texts are the products of (a) textual culture. By this I mean that textual culture provides the steady state within which all texts are produced, an array of practices within material culture coupled with a set of governing shared presumptions among the makers and users of texts. To frame things in this way tells us very little, however, and certainly doesn't get one very far in trying to understand the *Mahārthamañjarī* and the world of its emergence. In order to distinguish this very general sense of textual culture (the field, perhaps, of the playing out of McGann's 'textual condition') from the more specific sense in which I employ it here, I intend by my use of the term to denote a particular point in space and time, the textual culture *of Cidambaram* over the several generations stretching from the middle of the twelfth century into the early decades of the thirteenth. It is in this period that a corpus of works that can be otherwise distinguished from each other through an assortment of criteria (genre, language, medium, and audience, to name only the most significant) come to share certain core thematics and foci. Within this spectrum of texts emerged the distinct textual project embodied in the *Mahārthamañjarī*.

The idea that a local textual culture could provide a sufficient condition for the intelligibility of a particular work may *prima facie* be taken as a providing a pro-

gram for research: what were the works and agents with whom Maheśvarānanda was potentially in contact when he set about composing the *Mahārthamañjarī*? This is a program made tantalizing by Maheśvarānanda's own compositional and rhetorical techniques, with his recastings of earlier works and his direct and oblique references to other, contemporaneous ways of thinking radically or partially opposed to his own. This initial view then becomes: read everything that was definitely or arguably produced in twelfth and thirteenth century Cidambaram, read everything that these works draw on, and so on, thereby producing for oneself the ability to sympathetically reconstruct this particular world as seen through its textual culture.[27] Lacking world enough and time, instead of a final portrait of a distant world at work, I may only hope here to plot out lines of force, tracing patterns of affinity and antipathy, and unearthing a few of the transactions that occurred among Cidambaram's literate elite. This might seem like making a virtue of necessity, but there is another, more cogent reason for so doing: the degree to which the making of the MM is itself a perspectival articulation of the possibilities of textual creation in its time and place suggests that one work 'outward' from the indications that the work itself provides, rather than simply attempt to account for it through a reckoning of the external agencies that influenced it.

Textual culture, then, provides a sort of lens: a construct through which I propose

[27]This understanding of historical interpretation is that associated with Friedrich Schleiermacher in the history of modern hermeneutic theory. On Schleiermacher, see the useful introduction in Mueller-Vollmer 1994. For all that this sort of historicism has fallen out of fashion, its seductive power—the promise of an absolute and total reading—should not be discounted as an ideal goal of textual study.

to view the *Mahārthamañjarī* as physical text-artifact and as linguistic creation. In taking the textual culture of Cidambaram to be a circumambient complex fact influential upon the form and content of Maheśvara's text, I understand it to be not simply a fund of material upon which this one author drew, but a larger series of events and structures within which the text may be meaningfully placed. The MM provides a single node, a moment about which the existing persons, forces, and institutions of the time and place can be seen to constellate. I presume that the act of text-making is an eventful one, that the work done by Maheśvarānanda itself in turn altered the world of texts and users of texts both within and beyond the Cidambaram of his day.[28]

[28]Among the recent attempts to think through the historical situation of texts within Indology, the work of Pollock 1998a, Inden 1990 and 2000, and Sanderson 2001 have all been influential on my thinking. In the course of his larger project on the intertwined histories of Sanskritic and vernacular cosmopolitanism, Pollock relies on the mediation of "sociotextual communities ...[which] define themselves in significant if variable ways on the basis of the literature they share, and [which] create new literature in the service of new self-definitions" (*op. cit.*, 9). These communities—though purposefully limited by Pollock to royal courts and to readers and creators of literary texts—provide the historically visible nexuses through which Pollock's larger historical narrative can be reconstructed. Their role is thus quite similar to the place held by Cidambaram and its elites in the present argument, as a mediating point between the macro-historical (the dispersion of Kashmirian knowledge, the state politics of the period) and the individual text.

Inden, in the course of his survey and analysis of the *Viṣṇudharmottarapurāṇa*, attempts to both write an historical genealogy in which the *purāṇa* explicitly situates itself (dubbed the "scale of texts" by Inden, adapting Collingwood), while arguing that the text represents a complex social project. He does this with an explicit theoretical agenda, that of driving a wedge between Indic texts and the historical contextualization of them as usually practiced within Indology. In so doing, Inden himself creates a multi-generational narrative of the coming to being of this particular text, as the "complex agent" responsible for the VDhP (a series of Pāñcarātra adepts active at the royal court in Kashmir) produced a totalizing, imperial view of the world and of the place of the text's religious vision within it. Inden's work, like the present study, is predicated on a speculative reconstruction of the guiding intention underlying textual creation.

In addition to its direct influence on my understanding of the textual precursors of the *Mahārthamañjarī*, Sanderson's work provides a limit case in the degree to which any sort of speculative reconstruction can and must be subjected to empirical verification. His work on the anonymous scriptural literature of the Śaiva, Vaiṣṇava, and Buddhist Tantric traditions provides an exemplary model of how textual transactions and reimaginings can be tracked through parallel passages in the surviving documents. This work of painstaking philological labor relies upon the assumption of a

In arguing for the interpretive significance of any work's historical context, however, one must be cautious: it is all too easy to slip into a mechanistic reduction of the relation between these. Still very suggestive are the remarks of Dominic LaCapra (1983) on Janik and Toulmin's (1973) reading of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* as set within the world of fin-de-siècle Vienna. LaCapra is justly critical of the limitations of this particular study on its own terms, "not to fault Janik and Toulmin for not being exhaustive...[but rather] to question the concept of exhaustiveness including the form it takes in Janik and Toulmins: that of contextual saturation of the meaning of a text." (99). LaCapra's response is to present the *Tractatus*—or any other complex text—as an "interplay between different forces...whose relation must be taken as an object of inquiry" (116). The task of the reader and interpreter of texts in context is thereby handed a new agenda, that of understanding the ways that the relation between the two can be posited in the first place, by way of critiquing and avoiding the "systematic defect" whereby "the simplest documentary texts—or documentary texts subjected to a simplistic interpretation—[provide] the basis for an understanding of the past or the 'context' to which complex texts are made to conform" (117). It is in this spirit that my own historicizing, contextualist researches are offered.

But why 'textual culture'? Other terms might suggest themselves for the context-dependent nature of language and of interpretation. What does the combination of

shared material and practical culture uniting the redactors of these discrete traditions based on a presumed continuity (Sanderson's preferred term is "text-flow") that allow for this assumption.

these two words, themselves with long and often confused pedigrees,[29] do for our understanding in the present case? This is a phrase I use deliberately, advisedly, and with a specific meaning. In speaking of texts and textuality (instead of, say, discourse and the discursive) I intend to keep constantly in mind that the workings of the literate elite of Cidambaram proceeded through the necessary mediation of scratchings on palm-leaf or stone, text-artifacts that were copied and recopied, obtained, possessed, lost, and found material objects. This is the case even granted the problematic status of the text-artifact in premodern South Asia, where a competing technology of recording—the wide-spread cultivation of an astonishingly accurate mnemotechnic—seemed to render secondary the necessity of more concrete media.

For the moment, I must simply assert that middle-period Indic civilization was pronouncedly a civilization of the book, and that—in their widest possible definition—the Tantric religions especially were fundamentally dependent on written texts. The significance of the written word for the world of Cōḻa Cidambaram cannot, I think, be overestimated. Yet the presence of these physical artifacts was, to be certain, only one important node in a much wider network of instances of language use. Reading was not silent in the ancient world, as we are often reminded, and the texts extant in Cidambaram around the turn of the thirteenth century were the bases

[29]'Textual culture' is not an original coinage (see for instance Irvine 1994). Its two constituent elements are among the slipperiest terms of art in humanistic study: almost three decades ago, Williams had already deemed 'culture' "one of the two or three most difficult words in the English language" (1976, p. 76) before the rise of 'cultural studies' as a discipline made matters, if anything, much worse. 'Text' is little better: in the wake of Ricoeur, Geertz and Derrida, the term would seem to have been exploded beyond all utility, and even beyond all recognition (*cf.* Silverstein and Urban 1996, p. 1).

for public performance, proclamation, and elucidation. These speech acts seem at first to be irreparably lost to the historian or the philologist. Yet I don't believe that this loss constitutes fatality, as the participants in the textual culture were themselves preoccupied with and dependent upon the mute artifacts to make possible these moments, among which artifacts we count our surviving witnesses. It is from within these that we may gather some traces of these fugitive events of language-in-performance: I will have occasion in later chapters to point to places in Maheśvarānanda's text where argument is inextricably linked with effects of sound, and so with the speaking voice.

Within the textual culture's network of influence, adaptation, and polemic there remains the individual text. It would be a crucial error of method to simply view a work as the sum total of the historical forces that subtend its creation and transmission. The motivation for proposing the mediation of Cidambaram's textual culture is not to dissolve the MM into it; rather, it is to ratify the text in its peculiar existence. It is here that I presume, then, the founding intuition of historicism—that works of human effort make the most sense in the terms in which they were initially conceived—to be fundamentally correct. There is an additional motivation to taking this particular text as the way into this particular textual culture. The Cōḻa period has long been seen as the high-water mark in the history of medieval South India, a shining moment of authenticity, cultural attainment, and world-historical significance. This view is generally grounded in a specific corpus of cultural monuments from the period: the temples of Tañcāvūr and Gaṅgaikoṇṭacōḻapuram, the inscrip-

tional panegyrics of Rājarāja I and Rājendra I, the Tamil court epics of Kampaṉ and Cēkkiḻār, the Naṭarāja bronzes of the Cidambaram ateliers. The understanding of the period bears many of the hallmarks of the cultural imaginings of golden ages throughout the world: harmony, autochthony, a unified cultural order. The history takes on an entirely new light when viewed from the perspective of Maheśvarānanda's text. This is not to say that the story disclosed by the making of the MM may in any reasonable way be understood as history from the margins: Maheśvarānanda wrote from the very heart of the high culture of the Cōḻa heartland, but his work was neither an appendage of the court society, nor was it subsumable within the culture of Cōḻamaṇḍalam as generally conceived. Looking at his work as both a product of the Cōḻa world and as an attempt to imagine that world differently serves as a thin edge of the wedge with which to reorder the existing understanding of the culture of this polity and of middle-period south India as a whole.

As a way to demonstrate something of the claims made here, consider again the following words, from the MMP's first prose sentence:

> *...pratijñādyavayavapañcakātmakaṃ mahārthamañjaryāhvayaṃ mahat tantram...*
>
> ...[the] great scripture entitled *The Flower-Cluster of the Great Purpose*, that contains the five parts of a syllogism, beginning with the major proposition.

As we've already seen, taken as an isolated instance of language, this phrase—essentially a small nominal sentence—reveals itself to be a concatenation of prior texts. In coming to understand this, we can see already the incorporative, constructivist style in which Maheśvarānanda casts the *Parimala*. The phrase appropriates the form of existing definitions of what constitutes scripture for the Śaivas, juxta-

posing this with a claim about the effectiveness of the structure of the text itself: this scripture is something that will make its readers aware of a vision of the world, as surely as one can prove the existence of fire from smoke. Unpacking the textual precursors of this first sentence of the *Parimala* is in itself worthwhile, in that we can begin to get an impression of the breadth of our author's reading, and of his stylistic *modus operandi*. What remains to be accounted for is the motivation for the author's pastiche of earlier texts here: to what end are the recombinant energies created by this phrase directed? For this is a very odd claim indeed, something that almost amounts to a category error within the thought-world of Maheśvarānanda's tradition.

In risking this sort of doctrinal dissonance, Maheśvarānanda seizes an opportunity that the world of Cidambaram afforded him. He was being neither disingenuous nor pointlessly iconoclastic when he advanced the claim to the authority of scripture; indeed, it is quite possible that the new works purporting to be the revealed scriptures of the Śaiva canon were already beginning to appear in South India and indeed at Cidambaram itself. Nor was he being willfully eccentric in his hybrid conception of his work (at once *tantra*, *śāstra* and *sāhitya* of a sort); other works definitely composed in Maheśvarānanda's milieu were equally the outcomes of productive textual miscegenation (as in the examples of Cēkkiḻār's *Periyapurāṇam* and the *Sūtasaṃhitā*, both discussed further in Chapter Two). It is within such a world of innovation and creative improvisation that the possibility of claiming for one's text such a novel and unstable generic identity could become a live option, and that such a new sort of text

could create for its readers new possibilities of self-understanding.

There yet remains the question of what textual culture (in the restricted sense introduced above) means, practically speaking. In the simplest terms, it is an allowance for mediation and thus for comparison: works written within the bounds of a single textual culture may be juxtaposed on the presumption that they potentially share more than just the trivial fact of their authors' proximity. We may be permitted to allow for a common problematic uniting works of manifestly different formal or generic character, based on this presumptive mutually informing relationship. In the present case, this then allows for a further inquiry into precisely the formal or generic particularities of a single work, the MM. This larger field involved tacit as well as explicit rules followed by all of its participants, rules which Maheśvarānanda obeyed even while seeming to bend or flaunt them. These tacit rules may be briefly cataloged, with the important caveat that these are purposefully cast for the moment as generalities. The more contingent details of the world of texts at Cidambaram—the works, genres, authors, and events that made up the fabric of the culture—will be the subject of the next chapter. For the moment:

A textual culture is a collectively created and maintained work of institutions, practices, and representations. This might seem the most self-evident of points, but it contains within it several important corollaries. As used here, textual culture is inclusive of a number of different loci of textual production, loci normally kept distinct: the handiwork of a Tamil *pulavar* or *literatus* and the documentary products of an *ūrkkaṇakku* or village accountant are to be seen alongside the Maheśvarānanda's

Sanskrit panditry. This might seem to be an appeal to the simplest sort of contextualism, and it might be objected that this simple juxtaposition doesn't necessarily tell us anything at all of interest. However, the collective labor of and with the text in middle-period Cidambaram has in common more than just the fact of proximity. The domain of the textual culture of Cidambaram visible to our gaze consists entirely of authorized, intentional, and publicly disseminated documents. There were present in the Cidambaram of late Cōḻa times a number of different, discrete fields of textual production: literary, theological, liturgical, and juridical, to cite just a few. As Maheśvarānanda's case among a great many others serves to demonstrate, it was in this period that the lines between these fields were productively blurred, leading to new anomalous works and genres.[30] Within and above the dynamics of these individual instances, the textual culture itself forms a provisional, porous boundary, a local set of all sets within which the instances and fields could take place. The work of creating and contesting the ideological and institutional order of this time and place was equally carried out by the pronouncement of the beneficence of a local grandee as it was by the promulgation of a hymn to the deity enshrined in the temple's *garbhagṛha*. The different venues of textual creation consisted of overlapping agencies and spaces both literal and conceptual.

*The individual productions of a textual culture (*i.e.* its texts) are the realization of the intention of one or more agents.* The representations of the various agents within the textual order were not the adventitious results of other, more primary historical

[30]In speaking of 'fields' in this way, I am betraying my debt to the intellectual and literary sociology of the late Pierre Bourdieu. I return to his work below (pp. 110ff.).

processes, but were knowledgable efforts at interpreting, explaining, and remaking the world around them. This affirmation of the intentionality underlying textual productions follows from the previous point. It is by no means the case that the work to which subsequent (or even contemporaneous) agents put the products of this culture were somehow presciently imagined in a single, radically valorized moment of creation. Nevertheless, the act of textual creation—and not the subsequent history of reception—provides the deliberate focus of this study. In speaking of intentionality, we needn't be tied to a notion of unitary authorship, much less the affirmation of some numinous source of authorial genius. The very rudiments of Maheśvarānanda's textual project militate against such an idea: as already mentioned, the MM is a text narrates itself within a complex web of influential agents, indeed of authors (Maheśvarānanda himself, his teacher, his students, his visionary guide).

The authority to create (or alter or supplement) texts rests with a limited franchise, even within the ranks of the literate elite. Even if we presume only a tiny proportion of the population in a premodern Indian polity to be literate (a presumption for which there is little hard evidence in any case), the authors of whom we possess any knowledge are a tiny set within that elite. These authors, however, act often as the agents of larger constituencies, whether electively or otherwise. Textuality is a central feature of the creation of an enduring sense of belonging, and the actions of these authorial elites have consequences far beyond their immediate context.

A textual culture, at any given period in its history, is necessarily based upon prior works and authors, from within the culture or from without. Texts by their very nature

place themselves within genealogies and hierarchies. The MM is by no means alone in its constant reworking of earlier texts; the inherited stuff of literary and intellectual source material is everywhere in evidence in the corpus of Cidambaran texts. This is not to foreclose the possibility of originality but, as with spoken language, there is rarely if ever any truly radical autochthony within textual orders.

As a textual culture is receptive to outside influence, so the scope and intention of works produced within it may stretch far beyond the culture itself. Texts can, and often do, presume doubled or even multiple orders of reception, depending on their presumed circulation within and beyond their points of inception. It is possible to reconstruct the local—even the intensely local—context of a textual detail (a piece of philosophical argumentation, for example) while simultaneously seeing its adherence to larger exigencies and norms. This multiplicity of register is, if anything, a constant in texts of any time and place, but its detection and explanation is especially difficult in the case of Indic texts, where generic regulations are especially strict and the immediate setting especially difficult to access.

Dispersion is a central fact of textual culture. Textual cultures are, as all human things, subject to the vicissitudes of time, as are their individual products. We may follow McGann in claiming that "variants are screaming to get out" of all texts, and not just the works of the poetic imagination that he favors.[31] This condition is, I think, even more pronouncedly the case in the world before print, when the very survival of a text was dependent upon a fragile set of human circumstances. To priv-

[31] McGann 1991, p. 10.

ilege our materials here even further, the unique set of linguistic and environmental circumstances of the Cōḻa south would seem to be the limit case of this: a complex society, dependent upon the written word, faced with a multiplicity of languages and an especially unfavorable climate for the survival of texts written on palm-leaf. One can in part see the vast epigraphical corpus as a direct response to this—an attempt to render permanent the textual dispensation upon which the region's temples (and much else besides) depended. Yet there are other responses at work for those whose texts were not favored with lithic inscription, techniques (such as versification or prose stylization) to render fugitive language into enduring text. Texts are naturally subject to an ongoing tug-of-war between the human fact of their dispersion and corruption and the formal realization of the guiding intentions of their authors. The scientific methods of textual study and criticism provide powerful, absolutely necessary tools to reconstruct the history of this dialectic, yet textual criticism cannot and does not intend by its practices to dissolve the fact of contingency and dispersion, but rather to knowingly restore the text to the dynamism within which it always has existed.

1.6 Plan of the Dissertation

Other than this introduction, the current study comprises three substantive chapters. The second chapter continues and extends the notion of textual culture introduced here, presenting an empirical survey of the works produced in Cidambaram ca. 1110–1250. The individual and collective agents of these documents (authors, patrons, and others) and the relations that can be seen to obtain between them are described, and

the dynamics that govern the workings of several Cidambaram texts are examined in detail.

In the third chapter, I return to the *Mahārthamañjarī* itself, by way of initially positioning the work within the space of textual possibilities sketched out in Chapter 2. I argue that contained within Maheśvarānanda's presentation of the thirty-six reality-levels (*tattva*s) of the Śaiva universe, there is a subtle polemic against the interpretation given in the *Tattvaprakāśavṛtti* of Aghoraśiva, the leading Saiddhāntika theologian resident in Cidambaram prior to Maheśvarānanda. In a way that is characteristic of Maheśvarānanda's style throughout the MM, he goes about this polemic not simply through argument but through consciously shifting the rhetoric and register of his text, employing style itself as a form of argumentation. This presentation of the form and function of an extended piece of Maheśvarānanda's language is based upon a specimen critical edition and an annotated translation of that portion of the MMP (Appendix C). Though only a covering a limited segment of the MMP (and only employing a limited number of MSS) this edition reveals significant details about the MMP's text-history, the results of which are summarized in the introduction to the Appendix.

Having thus presented evidence for the motivation of a major individual text-segment of the MM, the fourth and final substantive chapter addresses the question of the whole. In particular, it seeks to answer the question raised by the most striking formal feature of the text, its root-verses in Māhārāṣṭrī Prakrit. It is argued there that the principle source for Maheśvara's language choice can be seen elsewhere, in

the domain of Sanskrit literary theory. Seen in this way, the complex whole of the MMP can be read as a series of interpretative conundrums raised and answered in the commentary through recourse to methods of reading borrowed from literary analysis. Returning to the central theme of this dissertation, this is seen to culminate in the innovative form of the MM, which is grounded in a transforming vision of the textual community that it both invokes and creates.

This sympathetic reconstruction of Maheśvarānanda's authorial project is followed by some concluding remarks, where I try to situate the results of the present research within the framework of larger questions about historically informed interpretation as well as the civilizational orientations of Indological study.

CHAPTER 2
TEXTS, PUBLICS, AND PUBLIC TEXTS IN LATE CŌḺA CIDAMBARAM

In this chapter, I look to several products of the same historically bounded set of authors, institutions, and practices that formed the background to Maheśvarānanda's composition of the *Mahārthamañjarī*. The creation of the *Mahārthamañjarī* can in this way be understood as a point of entry into the history of Cidambaram, a way to jump into the hermeneutic circle of the representations produced in this vitally important South Indian religious and cultural center. While the MM thereby provides the central focus for this study, understanding it as embedded within this particular context also provides an opportunity to take a fresh look at a pivotal moment in the wider cultural history of the medieval South. There are three domains of the textual culture that I will highlight here. The first set of sources form a part of the epigraphical archive of Cidambaram's central Śaiva temple. These are, by virtue of their special form of preservation and transmission, the texts most localized and most particular to their immediate context. In contrast to other scholarship on these documents, I am especially interested in the diachronic narrative that emerges from them, the ways in which over the course of the 1100s, we can detect a rapid transformation of the area and of its relations of textually-mediated political power. The second textual domain consists of works which claim for themselves the genre taxon of *purāṇa* or 'text about the past.' Two major works of *purāṇa* were produced in Cidambaram in

this period, the *Sūtasaṃhitā* of the southern Sanskrit *Skandapurāṇa*[1] and Cēkkiḻār's Tamil masterpiece the *Periyapurāṇam*. Both of these works sought out and in fact attained a dissemination far beyond the confines of Cidambaram, but are nevertheless deeply invested in the world of their origin in ways that significantly effect their interpretation. The third and final domain—that of the rhetorical hymn—is represented by only a single example, a work of Aghoraśiva, a theologian and ritualist of the Śaivasiddhānta order. The hymn appears to have been an especially popular and productive genre in late Cōḻa Cidambaram, with old works performed alongside very recent compositions. Maheśvarānanda and his teacher both composed hymns (*stotra*s or *stava*s), figuring forth complex theological arguments within a literary economy of praise. Aghora's contribution to the genre, which equally attempts combine doctrine and literary form, is of particular interest as its author was almost certainly a man whom Maheśvarānanda took as a polemic interlocutor.[2]

Among the common features of these works—indeed, what makes their juxtaposition possible here—is their explicit invocation of Cidambaram and of its temple to Śiva. The embeddedness of these texts within this local world is however by no means limited to this single point. They equally share an foregrounded relationship to a particular body of precursor texts, a relationship that (as in the case of the MM) is fundamental to their interpretation. These works are, in Inden's (2000) terms,

[1]This is to be distinguished from the text published by the Veṅkaṭeśvara Steam Press as well as from the so-called '*Ur-Skandapurāṇa*' that forms the subject of the ongoing research of Bakker, Isaacson, and their collaborators (and which has been previously published as the *Ambikākhaṇḍa* by Bhaṭṭarāī (1988)).

[2]See Chapter Three, below.

the apexes of several discrete scales of texts; taken together, they are evidence of the plurality of textual forms, a spectrum of possibilities of affiliation, identification, and differentiation, of which Maheśvarānanda's Tantric dispensation formed only a single instance. And, much like the MM, all of the works surveyed in this chapter incorporate their textual precursors within their own integral form. This is true even for the putatively prosaic language of the temple inscriptions.

Understanding the texture of these works that results from this kind of lamination is a central task of philological study—central, but not exclusive.[3] To see these works as simply formal orchestrations of language would be a serious misinterpretation. Rather, all of the works I will review here are, as I will demonstrate, engaged in enunciating fundamentally *public* claims within Cidambaram's textual culture. It is self evident to say that texts presume and require audiences: I mean something more than this when I speak of these works' shared publicity. This rests in the first instance in their explicit attempts to anchor themselves within the wider realms of performance and dissemination localized in Cidambaram, attempts that will be detailed in what follows. Further, all of these texts sought to adopt, transform, and in certain cases create entirely their own constituencies within the wider textual culture, and in so doing reimagine the ways of knowing and belonging available in this time and place.

The successful articulation of these sorts of public claims took on particular importance in Cidambaram beginning in the early 1100s. It was during this period that the city emerged as a center of Śaiva religious culture of transregional importance,

[3]For the sense in which I speak of 'texture' here, see Becker 1995, Shulman 2001, pp. 3–18 and Narayana Rao, Shulman, and Subrahmanyam 2001, pp. 1–10, 253–260.

a transformation which coincided with the final efflorescence and ultimate decline of the cultural and political significance of the Cōḻa emperors who had ruled the region for the two preceding centuries. This is by no means a simple narrative of decline and fall; rather, the twelfth century was a period in which multiple differing and often overlapping conceptions of collective identity and mobilization were simultaneously imagined. Cidambaram's vital place in this reimagination seems to have been something new. The town had for centuries held an important place in the spatial imagination of the theistic religions of the Tamil country, both Śaiva and Vaiṣṇava. Both of the canons of *bhakti* hymns dating to the latter part of the first millennium—the *Tēvāram* and the *Nālāyirativiyapirapantam*—contain references to the town that the hymnists variously called Tillai or Puliyūr, as well as its residents, the famous three thousand brahmans of Tillai (*tillaimuvāyiravar*). These references to the place and its inhabitants were, however, the product of itinerant poets, none of whom themselves were resident in Cidambaram or its surroundings, and for whom it was part of a far flung network of other sacred sites. There may have been original texts composed in Cidambaram prior to 1100, yet the overriding impression of the early history of the place is of a *tapovana* or penitential retreat, an image that doubtless made it attractive to ascetics and the odd pilgrim. There is, however, no mention of it as a center of culture and learning.[4]

The centuries long history of the growth of the town into a temple city of great

[4]This is the impression shared by both Swamy and Younger (Swamy 1979, Younger 1995). It is part of the ethnohistorical imagination of the *Cidambaramāhātmya*, in which the sage Vyāghrapāda is the first human inhabitant of the site, chosen for its inhabitability and this its suitability for asceticism.

importance is inseparably linked with the fortunes of the Cōḻa emperors, although this connection is in certain ways highly anomalous. Early in the dynasty, Parāntaka (r. 907–955) was responsible for what would prove to be the paradigmatic act of royal charity to the temple, the gilding of the roof of the central *ciṟṟampalam* shrine. This event was celebrated in the *Tiruvicaippā*, a hymn composed by Parāntaka's son Kaṇṭarātittiyaṉ, and would go on to become a *topos* in later eulogistic writing. By the eleventh century—the noontide of Cōḻa power—royal interest in the growing temple site and the habitations that had emerged around it seems certain, although there is but little trace of this interest that can be found in Cidambaram itself. That the imperial kings of the dynasty were devotees of Naṭeśa is widely accepted, despite the thin evidentiary basis of this claim.[5]

It is only with the accession of Kulottuṅga I (r. 1070–1115) that Cidambaram came to occupy a truly significant place in the cultural imaginary of the Cōḻa world. The rule of this king, heir to both the Cōḻa and the Veṅgi Cāḷukya houses, witnessed a reorientation of the Cōḻa domain that was to have direct and significant consequences for the city and its temple. Where once the site lay in the border region between the core of Cōḻamaṇḍalam (centered on the Kāvēri river) and the old Pallava territories, Cidambaram came to have a higher profile within a kingdom which increasingly looked

[5]Rājarāja I (r. 985–1014) is often said to have taken the Cidambaram Śiva as his *iṣṭadevatā* or personal deity on the strength of the title *śivapādaśekhara* ('he who is crowned by Śiva's foot') that he adopts in his inscriptions commemorating the construction of the Bṛhadīśvara temple in Tañcāvūr (*e.g.* SII II:1, ln. 55); as was already noted in Subrahmanyam 1942, this has little to no probative value. The Tañcāvūr temple itself incorporates a subsidiary shrine to Naṭeśa, among many others subordinated to the central massive liṅga shrine and to an iconographic program centering on the martial figure of Śiva as Tripurāntaka. I am unaware of the evidence for the often repeated claim that the Cōḻa coronation ritual or *rājyābhiṣeka* was ever held at Cidambaram.

northward from the dynasty's ancient home territory in the delta. This period marks the emergence of Cidambaram's mature epigraphical archive, the first textual domain that I am interested in here.

2.1 Epigraphy: Dramas in stone

The inscriptional archive is in important ways out of joint with the wider history of the dynasty: the number of surviving records from the Cōḻa heyday of tenth and eleventh centuries—the period of Parāntaka and Rājarāja Cōḻa, two kings as we have seen closely associated with the temple—is strikingly low.[6] It is of course possible that earlier records have been destroyed in the course of renovations—the current complex has hardly any Cōḻa architecture at all—but older inscriptions were frequently recopied throughout the Cōḻa period when the arrangements to which they referred remained in force. Something momentous happened at Cidambaram, a dramatic change that is marked by the temple's sudden efflorescence beginning in the early decades of the twelfth century.

This new moment is heralded by a series of records on the north face of the innermost *prākāra* wall of the temple compound. In three inscriptions datable to the final years of Kulottuṅga I's reign, we see sudden evidence of a new courtly interest in the temple. These are not the first royal or aristocratic epigraphs that survive in Cidambaram, but their close proximity to each other in time (as well as the physical

[6]Thus Orr 2004, p. 231: "...of the 288 inscriptions, only 6 date from the tenth century and 7 from the eleventh." Orr's study of the epigraphic history of the city and its region has been invaluable for my interpretation of this body of documents. I am very grateful to her for sharing a prepublication draft of this important paper with me; it marks the first real advance in the subject since Subrahmanyam's pioneering study (Subrahmanyam 1942).

space of the temple wall) insists, I think, on something new and important. Two of these record the donations of the Cōḻa princesses Rājarājaṉ Kuntavaiyāḻvār and Maturāntikiyāḻvār, sisters to the king. These royal sisters' endowments are notably grand: Kuntavai presents the Lord of the Little Shrine with a gift of gold ornaments, and brings on her brother's behalf a stone that the king of Kambhoja had previously sent to him, while Maturāntaki gifts the deity with a tract of land in the name of a local brahman, Vācciyaṉ Iravi, in order to endow a hospice for the feeding of Śaiva devotees.[7] The third, undated inscription is an elaborate bilingual verse eulogy on a general of the Cōḻa armies, styling himself as Naralokavīra, in which he takes credit for a massive program of construction and public works in the temple and its environs.[8]

Naralokavīra was a lord from the empire's northern marches in Toṇṭaimaṇṭalam, the old Pallava country. While I here adopt the name by which he is best known, both at Cidambaram and elsewhere he is also called various other titles: the Treasury of Loving-kindness, Pride Incarnate, Lord of the Toṇṭai Country, the Swordsman of

[7]The records of the two younger sisters of Kulottuṅga are: Kuntavai (Kulottuṅga year 44, 1114 CE)=ARE 119 of 1888 (=EI vol. 5, p. 105); Maturāntiki (year 46, 1116 CE)=ARE 117 of 1888 (=SII IV:222, lines 7ff.).

[8]The Naralokavīra grant has had a complicated publication history: the basic text of the inscription was recorded in ARE 120 of 1888 (=SII IV: 225). The Sanskrit text was also copied down by one of the pandits working under Mackenzie and was subsequently published (with some different readings and a Tamil paraphrase) as SITI 1271–1273. A somewhat different Sanskrit text was published by B.G.L. Swamy as an appendix to Swamy 1979 (which, additionally, is identical to Swamy and Nanjundan 1973). This latter text is accompanied by a very unreliable translation, based probably on the SITI gloss. The Archeological Survey's version of the Tamil text of the inscription is faulty, and was subsequently reissued in a heavily conjectural version by Mu. Irākavaiyaṅkār (1935-36, nos. 1059–1094). Additionally, partial translations of the grant are included in Nilakanta Sastri 1932 and Balasubrahmanyan 1979 (pp. 23–26). Despite all of these materials, the text remains highly problematic. I am in the process of producing a critical edition and philological translation of this inscription.

Māṇavil, Master of Kaliṅga.[9] This last title was perhaps a mark of distinction won in Kulottuṅga's war against king Anantavarman Coḍagaṅga of Kaliṅga (ca. 1110 CE, the subject of Cayaṅkoṇṭār's *Kaliṅkattupparaṇi*[10]); this allows us to roughly locate in time the construction project that his inscription details as occurring at some point after this campaign, while—as we shall see below—the records of Kulottuṅga's son and successor Vikrama provide a *terminus ad quem* of 1128–1129 CE. Naralokavīra appears in more than a half-dozen other inscriptions spread across the Cōḻa heartland, records that he himself largely had commissioned to celebrate his acts of public piety.[11]

The Cidambaram record, however, is the longest, most complex and historically significant trace left by this magnate from Toṇṭaimaṇṭalam. It is an unusual text: a bilingual eulogy of thirty-one Sanskrit verses in various meters (with *mālinī*, *vasanta-tilakā*, and *śārdulavikrīḍitā* predominating), and thirty-six Tamil *veṇpā*s, a noteworthy departure from the Cōḻa court style, the elaborate Tamil *kunstprosa* of the *meykkīrtti*.[12] More striking still, both portions of Naralokavīra's grant lack reference to the regnal dates of Kulottuṅga; in fact, there is a conspicuous absence of any ex-

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[9]Aruḷākara (Skt. text, verse 10; a strikingly hybrid bilingual form, perhaps his given name) Mānāvatāra (Skt. vs. 1), Toṇṭaimāṉ (Tamil text, *passim*), Māṇaviṟvāḷkūttaṉ, Kāliṅkar.

[10]See Chapter 4, pp.173 ff.

[11]All of these, including the Cidambaram record, are detailed in Nilakanta Sastri's classic prosopographical study. Note that Naralokavīra needs to be distinguished from another Toṇṭai lord, Karuṇākaraṉ, the Cōḻa generalissimo of the Kaliṅga war and the hero of Cayaṅkoṇṭar's poem. Despite their identical natal region and their similar names (Aruḷākara and Karuṇākaraṉ being essentially synonymous), the identity of these two men is ruled out by their separate mention in Oṭṭakkūttar's *Vikkramacōḻavulā* (Shastri *op. cit.* pp. 187–188).

[12]Instituted under Rājarāja I (r. 985–1014), the *meykkīrtti* provided the hallmark of an official imperial proclamation, an authorizing preamble set in a formulaic register of high literary Tamil, grammatically connected but stylistically distinct from the donative record proper. Each Cōḻa monarch had a single *meykkīrtti* that was successively revised to include new accomplishments such as military victories, climaxing with the sovereign's name and the number of years since his coronation.

plicit mention of the Cōḻas whatsoever. Interestingly, there is nothing of the division of labor between the two languages that Pollock has termed "hyperglossia": both Tamil and Sanskrit are here equally directed towards the task of praise.[13]

In what amounts to a permanent poetic record of a twelfth-century ribbon-cutting ceremony, the two halves of the inscription each fuse the documentary and the workly.[14] In succession, one reads about the flower gardens that the lord from the Toṇṭai country endowed, the several maṇḍapams he had built, and the pieces of ritual accoutrement he donated to the shrine. Within this framework, however, there are important differences between the Sanskrit and the Tamil halves. Neither portion of the eulogy is in any way a 'translation' of the other (*pace* Swamy 1979, p. 123); instead, the two eulogists have the same biographical facts in their hands, only two produce two very different effects.

I will confine myself to the opening verses of each portion.[15] Even this small amount of the text of the inscription presents major difficulties; however, these verses will serve to illustrate the dynamics of the two conjoint texts:

> *cakre tena sabhāpates tribhuvanakṣemāya nṛttam paraṃ*
> *kurvāṇasya tadekatānamanasā mānāvatāreṇa yat* |
> *tan mattaś śṛṇu sāvadhānam adhunā yatstotrapātrāśrayair*
> *vvaktrair dehabhṛtaś caranti sarasan dyāvāpṛthivyor dvayoḥ* ‖ 1 ‖

[13] Pollock 1998.

[14] These terms follow Pollock *op. cit.*

[15] The presentation of these verses differ according to their language. For the Sanskrit text, I have departed from the published text of the *South Indian Inscriptions* series and offered emendations in a number of places. Where I follow the SII, I have retained the usual orthographic irregularities seen in Sanskrit epigraphs (*e.g.* consonant gemination, homorganic nasals for *anusvāra*). For the Tamil *veṇpā*s, I have closely followed the text as reconstructed by Irākavaiyaṅkār, and have regularized the word-boundaries. Where I have thought it necessary to either depart from his edition or to show the extent of his conjecture, his readings are recorded with the siglum RI. My interpretation of the Tamil verses especially remains tentative on a number of points. Where I find myself unable to make sense of the text, I have marked off the text in both the original and the translation with obeli.

nyadhita niravasānadyotiṣo vīthidīpān
iha tamasi vilupte tair asaṃkhyair ajasram |
tapanatuhinabhāsor atra śarvārcanārthaṃ
dinakaranikaratvād eva sārtthaḥ prakāśaḥ ‖ 2 ‖

†*b⁻⁻ndrāṇīr*† *akuruta lasadvīthikāyām amuṣyāḥ*
sekaṃ karttuṃ muditabhuvaneṣūtsaveṣu smarāreḥ |
etās tattatsamayanihitaiḥ pūritāḥ puṇyatoyais
tadbhaktānāṃ dadhati hṛdayais tulyatām bhaktipūrṇaiḥ ‖ 3 ‖

1c °*pātrāśrayair*] *conj.*; °*pātraśśatair* SII **1d** *sarasan*] SII *emend.* • *dyāvāpṛthivyor dvayoḥ*] *emend.*; *dyāvāpṛthivyonvayoḥ* SII **2c** *śarvārcanārthaṃ*] *conj.*; *śarvvārccārtthān* (unmetrical) SII **3a** *b⁻⁻ndrāṇīr*] *emend.*; *b...ndrāṇir* (unmetrical) SII • *lasadvīthikāyām*] *emend.*; *lasadvīdhikāyām* SII **3c** *pūritāḥ*] *emend.*; *pūritā* SII **3d** *tadbhaktānāṃ dadhati*] *conj. Isaacson*; *tatbhaktyā nandayati* SII.

Listen to me carefully, now, to the things that were done for the Lord of the Assembly who performs the supreme dance for the benefit of the three worlds by that Mānāvatāra, whose mind is set solely on him. Creatures joyously wander both heaven and earth with mouths that are the abode of that praiseworthy one.

He has endowed street lamps that are permanently alight; now that these numberless [lamps] have forever dispelled the darkness here, since they serve as a collection of suns, the light of both the sun and the moon here have a [new] purpose for sake of the worship of Śarva.

He has placed [lit. 'made'] †...[pots?]...† in Her glittering gallery, so to make shower-offerings during the festivals of Smara's enemy that are the delight of the entire world. When they are filled with the auspicious waters that are employed for various occasions, these [pots] become equal [*ex conj*, lit. 'bear equality'] with the devotion-filled hearts of [Devī's] devotees.

ellai kaṭalāl ikalvēntaraik kavarnta
celvamelāṉ tillaiccirṟampalattut tollait
tirukkoṭuṅkai poṉvēyntāṉ ṟiṉmaik kaliyiṉ
tarukkoṭuṅka vēlkūttaṉ ṟāṉ (1)

tillaiyiṟpoṉṉampalattaic cempoṉāl vēyntuvāṉ
ellaiyaip poṉṉākkiṉāṉ eṉparāl ollai
vaṭavēntar celvamelām vāṅka vēlvāṅkuṅ
kuṭaivēntar toṇṭaiyār kol (2)

teṉvēntaṉ kūṉimirtta centamiḻar teṉkōyil
ponvēyntu tikkaip pukaḻvēyntāṉ olkum
kuṟṟam palakaṇṭōṉ kōḻiḻaikkum
vēṟkūttaṉ ciṟṟampalattilē ceṉṟu (3)

poṉṉampalakkūttāṭum iṭam paḻa[m arai]vil
poṉṉampalakūttar poṉvēyntāṉ teṉṉar
malaimaṉṉar ēṉai vaṭamaṉṉar maṟṟak
kulamaṉṉar celvam elāṅ koṇṭu (4)

1a *kaṭalāl*] SII; *kaṭalāv* RI • *ikalvēntaraik kavarnta*] RI; *ikal[lent]aṇakkavanta* SII **1d** *vēlkūttaṉ*] *emend.*; *velkūttaṉ* SII, RI **2d** *kuṭaivēntar toṇṭaiyār kol*] SII; *kuṭaivēntaṉ ṟoṇṭaiyār kō* RI **3b** *olkum*] *conj*; *oṟkum* SII; *oṉṉārkkuk* RI **4a** °*kūttāṭum iṭam paḻa[m arai]vil*] SII; °*kūttarāṭam palamaṇaviṟ* RI **4b** *poṉvēyntāṉ*] *conj*; *poṉvēyntār* RI; *poṉmentār* SII

> They speak of an auspicious munificent [king] of old who once gilded the Little Shrine with all the treasure seized [from?[16]] the hostile kings stretching all the way to the bordering ocean. In order to vanquish the pride of the powerful Kali [age], that spear-fighter [1] covered the golden shrine of Tillai with bright gold [and thus] gilded the borders [of his kingdom]. [But] what [of] the kings of Toṇṭai, the lords who bear a parasol and take up a spear in order to seize at once [*ollai*] all the treasure of the kings of the north? [2] The southern king gilded the southern temple of the men who speak proper Tamil, they who straighten what is crooked, and [thus] he covered that direction with his fame. The one who saw over again that evil was on the wane [? *ex conj.*], the spear-fighter who holds firm his vow went to the Little Shrine [3], and he gilded the Dancer in the Golden Shrine, in the older part of the dancing hall [?], taking with him all the treasure of the mountain kings of the southern people, the northern kings, and the kings of the noble house [4].

The eulogists cut into the facts of the donor and his donations in very different ways. The Sanskrit poet dives headlong into the litany of Naralokavīra's public works: his deeds are recounted as a series of *in praesentia* statements of fact. In the course of the eulogy, the everyday world of gift and giver comes to be transfigured, shot through with the supernatural: within the wall that he has erected, Śiva becomes 'the initiatory guru in the destruction of the cities of his enemies', while in the grove where the Toṇṭaimāṉ plants thousands of new trees, the swaying areca palms "have been shattered by Hara's dancing," and the gods—even Viṣṇu himself—stand outside the temple at Śiva's command, as Naralokavīra and his wife are granted the priceless gift of Śaiva liberation.[17]

As a concrete historical figure, Naralokavīra is all but absent here, swallowed up by the grandness of his gesture: other than the fact of his *bhakti*, the man remains

[16]The text and translation are problematic here: the adjectival participle (*peyareccam*) dependent on *celvam* would, as presently constituted, have to relate to the direct object *ikalventarai*. Note that the text is RI's conjecture on an already conjectural reading found in the SII. My solution (as if the text read **ikalventariṉ*) is very tentative.

[17]vs. 8: *parapurapradhvaṃsadīkṣāguruḥ*; vs. 4 *haranaṭanaviśīrṇṇā(ḥ)...pugāś calanti*; vs. 23 *vaikuṇṭapramukhās surā api bahis tiṣṭhati yadājñayā...sa tatra muktiṃ atulān devyāś ca tasyākarot.*

a cypher. But this is itself a deliberate strategy on the Sanskrit panegyrist's part, based on the particular value ascribed by his tradition to acts of generosity: to give and give unfailingly is regarded as a specimen of the sentiment of heroism, *vīrarasa*. In the relentless detail of his offerings, Naralokavīra is transformed into a figure that transcends the particular details of his career; in his generosity he is an equal to kings both living and long dead.

By contrast, the Tamil portion sets out Naralokavīra's generosity as a narrative. While the *veṇpā*s do little to really individuate the man, they place his works in a doubled history. In a way that obliquely parallels the first-person announcement that begins the Sanskrit *praśasti*, the Tamil verses begin by invoking the founding myth of Cōḻa patronage in Cidambaram centuries before, reporting the fact through an unidentified "they say" (*eṉpar*), only to contrast this with the even greater generosity and valor of Naralokavīra's putative ancestors, the Pallavas of Toṇṭaimaṇḍalam. This historical preamble then gives way to the general's own martial exploits and benefactions. Significantly, there are details that are unique to the Tamil text, filling out the picture of the social universe centered on the Cidambaram temple in a way alien to the magical realism of the Sanskrit text, including a closing mention of a construction of a sluice for the lands of the 'three thousand Tillai brahmans,' one of the only three references to this community in the entire epigraphical archive.[18]

[18]See Orr *op. cit*, pp. 231–2. The other two references are in fact contained within a single inscription SII VIII: 43 (=ARE 455 of 1902). This record, dated in the thirty-sixth regnal year of Kōpperuñciṅkaṉ (see below), mentions the personal name of a Veḷḷāḷa (n.b.) signatory, Tillaimuvāyiraveḷaṉ, and orders a group of brahmans to ensure that all new revenue accruing to a stipulated parcel of land "be recorded with the name Tillaimuvāyiraviḷākam, under the names of the brahmans who perform Vedic recitation in [the *agrahāra*] Tillaināyakacaturvedimaṅgalam." (ln. 6:

The juxtaposition of these two texts, Tamil and Sanskrit, was quite deliberate. As we have seen already, it marks a pronounced departure from the royal style of Naralokavīra's Cōḻa liege. To have himself spoken of in Sanskrit already marked a clear divide from the cultural politics of the court: the *praśasti* serves to display Naralokavīra's ability to have his actions cast into the elevated register of the language of both kingly and divine power. The Tamil eulogy is, if anything, even more radical. While studiously avoiding any explicit mention of the Cōḻa line, the text evokes an implicit comparison between the dynasty's past achievements and Naralokavīra's present actions, actions which if anything demonstrate even greater devoted participation in Mahādeva. The net result is the imagination through language of an autonomous lord in his own right.

The Toṇṭaimāṉ's actions at Cidambaram required an enormous investment in time and resources, and may well have been the expression of a profound commitment to the Śaiva way of life. But this should not distract us from the image of the donor that the bilingual text projects, that of a lord himself capable of marshalling such resources and maintaining such a public commitment, independent of the authority of his sovereign.[19] The gesture that the inscription embodies—and the complex politics that it presumes—needs to be understood in the light of the court society of the later

[*akarattu brāhamaṇar*]...*tillaināyakaccaruppetimaṅgalattu* [*sic*] *adhyāyaṉa paṭṭarkaḷperil tillaimuvāyiyavilākam eṉṉum perāle eḻutakkaṭavarkaḷākavum*...).

[19]Contrast here the opinion of Nilakanta Sastri, who sees in Naralokavīra's elaborate descriptions of conspicuous donation no motivations more complex than *bhakti* and loyalty to one's sovereign; the absence of a *meykkīrtti* goes unnoticed, and the lack of dating in regnal years is glossed over as evidence of "a free literary form [narrating] facts relating to well-known persons mentioned in other contemporary records of a more formal character giving reliable details of time and place", for which "several instances" are available (Nilakanta Sastri 1932, p. 186).

years of Kulottuṅga's very long reign. The king was not a young man when he acceded to the Cōḻa throne in 1070—he had briefly ruled over the Eastern Cāḷukya domains a decade before, and had lived for some years as a condottiere in Bastar—and by the time Naralokavīra set about his works in Cidambaram, Kulottuṅga had ruled over the Cōḻa dominions for over four decades. It was thus at a point when the emperor might have been little more than a senile invalid that his feudatory from Toṇṭaimaṇḍalam began his very public project. This was not an act of open disloyalty or a precursor to rebellion;[20] instead, the text forms a calculated assertion of authority on the borderlands of the Cōḻa core territory, an act of deliberately ambiguous self-fashioning.

The details of the outcome of Naralokavīra's gambit remain obscure. From his tenth regnal year onward, Kulottuṅga's son and successor Vikrama (r. 1118–1135 CE) was to take credit for much of Naralokavīra's building project in his own inscriptions, with their details reshaped into the complex Tamil prose of the Cōḻa chancellery.[21] However, Vikrama was not, it seems, declaring the Toṇṭai lord to be his enemy, as Naralokavīra is mentioned among Vikrama's favorites in the courtly entertainments of the time.[22] Epigraphic context may provide us with another clue to the complex

[20]Though both the rhetoric of the Tamil eulogy as well as some of the gifts themselves, come very close. Especially significant here is Naralokavīra's claim to have covered with bronze the *pērampalam*, the 'large shrine' to the immediate south of the *cirrampalam* sanctum (Skt. text vs. 14: *sa tatra mahatīṃ sabhām api vidhāya tāmreṇa tām*; Tamil vs. 5: *tillaicciṟṟampalattē pērampalantaṉṉai...cempuvēy vittāṉ*). To have altered the sanctum itself (or to have used gold on the roof of the larger structure) would have been an act of outright defiance, if not a declaration of war.

[21]ARE 314 of 1958-59 and SII V:458, cited in Orr *op. cit.* p. 237. The portion of Vikrama's *meykkīrtti* concerning Cidambaram is translated in Nilakanta Sastri 1955, p. 344-45.

[22]See above, p. 46n.

alliances that formed in Kulottuṅga's court, in the form of the two Cōḻa princesses' donative records.[23] These may in fact be an endorsement of sorts for Naralokavīra's project, as they are engraved nearby Naralokavīra's eulogy, on a wall that he himself may have had erected.[24]

As an explicitly poetic text, cast in language intended to draw attention to itself, Naralokavīra's inscription is atypical of much of what was to follow it, but it is the very thickness, formal design, and reflexivity of its poetry that make it a guide for the rest of the epigraphical drama played out on the walls of the Cidambaram temple.[25] The two eulogists sought to project a transformed image of their subject, to craft a persona for the real man to inhabit. In doing this, the inscription is tied in the architectural surround of the temple—it is *this* tank and *that* wall that Naralokavīra built. Thus the man's virtual persona and the actual environs of the place are inextricably bound up in one another. The text's readers are, after all, right in the middle of the things described, and the blunt physicality of the temple's circumambient structure serves to ratify the claims about the man whom the poets praise.

The long history of the temple and its urban surrounding in the 1100s and 1200s,

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[23]On context sensitivity in epigraphical interpretation, see Morrison and Lycett 1997.

[24]Nilakanta Sastri, Balasubrahmanyam, and Younger all presume that the first *prākāra* wall of the main shrine—on the north side of which the three inscriptions can all be found—is the wall referred to in the eighth verse of Naralokavīra's Sanskrit *praśasti* (8ab: *nāmnā tan naralokavīram akarot sālam mahāntam prabhoḥ*, 'He constructed the great wall for his Master, called 'Naralokavīra' [after himself].') This explanation, however, fails to account for the presence of another inscription (ARE 118 of 1888, SII IV: 223) in the same place bearing the *meykkīrtti* of Rājendra I and dated in his twenty-fourth regnal year (1036-37 CE). On this important grant, which details major endowments for the temple's festival calendar as well as the mercantile communities then active in the environs of the city, see Hall 2001, pp. 101–104. This record makes no mention of being a fresh copy of an earlier grant; the problem merits further investigation.

[25]The metaphor of the epigraphical drama (here and in the title of this section) is indebted to Karashima 1996.

however, is not simply that of the luminaries of the Cōḻa court like Naralokavīra and the two royal sisters. While the players in the vast majority of the inscriptions are certainly elites, their importance is of a more local order. Even in the many cases where figures from the court appear in the records, they do so alongside and at times at the behest of these leading families and individuals. As Orr rightly points out, Cidambaram is unusual in this regard, as it is in so many other ways compared to the other great temples of the region. This may relate to Cidambaram's singular place in the landed order of the Cōḻa polity, its status as a a *taṉiyūr* or 'independent settlement.'[26] In practical terms, this ceded large tracts of the surrounding countryside to the direct authority of the government of Cidambaram. The growth of the region surrounding Cidambaram in this period appears in fact to have been prodigious, especially so through the foundation and extension of *brahmadeya* settlements.

Yet it remains unclear who exactly oversaw this boom. If there is any source of authority seen consistently throughout the records, it is that of the *mulaparuṣai*, a brahman collective.[27] Throughout the period, records of donations or land transfers bear the imprimatur of this body, declaring a transaction to be 'in accord with the ruling of the Great Assembly written by the members of the *mulaparuṣai*' or

[26]On the *taṉiyūr* and its role in the Cōḻa system of land tenure see Subbarayalu 1973, who points to the preponderance of these sites in the northern edge of the Cōḻa core. See also Champakalakshmi 2001, (esp. pp. 79–81 on Cidambaram). On settlement patterns in Cidambaram itself, see Thirumoorthy 2001.

[27]This is the form encountered everywhere in the inscriptions; in proper Tamil orthography, this should be written *mūlapparuṣai* (=Sanskrit *mūlapariṣad*). The interpretation of this name is unclear: is *mūla°* used here as an adjective ('the principal assembly') or is the term a shorthand for 'the assembly of the *mūlasthānam*/Mūlanātha'?

a similar phrase.[28] Through these formulaic admissions of authority, and through grants composed in the plural voice of the *mulaparuṣai* itself,[29] we can follow a process of collective self-creation, as these brahman men projected themselves as the ruling society of the city and its surrounding region. It remains obscure who made up the *mulaparuṣaiyār* and what was their relationship to the temple. Subbarayalu sees them as the temple's governing authorities (similar to the Dikshitars of contemporary Cidambaram), something that Orr disputes, noting that the group is only publicly associated with land transactions, not temple business, and that a large number of other explicitly recognized temple authorities appear as guarantors of records throughout the period.[30]

Individual brahmans, some identified as members of the *mulaparuṣai*, others acting independently, make up a disproportionately large share of the named figures in the records (about half of the 1600 individuals[31]). Individual brahmans—including figures associated with this assembly—seem to have been among the major landholders in the environs of Cidambaram. The corpus of records present numerous instances where such figures are the donors of parcels of privately held property to the temple and dozens more cases where these brahmans are adventitiously mentioned, as when their lands provide a boundary for a land donation, or when they serve as witnesses to a transaction. The impression that emerges of the Cidambaram brahmans is not of

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[28]SII VIII: 44: *mulaparuṣyaiyār eḻutiṉa mahāsabhāniyokappaṭiyē.*

[29]See for instance SII IV: 227, VIII:43.

[30]Subbarayalu 1973, pp. 91–94; Orr *op. cit*, p. 233.

[31]Orr *op. cit, ibid*

temple functionaries, much less of a single homogenous group like the Tillai 3000, but of a substantial and powerful landed elite.

Their pattern of public self-assertion is all the more significant given the anomalous status of these Brahman groups. Most of the named Brahman figures who are members of collectives like the *mulaparuṣai* or are otherwise clearly resident in the vicinity of Cidambaram are united by their unusual *gotra*s or brahmanical 'clans': Kavuciyaṉ/ Kavuṉiyaṉ, Vāacciyaṉ, and Uḻaiccaraṇaṉ, names that are vanishingly rare outside of Cidambaram itself.[32] This unusual onomasty signals perhaps a period of recent and even sudden brahmanization, where local elites adopting a place within the genealogical ideal of the pan-Indic caste hierarchy had yet to accommodate their collective identities to translocal norms.

If this line of thinking is correct, then the public, performative work of the Cidambaram epigraphical corpus becomes even more important. Over the long term of our period, stretching deep into the 1200s, the social history of region is marked by the gradual sale and transfer of the landed wealth of these brahman elites to the temple itself.[33] As the whole Cidambaram region was in the process of quite sudden and novel

[32] *Cf.* Orr *op. cit*, p. 233n. Of these *gotra* names, one can recognize in the first the pan-Indic *gotra* Kauśika. Both it and *vācciyaṉ* have a geographical distribution beyond the immediate confines of what is now Cidambaram taluk, although the occurrences of both are especially concentrated there (see Karashima, Subbarayalu and Matsui 1978). The name *vācciyaṉ* perhaps suggests a role in ritual or other public performance (≈ Skt. *vācaka*?); the *Tamiḻk kalveṭṭuccollakarāti*, *s.v.* *vācciyaṅkaḷ* gives 'musical instruments' (*vādiyaṅkaḷ*), citing a twelfth century record from the Kannada region [=EC, x, 132]. The name *uḻaiccaraṇaṉ*—found exclusively in Cidambaram—remains opaque; indeed, even its orthography is uncertain: Orr *op. cit. ibid.* reads *uḻaiccāṇaṉ* (I follow the transcription in Orr's manuscript; the names given in the published version are incorrect). I choose instead to give the name that seems to yield some sense ('deer foot'); the two renderings are graphically indistinguishable in inscriptional Tamil.

[33] *Cf.*. Orr, *op. cit*, p. 234. The consequences of this pattern are unclear: did these brahmans settled into comfortable lives as rentiers in the surrounding *brahmadeyas* or did they themselves become

development, becoming set out from its surroundings by virtue of its unprecedented role in the Cōḻa agrarian order, its ruling society was equally embarked on a collective program of re-invention, one that in its dimensions dwarfs that of a single magnate like Naralokavīra.

This process of the longue durée, however, was punctuated by events that overtook the Cōḻa domains during the dynasty's decline. The final decades of the twelfth century saw a series of campaigns waged between the Cōḻas and the increasingly restive Pāṇṭiyaṉ kings of Madurai. In 1216-17 (thus very possibly during Maheśvarānanda's lifetime), in a reaction to the rising tide of Hoysaḷa power as much as a blow against the dwindling Cōḻa imperium, Māṟavarman Sundara Pāṇṭiyaṉ led an army as far north as Cidambaram.[34] In a sudden and dramatic shift in the temple's epigraphic discourse, he left a burst of royal graffiti, especially on the eastern *gopuram* of the temple. These brief inscriptions are clearly invested in the maintenance of a public persona, in a way that differed markedly from earlier inscriptions. For example (SII IV: 618):

> The king in whose land Tamil thrives made the lord of the Kaveri country, with its gardens black with rainclouds, mount his chariot and flee to the jungle. The great oath that he made in order to punish the armies of the Ariyar who had donned their garlands, taken up their spears and gathered against him—that he would fight them all alone—is even today ever-renewed.
>
> He is helpless when he sees the pearl garlands that lie atop of the nipples of great-breasted women of soft, cultured speech and golden bangles, this Cuntaramīṉavar, who takes up his spear and joins battle against the numberless host of the Kāṭavar [=Pallavas], making the rising tide of their blood reach to the heavens.

Where Naralokavīra was delineated in relation to Śiva and to the god's devotees, and

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drawn into the temple's ambit, becoming the ancestors of the contemporary Dīkṣitar community?

[34] Orr (*op. cit.*) dates this incursion to 1258 CE; I adopt the date given in Nilakantha Sastri 1955 pp. 393ff.

where the image of the area brahmans emerges from the noise of details of land sale and endowment, the Pāṇṭiyaṉ king keeps the stage all to himself: all other presences—even that of the god—are purged, leaving only the southern king as warrior and as ritual patron, a transformations that might be attributable to the influence of a different royal style of the Madurai court.[35]

This heroic but ultimately quite transitory image of the Pāṇṭiyaṉ king is in great contrast to the final player in the drama, the warlord Kōpperuñciṅkaṉ (r. ca. 1243–1279).[36] Along with his subordinates Cōḻakōṉ and Vēṇāṭuṭaiyaṉ, Kōpperuñciṅkaṉ oversaw and authorized by far the largest portion of the Cidambaram epigraphical archive. Properly speaking, these records of the middle and end of the thirteenth century—which include more than half of the total extant documents—stretch beyond the period with which we are concerned, yet this final act in Cidambaram's epigraphic drama is conspicuous in the way it looks back at what had come before. Kōpperuñciṅkaṉ himself presents an uncannily familiar figure: like Naralokavīra, he was a lord of the Toṇṭai country whose career was rhetorically invested in the authority of the Cōḻa kings despite his independence from them. His long rule over the region was marked not by any disjunction with the Cōḻa past, no moment of radical self assertion like that of the Pāṇṭiyaṉ king, but rather by a strictly imagined continuity with the earlier order. Temples, territories, even individual roads and irrigation sluices all maintain

[35]For Sundara Pāṇṭiyaṉ's support of ritual celebrations of public power, see SII IV: 620 commemorating the performance of a *tulabhāra* ceremony at Cidambaram; during the same campaign he also undertook a *vīrābhiṣeka* while in the Cōḻa country.

[36]For these dates, along with the refutation of a theory of two separate kings bearing the name Kōpperuñciṅkaṉ (found, for instance, in Venkatasubba Ayyar's introductory essay to SII vol. XII) see Pālacuppiramaṇiyam 1965, pp. 35–65, esp. pp. 40ff.

their earlier names, often the names of member of the Cōḻa royal house, while the pattern of consolidation of the temple's property holdings and the cashiering of the local brahman elite carries on and even accelerates over the middle decades of the 1200s.

We can perhaps see in this conservatism an attempt to quell some of the chaos that attended the thirteenth century and the decline of Cōḻa authority. But that is not all that can be read off this final lengthy backward glance. It would be a serious error, I think, to see in this continuity the successful and benevolent management of the Cidambaram region by the Pallava warlord and his agents. Rather, the ruling society of Cidambaram succeeded in constituting itself and its region in a way that enabled it to ally itself with these magnates, and to endure.

2.2 Futures Past: *Purāṇa*s as Public Texts

Within the expansion recorded in epigraphy, at first gradual but then with increasing intensity through the later part of the century, we may situate the emergence of the new body of textual materials explicitly associated with Cidambaram, especially *purāṇa*s, texts about the past. Of these, we may note in passing the *Cidambara-māhātmya* (CM), a Sanskrit narrative of the temple's legendary prehistory that has been the subject of several studies by Hermann Kulke.[37] Kulke understands the work to have been written and redacted during the reigns of Kulottuṅga and his son and successor Vikrama (r. 1118–1135), and to have reached something close to its present

[37]Kulke 1970, 1993

form by the reign of Kulottuṅga II (1133–1150).[38] On his reading, the CM served a very particular political aim, that of legitimating both the rule of Kulottuṅga and the position of the newly arrived Brahman priests that Kulke hypothesizes may have been imported from Veṅgi, where Kulottuṅga had previously reigned. In particular, the text's twenty-fifth *adhyāya*, which narrates the handing over of the tiger flag (*vyāghradhvaja*) characteristic of the Cōḻas to the 'Bengali' king Hiraṇyavarman (in whom Kulke urges the reader to see a reflex of Kulottuṅga), formulates "a legitimate claim of Hiraṇyavarman/Kulottuṅga to the Cōḻa throne—just because such a claim did not exist...[the CM's] essential function consists in a transformation of a political claim into a new 'legendary reality'".[39]

Kulke's main literary-historical point—the identification of the text's Hiraṇyavarman with Kulottuṅga—seems to me to be likely correct. There are, however, some serious problems with his reconstruction. For all the merits of his analysis, it represents a textbook case of the sort of functionalism which done much to hamper the history of premodern South Asian culture.[40] The assumption that Kulottuṅga needed to justify an illegitimate seizure of power via the fabrication of a mythical pedigree begs the question, for reasons both empirical and theoretical. There is no hard evidence, inscriptional or otherwise, to support Kulke's claim for a colony of Andhra brahmans settling in Cidambaram at Kulottuṅga's behest and adopting the

[38] Kulke 1993, p. 205n.

[39] *ibid.*, p. 202.

[40] On the problems of legitimation theory and of its application to South Asia in particular, see now Pollock 2006, pp. 514–524. See also Giddens 1979 for a persuasive critique of functionalism within social scientific theory in general.

mantle of the Tillai 3000 brahmans, the collectivity associated with the site since the early *bhakti* hymnists. Further, the claim that Kulottuṅga "needed an additional legitimation of his kingship" on account of his putatively 'foreign' birth fails to adequately account for the history of the marital alliances of the Cōḻa and Cālukya dynasties.[41] More significantly still, Kulke's interpretation is grounded in the presumption that works of culture only obtain in an *ex post facto* relation with the actions of historical agents—that the "coup d'état" (as he has it) of Kulottuṅga is over and done with before the CM was needed to patch over and mythically rewrite the history of the victor. For whom such revision is needed—the question, in fact, of the CM's discursively fashioned public—isn't even considered.

The problems occasioned by the CM's interpretation help us to see the two other Cidambaram *purāṇa*s in greater relief. Probably the earlier of the two is the *Sūtasaṃhitā* (SS). The SS is organized around the propagation of a Veda- (and especially Vedānta-) congruent devotional Śaivism, what would later come to be identified with the brahmanical Smārta orthodoxy throughout southern India. Raghavan, in his elegant and adroit survey of the text, tentatively dates it to the tenth century. While his argument for the lower limit of the SS's composition stands, the evidence for this early date is exceedingly spare.[42] Raghavan rightly notes the often reiter-

[41] For a fine account of these alliances, and their importance for the history of the study of South Indian royal kinship see Trautmann 1995 pp. 387ff.

[42] The lower limit is furnished by the text's published commentary, the *Tātparyadīpikā* of Mādhavamantrin, who flourished 1368–1384 CE (Raghavan 1992, p. 108). Raghavan finds the upper limit reflected in the absence of any mention in the SS of the worship of the Naṭeśa ectype Tyāgarāja at Śrīmadvalmīka/Vālmīkakṣetra (=Tiruvārūr) along with the lack of any reference to the main shrine at Cidambaram as the *kanakasabhā* ('the golden assembly'), thus pointing, he claims, to composition prior to the rule of Parāntaka I Cōḻa. Neither of these two pieces of strictly negative evidence has

ated centrality of Cidambaram to the SS's compilers (*op. cit.* p. 115); going a step further, it is fair to say affirm that, if the text were not in fact wholly composed in Cidambaram, it authors were intimately familiar with the city and its temple at first hand. This may in fact help to date the text to times later than Raghavan's estimate, during the boom beginning in the 1100s. Kulke (who adopts Raghavan's early dating of the text) has pointed to a number of shared themes and even parallel passages found in the CM and the SS. Such common material, however, does not obviously point to which text is the borrower and which the source, or indeed whether both are indebted to another, earlier text. In a least one of the cases that Kulke notes in his monograph, it seems at least *prima facie* possible that the SS is the more likely borrower.[43]

Taking all of this into account, it is not possible to positively date the composition of the SS, but there is no positive evidence that confirms Raghavan's proposed early date, and some circumstantial evidence that points to a period considerably later than

any real probative value.

[43]Kulke points to the episode of Pulkasa (CM 8.1–21) as an interpolation of material from his second 'Hiraṇyavarman Schicht' into earlier layers of the composite *māhātmya* text. This argument is based in part on his identification of a parallel in SS, the story of the sinner Durghaṭa (SS, IV.24) who, by virtue of three years' devout residence and worship in Cidambaram eventually becomes a world-ruling emperor through Śiva's grace (IV.24.25: *sa durghaṭaḥ punaḥ samastalokādhipatir babhūva*). The argument here rests in part on the 'change' of the protagonist's name from the SS's Durghaṭa ('Misbegotten') to 'den Namen einer sehr tief stehenden Kaste,' Pulkasa (p. 175). Kulke, however, overlooks the earlier telling of this brief narrative within the SS itself (I.4.17cd–39cd), where the hero is in fact named Pulkasa. Here the story is slightly different, with Pulkasa obtaining *paramāṃ muktiṃ* (37a) instead of imperial power, and with the story also describing his spiritual guide, a degenerate Brahman pimp (*gaṇikāpati*), who himself is liberated at story's end.

The presence of two variant versions in the SS for the CM's single story points to the possibility that the redactors of the SS may have had the single story in mind as a narrative template for their two, rather different stories of a morally degenerate man transfigured through Naṭeśa's grace. This, however, is very provisional: lacking access to the CM text itself, and without looking to other versions of this motif in related sources, no conclusions can at present be ventured.

the tenth century. If we take the text's familiarity and involvement with Cidambaram as placing it within the ambit of the temple city's textual culture (as I think we should), then the text might best be seen within the city's growth in the 1100s. It was, in any event, certainly in circulation at this time.

At its outset, the SS totally accords with the formal features of the other *purāṇa*s: it begins as the Sūta Romaharṣaṇa arrives at the *sattra* sacrifice begin held in the Naimiṣa forest, is honorably greeted, and asked to recite a meritorious collection of stories (*puṇyāṃ saṃhitāṃ*, I.1.4). He agrees, and announces that his topic will be the *Skāndam*, the great *purāṇa* of Skanda; of its six *saṃhitā*s, he will teach the second, the *Sūta* (I.1.19cd-30), in six thousand verse-units or *grantha*s.[44] The remainder of this initial scene is devoted to a presumptive defense of the orthodox textual order: the Vedas are affirmed as the source of self-authorizing supernatural truth, but the sum total of that truth—what is to be reflected within the SS itself—is that it consists entirely of Śiva, the *vedavedya* or 'subject of the Veda.' All twice-born men can and should know this to be true; it is only obscured by the vastness of the Vedic texts and the complexities of their schools of transmission.

While thus cleaving to the truth-claims of the orthodox Mīmāṃsakas, including the ultimately derivative and explanatory character of the *smṛti*s and the *purāṇa*s, the authors of the SS actually adopt a position that radically undermines the claims of orthodoxy. While the Vedic corpus is the incomparable source for transcendent

[44] It is subdivided into four *khaṇḍa*s, the *Śivamāhātmya* (700 *grantha*s), the *Jñānayoga* (called 'the epitome of the Vedānta,' *vedāntasaṃgraha*, 737 *grantha*s), the *Mukti* (637 *grantha*s) and the *Yajñavaibhava* (4000 *grantha*s). The total *grantha*–count is thus actually 6074.

knowledge, it is the privileged understanding of the SS that acts not as a auxiliary to it but as the key to its interpretation. This is not an especially novel claim but it sets the tone for what the text's author/compilers do next. The Sūta's narrative abruptly changes gears in the next chapter, moving the scene to heaven, where Viṣṇu and the other gods once assembled to collectively ponder the greatest of mysteries: from what single cause did all of existence proceed? While they deliberated, Śiva, in his infinite compassion, manifested himself in their presence for the very first time. Somewhat curtly (for the gods, one presumes, aren't used to surprises), they honor him and ask, "Who are you?"[45] Śiva begins, then, to explain himself: he is the creator of the world, one who always has been and always will be, whose power of illusion has fashioned the appearance of all things moving and unmoving; he who comes to know him through the words of the Veda will surely attain *mokṣa*, final beatitude. As the god explains these momentous truths about himself, his words are inflected with the words of the very Vedic texts the he claims to be the way of approach to him.[46]

Śiva then disappears, and the text then takes on a vertiginous quality: the gods begin to praise Śiva with a hymn from the *Atharvaśiras*, a hymn which precisely narrates the gods giving praise to Śiva.[47] They then proceed to an elaborately described

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[45]SS I.2.3cd-6: *purā viṣṇvādayo devāḥ sarve saṃbhūya kāraṇam ‖ vicarya jagato viprāḥ saṃśayāviṣṭacetasaḥ | atīva sukhadaṃ śuddhaṃ raudraṃ lokaṃ samāgaman ‖ teṣāṃ madhye mahādevaḥ saṃsāradrāvako haraḥ | rudraḥ paramakāruṇyaḥ svayam āvirabhūd dvijāḥ ‖ adṛṣṭapūrvaṃ taṃ dṛṣṭvā devā viṣṇupurogamāḥ | praṇipatya mahādevam apṛcchan ko bhavān iti ‖*. This final *pāda*=*Atharvaśiras* 1.1.

[46]I.2.8≈*Atharvaśiras* 1.2, while 10b≈*Chāndogya* 6:14.2

[47]I.2.11–12ab: *ityuktvā bhagavān rudraḥ svaṃ pūrṇaṃ rūpam āviśat | nāpaśyanta tato rudraṃ devā viṣṇupurogamāḥ ‖ atharvaśirasā devam astuvaṃś cordhvabāhavaḥ |* As Mādhavamantrin notes *ad loc*, this closely follows *Atharvaśiras* 1.6: ***tato devā rudraṃ nāpaśyaṃs** te devā rudraṃ dhyāyanti. tato devā **ūrdhvabāhavaḥ stuvanti** yo vai rudraḥ sa bhagavān.*

worship to Śiva, complete with *pratīkas* to the Vedic mantras they employ. The *pūjā* they offer is a closely observed version of a recognizably Smārta worship, complete with the standard array of guest offerings given to the god and culminating in the three lines of holy ash that are smeared over the brows and bodies of the assembled *devas*. Śiva again comes into their presence (I.2.24), and reveals to them again the truth of the Veda, including the fact that 'only those brahmans who have faithfully followed the Pāśupata vow are fit to receive Vedic instruction.'[48]

This early episode of the SS provides a performative intimation of what the text as a whole sets out to do: to reassemble the textual inheritance of certain sectors of the Vedic and Śaiva corpora within its own ambit of an orthodox *aupaniṣadika* nondualism.[49] The twinned techniques of recast and quotation that are evident in the SS's relation to its antecedents are by no means unique to the work; yet their use here nevertheless signals something of the particular dynamics at work in Cidambaram's textual culture in this period. In the SS, this revivification of prior textual forms is grounded in an argument about the universal sovereignty of Śiva, seeking to find a Śaiva keynote underlying the vast and diverse spectrum of the Vedic corpus by way

[48] I.2.39: *vrataṃ pāśupataṃ cīrṇaṃ yair dvijair ādareṇa ca | teṣāṃ evopadeṣṭavyam iti vedānuśāsanam* ‖.

[49] It is precisely this project that Raghavan refers to when he speaks of the author of the SS as "enthused to do in the S.S. for Śiva–bhakti and Advaita what the Bhāgavata did for Kṛṣṇa–bhakti and Advaita" (*op. cit.* p. 122). In fact, in a way that largely parallels the complex negotiations of genre, register, practice, and belief that underlay the *Bhāgavata* (as it has come to be understood through the seminal work of van Buitenen 1968 and Hardy 1983), the SS can be seen arising at the complexly dialogical intersection of a host of precursor texts and systems of doctrine and practice. Raghavan's excellent study provides a very valuable survey of these, especially the parallels, recasting, and adoptions of Vedic texts, the *Gītā* and the *Bhāgavata* itself (pp. 120–125). The text as a whole is a palimpsest of these borrowings—especially so in the closing '*Brahmagītā*' in twelve *adhyāyas*, which Raghavan describes as 'a resumé of the leading Upaniṣads' (*op cit.* p. 119).

of a re-visioning of the world of *śrauta* and *smārta* textuality through the lens of the open and mutable form of a *purāṇa*.

The SS compilers consciously sought to exclude other kinds of textuality, while attempting, through their work's universalizing register, to subtly incorporate these very same excluded possibilities. This can be see most clearly in the case of the self-consciously extra-Vedic world of Śaiva scriptural and exegetical texts. In this, the SS inverts the Śaiva religion's own theoretical self-understanding as the more specific (and hence more efficacious) system of observance, as expressly contrasted with the general and widely available Vedic teaching.[50] Not all of the material that its compilers have downloaded into the SS derives from the Vedic orthodoxy; indeed, the text recognizably looks out upon a wider field of Śaiva practice and doctrine.

Much of this borrowing is of materials that are distinctively Śaiva but not necessarily technical in nature and which cannot be traced to any particular source or sources. For example, the five faces of Sadāśiva (Īśāna, Tatpuruṣa, Aghora, Vāmadeva, and Sadyojāta, the five *brahmamantras*) are made the underlying basis for a lengthy series of homologous sets of five (IV.14.3–31). Each of these faces is within Śaiva scriptural texts associated with a corresponding stream (*srotas*) of revelation: a rudiment of this notion can be seen at IV.20.20cd–23, where the Śaiva scriptures are divided into an *ūrdhva*– and an *adhaḥsrotas*. But the most significant and interesting borrowing is found in the SS's third major section, the *muktikhaṇḍa*. This relates to the Śaiva theory of liberation, and the gradation of the forms of post-

[50] On the relationship between *sāmānya*° and *viśeṣaśāstra*, see below, Chapter Three, p. 150.

mortem beatitude into *sālokya* (existence in Śiva's heaven), *sāmīpya* (proximity to the divine presence), *sārūpya* (possession of Śiva's fundamental characteristics of omniscience, omnipotence, and omnipervasion) and *sāyujya* (total identity).[51] For the composer-redactors of the SS this four–term series is first introduced as that which has been taught in the *upaniṣads* (III.2.28ab: *śrūyate...vedānteṣu*; a statement that Mādhavamantrin unconvincingly attempts to justify *ad loc.*) only to be unfavorably compared to the complete, nonrelational liberation (III.2.35a: *paramā muktiḥ*) that is the SS's own apex-point. The Śaiva hierarchy is then reintroduced as the subordinate (II.2.36d: *paratantrāḥ*) forms of liberation. Here the text betrays a certain ambivalence towards its Śaiva source material, as they are both affirmed and held at arm's length. This system of liberation-in-stages (*kramamuktiḥ*) is extrapolated out of its strictly Śaiva context, as each of the four grades is respectively correlated with the Smārta trinity of Śiva, Viṣṇu, and Brahmā (III.2.40–47ab). It is essential to see the resulting eclectic synthesis not as a collision of unreconciled sources, but as a deliberate textual strategy, a harmonization of diverse materials within the text's own superordinate structure.

The SS is written in a generally didactic mode, with scant narrative frames in-

[51]The history of this set of four is obscure to me, though it seems reasonable to presume it to be a doctrine specific to certain Śaivas. Seemingly the earliest list in which these four occur (with *sāṃnidhya* in the place of *sāyujya*) can be found in the *Mātaṅgapārameśvarāgama*, *yogapāda* 5.63 ff, where they appear as part of a larger set of seven kinds of liberated souls (I thank Dominic Goodall for this reference). Kashmirian exegetes from the eleventh century and after seem to use a three term set (the SS's set excluding *sārūpya*) and only for the inferior forms of liberation: thus Jayaratha *ad Tantrāloka* 13: 245cd-246ab and Kṣemarāja *ad Svacchandatantra* 10.787cd-788ab. In later South Indian literature, for example in Vedajñāna's *Śaivāgamaparibhāṣāmañjarī* (ca. 1550), they are established as the set of four we see in the SS. Whether this set of four then is a purely southern development (it can also be found in the Tamil *Tirumantiram*) is something that remains to be seen.

troducing long argumentative passages cast in the brusque economy of the *anuṣṭubh* meter. The *muktikhaṇḍa* as a whole (including the passage just discussed) is framed as a dialogue between Śiva and Viṣṇu, with only very occasional interjections by the Sūta, the text's ultimate narrator. The scene begins to change in the section's eighth and penultimate chapter, where the sages—for the first time in the whole *khaṇḍa*—ask a question of the Sūta: what did Viṣṇu do after he had acquired this knowledge of ultimate things from Śiva? He brought these teachings to the gods, the Sūta explains, having used Cidambaram (III.8.2d: *vyāghrapura*) as a launching pad for his return flight to his Vaikuṇṭha–heaven. When the other gods asked to hear the secrets that has been imparted to him, Viṣṇu demurred, pointing to his own unworthiness as a teacher, and tells them to take themselves to Cidambaram (III.8.8d: *puṇḍarīkapura*) and there offer worship to Śiva themselves, providing a detailed *dhyāna* or visualization of Śiva in the process (vv. 14b–23). The Sūta again takes up the narration, this time with a noticeable shift in flavor: over a series of heavily enjambed verses written in lyric meters, the narrator describes the gods' audience with Śiva (III.8.27–30):

> *bhaktyāpūjya maheśvarākhyam amalaṃ muktipradaṃ bhuktidaṃ*[52]
> *śaktyā yuktam atiprasannavadanaṃ brahmendrapūrvāḥ surāḥ* |
> *nityānandanirañjanāmṛtaparajñānānubhūtyā sadā*
> *nṛtyantaṃ parameśvaraṃ paśupatiṃ bhaktyaikalabhyaṃ param* ||
>
> *laukikena vacasā munīsvarā vaidikena vacasā ca tuṣṭuvuḥ* |
> *devadevam akhilārtihāriṇaṃ brahmavajradharapūrvakāḥ surāḥ* ||
>
> *munīśvarā maheśvaraḥ samastadevanāyakaḥ*
> *sureśvarān nirīkṣaṇān nirastapāpapañjarān* |
> *anugraheṇa śaṃkaraḥ pragṛhya pārvatīpatiḥ*
> *samastavedaśāstrasārabhūtam uttamottamam* ||
>
> *pradarśayan naṭeśvaraḥ samastadevasannidhau*
> *svanartanaṃ vimuktidaṃ mahattaraṃ maheśvaraḥ* |

[52] *bhuktidaṃ*] *conj.*; *bhaktidaṃ* Ed.

samastalokarakṣakaṃ mahātmanāṃ hṛdi sthitam
nirīkṣanārham iśvaro 'karot sabhāpatiḥ śivaḥ ||

The gods, led by Brahmā and Indra, once they had devoutly honored the stainless one called Maheśvara, the giver of liberation and of [karmic] experience, who is joined with his Power and whose face is exceedingly bright, God himself, the lord of creatures, the ultimate, who can only be approached through devotion and who forever dances through the power of his insight, the highest wisdom that is undying, stainless and ever-joyful,

Oh sages, led by Brahmā and the wielder of the *vajra*, the gods praised with the words of the Veda, and with worldly speech the God of gods, who removes all afflictions.

Sages—Maheśvara, the master of all the gods, did in his mercy receive the greatest of the gods, all of whose sins fell away at his gaze, and then Śaṃkara, the husband of the Mountain Goddess and the Lord of Dancers, while he was performing his unique dance in the presence of the gathered gods—the utterly sublime, the essence of all of the Vedas and the *śāstras*, that greatest of dances, which gives total liberation, maintains all of the worlds, and abides in the hearts of the great—the master of the Assembly, Lord Śiva, made his dance manifest to them.

The gods praise Śiva, and he begins to dance: from the point of view of their content, these verses are completely conventional. It is their form that is of particular interest, first of all in the shift to the longer *kāvya* meters. This is a way of the text drawing attention to itself, breaking with the standard epic *śloka* that dominates it. This formal 'thickening' is further borne out by the individual verses, in a startling way: the first verse, written in *śārdūlavikrīḍita*, employs initial rhyme or *dvitīyākṣaraprāsa*, a figure of sound that is extremely rare in Sanskrit but that is so common as to be practically obligatory in medieval Tamil. The final two verses—in the rare *pañcacāmara* meter—are composed with an obvious priority given to their rhythmic cadence, and contain a spellbinding display of internal rhyme and assonance, again features diagnostic of contemporaneous Tamil poetry, and hardly something one expects to see in a Sanskrit *purāṇa*. This presence of such an insistent rhythmic figure within the metrical structure of a verse is called *cantam* within Tamil prosody; as far as I am

aware this is completely untheorized in Sanskrit metrics.

The point bears emphasis: as the composers of the SS shift the scene to Cidambaram, the language of the text itself changes and adopts highly marked 'Dravidian' formal features. Though as yet we are still within the ambit of the unearthly, the particulars of the place begin to impress themselves on the text. This establishes a tension in the narrative, as ultimate things are set self-consciously within the world of men: the SS's Vedāntic truths are by definition timeless and placeless, and the vision of release offered up by the text is the state of complete non-relation, of pure being without becoming. Yet here these truths are situated in a particular point in space—Vyāghrapura, Tigertown—and are introduced in language that bears the recognizable stamp of the local and the circumscribed.

This is only increased in the following verses, where the priority of Cidambaram is first set against a purely gnostic (and purely Vedāntic) view of liberation, and a catalog of other Śaiva holy places, Vārāṇasī chief among them. This tension—between the universal and the particular, between the text's mental map of India and its own backyard, so to speak—is then resolved by one of the vertiginous narratological moments familiar to readers of the Epics and *purāṇa*s. The sages again interrupt the Sūta: how can *we* see this dance of Śiva's (III.9.3ab)? Thereupon the whole crew—the narrative bedrock of the entire text—shift from their sacrifice in the Naimiṣa forest to Cidambaram. Naimiṣa, "the Twinkling," is the site of the recitation of the *Bhārata* and all of the *purāṇa*s: it is a place apart from space and outside of time. Yet, when the Sūta and the assembled sages (along with Vyāsa, who suddenly appears on the

scene) decamp from there to Cidambaram, they arrive at a moment sharply marked in time, as the sun is set in Sagittarius, under the Ārdrā asterism. Śiva dances for the sages, the sky rains flowers, the earth resounds with divine music, and Śiva, Ambā and their retinue go out on procession, first to the temple's tank, and then through the town. The assembled gods begin to hymn the god, and so the chapter, and the *muktikhaṇḍa*, draws to a close.

It takes no great leap of the imagination to see in this final epiphanic description a narrative translation of the Cidambaram festival calendar: Śiva and the goddess go on procession, bathe, and are celebrated by the surrounding throngs with hymn and song. The details given in the SS accord well with this hypothesis: the astrological data correspond to the Tamil month of Mārkaḻi (Skt. *mārgaśīrṣa*, November-December), historically and into the present day the period of one of the two great festivals associated with the Naṭeśa temple. The hymn with which the chapter and the *khaṇḍa* draw to a close is in fact a close refashioning in *anuṣṭubh* of the *Śatarudrīya*, the ancient Vedic hymn to Śiva.[53] This would have struck the initial audience of the text as an especially fitting source, as the place enjoyed by the *Śrīrudram* (=*Śatarudrīya*) as a part of the temple liturgy is attested by epigraphy.[54]

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[53]On the *Śatarudrīya*, see Gonda 1980; note that Raghavan (*op. cit*, p. 120) identifies it (though gives the location in the SS incorrectly), while Mādhavamantrin does not.

[54]SII IV:631 (=ARE 193 of 1892), ll. 2ff: *tribhuvaṉaccakravarti śrīsundarapāṇḍyadevar uṭaiyār tiruccir̲r̲ampalamuṭaiyaṉāyaṉār koyil kaṇkāṇṇi karaṇattārkku ikkoyil eḻunt'aruḷi iruntu pūjaikoṇṭaruḷum uṭaiyār śrīmūlasthānamuṭaiyār tiumuṉpu śrīrudram addhyāyaṉam paṇṇa śrībali eḻunt'aruḷiṉāl* (?) *tirumuṉpu niṉr̲u namakku āśīrvādaṃ paṇṇuvārkaḷāka....* The inscription is fragmentary (it breaks off immediately after this quotation), but it may be interpreted as follows: "The Emperor to the Three Worlds, the glorious Sundarapāṇḍya [gives the following order] to the superintending officers of the temple of the Master of the Auspicious Little Shrine: [in order to provide for temple servants] who will offer benedictions for our benefit in the presence of the deity during the auspicious establishment of the *bali* offering while the *śrīrudram* is being recited in the presence

In this one moment, the outer narrative frame of the SS comes into contact with the real world of its authors' and audience's actual lived experience of the Cidambaram temple. That this is an experience of the time out of time of festival should not distract us from just how daring, and how affecting a narrative technique this is. The purāṇic composers have left no trace of themselves in the text other than this, at least none that I can detect. We can thus only speculate as to the particulars of their position and the social constituency that they might have some to serve through the promulgation of the work. It seems to me just possible that the SS's composers might have come from the landed Brahman communities of the environs on Cidambaram that figure so conspicuously in the temple's epigraphy. The seemingly recent and perhaps insecure foundations of their brahmanical pedigree may have induced such men to craft such a text as the SS, with its emphatic assertion of Vedic *bona fides* and its curious mélange of universalist aspirations and local knowledge.[55]

It is in precisely this enunciative project that the text is at once at its most creative and its most equivocal. In the process of situating itself within the prestigious orbit of the Cidambaram temple and its liturgical and textual dispensations, the SS's compilers found themselves in a telling dilemma: in locating themselves within the

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of the deity who is pleased to be established and to be receiving worship in this temple, the Lord of the *mūlasthāna...*" It might be objected that this thirteenth century record is considerably later than my proposed dating for the SS; note however that the mention of the *śrīrudram addhyāyaṉam* refers to an already existing liturgical practice to which the Pāṇṭiyaṉ king is appending another observance.

[55]One may contrast here Kulke's suggestion that the author or authors of the CM might have been Brahman transplanted by Kulottuṅga I from Veṅgi to Cidambaram, for which there is no evidence in the epigraphical record. The present theory has at least the advantage of an actually-existing social constituency in which the text's authors may tentatively be located.

world of their own everyday experience, the world in which their project took on its greatest efficacy, they mortgaged their own claims to transcendent authority upon the contingent state of affairs of their own locally-inflected textual culture. This should not be understood as a failure of the SS author-compilers; instead, this works as a productive tension within the text. In attempting to anchor the claims to a totally non-relational state of beatitude, they resorted to the highly 'relational' style and content of their own place and time, thus driving a wedge between their systematic claims and their effective realization in text. While speaking in the universalizing register of the great *purāṇa*s, the creators of the SS simultaneously managed to evoke their own local world in a distinctive and novel way.

The problem for the second of our Cidambaram *purāṇa*s was, if anything, the precise inverse of that of the SS. The poet Cēkkiḻār consecrated his *Tiruttoṇṭar-purāṇam* (better known as the *Periyapurāṇam*, hereafter PP) to the explicit project of providing a universal narrative account of the foremost of the devout men and women revered by Tamil Śaivas, one intended not merely for the faithful, but for 'the entire world,' *ulak' elām*. It is with these words that his long poem famously begins:

ulak' elām uṇarnt'ōtaṟk' ariyavaṉ
nilav'ulāviya nīrmali vēṇiyaṉ
alakil cōtiyaṉ ampalattāṭavāṉ
malarcilampaṭi vāḻtti vaṇaṅkuvām (1)

ūṉ aṭainta uṭampiṉ piṟaviṉē
tāṉ aṭainta uṟutiyaic cārumāl
tēṉ aṭainta malarpoḻiṟ ṟillaiyuḷ
mānaṭañceyvaratar poṟṟāṭoḻa (2)

He who is dear to the thought and speech of the entire world,
In Whose locks rest the moon and the spreading waters,
He of limitless luster, Who dances in the *ampalam* —
To His flower–ankleted feet we do reverence.

> Embodied birth, by flesh conditioned,
> attains the purpose to which it's suited
> in order to worship the golden feet of Varatar,
> who performs His great dance in Tillai,
> its flower gardens abounding with honey.

These two verses clearly signal the work's and its author's affiliation to Cidambaram. A few verses further (translated below), Cēkkiḻār names for the first time the patron king under whose authority the work was commissioned: Anapāyaṉ, a *biruda* of Kulottuṅga II Cōḻa (r. 1133–1150). The relationship between this Cōḻa king and Cēkkiḻār as well as the importance of Cidambaram as the site of the composition and initial promulgation of this Śaiva religious epic are echoed in the later verse hagiography of Cēkkiḻār, the *Cēkkiḻārpurāṇam* attributed to the fourteenth century Śaiva divine Umāpaticivaṉ.[56] There, Cēkkiḻār is described as a minister to the Cōḻa king who decides to craft a long Śaiva poem to unseat the earlier Jaina *kāvya Cīvaka-cintāmaṇi* (vs. 20) from the king's favor, and retires to Cidambaram to complete the task (vs. 28). Now, as I will return to in greater detail below, I think that a great deal of caution is called for in accepting this later text's claims at face value. In outline, however, I think that we need not suspect the authenticity of the tradition represented in the *Cēkkiḻārpurāṇam* regarding the time and place of the text's composition, since these details find support within the text itself, as well as finding further confirmation in contemporaneous inscriptional evidence.[57]

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[56]The text of this *purāṇam*, also called the *Tiruttoṇṭarpurāṇavaralāṟu* (the *History of the Tiruttoṇṭarpurāṇam*) is included in the first volume of Ci. Kē. Cuppiramaṇiya Mutaliyār's edition of the PP.

[57]The epigraphical references to Cēkkiḻār and other members of his family were first brought to the attention of modern scholarship by Irākava Aiyaṅkār 1937, and were expanded and further interpreted by Irācamaṇikkaṉār 1947. I discuss this evidence in more detail in Cox forthcoming b.

At its most basic level, the PP is a collection of seventy-two separate narrations of the lives of the *nāyaṉmār* (numbering sixty-three individuals and nine collectives), with the life of the *Tēvāram* poet Cuntaramūrtti providing a frame for the rest. This structure derives from the list of Śaiva saints contained in the *Tiruttoṇṭattokai* attributed to Cuntaramūrtti himself, as well as in the (eleventh century?) expansion of this text by Nampiyāṇṭārnampi, the *Tiruttoṇṭattiruvantāti*. Cēkkiḻār informs his audience that his text is an exposition (*viri*) on the first work, as augmented by

the second, which he understands to be an expansion (*vakai*) of Cuntarar's text.[58] The *Tiruttoṇṭattokai* is a bare list of the names of the seventy-one individuals or collectives, all of whom the poet (and thus the text's subsequent reciter) declares himself to be the slave or servant (*aṭiyēṉ*). Nampi's text in turn is a short verse eulogy based on the Cuntaramūrtti text. Interestingly enough, the *Tiruttoṇṭatokai*, like the *Śatarudrīya* discussed earlier in the context of the SS, is attested in epigraphy

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[58]As is made explicit in the following:

eṉṟu māmuṉi vaṉṟoṇṭar ceykaiyai
aṉṟu coṉṉapaṭiyāl aṭiyavar
tuṉṟu cīrtiruttoṇṭattokai viri
iṉṟ' eṉātaravāl iṅk' iyampukēṉ (47)

maṟṟ' itaṟkup patikam vaṉṟoṇṭartām
puṟṟ' iṭatt' empurāṇār aruḷiṉāl
coṟṟa meytiruttoṇṭattokai yeṉap
peṟṟa naṟpatikan toḻapperṟatāl (48)

anta meyppatikatt' aṭiyārkaḷai
nantanātaṉā nampiyāṇṭārnampi
punti yārap pukaṉṟa vakaiyiṉāl
vantavāṟu vaḻāmal iyampuvām (49)

In accord with the manner in which that the great sage [=Upamaṉṉiyaṉ, see below] did then speak of the deeds of the harsh devotee, so now I am pleased to compose here an exposition [*viri*] on the *Tiruttoṇṭatokai*, of great fame among the devout.

Further, the fine verse-text [*patikam*] that is called the true [or, the 'actual' *mey*°] *Tiruttoṇṭattokai*, which the harsh devotee himself was made to speak through the favor of our ancient [lord] who lives in the Anthill [*i.e.* Śiva at Tiruvārūr] has been worshipfully adopted as the lemma [*patikam*] for this [work].

We will compose this without deviating from the path laid out by the expansion [*vakai*] that our master Nampiyāṇṭārnampi crafted in order to fill the mind with the slaves of the Lord [mentioned] in that true verse-text [*meyppatikam*, as above].

At first glance, the pivotal verse 48 seems to be a pleonasm: *itaṟkup patikam...naṟpatikam*: "the good *patikam* is the *patikam* for this [work]." This relies on the complicated historical semantics of *patikam*, a word whose etymology continues to be debated into the present day. The earliest use of *patikam* dates to the Caṅkam period, especially to the poetic colophons attached to the decads of the *Patiṟṟupattu*. While it is generally agreed that the Tamil word is a *tadbhava* (a Sanskrit derivative that has been morphologically altered), there is disagreement as to what is the Sanskrit original, either *padya* ("verse") or *pratīka* ("surface, appearance, the first word of a verse [cited in a commentary]"). Cēkkiḻār, seemingly aware of these two divergent etymologies, plays on them here; for the present translation of 'lemma' *cf.* OED *s.v.*, "The argument or subject of a literary composition, prefixed as a heading or title; also, a motto appended to a picture, etc...The heading or theme of a scholium, annotation, or gloss."

as a part of the liturgy of the Cidambaram temple.[59] Cēkkiḻār seems to have adopted a piece of authoritative textual material known, indeed perhaps intimately known, to his initial audience, and used it to form the overall structure for his long religious epic, taking Nampi's later version as an outline, further expanding on details given there, while integrating the whole text into the scope of a single, unified narrative. Cēkkiḻār adopted this sequence of basic text–initial expansion–authoritative exposition from the traditions of Tamil grammar and poetics;[60] its use in a literary context seems to be an innovation, one that highlights the didactic purpose to which the work is consecrated.

This in itself is quite extraordinary: a conscious and deliberate effort to create a long poem on an explicit and closely observed constructive logic. Yet the textual dynamics of the PP are actually considerably more complex than this model would lead one to believe. As a poet, Cēkkiḻār was a voracious assimilator of other texts, both literary and otherwise. Here, I will concern myself with what might be considered Cēkkiḻār's opening gambit, the PP's presentation of itself in its first canto, the *Tirumalaiccarukkam*.

Much of the detail of what the PP considers itself to be and the work it is intended to do emerges at its very outset, in the *pāyiram* or preamble to the work. This section

[59] SII IV:223 (=ARE 118 of 1888). Among a series of benefactions sponsored by "Nakkapāvai, a woman who is an intimate of the king Rājendracoḻatevar," this inscription records the following donation: "an additional five *kācu* for the reciters of the *Tiruttoṇṭattokai* during the festival day in the auspicious month of Māci" (ln. 25: *...tirumācittirunāḷil tiruttoṇṭattukai* (*sic*) *viṇṇappacceyvāṟkku kācu aiñcum...*).

[60] The earliest such a model can be found in Nakkīraṉār's commentary on the *Iṟaiyaṉārakapporul* (Paramasivan and Buck 1997). The model is taken up also in Pavaṇanti's *Naṉṉūl* (*pāyiram*, *cūttiram*s 5–8), under the rubric *mutal*, *vaḻi* and *puṭai*.

began with its first two verses; picking up from there, we read:

> We install in our thoughts that rutting tusker with his dangling ears, his long crown, and his five strong hands, who graced us with the now-accomplished eminence that is this Great Tale in sweet Tamil verse, giving liberation. (3)
>
> In accord with divine precept, may that great assembly be illustrious and victorious throughout the world, filled with those pure ones who revel in the virtues of the flowers which are the words of the *nāyaṉmār*, who give praise to Him who dwells within the assembly hall, in Whose matted locks rests the waxing moon. (4)
>
> I speak of the glories of those numberless slaves of the Lord, whose greatness knows no limit. Though speaking of them with measure is difficult, my limitless passion wells up, and I speak. (5)
>
> I shall endeavor to tell of the unrivaled merits of the holy devotees, whose greatness is inconceivable. I'm like a dog, burning with lust to lap up the cool and far-spreading ocean. (6)
>
> When some matter is spoken of, by its own merits, any may grasp the words to get at their meaning. Though my words are poorly matched to this matter, those who are suited to its truth may grasp its magnitude. (7)
>
> The Cōḻa, he who decorated Ceyavaṉ's holy *pērampalam* with pure gold, Anapāyaṉ, whose merits are known throughout the wide earth— it was in fact his royal assembly who wished for these loving words. (8)
>
> Should you say, "The divine servitude [of the *nāyaṉmār*], charged with [the Lord's] presiding favor, is beyond the power of your understanding; how then can you possibly tell of this?" I would then reply: "This is owing to the matter that has been taught by that one who is the very image of the Master of the faultless Veda." (9)
>
> And as for the name: In this world, there are two kinds of darkness—dispelling that darkness which thrives in the anxious minds of people, as the red-rayed Sun pushes back the other, outer darkness, we call this *The Purāṇa of the Holy Devotees.* (10)

We may begin at the end. In the final verse of the *pāyiram*, Cēkkiḻār explicitly baptizes his text with its title, the *Tiruttoṇṭarpurāṇam*, setting the terms for his poem's reception as a *purāṇam*, an account of the past. This marks, I believe, quite possibly the first time anyone had ever so described a work in Tamil, although in Cēkkiḻār's wake *purāṇam* was to prove a highly productive genre.[61] Does this suggest

[61] See Raghavan 1960, Shulman 1980, and Rocher 1986, p. 77. Raghavan refers to a number of early examples, for example a *Purāṇacākaram* cited in a work on prosody; he further claims that the *Tiruttoṇṭattokai* itself is referred to as a *purāṇam*, a claim for which he cites no evidence. The only other possibly early work is the Jaina *Śrīpurāṇam*, composed in Sanskritized prose; Zvelebil (1994) dates this to the fifteenth century.

that Cēkki<u>l</u>ār sought to align his text generically with, say, the SS? Although—as we will see below—the PP may in fact be indebted to a Śaiva purāṇic source in Sanskrit, I do not believe that this is the kind of precursor Cēkki<u>l</u>ār wished to imply. Unlike the SS, for instance, the PP emphatically has a single, historical, human author and lacks the traditional topics—the much-discussed *pañcalakṣaṇa*—that such a text should include.[62] There is, moreover, a more likely candidate for the kind of text the PP means itself to be when it calls itself a *purāṇa*: as Peterson has pointed out, the PP is much closer in its form and design with the Jaina universal histories that share this title.[63] A number of such works were produced in the centuries before Cēkki<u>l</u>ār's time in the nearby regions of what is now Karnataka: Jinasena's *Ādipurāṇa*, Guṇabhadra's *Uttarapurāṇa* (both in Sanskrit), Puṣpadanta's Apabhraṃśa *Mahāpurāṇu*, and Cāmuṇḍarāya's Kannada *Ādipurāṇam* (the last of these Peterson suggests as a particularly apt candidate for what she terms Cēkki<u>l</u>ār's "shadow–text").[64]

Looking at this declaration of title and genre in the context of the *pāyiram* as a whole, we may see what other preconditions about the text Cēkki<u>l</u>ār seeks to establish. Bound up in the opening declaration of the *pāyiram* is a particular and certain image of the text's author. Cēkki<u>l</u>ār's references to himself here are admittedly conventional: his claims to inability in the fifth and sixth verses, for example, form the traditional *avaiyaṭakkam* or apology to the assembly that heads any Tamil

[62]See Rocher *op. cit.* pp. 24–30; the SS for its part, contains the stereotypical verse definition of *purāṇaṃ pañcalakṣaṇam* at 1:1:33.

[63]See Peterson 1998.

[64]Peterson's argument concerns the place of the PP in the history of conflict between Tamil Śaivas and Jainas, an explicit *topos* of Cēkki<u>l</u>ār's account of the lives of the two *nāya<u>n</u>mār* Appar and Campantar. On this perceived 'communal' aspect to the PP, see below.

peruṅkāppiyam (=Skt. *mahākāvya*). Normally, however elegant its language, the *avaiyaṭakkam* hangs in the air of a poem's beginning as a rhetorical question, a stock gesture of humility. Here, however, Cēkkiḻār rushes through the conventional apology to announce his own certitude: his great passion wells up (*aḷavil ācai turappa*), and he is impelled to speak. Here we find the poet divided between two competing modes of his craft: on the one hand the court poet, on the other the enthusiastic *bhakti* singer.[65]

With the reference to the commission by the royal assembly of Anapāyaṉ Cōḻa, the last element of the picture is in place. Cēkkiḻār creates for himself a complex persona to inhabit, at once poet, courtier, and *nāyaṉār*–devotee. This multiple self-imagining can perhaps be laid alongside what we know of the poet outside of his work: an entitled member of the Cōḻa elite, native to the northern marches of the kingdom, yet likely settled in Cidambaram, a town in which his own clan seems to have occupied a place of importance,[66] the persona that the poet crafted for himself may bear the strong impress of his own complex negotiation of his public self. Significantly, the image of the author in the *pāyiram* is coordinated with another, collective persona, that of the 'great assembly' (*pēravai*), the community of Śaiva believers. This is borne out throughout the text, through the consistent and charged references to Śiva

[65] *Cf.* Shulman's description of the figure of Kampaṉ (1993 [=2001, pp. 103–128]).

[66] As can be seen in temple inscription of 1186 CE (ARE 313 of 1959; admittedly, this is after the composition of the PP), in which a man named Cēkkiḻaṉ Araiyaṉ Etirilicoḻaṉ of the town of Kuṉṟattūr (Cēkkiḻār's native place), on the order of the king purchased land on behalf of a local brahman to provide support for two families of temple gardeners. The intersection of a member of the Cēkkiḻaṉ clan, royal imprimatur, and a member of the local brahman elite is certainly striking. See also Cox forthcoming b.

as *emperumāṉ* and *empirāṉ*, that is, *our* lord and master.

The PP's generic self-articulation—and the concomitant creation of individual and collective personae within the text—doesn't end with its opening decad of verses. As noticed earlier, Cēkkiḻār places his work within a hierarchy of earlier texts (those of Cuntaramūrtti and Nampiyāṇṭārnampi), invoking explicitly a model of textual genesis adopted from the Tamil grammatical and literary-critical traditions. This creative adoption is not simply allowed to stand on its own; instead, Cēkkiḻār situates this within a properly narrative framework. The narrative (detailed in vss. 23–50) resituates the events of the PP within a mythic context. It begins as the sage Upamaṉṉiyaṉ (=Skt. Upamanyu), attended by a group of ascetics, was once sitting in mediation on the slopes of Kailāsa, Śiva's holy mountain. Suddenly, the assembled company was witness to something amazing: a single flash of radiance, like the light of a thousand suns, appeared before them (vs. 26). Questioned, Upamaṉṉiyaṉ announces that this portent signals a great event: the *vaṉṟoṇṭar*, the 'harsh devotee,' has returned from his sojourn in the South to his true home atop Kailāsa.

Inevitably, this laconic answer elicits more questions from the gathered *yogi*s. Upamaṉṉiyaṉ obliges his audience, and begins to tell a story: Śiva once had a servant named Ālālacuntaraṉ who was tasked to bring flower-garlands and ash for the god to adorn himself. Once, as he went to a celestial garden to collect his day's flowers, this servant caught sight of two beautiful handmaidens of the Goddess, Aṉintitai and Kamaliṉi, themselves come to gather flowers for their lady. Ālālacuntaraṉ did his work there in the garden and returned, as did the two demigoddesses, but—of

course—there is no hiding from God: Śiva summarily commands Cuntaraṉ to take human birth in the southern country and there "join in love's pleasures with the gentle ones" (vs. 37: *melliyalāruṭaṉ kātaliṉpaṅ kalant' aṇaivāy*). Their tenure in the world having drawn to an end, Upamaṉṉiyaṉ tells his audience, these three have now returned. Prompted by another question from the *yogin*s, Upamaṉṉiyaṉ concludes with praise for the far South, as a part of the world worthy of such an auspicious visitation.

This charming little story of a heavenly ménage a trois and its earthly consequences appears to be an invention of Cēkkiḻār's. The narrative framework that Cēkkiḻār sets this in is familiar: a great sage responding to the questions of a prestigious audience, it recalls the outmost conversational setting of the Sanskrit *purāṇa*s, just as we saw in the SS. Moreover, the choice of Upamaṉṉiyaṉ seems a very deliberate one of Cēkkiḻār's. Upamanyu's is a famous name in Sanskrit mythology, especially in Śaiva texts, but Cēkkiḻār, through two oblique yet telling references points towards the particular sources of his indebtedness. The PP's readers hear that Upamaṉṉiyaṉ is one "who once placed his feet atop the crowned head of Mātavaṉ [*i.e.* Kṛṣṇa], the lord of the Yādava's city of Dvārakā,"[67] a reference probably to a lengthy passage in the *Mahābhārata*'s *Anuśāsanaparvan* (13.14–17), which has Upamanyu teaching the *śivadharma* to Kṛṣṇa, culminating in a litany of the thousand names of the god.[68] Further—and even more significantly for our present purposes—Upamaṉ-

[67]vs. 24ab: *yātavaṉṟuvāraikk' iṟaiyākiya/ mātavaṉmuṭi mēl aṭi vaittavaṉ*

[68]Alternately, this could be a reference to the dialogic setting of the *uparibhāga* of the *Śivapurāṇa*'s *Vāyavīyasaṃhitā*. It is, however, uncertain whether the *Śivapurāṇa* in its present state is earlier than the PP; Hazra 1940 dates the text to the eleventh century, based on rather impressionistic

ṉiyaṉ's catalog of the virtues of the southern country includes "Perumpaṟṟappuliyūr [=Cidambaram], which is honored even by that rare sage of ever-increasing *tapas*, my father Tiger-Foot,"[69] employing a pure Tamil name (*pulikālaṉ*) for the Sanskrit name Vyāghrapāda. Upamanyu's father is named Vyāghrapāda as far back as the Vedas, yet the connection of the elder sage with Cidambaram has its first textual attestation in the *Cidambaramāhātmya*, which as we have seen was likely composed close to Cēkkiḻār's own time. By choosing Upamaṉṉiyaṉ as the teller of the tale of Cuntaramūrtti's incarnation (for so Ālālacuntaraṉ will come to be known), Cēkkiḻār makes a very deliberate, indeed an ingenious decision, gesturing at once towards the very local world of its region of initial circulation and to the grand compass of the Sanskrit epic imagination.

There is, however, something strange about the story that Cēkkiḻār has Upamaṉṉiyaṉ tell. Śiva demands that his servant should find love and satisfaction on earth with two heavenly women—the openly erotic character of this divine command is hardly what one might expect as the narrative core of the pious PP. More to the point, however, there is something odd about the narrative morphology of the whole episode. A happening in heaven setting in motion a chain of earthly events is a familiar device in old Indian texts (one thinks of the opening to Bāṇa's *Harṣacarita*), but almost always due to the working out a *curse*, not what amounts to an arbitrary paid leave for one of god's servants. This slight narrative disconnect points to one

grounds.

[69]vs. 41: *poruvaruntavattāṉ pulikkālaṉām/ arumuṉi yentai yarccittum uḷḷatu...perumpaṟṟappuliyūr.*

final source for Cēkkiḻār's opening gambit in the PP, although the actual text in question remains elusive.

Cēkkiḻār must surely have felt the need to incorporate the details of the historical Cuntaramūrtti's biography, and any reader of his *Tēvāram* would know that Cuntarar married two women in the course of his life, Paravai and Caṅkili, whom he names in the autobiographical codas to his hymns.[70] But something else is at work here, some felt need on our author's part to integrate this biographical fact into the fabric of his narrative. I propose that as a final layer to the complexly laminated generic form of the PP, Cēkkiḻār intended an explicit homage to that most celebrated pan-Indian story cycle, the *Bṛhatkathā*. I cannot be entirely certain of this, as I am unable to propose any particular version of the cycle to be the text that Cēkkiḻār definitively had before him as his composed the PP.[71] It appears that Cēkkiḻār's use of this *Bṛhatkathā* source, whatever it was, rested on a creative fusion of two distinct borrowings from the text. Among the innumerable stories that make up the extant versions there are found many tales of erotic adventure, as in the stories of King Udayana and his son

[70]Of course, to presently speak of the 'historical Cuntaramūrtti' outside of Cēkkiḻār's authoritative biographical account is an almost impossible task; as Gros eloquently put it (1984, xii), "C'est le mirage de Cēkkiḻār auquel l'historien tente vainement d'échapper car le passé qu'il reconstruit ne se dissociera plus de notre magicien du XIIe siècle et de ses suggestions impératives." For a suggestive attempt to read both the PP account and the authorial (or perhaps quasi-authorial) traces in the Cuntarar *Tēvāram*, see Shulman 1990, pp. xv–xlii, esp. xxvii–xxxiv.

[71]Somadeva's *Kathāsaritsāgara*, now perhaps the most popular version of the *Bṛhatkathā*, is a possibility; it was completed some time in the third quarter of the eleventh century. It is also possible that Cēkkiḻār had access to either of the other Northern Sanskrit versions, Budhasvāmin's *Bṛhatkathāślokasaṃgraha* or Kṣemendra's *Bṛhatkathāmañjarī*, or to another Sanskrit version altogether. There is also the Tamil version, the *Peruṅkatai* of Koṅkuveḷīr, but it survives only in a fragmentary form, lacking the (for my purposes) crucial introduction to the text. See Nelson 1978 and 1980 and Vijayalakshmy 1981b on these several versions of the *Bṛhatkathā*; both contain useful surveys of the extant versions (including the Jaina Prakrit *Vasudevahiṃḍi*) and present serious (if rather different) arguments about their priority and critical interest.

Naravāhanadatta. These stories along with the enormous corpus of other narratives are set within a framing introduction, called the *kathāpīṭha* ("the seat of the stories"). This sets out one of the divine curse-narratives to which I referred above: Guṇāḍhya, the scholar Vararuci, and the *piśāca* Kāṇabhūti, all intimately involved in the creation of the earthly *Bṛhatkathā*, are in fact beings from Śiva's heaven cursed to be born on earth for their eavesdropping on Śiva's relation of the story-cycle as a bedtime entertainment to Pārvatī.

In the *Bṛhatkathā* version all of the cursed figures are male; there is none of the romantic subtext to Cuntarar's incarnation story. Cēkkiḻār seems to have fused the erotic theme that occupies so much of the *Bṛhatkathā* with this account of the cycle's putatively divine origins. Very speculatively, we may reconstruct the poet's thinking here: bearing the fact of the Cuntarar's two marriages in mind, as well as his desire to make the initial, inspired *ex tempore* performance of the *Tirutoṇṭattokai* into the key moment for his entire long poem, Cēkkiḻār alighted upon the common structure uniting the two trios (the three *Bṛhatkathā* characters and Cuntaramūrtti and his two wives) as a way to provide a suitable incarnational back–story for his own poem. Although the conditions of Cuntarar's time on earth are not directly linked to the propagation of the *Tirutoṇṭattokai*, the shared motif appears clear enough.[72]

[72]This condition is implied in Upamaṉṉiyaṉ's description of the three servants' love at first sight; vs. 35:

> *mātavañ ceyta teṉṟicai vāḻnt' iṭat*
> *tītilāt tiruttoṇṭattokai tarap*
> *potuvār avar mēṉ maṉam pōkk' iṭak*
> *kātaṉ mātaruṅ kāṭciyil kaṇṇiṉār*
>
> That man who was equal to the task of presenting the flawless *Tirutoṇṭattokai*, so to make flourish the southern country that had performed great *tapas*, set his mind

Table 2.1 Textual antecedents for the *Periyapurāṇam*

Text or texts	**Evidence of Indebtedness**
Jaina *purāṇas*	sixty-three *śālākapuruṣas*≈ sixty-three *nāyaṉmār*
Tēvāram bhakti corpus	poet as enthusiast (PP vss. 5, 6); direct quotations (*passim*)
Tamil *peruṅkāppiyam*	*avaiyaṭakkam*; descriptive topoi
Tiruttoṇṭattokai/ *Tiruttoṇṭattiruvantāti*	vv. 47–49 (explicitly mentioned by Cēkkiḻār); *passim*
Sanskrit narrative literature	Upamanyu as narrator=*Mahābhārata* (*Śivapurāṇa*?); Upamanyu as son of Vyāghrapāda (/Pulikālaṉ) and associated with Cidambaram (vs. 41)=*Cidambaramāhātmya*, 10:1–24
**Bṛhatkathā* (actual source unknown)	Cuntaramūrtti's incarnation narrative='*kathāpīṭha*' curse episode+erotic story cycles (of *e.g.*. Udayana, Naravāhanadatta, etc.)

Since the story of Cuntarar's life of devoted service to Śiva could hardly be made the consequence of a curse by the god, Cēkkiḻār transformed Ālālacuntaraṉ's story into the playing out of a boon, a sort of divinely sanctioned erotic vacation. Motivated by the details of the historical Cuntaramūrtti's biography, this incarnation narrative was combined by Cēkkiḻār with the motif of a man winning a series of women, familiar to readers of the *Bṛhatkathā*'s central storyline. The Kailāsa episode becomes, then, a somewhat attenuated but nevertheless perceptible *renvoi* to the *Bṛhatkathā* cycle and an emblem of the PP's incorporative generic self-presentation as a whole.

The several generic models that the opening of the PP invokes are shown in Table 2.1. This diversity of the generic prototypes for the PP casts serious doubt

upon them, and for their part, those lovely women saw him, on this their first meeting [*kāṭciyil*].

on the central contention of *Cēkkiḻārpurāṇam* attributed to Umāpaticivaṉ,[73] that the PP was intended as a polemic counterblast to Tiruttakkatēvar's *Cīvakacintāmaṇi*. Decades ago, Irācamanikkaṉār noted that there was nothing in the patent text of Cēkkiḻār's poem to bear out this interpretation; rather, the *Cintāmaṇi* was one of the great array of Tamil literary precursors to which Cēkkiḻār incorporates allusions in his text. Seen from the perspective laid out here, the CP's claim becomes even more difficult to sustain: there is a complex textual background that the PP integrally presupposes, but it does not necessarily include the erotic and martial adventures of Prince Cīvakaṉ, whose story is ultimately subordinated to the Jaina vision of *askesis* and renunciation.[74] While stories of contestation and even violent conflict between Śaivas and Jains fill the verses of the PP (once again, this was a necessity imposed by the nature of Cēkkiḻār's source material, especially the *Tēvāram*s of Appar and Campantar), I simply do not think that this is relevant to our understanding of the origins and self-presentation of the text.

I do not mean by this to imply that the author of the CP (whom I will call pseudo-

[73]This attribution is, however, very likely incorrect. The Umāpati who was the author of the key works of Tamil Caivacittāntam theology, who flourished ca. 1313 CE (ll. 26-27 of the *pāyiram* of his *Caṅkaṟpanirākaraṇam* date that work to *śāka* 1235) has had a small library of works in both Sanskrit and Tamil attributed to him, often on very weak grounds. See Chauhan-Colas 2002, pp. 305-06 and Goodall 2004, p. cxviii for some well-founded arguments for the impossibility of the ascriptions of several Sanskrit works to this author. See also Nagaswami 1998 for a critique of Smith's (1996) acceptance of the fourteenth century Umāpati as the author of the *Kuñcitāṅghristava*. Irācamaṇikkaṉār 1947 finds no warrant to attribute the CP to the fourteenth century Umāpati, and speculates that the author of that text may have predated the shastric author (a claim for which he adduces no evidence). Given this amount of uncertainty, it seems to me best to presume that *all* of these 'Umāpati-candidates' are different men, until proven otherwise. Since the generally accepted narrative of the history of Tamil Śaivism derives from texts attributed to this author (especially the CP, the *Tirumuṟaikkaṇṭapurāṇam* and, for Cidambaram, the *Kōyiṟpurāṇam*), the need to properly stratify these texts and to assess their potential validity as historical sources is a pressing one.

[74]As compellingly argued in Ryan 1998.

Umāpati) was disingenuous to his audience, or that he was a sort of communalist avant la lettre. Instead, I think that pseudo-Umāpati's argument in the CP represents a real attempt to understand Cēkkiḻār's poem from within the horizon of the post-Cōḻa Śaiva literary culture, perhaps that associated with one of the new *maṭam*s that arose in the fourteenth century or later. The CP contains much that is legitimately historical in character, information about Cēkkiḻār's life that is confirmed by both the PP and by contemporary epigraphical references to the poet and his family; and pseudo-Umāpati's understanding of the PP and its relationship to the *Cintāmaṇi* may very well derive from his partial awareness of precisely the genre-melange that has been outlined here. The *Cintāmaṇi* is genetically related to the Jaina versions of the *Bṛhatkathā*, while the homology between the sixty-three *nāyaṉmār* and the sixty-three Jaina *śālākapuruṣa*s may have strengthened either pseudo-Umāpati's own conviction for this argument, or may have been the source of a tradition that he records.[75]

The CP is a fascinating piece of literary ethnohistory, but it is a history that is directed towards defending a patently incorrect thesis. It points to the very changed circumstances of early-modern Tamil Śaiva monastic literary culture, a culture possessing fundamentally different dynamics and observing different canons of literary taste from those of Cēkkiḻār's lifetime. Indeed, the anxieties over a Jaina epic as a major part of the Tamil literary landscape may have emerged precisely in this latter period, and not before. It is possible that in the fourteenth century the *Cintāmaṇi*

[75]Note however that Cīvakaṉ/Jīvandhara is numbered among the Jaina *kāmadeva*s, who are not counted in the scheme of sixty-three (Vijayalakshmy 1981a, p. 2).

may have taken on a new (and for the Śaiva devout, perhaps troubling) importance, as it was then that it received its authoritative commentary by the most celebrated *literatus* of the time, the avowedly Śaiva Nacciṉārkkiṉiyar.[76]

Pseudo-Umāpati's text has enjoyed a wide-ranging influence in contemporary discussions of the motivation and construction of the *Periyapurāṇam*, and indeed on the understanding of the Śaiva religion under the Cōḻas,[77] a level of influence that does not seem especially warranted. Discarding its monothetic model of the text's genesis, and replacing it with the more dynamic picture of influence and adaptation sketched out here, a better picture of the cultural work of the PP emerges. The *purāṇam* can be situated within a complex network of resemblances to other literary texts, in both Sanskrit and Tamil: this in itself tell us very little. The point, however, is not that Cēkkiḻār borrows, but that he borrows so much and that he so openly rearranges the diverse contents of his borrowing into a new whole.

The discussion of the generic prototypes of the PP needs to be seen within the wider question of the work's purpose as a piece of textualized language and of the intentions (authorial or otherwise) that it was meant to subserve. To summarize: the PP is anchored to its local world through its invocation (and often, direct quotation)

[76]See Gopal Iyer 1997.

[77]In particular, Monius' recent study (2004) takes the CP's narrative as its point of departure for a reading of the differing cultural poetics presupposed by the Jaina and Śaiva texts. Monius' avowed aim of "taking Umāpati seriously" (*op. cit.* p. 126) relies on the perfectly valid interpretive principle that a historically proximate understanding of a cultural object like the PP *prima facie* merits scholarly attention; this is an idea with which I am in complete sympathy. Further, I find much to admire in her nuanced readings of the PP, the *Cintāmaṇi* and the *Kaliṅkattupparaṇi* (her interpretation of this last text follows Shulman 1985). There does not need to be a genetic relationship between two works in order to fruitfully contrast their mutual aesthetics, and Monius' observation that the emotionalism of the PP marks a literary sea change from the ironies of the *Cintāmaṇi* seems sound.

of the *Tēvāram* hymns, and to the local network of temple sites which they explicitly invoke,[78] all the while gesturing emphatically to the non-local, indeed 'placeless' works of the Sanskrit literary and mythological imagination, or to earlier Tamil works adhering to these same models. Put this way, the textual project of the PP—its seemingly paradoxical status as a Tamil Śaiva religious epic meant for 'the entire world,' *ulak' elām*—can perhaps be understood as an effort to enact a vision at once vernacular and cosmopolitan, to adopt Pollock's terms.[79] Given that many of the textual models integrated into the PP come from beyond Cōḻamaṇḍalam, indeed from beyond the Tamil-speaking world altogether, and that the PP ties itself so forcefully and explicitly to a larger collective, it may appear readily amenable to Pollock's theorization.[80] There is, however, a telling difference between the PP and the works that Pollock draws upon. For Pollock, the socio-textual communities—that which introduces the crucial mediation between the idealities of texts and the realities of actual historical life—are invariably and indeed exclusively royal courts.[81] While the Cōḻa king and his court figure explicitly into the beginning of the PP, the relationship there articulated

[78]See Peterson *op. cit*, and Stein 1977.

[79]Over the course of a series of interrelated, closely argued pieces (Pollock 1996, 1998a and b, now summarized and extended in Pollock 2006), Pollock has suggested a historical model in which the universalized and centuries-old model of Sanskritic literary culture acted as the reagent for the development of literary works in the local languages of middle-period southern Asia. Sanskrit, with its extensive literary canon as well as its theoretical apparatus of grammar, metrics, poetics and other forms of knowledge, provided a common template for the literary that was adopted and domesticated throughout the region, from the literarization of Kannada in the ninth century (Pollock's principal case study) through the increasing emergence of other literary vernaculars in the second millennium of the common era. Central to this process is the need for the local literary cultures to "evince translocal properties," *i.e.* those already present in the cosmopolitan order of Sanskrit literature.

[80]As Pollock concedes (see for instance 2006, pp. 290ff.), his model runs afoul of the literary history of Tamil, which—in almost any of the conventional versions of that history—falls outside of the scheme of periodization presumed by his theory of vernacularization.

[81]See for instance 1998a pp. 33ff.

is far more ambiguous than that of the texts adduced by Pollock. This represents, I believe, a self-conscious reaction to the very process that Pollock's theory describes. Even in the *pāyiram*, where the royal assembly (*arac' avai*) is credited as the impetus for the creation of the text (vs. 8), its invocation is preempted by the conspicuous mention of the "*great* assembly" (*pēravai*), the community of the Śaiva devout (vs. 8). For all the conventional panegyrics to Anapāyaṉ, the PP is by no means a courtly entertainment; it instead links itself to a different kind of sociality entirely, that of the Śaiva community, which exists, so we discover, above and beyond any particular polity.

The difference between the PP and the works of the cosmopolitan vernacular texts might be amenable to the rubric of 'secondary' or 'regional' vernacularization that Pollock understands as a subsequent phase to the cosmopolitan.[82] In the case of the PP, however, there is no evidence of an anti-courtly politics or aesthetics at work in the text; in fact, it more closely accords with broadly speaking Sanskritic models than much of the Tamil poetry that is contemporaneous to it. The contrast between Cēkkiḻār's cultural politics and those of his Vīraśaiva contemporaries in Karnataka is very instructive: there is nothing in the text that resembles Basavaṇṇa's radicalism, whether textual-linguistic or socio-political. If anything, the PP might be understood not so much as non- or anti-courtly as post-courtly.[83] This accords with not only the text's composition in Cidambaram, at once center and periphery within

[82] 2006, pp. 432–436.

[83] See Cox forthcoming b for some reflections on the image of Cēkkiḻār as a 'conservative revolutionary,' attempting to create through his authoritative text a place for his constituency of the Śaiva faithful outside the role of subjects of the Cōḻa king.

the Cōḻa kingdom, but also with its specific aesthetic strategies. The PP aims not at adequation to and domestication of a translocal norm (as in the case of Pampa's *Vikramārjunavijaya*, studied by Pollock), but rather to promote the local and the contingently historical—most forcefully, the moment of the inspired enunciation of Cuntarar's *Tiruttoṇṭattokai*—to the level of the universal and the non-contingent.

The *Sūtasaṃhitā* and the *Periyapurāṇam* each attempted to articulate what it is that a *purāṇa*—a text about the past—could be in the world of Cōḻamaṇḍalam. That their answers were by no means simple or univocal should not blind us to the fact that they were in fact and perhaps a bit paradoxically something *new*. As with the epigraphical texts, the sudden impulse towards textual creation seems here to be connected in complex ways with the rapidly changing world of the twilight of Cōḻa imperial power. Both, most forcefully, are about the imagination of collective life; in the case of the SS, the social imagination is bounded by brahmanical identity, but there is something much more to the text than a simple evocation of a monolithic caste-consciousness. Rather, the text attempts to argue for a new way to be at once a brahman and a worshipper of Śiva, and to be embedded in a regional world and its particular structures of meaning.

The PP is, if anything, an even more complex case. In contrast to the largely didactic SS, it is literary work above all else, and its affective power depended crucially on its negotiation between Tamil and the wider world of Indic literary form. Yet the PP is crucially a text from outside the ambit the Cōḻa court: though it gestures towards Anapāyaṉ's patronage, it is fundamentally concerned with imagi-

native creation of a new kind of socio-textual collective. This was a particular way of public sociality that was perhaps only beginning to become a live option in the Cidambaram of the middle decades of the 1100s, a time when (as we saw in the case of Naralokavīra) ambiguous assertions of independence and authority were increasingly possible. To imagine a form of collective belonging that is at once Tamil and Śaiva as something novel might seem a strange claim in light of the two terms' subsequent identification.[84] The same thing may be said in fact of the regionalized Smārta orthodoxy of the SS. In both instances, these texts were remarkably successful in their creations of a social constituency, an ideational community that resembles to some extent those groups that Benedict Anderson has described as the product of realist narrative prose.[85] The long shadow cast by these two Cidambaram *purāṇas* was such that we are still in some way a part of the future these accounts of the past sought to create.

2.3 *Stava*: Contemplation as Spectacle

The final author we will be concerned with here, Aghoraśiva, was the single most important figure within the Śaivasiddhānta order during the later Cōḻa period. He presided over a massive project of consolidation and rationalization of the Śaivasiddhānta's textual foundations, composing numerous works, principally commentaries, on theological and liturgical topics. The Saiddhāntika religion of his era was

[84]For a critique of this identification, see Sivathamby 1986 pp. 96–100. *Cf.* also Ramaswamy 1997, pp. 24–34.

[85]Anderson 1991, pp. 25–36, *et passim.*

one of individual observance and salvation tied to a network of seminaries and royal courts stretching throughout the Subcontinent, in contrast to its subsequent transformation into the doctrinal superstructure of the cult of the Śaiva temples of Tamilnadu.[86]

Aghoraśiva was not alone in his work of systematization. He appears to have been the central figure in a circle of authors, including both his contemporaries and direct pupils.[87] Aghora was however without question the most significant intellectual in this group, though his value chiefly lay in the authoritative restatement of earlier authors hailing from outside the Tamil country. Of his models, the most important by far was the Kashmirian thinker Rāmakaṇṭha (*fl. ca.* 950–1000); indeed, Aghora's own writing is often a palimpsest of Rāmakaṇṭha's often obtuse theology recast in Aghora's lucid Sanskrit prose. Other central precursor-texts were those of Sadyojyotis and Bhojadeva, both of whose works received commentaries by Aghora.[88]

The SS and the PP were works that cast themselves as belonging to a wide franchise of readers and adherents: the first to potentially all twice-born orthodox males, the second to those drawn together into the imagined community of Tamil Śaivas.

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[86]The pan-Indic spread of the Siddhānta into the twelfth century is by now commonly accepted in Indology; it was earlier thought to have been a tradition specific to the Tamil country. Building especially on the work of Helene Brunner, several recent publications of Dominic Goodall (1998, 2000, 2004) have argued convincingly for the controversial claim that the Saiddhāntikas up to and including Aghora were concerned exclusively with private worship rather than with the public observances in temples. As the notes of this section will attest, much of my interpretation relies on Goodall's magisterial work on this tradition.

[87]See the extended discussion of the relation of the authors in this circle given in Goodall 2000, pp. 208–212.

[88]We will return to Aghora's *vṛtti* on Bhoja's *Tattvaprakāśa* in Chapter 3. On his indebtedness to Rāmakaṇṭha, see especially p. 123n.

Aghoraśiva addressed himself also to a community, but one that was pronouncedly individual in its orientation. The Saiddhāntikas—that is, the professed adherents to the Śaivasiddhānta, the 'orthodox religion of Śiva'—formed a self-conscious elite, who had adopted above and beyond their general Vedic observances the ritual discipline prescribed in their scriptures. Much of Aghoraśiva's extant writings focused on the particular details of these daily and occasional observances. These practical details, however, were inextricably embedded within a theological picture of the world's workings and the place of the individual within that order. For the Saiddhāntika, the human soul naturally shares the infinite faculties of power and awareness possessed by Śiva, only to have this obscured by the vicissitudes of the ever-present impurities of individuation, of the causality of action, and of the connection with the material substance of the universe. The Saiddhāntika ceremony of initiation destroys these impurities, while obligating the initiand to the ongoing practice of its ritual system with the promise of liberation at the moment of death.[89] This life of observance was to take place within a densely inhabited Śaiva cosmos, filled with orders of beings including the Śaiva *mantra*s (considered to be not just acoustic formulae but conscious, agentive beings), and their superintending powers (*mantramaheśvara*s), all entities that represented the post-mortem destinies of suitably advanced souls which had not received the supreme good of initiation into the Siddhānta. The latter was a guarantee of the passage after death into the natural, unsullied state of equality with Śiva for eternity. Thus, the religion of the Śaivasiddhānta is concerned above all with

[89]This sketch closely follows that of Sanderson 1995 pp. 38–43.

the destiny of the souls of its adherents, a destiny terminating in a state of uttermost individuality that is paradoxically absolutely common to all those who attain it.

This elaborately conceived cosmos, and the upward mobility of certain souls within it, constitutes the central theme of the Śaivasiddhānta. As we have seen, part of its architecture (the gradation of approaches to the divine into *sālokya*, *sāmīpya*, etc.) was adopted by the authors of the SS; more tenuous but still I believe tangible is Cēkkiḻār's indebtedness to the school in crafting parts of the PP.[90] The majority of Aghora's writings are squarely set within the problematic of rationally defending this ordered view of the universe. It is not, however, with this level of intradisciplinary debate that we are concerned here; instead, I will concentrate on a work of Aghoraśiva's that was more engaged with constituencies beyond the Saiddhāntikas themselves.

Aghora's period of activity is securely dated and localized in space thanks to a work called by its modern editors the *gotrasantati* ("The Tradition of the Lineage"). This is a short verse text that concludes his *Kriyākramadyotikā* ("The Elucidation of the Liturgy") and which contains a chronogram dating the completion of the text to *śāka* 1080, 1157/8 CE.[91] References to the Cidambaram Śiva in this text make Aghora's location there relatively certain; there is further a contemporary tradition

[90] For evidence of this claim, see Cox forthcoming a.

[91] The *gotrasantati*, as the most significant source for the history of the southern Sanskrit Śaivasiddhānta order to survive, has been frequently noted in secondary literature. See *inter alia* Filliozat 1971, Davis 1992, and Goodall 1998. The last of these gives a much improved if conjectural version of the text as compared to Gurukkaḷ's edition. Significant problems remain: see Goodall *op. cit.* for convincing proof that the *Mahotsavavidhi*, the concluding section of the published *Kriyākramadyotikā* could not possibly have been written by Aghoraśiva, judging especially by the range and quality of sources that it cites.

that links Aghora to the foundation of a *maṭha* or monastic hospice in the city.[92] The *gotrasantati* articulates a certain kind of public claim, linking our author with a spiritual fraternity stretching across generations, locating him within an eminent family of Śaiva brahmans, and suggestively linking both of these to the Cōḻa ruling house.

By contrast, the public nature of the text I examine here—the *Pañcāvaraṇastava* (PĀS; "Hymn on the Five Circuits")—is of a totally different nature.[93] The Cōḻa kings and Cidambaram are totally absent from the text, which details the program of visualizations that a Saiddhāntika worshipper was enjoined to perform during his daily mental worship. This seemingly most private of religious observances provides the material for the PĀS's roughly one hundred verses. In systematically presenting the order of daily worship as experienced by a Śaiva ritual practitioner, Aghora brings together the earlier and internally diverse scriptural and liturgical traditions into the synthetic norm of the text.[94]

Very briefly, the text begins with the worshipper first visualizing and venerating Śiva as the sun. He then imagines a series of other astral phenomena, and the

[92]This is mentioned in the *bhūmikā* to Gurukkaḷ's edition of the *Kriyākramadyotikā*, see also Davis 1992 p. 369. Aghora's connection to the city is also reflected in his first introductory verse to his commentary on Sadyojyotis' *Tattvasaṃgraha* (Dwivedi 1988 p. 115; probably emending to *śrīmaddabhrasabhāpatim*).

[93]All citations of this text are from Goodall, Rout, Satyanarayanan, Sarma, Ganesan, and Sambandhaśivācārya 2005. I am very grateful to the editors for providing me with a prepublication copy of their edition, and I have benefitted greatly from their superb annotation to the text.

[94]I can not claim a detailed understanding of the earlier texts that Aghoraśiva drew upon. The basic structure of five *āvaraṇas* or circuits allies the text with the several recensions of the *Kālottara-tantra*. For an overview of the number of circuits given in other texts, see Goodall's introduction to the edition, pp. 22–24, 26–27; this in turn draws on Bhatt's earlier presentation (1979, pp. xv–xix).

various guardians and gatekeepers of an imagined palace or temple. Within this space, the worshipper envisions an elaborate throne topped with an eight-petalled lotus, atop which sits Sadāśiva, the form of the god most revered by the Siddhānta. The remainder of the text fills out the deity's retinue into the titular five circuits (*āvāraṇam*s): the two sets of *mantra*s that correspond to the deity's five faces and his accoutrement (the *brahma-* and *aṅgamantra*s, first circuit), his demiurgic deputies (the eight *vidyeśvara*s, second circuit), leading companions (the eight *gaṇa*s, third circuit), the guardians of the ten directions (the *lokapāla*s, fourth circuit) and their personified weapons (the *astra*s, fifth circuit). In a brief coda to this series, the worshipper also venerates the sacrificial fire as consecrated to Śiva, the many recipients of the Śaiva fire-offerings, his own initiatory *guru*, Śiva as embodied in the scriptures, and Caṇḍeśa, the recipient of the *nirmālya*, the physical remains of outward worship.

The PĀS is thus a poetic advertisement of the ritual core of the Saiddhāntika religion. While exhaustive of the broad strokes of the daily worship, it is not a free-standing manual to the liturgy: it lacks most conspicuously the *mantra*s that the worshipper must employ in his worship, the software required for the hardware of the visualizations to work. Along with the contemporaneous *Śivapūjāstava* of Jñānaśiva, Aghoraśiva's hymn is part of a newly imagined genre of 'liturgical *stotra*' (the label is Goodall's, Introduction, p. 13), an argument for the structured harmony and aesthetic appeal of the version of Śaiva ritual practiced by the Śaiva Siddhānta. As a hymn, the text was a participant in what was perhaps the most visible and productive textual domain centered on the Cidambaram temple. The *Mahārthamañjarī* attests to a

wealth of other such texts in Sanskrit: Maheśvarānanda's own praise-poems to the goddesses Parā and Komalavallī, and his guru Mahāprakāśa's four *stotra*s (including the *Ānandatāṇḍavavilāsastotra*, specifically on the Cidambaram Naṭeśa) point to the vitality of *stotra* as a genre within other, competing Śaiva orders.[95] We have already seen the way that references to hymns enable us to bridge the gap between the world of temple practice represented by epigraphy and texts like the *Sūtasaṃhitā* and the *Periyapurāṇam*. Both of these *purāṇa*s in fact derive some of their power from the presence of this circumambient hymn culture. The PP, in addition to incorporating parts of the earlier *Tēvāram* corpus as *pratīka*s, should be understood as the only premodern commentary that was seemingly ever written on these hymns, while the SS is filled with *stuti*-passages of varying length throughout. It is easy to understand one of the functions of the SS as a Smārta hymnal, containing occasional pieces that could be independently recited and performed.

We may thus infer a field for the consumption and production of hymns to Śiva in both Sanskrit and Tamil that was present in Cidambaram at this time. We cannot reconstruct the market for these compositions in any detail, nor of the effects that may have had as forensic attempts to please and to convince different constituencies within the populace of the region. Nevertheless, the sheer number of new texts,

[95]Maheśvarānanda also repeatedly cites the Kashmirian *Stotrāvalī* as well as Kālidāsa/Śrīvatsa's *Cidgaganacandrikā*, a goddess-cult variation on the theme of the liturgical hymn. This last text—one of Maheśvarānanda's most important source-texts for the Krama worship—was itself possibly a product of the Cidambaram textual culture. The *cidgagana* of its title is a close synonym of *cidambaram*; more probative is that fact that the text venerates a line of sages "beginning with Patañjali' (vs. 9 cd: *ye maharṣayas...tān patañjalimukhān upāsmahe*), a reference perhaps to the origin-myth (contained in the CM) of a part of temple's composite ritual culture deriving from that sage. On the Patañjali narrative, see Kulke and Younger *op. cit.*

the sort of ingenuity that went into their construction, and the continued support for earlier works all attest to powerful impulses at work among within the temple city's textual culture. Faced with this evidence, we may presume a multiple and diverse audience for Aghoraśiva's hymn, an audience consisting of partisans as well as the unconvinced, of Śaiva initiates as well as laity. This would have been an audience broadly circumscribed by a claim of religious identity, but may not have been nearly as restrictive as we tend to think of the potential auditors of Sanskrit *kāvya*: it could have included within its ranks non-Brahman landholders like Cēkkiḻār (who, I am convinced, knew Sanskrit), or arriviste brahmans like those whose names fill Cidambaram's donative records. Within such an audience, there would be some willing to be swayed, some adamantly opposed, but most probably indifferent to the sort of commitment Saiddhāntika initiation would entail. Faced with this, what does Aghoraśiva's hymn set out to do? What are the ways in which it is made to cohere as a piece of language, in what ways was it keyed to a context of performance, and perhaps most importantly how could it be made to appeal to its auditors?

The poem's main intent, in J.L. Austin's jargon, is illocutionary: the speaking subject of the verses accomplishes the action of praise through the act of reciting the poem.[96] This speaking subject, however, is an open role, inhabitable by any reciter of the poem. The PĀS provides in its basic structure a rhetorical frame whereby the user of the text, the possessor of a manuscript or someone who had the text by heart, constitutes himself (or, though less likely, herself) as a committed Śaiva worshipper

[96] Austin 1963.

through staging the text in recitation. This constitutive aspect is everywhere in the text bundled together with second rhetorical dimension, that of the text as a tool of pedagogy, an inculcator of a set of propositions about the nature of the Śaiva cosmos, while teaching a method for propitiating the central figures of that cosmos.

Thus the hymn, in the process of being enacted as a performative script is, by the same process, the medium through which Aghoraśiva expatiates on a particular means of organizing the materials of the Śaiva liturgy, and thus articulates an argument about the world, its contents, and its ends. This second didactic dimension of the text is brought to the level of explicit articulation by the hortatory verses (those that invoke a plural audience through imperative constructions) directed to any potential audience, including the reciter/enacter who inhabits the text's performative 'I'.

This point about the PĀS's structure and function bears emphasis largely as a consequence of the astonishing lack of reflection within indological scholarship on the rhetoricity of *stotra* literature.[97] In the large majority of the PĀS's one hundred and two verses, the semantic structure is stereotyped and straightforward. We may take

[97]Gonda's exhaustive catalog (Gonda 1977) devotes practically no attention whatsoever to the question of extratextual effect. Of the existing scholarship of which I am aware, only Cutler's study (Cutler 1987) devotes adequate attention to hymns as acts of communication, often compellingly complex communication. Cutler's model derives from Jakobson's well-known essay (1960) on the nature of poetic language; from this (as well as reflection on Ramanujan's earlier work, for instance Ramanujan 1981), Cutler introduces a simple but effective triadic model (god–poet–audience) that he finds to be differentially invoked in the Tamil *bhakti* corpus, but also in Indic religious literature generally (see esp. pp. 19–37, 70–75). Cutler's model, along with his close readings of numerous verses, has been influential on my thinking here; I should note as an immediate caveat that Aghoraśiva's poem lacks for the most part the emotionalism that the *bhakti* corpus is famous for, a dimension that Cutler explores so productively. The didacticism and accompanying double-voicedness of the PĀS, where the reciter at once inhabits the poem's 'I'-position and is subject to the educative authorial intent of Aghora, is something alien to the putatively 'unlearned' voice of *bhakti* poetry; however, this sort of multi-level role creation and inhabitance is effectively analyzed by Cutler in the narrative poems of Nammāḻvār's learned and highly literary *Tiruvāymoḻi*.

as an example of this standard form the second verse, on the sun figured as Śiva:

> *padmāsanaṃ raktatanuṃ dvinetraṃ*
> *śvetābjayuktāṃsagahastadvayam* |
> *raktāmbaralepanamālyabhūṣyaṃ*
> *sthitaṃ sahāṅgaiḥ śivasūryam īḍe* ||
>
> I revere Śivasūrya, along with his limbs (or: rays), sitting on a lotus-seat, having a red body and two eyes, holding white lotuses in his two hands, held at the level of his shoulders[98], and adorned with red clothes, unguent, and garland.

In this standard form, each description depends on a first-person performative verb (*e.g. īḍe*, *vande*/*vandāmahe*, *numaḥ*, *śaraṇaṃ vrajāmi*, *etc.*) with the rest of the verse or series of verses describing the direct-object recipient of the praise. Roughly three quarters of the text conforms exactly to this pattern (72 verses). Another sixteen verses lack a finite verb, but may almost all be construed as multi-verse units with a following verse: these consist entirely of a string of compound adjectives given in the accusative. Of the remaining fourteen, several (vv. 47, 50, 52, 72, 101) consist of imperative appeals to the hymn's presumptive audience.[99]

Of the ten remaining verses, two (vv. 45 and 46) are a block of praise directed to the Goddess, built upon polite imperatives in a manner typical of a *maṅgalācaraṇa*. It is when Aghora turns to his description of Sadāśiva, the central deity in the Saiddhāntika pantheon (vv. 28–42), that his departures from the normative structure of the *stotra* become vital to the impact of the text as a whole. This description of Sadāśiva, the apex of the entities under worship in the universe of the Śaivasiddhānta, provides the structural heart of the *pūjā*. One would expect, then, the passage to be the most formally significant in the entire hymn, the poetic crescendo to Aghora's ordered

[98]See Goodall *et al.*'s annotations to this verse.

[99]See the editors' annotations to vv. 50 and 52 on this construction.

vision. This is in fact the case, though in a surprising way. It begins in the familiar style of much of the rest of the PĀS, with Sadāśiva described as a beautiful, unearthly young man seated in state atop his lotus throne. Each of his five faces is a different color, and the implements in his ten hands are each successively described (in fact, two different arrangements are given, vv. 31–32). Once this central figure to the entire worship has been exhaustively described, the poem changes markedly. Aghoraśiva begins with a general note:

> *sṛṣṭisthitipralayarakṣaṇanāmadheyaiḥ*
> *kṛtyaiḥ paśor malam alaṃ paripācya mokṣam* |
> *dīkṣātmakena karaṇena kṛpāmburāśe*
> *pāśatrayāt paśupate kṛpayā karoṣi* ‖34‖
>
> Paśupati, Ocean of Compassion—through the actions that are called creation, maintenance, withdrawal, and protection,[100] the impurity of the bound soul is completely ripened, and by means of initiation the soul is set free from the three bonds. All of this you do, in your great compassion.

This statement—a *précis* of the central Saiddhāntika doctrine of salvation cast in verse—is then followed by a series of verses that, like this one, take the form of direct addresses to the author's god. These verses (vv. 35–37) catalog the different kinds of adepts admitted by Aghoraśiva's religion. Aghora first describes the *putraka* or catechumen who is obliged to perform the elaborate daily cult combining the typical brahmanical worship of the day's junctures along with the Śaiva bathing in ashes,[101] then the *sādhaka*s or power-seekers who seek to derive supernatural pleasures from their commerce with Śiva.[102] Aghora is quick to clarify that these latter adepts are given liberation following upon the attainment of their desired ends, thus encompass-

[100] On this anomalous *rakṣaṇa*, see the editors' annotations *ad loc.*

[101] Vs. 35a–c *vihitasalilabhasmasnānasandhyāpraṇāmāḥ kṛtadinakarapūjāḥ...dīkṣitā ye narāḥ*.

[102] Vs. 36a: *ye cātra śuddhavibhuvanodbhavabhogakāmāḥ*

ing them within the liberationist aims of his householder religion.[103] The final class of Śaivas accommodated by Aghora's scheme are those who "seek the many kinds of worldly successes, which leave unquelled the anguish that yet lies within their hearts," to whom Śiva is said to also grant liberation.[104]

This catalog of types of Śaiva persons, occurs as an aside to the visualization sequence that is the point of the whole PĀS. Save for the absolutely central role of the *ācārya* or religious teacher, these three verses sketch in the possibilities of identity available to any initiate into Aghora's religious community. Following upon these, there is a single verse (vs. 38, a sort of mid-course *phalaśruti*) recounting all the good things that flow from Śaiva worship, again addressed directly to Śiva. Aghora then concludes the section on Sadāśiva with a set of four verses (vv. 39–42):

yat karma nātha mama jātam abuddhipūrvaṃ
dīkṣottaraṃ vicarato vihitetaraṃ syāt |
tat sarvam eva bhavataḥ smṛtimātraruddhaṃ
kravyādayonisamavāptiphalaṃ na bhūyāt ‖39‖

ādehapātam iha me 'bhimatārthasiddhir
bhūyān maheśa hṛdayāmayanāśanaṃ ca |
prārabdhadehasahakārimalāṃśanāśād
ante ca vighnarahitaḥ paramokṣalābhaḥ ‖40‖

avyaktākhye vyaktarūpe 'tha liṅge
vyaktāvyakte sthaṇḍile vārcayanti |
ye tvāṃ nityaṃ nātha teṣāṃ dhruvaṃ syāt
pāśaprotāt pātakebhyaś ca muktiḥ ‖41‖

mūrdhorasā karayugena padadvayena
vācā dṛśā vimalayā manasā ca buddhyā |
vidyeśvarādinikhilātmagaṇābhirādhyaṃ
taṃ tvāṃ stutipadaiḥ praṇato 'smi bhaktyā ‖42‖

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[103] *Cf.* Brunner 1975.

[104] Vs. 37a–c: *ye caihikāni hṛdayāmayarogaśānti śūnyāni yāni vividhāni phalāni labdhum* | *vāñchanti...* As the editors convincingly argue, this refers to those initiates who are too busy with worldly life to embark on Śaiva ritual obligations. These figures, called *bhogin*s, are said significantly to include kings.

> Master, whatever action contrary to my duty that I may thoughtlessly have done since the time of my initiation, may all that be brushed aside just by reflecting on you, and may it not result in my being reborn in the womb of a demoness.
>
> Lord, until the moment of my death, may all my aims here on earth be accomplished, may the ills of my heart be put to rest and, at my final moment, as the last traces of my impurity and of the *karma* that holds me in this body are destroyed, may I obtain total and faultless liberation.
>
> Those who unfailingly worship you, Master, whether it be on an aniconic *liṅga*, an image, a carved *liṅga*, or a patch of consecrated ground,[105] may they surely have liberation, both from clothes of their bonds, and from all of their sins.
>
> With my head and chest, my hands and feet, with my words, my vision, my pure mind and my reason am I reverently bowed down to you by these words of praise, you who are adored by your entire retinue, the Vidyeśvaras and all the rest.

In the two final verses here, the entire community of Saiddhāntika worshippers is invoked and then the basic structure of the remainder of the hymn is resumed, providing a coda to this excursus, the only such aside in this otherwise rigidly structured *stotra*. It is the two verses that precede this coda that are, I think, especially interesting. The plea for absolution that forms that tenor of these verses does not seem to form a part of the liturgy prior to Aghora's time. While much of the material here is traditional (continued embodiment due to yet-unfulfilled *karma*, the threat of a future birth as a *piśāca* due to moral infraction), it would seem that Aghoraśiva is bringing together his sources into a novel form. This is something of an anomaly, for Aghora is elsewhere punctilious in his orthodoxy and careful to avoid anything that might suggest innovation. He remains, as ever, clear and straightforward, employing the language of theology in the formal trappings of poetic verse. Yet there are powerful ideas lurking within these simple lines, of guilt, of intimations of mortality, and of a promise of an ultimate solution to a suffering existence. All of these overwhelm the

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[105] See the editors' notes *ad loc.*

deceptively straightforward language here: though the audience has just heard time and again that *mokṣa* awaits the observant Saiddhāntika at the hour of his death, the possibility of beatitude is never more urgent or more real in the hymn than here.

It is thus tempting to hear in these verses Aghoraśiva's own voice, something that is conspicuously absent from his other writings. This isn't simply effusion—the poet's language getting away from him, and accidentally imbuing his work with a trace of himself—it instead represents a deliberate and carefully executed rhetorical strategy. If, as suggested earlier, we may distinguish two different functional levels within the rhetorical structure of the PĀS, the performative and the educative, it is here that these two are brought together into a momentary unison. The speaking subject of the hymn ceases to be the recurrent 'I' of the text's instantiation-through-recitation and instead pointedly indexes its author, its initial 'I', Aghoraśiva. The immediately subsequent invocation of the community of Śaiva worshippers (vs. 41) serves to reestablish the general frame, while the next verse resumes the standard structure and syntax of the majority of the hymn. In a sense, this might seem to negate the wider work of the PĀS, its attempt to provide a poetically compelling script for the fundamental and generalized contemplative program of the Śaivasiddhānta. The voice the speaks these verses may be the author's, as may be the concerns—of aging, of the small failures that fill even the most disciplined of lives—that give it its shape. Nevertheless the possibility that this voice offers, that of an inwardness, a deepened sense of self, is something made potentially available to all the text's subsequent audience.

Students of medieval and early modern Europe have long suggested that the inner life thought to be the peculiar property of the modern subject has deep roots in the ritual regimentation of the lives of monastic and lay Christians.[106] I would argue that the PĀS provides evidence of the beginning of a similar process within the Śaiva cult of private worship in the South of India. In the first instance, and throughout the entirety of the text, the PĀS is concerned with the projection of an aesthetically compelling picture of the basic Saiddhāntika ritual form, mapping out of the imaginative spaces of daily worship. Within this basic structure—in fact, at its very heart, the veneration of Sadāśiva—Aghoraśiva pronouncedly changes the text's mode of presentation, invoking the presence of the deity through direct address while simultaneously offering up a deepened subjectivity for the reciter-performer of the text. This latter role may have in fact been fashioned from the raw materials of the author's own biography: there is ultimately no way of ascertaining this. More significantly, through, the poetic restaging of the essential liturgical forms through which he and every other Saiddhāntika initiate structured their religious lives, Aghoraśiva hints at the possibility of a self-consciousness, an inner depth that emerges precisely through the adherence to ritual discipline.[107] All attentive Saiddhāntikas were certain of their common post-mortem destiny; seen through the lens of the PĀS, the trajectory of their individual lives from the moment of their initiation until the final falling of the

[106]See for example Asad 1993, pp. 125–170, Greenblatt 1980, pp. 74–156; underlying both of these is the influence of the later work of Foucault (1986).

[107]Although it is almost certainly not a source that Aghoraśiva had access to, in both its structure and intent the PĀS resembles the second *pariccheda* (the so-called *pāpadeśanā*) of Śāntideva's *Bodhicaryāvatāra*.

body assumes a new priority. This possibility of inwardness was not something that seems to have concerned Aghora in his dogmatic writings; it is only here, in his work intended for the agon of the competing forms of the Śaiva life present in his time and place that this could take shape.

2.4 Conclusion: Textual Power/Social Power

In the previous chapter, I introduced the main focus of this dissertation, Maheśvarānanda's *Mahārthamañjarī*, and argued that attention to the particular circumstances of its creation can help us to understand the details of its form, structure, and argument. I also began in a very abstract way to explain how I approach this set of informing circumstances, what I call the textual culture of Cidambaram in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. With the added perspective afforded by the materials discussed in this chapter, the whole question of historical location and context-specificity can once again be raised, before moving on to the *Mahārthamañjarī*. Does the presumption of textual culture—much less the particular specimens of it that I've adduced—better enable us to understand Maheśvarānanda's project? I believe that it does; from the vantage afforded by these works, we can see the informing interrelation in this time and place between textuality and the adjudication of publicly held conceptions of belonging and authority. To put it more bluntly, we can see the fundamental relationship between textual power and social power.

It is simple enough to understand the Cidambaram epigraphical corpus in these terms. In Naralokavīra's *praśasti*, one can see a complex representation realized

through text, a representation that hooks on to the physical surround of the temple compound in the service of creating a certain kind of personal charisma for its eulogized subject. In the subsequent uptake of the documentary basis of this record into the public assertions of the Cōḻa king, we see the ways in which the text and its political subtext were resituated or translated into the official register of the court style and the conventional image of the ruling monarch. In this empirically traceable textual transaction, power—the marshalling of fiscal and material resources and the stocks of political and cultural capital that proceed from this—is at once documented and (re)constituted, establishing in the process the evidentiary basis for the reconstruction of a complex historical event. The same can be said for the decades-long process of the consolidation of the several seemingly autochthonous Brahman collectives and their relation to Cidambaram's central Śaiva temple: one can see here a lengthy series of textually mediated negotiations in which the attestative work of language is clearly in evidence along with its practical results. And in the post-Cōḻa reign of Kōpperuñciṅkaṉ, we can detect a different but related process, an attempt to coopt the Cōḻa idiom of governing authority, traceable at the level of lexis and epigraphical idiom.

Here the coexistence of textual and social power is readily apparent: inscriptional discourse is a highly regimented and internally self-reflexive register of language that is explicitly about claims over public spaces and resources. The case can also be made, but in a rather more distant fashion, for the Cidambaram *purāṇa*s: these are texts that enjoin a stipulable set of beliefs and practices upon a recognizable community

of reception, and they did so through the recreation of a system of acknowledged precursor texts. But what of a text like the PĀS, not to speak of the MM, which is longer, more obtuse, and considerably more demanding of its reader than Aghora's brief hymn?

To attempt to bridge the gap between these texts' putative singularity and privacy and some sort of wider historical reality calls for theoretical justification. Two ready to hand models for such justification underlie my thinking: the more or less complex forms of mediation between cultural production and its contexts proposed in social theory, and the strictly bibliographic discipline of source criticism. These might seem a strange pairing; indeed, for their respective practitioners, they might be thought mutually exclusive.

In its famous (and famously inadequate) Marxian form, the first theory (often tagged as the 'reflection' or 'base-superstructure' model) requires that cultural production be deemed *ex hypothesi* epiphenomenal to some more primary historical process, for example, the dominant mode of production.[108] At once subtler and more invested in the priority of the historical particular is the model that can be abstracted from the writing of the sociologist Pierre Bourdieu. This seeks to isolate separable 'fields' or domains of socially recognized action each with their separate dynamics, across which structural homologies can be perceived. These homologies and the struc-

[108] The literature on this is vast, extending from the works of Marx and Engels themselves, through the Soviet era orthodoxy of Plekhanov to its more sophisticated (or casuistic) interpreters (for instance, Goldmann 1964 and Jameson 1981, esp. pp. 23–58). Particular to the study of early India, this view has its most eloquent and tenacious representative in D.D. Kosambi (Kosambi 1956 and 1957, pp. xl–lxii).

tured possibilities they enable become the privileged object of the study for historical sociology.[109]

For all the considerable appeal of this model (and I sometimes suspect that its appeal may outweigh its actual utility), it is difficult in the face of our surviving evidence to apply it to early South Asia.[110] Bourdieu's empirical research stretches across a truly impressive list of times and places, including nineteenth century Paris, entre-deux-guerres Germany, and post-colonial Algeria, yet these sites are for all their specificity set firmly within the modern world, and applying the theory to the nonmodern is a fraught interpretive task. We can readily agree with Bourdieu's principle that the several autonomous fields are all set within a structure of objective relations, and that these relations—among them, the scarcity of resources and the differential life-chances accorded to members of different social groups—apply equally to the world before capitalist modernity. Yet the history of early South Asia remains recalcitrant to this sort of analysis, in large part due to our lack of insight into the level of the auto-interpretation of its historical agents as they operated within what Bourdieu terms the 'field of power.'[111] This set of all sets, in which the dominant actors and institutions of the given fields are seen to interact consequentially, remains elusive in our materials: the evidence that allows us to see how elites of whatever field

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[109]I rely here especially on Bourdieu 1995, a theoretical summa of sorts based in his study of the French literary marketplace of Flaubert's lifetime. The précis of the field theory that I follow here can be found pp. 185ff.

[110]Bourdieu 1988, framed as a modest 'exercise in method' (p. vii) is perhaps the single most eloquent defense of the possibilities of the field theory.

[111]1995, p. 215: "The field of power is the space of relations of force between agents or between institutions having in common the possession of the capital necessary to occupy the dominant positions in different fields (notably economic or cultural)."

related to each other is slim indeed. For a theory that takes local explanation, for all its ambiguity, as the dialectical basis for the critique of exogenous theory-building,[112] this absence of information is troubling, especially as it allows us no local descriptive vocabulary to counterbalance the economistic language (capital, interest, *etc.*) that Bourdieu himself admits is only a stopgap, "a particular case in the general theory of fields." In investigating the complex fact of cultural and political life in our period, we find ourselves at the point of the preliminary assemblage and sifting of data in the service of an interpretation of the dynamics of the individual fields, a stage that is conceptually prior to the abstraction required for the Bourdieuvian theory to work.[113]

It is in the interest of reconstructing these dynamics (and, indeed, determining what the possible fields in this time and place even are) that I rely on the techniques of the source critic. In sharp contrast to the social-theoretical attempts to connect textual production and power, source criticism is founded on presumptions that are rigorously intertextual. I mean this not in the once-fashionable sense of Barthes or Kristeva, but in terms of a method concerned strictly if self-consciously with questions of bibliography, with the reconstruction of the contents of a given author's library. As a method, this tends deliberately to detach its privileged scholarly objects from anything and everything else that might have coexisted with them, in what amounts

[112] See here especially Bourdieu 1977, pp. 96–158.

[113] On the economistic prejudice of the field theory, see Bourdieu 1995, p. 183. On the move from the empirical to the abstract instance of the theory, *cf.* p. 199: " each field...has its autonomous history, which determines its specific rules and stakes, one sees that the interpretation by reference to the history unique to the field...is the preliminary for an interpretation with respect to the contemporary context, whether one is dealing with other fields of cultural production or with political and economic production."

to a tacit denial of the problem of the historicity and sociality of texts rather than an attempt at its solution.

Source criticism is of course a generalized philological technique instead of a theory associated with a specific proper name or set of names, and it is correspondingly difficult to laden it with a host of presumptions and prejudices. It is also a technique with a pedigree that is historically deep as well as broad—whatever their differences, a late medieval scholar like Mādhavamantrin is as much a source critic as a contemporary researcher. Yet the practice of source criticism is by no means theoretically neutral or self-evident. It presumes minimally the sequentiality of its data—text p must precede text q in order to act as q's source. More robust is the presumption that disclosing this sequence tells us anything about the world that is worth knowing.

Positing the mediation of textual culture is an attempt to steer between these two methodological extremes. There are good, historically specific reasons for wanting to do this. The South Asian second millennium witnessed what seems in hindsight to be an exponential increase in the creation of texts and in the reliance on writing as the central technology of culture and of rule. As the arguable center of the peninsular political order during this period, the Cōḻa domains participated intensely in this process. Again, this can most clearly be seen through epigraphy: the Cōḻa polity was the subject of probably the largest body of documentary textuality in the history of South Asia prior to the quasi-bureaucratic Mughal state centuries later. These tens of thousands of records, from grand royal charters to the humble labels found on irrigation tanks and sluices, did not simply exist in a vacuum: as even the most cursory

passage through the published versions shows, these are the surviving remnants of a far more widespread public discourse, of other bodies of documents (deeds, land assessments, wills, *et mult. cet.*) held by other sorts of collectivities. Epigraphs, however, are nowhere near the whole story of what appears at this great distance to be an enormous transformation in textual practices at this time.

In this world, looking at textuality and social power separately—or as if one were epiphenomenal to the other—simply fails to make sense. This is made especially clear in the case of Cidambaram. It is not an exaggeration to say that Cidambaram, as a cultural center of transregional importance, was written into existence in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. The texts examined here were instrumental to this profoundly important moment in the history of southern India. And it is in this light and with these same texts as background that we can begin to understand the *Mahārthamañjarī*, both in its formal construction and in its particular social project. In Maheśvarānanda's work, we see a carefully tailored response to what is perhaps the fundamental limitation to textual culture in general, and Cidambaram's in particular, the inescapable impress of the given work's precursors. All of the works surveyed here were founded upon their dependence to sources of authority located outside themselves, a text or texts taken to be authoritative. The stunning paradox of Maheśvarānanda's work, as we will now see, is to take this textual heteronomy and transfigure it from within, in the service of producing a new kind of text and a radically transformed author and reader.

CHAPTER 3
STYLE AS ARGUMENT IN THE *MAHĀRTHAMAÑJARĪPARIMALA*

In the previous chapter, I detailed the ways that Cidambaram's rise to prominence in the latter part of the twelfth century can be related to the complex transformation of the temple city's textual culture. In the space of what appears to be a very short period of time—two or three generations at the most—Cidambaram witnessed the dissemination of a substantial corpus of new and at times strikingly original texts. These individual and collective projects ranged from the multi-authored text of the temple's epigraphical archive, to public articulations of preexisting purāṇic narrative, to the refashioning of the liturgical means of the individual's relation to the Saiddhāntika Śaiva pantheon. All of these shared a common stock of Śaiva knowledge about the world; their differences in form, style, content, and presumptive audience all speak to the diverse complexity of the Śaiva collectivity, and point towards the stakes within the textual culture. The contestations and negotiations staged there were by no means limited to the realm of the theoretical or the theological; they were instead deeply imbricated in questions of dominance and collective self-presentation at a local as well as translocal level.

It is in this light that we can return to Maheśvarānanda's *Mahārthamañjarī*. Rather than looking at the level of its broad thematics or structural features, this chapter focuses in at the level of a single extended passage, looking to the level of the particular detail in the service of coming to a larger understanding of the text. The

passage under discussion here comprises the twelfth through the twentieth *gāthā*s of the *Mahārthamañjarī*, and contains the major part of Maheśvarānanda's interpretation of the reality-levels (*tattva*s) acknowledged within mature Śaiva systematic thought. Following the prose *anukramaṇikā* that begins the MMP, I will call the passage discussed here the *tattvaviveka*, "The Analysis of the Levels of Reality".[1] The doctrine of the reality-levels is one of the fundamental shared beliefs among all Śaiva theists: it forms a commonplace within many of the Cidambaran texts that we examined in the previous chapter.[2] Yet the understanding of the nature of this common doctrine differed profoundly among competing traditions of learned Śaiva exegesis. This spectrum of possible interpretation points, I think, to the ubiquity of the understanding of the realities within the theoretical common sense of elite Śaivism.[3] In arguing for what we shall see is an idiosyncratic understanding of this

[1]The whole section is called there the *ṣaṭtriṃśattattvaviveka*, the "Analysis of the *thirty-six* levels of reality". In this chapter, as well as the edition and translation found in Appendix C, I will only be concerned with the thirteen uppermost *tattva*s acknowledged by the Śaivas; the rationale for this will be discussed below. On the translation 'reality-level' instead of the more usual 'principle' for *tattva cf.* Goodall 1998, p. lii. Below, I occasionally render *tattva* simply as 'reality' (or plural 'realities'), or leave it untranslated when either of these possibilities makes for awkward English.

[2]While I have not found any reference to the Śaiva *tattva*-scheme in the SS, the *Periyapurāṇam* is aware of this theologeme: see the simile in verse 752 (part of the *Kaṇṇappanāyaṉārpurāṇam*):

> *pēṇutattuvaṅkaḷ eṉṉum perukucōpāṉam ēṟi*
> *āṇaiyāñ civattaic cāravaṇaipavar pōla...*
>
> ...just as those who cleave to the truth that is Śiva climb the great staircase that are the *tattva*s, worthy of reflection.

On this passage, and the place of Śaiva systematic thought more generally in the PP, see Cox forthcoming a.

[3]I distinguish this theology as 'elite' because it was necessarily the religion of the Śaiva initiate (the *dīkṣita*) that is relevant here. The *tattva*-hierarchy held a central place in the fundamental ritual event of *dīkṣā* or initiation itself. Thus, by 'elite,' I do not mean to limit myself to the professional religious virtuosi who were the producers and consumers of theology; instead there is a larger—if still socially circumscribed—constituency of all those who have taken on the supererogatory ritual duties of the *tantra*s.

doctrine, Maheśvarānanda signals something significant about the *Mahārthamañjarī* as a whole.

The *tattvaviveka* especially recommends itself for this sort of reading, as it contains what appears to be the most explicit intertextual linkage between the *Mahārtha-mañjarī* and another Cidambaran text. Maheśvarānanda's disputation on the Śaiva realities can be understood as a polemic response to a work of Aghoraśiva, whose liturgical hymn the PĀS I discussed in the previous chapter. The work in question is Aghora's *Tattvaprakāśavṛtti* (TPV), a commentary on the *Tattvaprakāśa* ("The Light on the Levels of Reality"), attributed to the great Paramāra king Bhoja of Dhārā.[4] In reading the work of Aghoraśiva alongside the *tattvaviveka*, I do not wish to argue that the latter is a systematic attempt at refutation of the former, although the numerous points of intersection and divergence in terms of phraseology and rhetorical strategy are detailed below. Rather, comparing Maheśvarānanda's *tattva*–theory to Aghoraśiva's serves two distinct but interrelated purposes. Building upon the evidence already presented in Chapter 2, it allows us to see once again the way that Cidambaram was the venue for overlapping fields of textual production and reception in this period. And, since Aghoraśiva's manner of argumentation differs pronouncedly from Maheśvarānanda's, the TPV provides a foil for this chapter's central contention, that Maheśvarānanda's presentation of the *tattva*s depends not

[4]Filliozat, whose fine study (1971) of the *Tattvaprakāśa* and its commentaries I will frequently refer to in the coming pages, questions this identification, and tentatively suggests that we identify the king Bhojadeva (*śrībhojadevanṛpatiḥ*) mentioned in the work's final verse with Mihira Bhoja of Kanauj (r. 836-882). I see no reason not to associate this text with the Paramāra king or a member of his circle.

so much on a philosophical argumentation as it does on style, on the specific textural effects that the MM strives to achieve.

Style is a feature of textual analysis that is notoriously difficult to define. Such is especially the case in the study of authors writing in Sanskrit, a language whose users tended towards deliberate abstraction and depersonalization.[5] In these circumstances, even putting forward the question of stylistic analysis may involve a certain methodological risk. The peculiar nature of the *Mahārthamañjarī* would only amplify this: as we've already seen, it is a work framed around quotation and adaptation—sometimes acknowledged, sometimes not—of a host of earlier texts. The whole question of a unique and characteristic authorial style might seem like a blind alley. Yet, as I will demonstrate, this very feature of the MM, its direct and indirect quotations and borrowings from other texts, points however paradoxically to something that is distinctive and definitive of Maheśvarānanda's style as an author. Maheśvarānanda's writing has a series of different registers that can be distinguished, each of which is associated with a particular rhetorical or even doctrinal position. A close examination of even this limited text-segment shows these different registers deliberately mapped onto different parts of Maheśvarānanda's argument in an effort to render language adequate or fit to the object under discussion. As he works his way through the series of the realities, Maheśvara is able to tailor his language to the phenomenological

[5]While Sanskrit *kāvya* has an extensive emic critical vocabulary to aid in its analysis (the theory of the literary *guṇa*s and *mārga*s, developed since the time of Bhāmaha, see now Pollock 2006 pp. 204–222), no such theorization is available for śāstric prose. When it has been noted at all, studies of style in *śāstra* have tended to the merely subjective (Śaṅkara is a good stylist, Śrīharṣa difficult) or the strictly technical (the numerous studies of the stratigraphy of Sanskrit texts based on the use of certain particles or formulae: see for example Trautmann 1971 or Srinivasan 1980.)

particulars of each, making for a Sanskrit prose (and, significantly, verse) meant to show as much as it tells.

In the ninth verse that opens the *Parimala* (see Appendix B), Maheśvarānanda characterizes the specific linguistic pattern of his text as a *vāṅmayapuṣpāñjali*, a cluster of flowers made up of language. This metaphor tells us something significant about both the means and ends of this work: this is something that is more than the sum of its parts, just as a spray of flowers has a beauty above and beyond its constituents. Further, this is a work (we learn from the same verse) that is *vineya-janacamatkriyārtham*, intended to evoke a sense of delighted wonder in the minds of people in need of instruction. The text's primary concern is thus the communication of a body of salutary knowledge conveyed through the production of a certain sort of pleasure, a pleasure above all of language itself. It is with this in mind that we may turn to examine a single gathering of the flowers of speech that the text comprises.

3.1 The Śaiva theory of the realities

Although other possibilities were occasionally entertained, Śaiva theologians came to generally accept the world both known and unknown to experience to be confected out of thirty-six distinct levels or dimensions of reality. These extend from the most subtle, the level of Śiva (*śivatattva*), to the most base, earth (*pṛthivitattva*). The idea that all of the world's contents can be analyzed through an exhaustive accounting is one of the founding impulses of Indian systematic thought; that these contents can be arranged into a hierarchical flow chart of existence is the position particularly

associated with the Sāṅkhya ('Enumeration'), one of the six systems of classical Indian philosophy.[6] In its developed phase as it was known to other philosophical schools, the Sāṅkhya accepts an essentially atheistic cosmos consisting of twenty-five *tattva*s. The Sāṅkhya thinkers' picture of the universe terminated in the levels called *puruṣa* ("person") and *prakṛti* ("primal matter," also called *pradhāna*, "the preeminent" or *avyakta*, "the unmanifest"). The former was thought to consist of the plurality of conscious souls, and the latter the undifferentiated material stuff of the universe. As these two *tattva*s interact, the latter gives rise out of itself to the three *guṇa*-s, or 'strands,' (*sattva, rajas, tamas*), which in their combination account for the other twenty-three *tattva*s. These first comprise the human psychic apparatus (ego, attention, and understanding) and the two sets of five 'senses' of knowledge and of action (the former being the familiar five senses, the latter comprising the human capacities for speech, manipulation, locomotion, excretion, and sexual pleasure). The final ten categories fulfill the need for the contents of sensory experience, the abstract qualities (*tanmātra*s) of sound, tactile sensation, color, taste, and smell and the five elements of *ākāśa*, air, fire, water, and earth in which these qualities inhere.[7]

This basic picture of the universe was taken up and reworked by the Śaiva theists early in their history, through the addition of a distinctively Śaiva superstructure of eleven further *tattva*s above the twenty-five categories of the Sāṅkhyas. In so doing,

[6] On Sāṅkhya generally, and the history of its development especially see Larson 1979 and Larson and Bhattacharya 1987 (although the latter should be read with caution, as Franco's highly critical review article (1991) demonstrates).

[7] This is only presented in the briefest of outlines, along the lines laid out by, e.g. *Sāṅkhyakārikā* 3, 11-18.

the anonymous authors of the Śaiva scriptures "demonstrat[ed] that the Sāṅkhyas had correctly grasped only the inferior levels of the universe" (Goodall 1998, li), and that the dispensation of Śaiva knowledge better captures the ultimate nature of things. In this view, consciousness is no longer simply the property of a plurality of agents, and effort must be made to account for the bondage of the individual soul, held by common Śaiva doctrine to be in a decisive (though controversial) way identical to Śiva. Thus, above the level of *puruṣa* (=the individual soul), the Śaivas posited a collection of five integuments (*kañcuka*s) which envelop the soul and diminish the capacities for omniscience, omnipotence, and omnipresence that it shares with God. Superordinate to these, the Śaivas placed the *māyātattva*, a higher ectype of the Sāṅkhyan *prakṛti*/*pradhāna*. Beyond this point lay what Śaivas commonly called the *śuddhādhvan*, the 'pure universe' of realms of existence inaccessible to ordinary experience in which one might hope to obtain release. These *tattva*s are successively that of pure awareness (*śuddhavidyā*), Īśvara, Sadāśiva, Śakti, and finally Śiva.

Neither Aghoraśiva nor Maheśvarānanda use this sort of retrogression in their accounts considered here;[8] rather, both follow the course of emission (*sṛṣṭikrama*) from Śiva downward through the taxonomy. The *tattva* scheme, again, was part of the common doctrinal inheritance of medieval Śaivas. The lower, Sāṅkhyan order is taken over wholesale: neither Maheśvarānanda's nor Aghoraśiva's interpretation of the lower twenty-three *tattva*s contain anything particularly distinctive.[9] Instead, it

[8]In another of his commentarial works, on the *Tattvasaṃgraha* of Sadyojyotis, Aghora presents the *tattva*s according to this retrogressive order, the *pravṛttikrama*.

[9]It is for this reason that I have limited the edition and translation to the first nine of the thirteen *gāthā*s of the *ṣaṭtriṃśattattvaviveka*. While Maheśvarānanda's discussion of the Sāṅkhya *tattva*s is

is in the upper reaches of the Śaiva cosmos—to which only the Śaivas are theoretically privy—that the different traditions of Śavia exegesis found grounds for contention. In fact, both of these authors are aware of the polemical stakes involved in their interpretation of the levels of reality. Aghora makes this pointedly clear in the second verse with which he begins his TPV:

> *advaitavāsanāviṣṭaiḥ siddhāntajñānavarjitaiḥ* |
> *vyākhyāto 'trānyathānyair yat sa tato 'smākam udyamaḥ* ||
>
> This effort of mine is opposed to the commentaries upon this work by those others, adverse to the knowledge of the [Śaiva] siddhānta, those who are filled with traces of non-dualism.

This admonition has a more general thrust to it than merely singling out Maheśvarānanda's Kaula nondualism: it may in fact be directed at the same Smārta *advaita vedānta* (for instance, that of the *Sūtasaṃhitā*) from whom Maheśvarānanda takes great pains to distinguish himself. Note that Aghora is referring not to nondualism as such, but the attempts prior to his time to offer a nondualist reading of the *Tattvaprakāśa* in particular. But Aghoraśiva doesn't get the final word. Outside of the *tattvaviveka*, Maheśvarānanda cites the *Tattvaprakāśa* in the course of his disquisition on *mala* or Stain, the source of continued worldly embodiment (E_V p. 31):

> *etena*
>
> *eko 'py anekaśaktir dṛkkriyayoś chādako malaḥ puṃsaḥ* |
> *tuṣakumbukavaj jñeyas tāmrāśritakālikāvad vā* ||
>
> *ityādinā malo nāmātmagataṃ kiñcid dravyam ity ācakṣāṇāḥ pratyākhyātāḥ.*
>
> Thus, through passages such as this one [*Tattvaprakāśa* 18]:
>
> "Though single, the Stain has many powers. It conceals the knowledge and action of the soul. It should be thought of like the covering of chaff [on rice-grains], or like tarnish on a piece of copper."
>
> those who believe Stain to be some substance present in the soul are refuted.

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not lacking in doctrinal or stylistic interest, its inclusion was not necessary for the present argument, and I thought it best to rein in the already lengthy edition and annotation.

For Maheśvarānanda, *mala* is only a byproduct of one's insufficient understanding of the actual nature of things, that the world consists only in the fluctuations of Śiva's unitary consciousness. He takes this verse to understand the presence of *mala* upon the soul to merely be an accidental blemish, simply removed. For Aghoraśiva, who argues repeatedly for the substantiality of Stain,[10] the verse speaks of the beginningless connection between Stain and the soul (just as chaff is always connected with rice), or of the fact that Stain is the source of human embodiment (just as chaff is the source of a shoot of grain) or that Stain, like tarnish, may be removed through an intentional act of cleansing. What this verse cannot possibly mean for Aghoraśiva is the adventitious and contingent connection of Maheśvarānanda's reading.

In almost every respect, the *tattvaviveka* and the TPV agree on the basic scheme of the *tattva*s. The only discrepancy, however, is important: in the middle of the taxonomy, where Maheśvarānanda (following the predominant line of Śaiva systematic thought) gives the standard Sāṅkhyan pair of *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*, Aghoraśiva records *prakṛtitattva* and *guṇatattva*. He does so with the warrant of an ambiguity in his root-text,[11] yet evidently took recourse to a great deal of commentarial ingenuity

[10] *Cf.* his comment *ad* vs. 15 (p. 34): *malasya dravyatvāc cakṣuṣaḥ paṭalāder iva dīkṣākhyenaiveśvaravyāpāreṇa nivṛttiḥ, na tu jñānamātrāt* "Because Stain is a substance it may only be removed through the operation of the Lord that is called initiation and not through knowledge alone just like, e.g., a cataract of the eye [that can only be removed through a surgical operation]." This echoes a commonplace in the writings of Rāmakaṇṭha, Aghoraśiva's principle model: see (among many other instances) *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* pp. 252-3 (*ad* 3.146ab), *Mokṣakārikāvṛtti* p. 256 (*ad* 53ab) and *Kiraṇavṛtti* p. 28 (*ad* 1.21cd). Aghora, for all his difference with Maheśvarānanda in questions of substance as well as style, was equally a very self-conscious legatee of the Śaiva authors of Kashmir, though in contrast to Maheśvara's eclecticism, Aghora seems to have exclusively and exhaustively based himself on Rāmakaṇṭha.

[11] In the brief mention (*uddeśa*) of his scheme of the *tattva*s in vss 21-23, Bhojadeva mentions both *avyaktaṃ* (→*prakṛti*) and *guṇatattvaṃ* in vs 23, while in the preceding verse the phrase *puṃso* (→*puruṣasya*) *jñakartṛtārthaṃ* ("so that the soul can both know and act") need not necessarily be

to argue through his interpretation. This seemingly deliberate misprision points to what is truly distinctive in both content and manner of argumentation about Aghoraśiva's presentation of the Śaiva realities in the TPV. In a way that separates him out from even his Siddhāntin coreligionists, Aghoraśiva here pursues a radical separation between spirit and matter: the entire spectrum of *tattvas*, no matter how rarified, are for him part of material creation and thus must be set against Śiva, consciousness as such, as well as the collection of individual bound souls. Thus *puruṣa*, as the soul embraced by the five integuments, cannot for Aghoraśiva be numbered among the set of the realities; nor can the material universe have Śiva at its apex. With consciousness altogether expunged from the stuff of cosmos, Aghoraśiva must rethink the rôle of the highest *tattva* altogether: it comes instead to be identified with *bindu* or *mahāmāyā*, like *māyā* and *prakṛti* yet another form of undifferentiated stuff that is excited by the intervention of Śiva's consciousness, in this case in order to produce the *śuddhādhvan* or 'Pure Universe' (the contents of the the *tattvakrama* down to the level of the fifth *tattva*, *śuddhavidyā*).

In rationally presenting this dualist ontology, Aghoraśiva relies throughout his *Vṛtti* on a strictly observed set of dialectical rules. Entities are either conscious or unconscious: of conscious things, there is only Śiva (said in the TP's first verse to be *satatodita* 'ever-arisen,' which Aghora understands as *nityamukta*, 'eternally liberated') and the plurality of souls, embarked to differing degrees on the path towards

understood as a mention of a separate *tattva*. Yet, as Filliozat points out (*op. cit*, 275ff.), giving *prakṛti* and *guṇa* status as separate *tattvas* appears to be vitiated by Bhoja's own statement in the following verse 24 (*prakṛtiguṇānāṃ nātyantaṃ vastuto bhedaḥ*, "There is not really a great difference between *prakṛti* and the *guṇas*").

liberation and identity with Śiva (this spectrum of sentient beings, ranging from deluded souls such as myself up to Ananta, the greatest of Śiva's deputies, is detailed in vss. 10–16). Unconscious entities make up the whole of the sequence of *tattva*s (in addition to certain other things admitted as reals, like *mala*), and these are either singular or multiple. If an insentient entity is singular, then it follows that it must be eternal; conversely, multiple entities must, like pots and other objects of experience, be transient, subject to arising and destruction. Thus, *bindu* (=*mahāmāyā/śivatattva*), *mala*, and *māyā* are all admitted as singular and eternal, enduring from one cycle of creation to the next; all the other *tattva*s are impermanent. These rules are not unique to Aghoraśiva; indeed, other Śaiva authors consider them to be axiomatic.[12] But one can see in the thoroughness and tenacity with which Aghoraśiva pursues their application an intimation of his intellectual style throughout the TPV: clear, systematic, and brief to the point to being taciturn.[13]

With consciousness and matter totally set against one another, however, Aghoraśiva is left with a problem. How is it that the world with all of its thirty-six graded levels of reality evolved in the first place? How can Śiva be preserved from the contagion of insentient materiality? Aghoraśiva's answer to these problems rely on interposing two kinds of buffers between Śiva and the world. As he repeatedly points out, it is not Śiva but rather his deputy Ananta, acting on God's orders, who actually does the work of creation and upkeep of the world as we know it. Aghora is also forced

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[12]See for instance *Tantrāloka* 9.156 and *Kiraṇavṛtti ed. cit.* p. 55 (*ad* 2.26ab).

[13]See also Filliozat's observations (*op. cit.* pp. 275–258) on Aghoraśiva's use of the methods of the Pāṇinian grammar to supply an underlying physics (my term) to the workings of the Śaiva cosmos.

to admit an accidental relation to obtain between Śiva or his agents and parts of the insentient universe, in positing the category *parigrahaśakti*, 'temporary capacity' (Filliozat: "*śakti* par adoption"). Thus, the upper reaches of the cosmos are products of the *śivatattva*/*mahāmāyā* as Śiva himself manipulates it as his *parigrahaśakti*, while the secondary creation from *māyātattva* is similarly handled by Ananta.[14]

3.2 Stylistic Intention in the MMP

Maheśvarānanda's *tattvaviveka* presents a singular contrast to this austerity of presumption and argument. Even in terms of its length of comment upon each individual *tattva*, the *tattvaviveka* strongly contrasts with the parsimony of Aghora's arguments. More significant is the *tattvaviveka*'s plurality of register, the way that the form and style of Maheśvarānanda's presentation is tailored to the particular matter under discussion. This can be seen from the very first: as he begins to discuss the reality levels, Maheśvarānanda briefly lays out the theory of the nature of relation (*sambandha*).

Each and every relation devolves into that of cause and effect, and the cause is in each and every case the action of some agent. This is even the case with those relations that would seem by our worldly understanding to be permanent and thus lacking the intervention of an outside agency, such as the existence of qualities or attributes in a substance. This is because one must accept that Śiva, being autonomous, is an agent, and being omnipotent, is such a kind of agent that he is capable of placing any sort of relata in whatever sort of relation we may find in the world. So, while we

[14]Thus the TPV *ad* vss. 7, 25, and 30.

are everywhere met with cause–effect relations, it amount to the same thing so say that all of these relations are in actual fact relations of agent and action, and that the agent is, whether directly or not, Śiva (12:1–22).[15] There are two sources to this line of argument. The equation of autonomy with agenthood derives from Pāṇini 1.4.54, *svatantraḥ kartā*, "the autonomous one is the agent," the definition of the grammatical category expressed by the first or third nominal case as coordinated with the finite verb of a Sanskrit sentence. This is a signal moment in the Maheśvarānanda's text: here as elsewhere, he relies on the common sense of language as a principle tool of argumentation. It is the second source of this argument, however, that is decisive here. Though it is not explicitly mentioned at this point in the text (it will be only at the end of the disquisition on the *tattva*s[16]) it is clear that the underlying presumption is that of the *satkāryavāda*, the characteristically Sāṅkhya theory of the preexistence of the effect in the cause. This is a doctrinal inheritance widely shared within the Śaiva fold; for his part, Aghoraśiva in the TPV also makes clear his adherence to it.[17] The doctrine argues that the creation of effects *ex nihilo* is logically and metaphysically impossible, and that the products of a material transformation of an existent thing (threads being woven into a cloth, or gold beaten into a diadem), though they might

[15]All references to passages in the *tattvaviveka* in what follows are given according to Appendix C's numeration by *gāthā* and line number. With only a few exceptions (noted below), I will not reproduce the Sanskrit text of quotations from the *tattvaviveka* in the body of this chapter.

[16]E_V p. 65: . . . *tatra śivatattve pṛthavyādīni sarvāṇy api satkāryavādamaryādayāvatiṣṭhante.* "all of the [*tattva*-s] beginning with earth abide there in the Śiva-*tattva*, in accordance with the position of the preexisting effect.".

[17]*ad* vss. 17 and 24, Aghora affirms *kāryakāraṇayor abheda*, 'the non–difference between cause and effect,' while *ad* 41, he explicitly mentions his tacit acceptance of the doctrine (*satkāryavādābhyupagamena*).

exhibit different properties than their source-material, are nevertheless consubstantial with that source. The *satkāryavāda* seems to have been adopted relatively late in the course of Sāṅkhya's development,[18] and was motivated by a greater need within the system as a whole: in order to provide rational grounds to justify the inference of primal matter (*prakṛti*/*pradhāna*) from the existence of its evolutes.[19]

In the *tattvaviveka*, the doctrine is put to uses strikingly different from this original intention. Yet the influence of the older theory can still be detected (12: 22–28):

> Under examination, it fails to make sense that insentient things can act as causes since, for instance, if a potter remains indifferent a pot cannot be created even when there is the collection of things such as earth, the stick, and the wheel. But in such cases as "the shoot arises from the seed", even though a specific agent is not seen, there is not, first of all, this sort of capacity on the part of the shoot, as it [i.e. the shoot] does not yet exist at that point.
>
> It might be suggested that the seed possesses this capacity: this would be incorrect. How can it be said that "the shoot arises" [but] the seed, being a different locus, has the capacity? Further, the seed causes [either] an already-existing shoot to arise, or a non-existent one. If it be an already-existing one, what is this 'causing to arise,' in this case, given that the existence of it [*i.e.* the seed] has already been declared? And if it be a non-existent one, how might existence and non-existence not be contradictory? Or, should we accept that, how might it not be an overextension? Therefore, created things require some non-insentient cause. And its non-insentience is none other than its status as an agent.

This is the *satkāryavāda* used to justify the necessity of an organizing intelligence at work in creation, something unacceptable to the atheist Sāṅkhya. But beyond this theistic reimagining in the context of the grammatical action-model, Maheśvarānanda applies the *satkārya* theory in an entirely original way. In postulating that "there is set of reals [*arthaḥ*] that abides in the midst of [Paramaśiva and earth], that consists of

[18] This is the suggestion in Bronkhorst 1994, pp. 315ff.

[19] Thus Vācaspatimiśra's *avataraṇikā* to *Sāṃkhyakārikā* 9: *ataḥ pradhānasiddhyarthaṃ prathamaṃ tāvat satkāryavādaṃ pratijānīte*, "Now, in order to establish the proof of the existence of primal matter, he first of all sets about introducing the *satkārya* doctrine."

the collection of the *tattva*s as they are successively encountered (i.e. drawn out by the mind) in every existing thing [*pratipadārthaṃ*]" (12: 39–40), he provides for himself a structural conceit that organizes his presentation of the entire *tattva*–schema. In contrast to the sort of parsimony and ontological discretion encountered in Aghoraśiva, the readers of the *Mahārthamañjarī* witness to the working out of a common essence within the great apparent diversity of phenomena. This common essence acts as a red thread throughout all of the subsequent *tattva*s, as the single intelligence that forms the sum total of existence for Maheśvarānanda reflects on itself and its internal complexity.

This intelligence, the principle player in the drama about to begin, is expressly marked out at the close of the *Parimala*'s comments on the twelfth *gāthā* (12: 56–58):

> The one [spoken of with the word] 'Paramaśiva' [in the *gāthā*] possesses the autonomy which has already been described, [and] which concludes in world-transcendence alone, but not in the imperial power that is the attainment of complete autonomy, which both transcends the world and consists of it. Further, since it would be inappropriate to have one possessing this sort [*i.e.* the latter sort] of a unique nature be drawn together [*pratyāhārānaucitya*]; it is rather the case that His nature is precisely that of the drawer-together.

The position here is exactly and diametrically the opposite of Aghoraśiva's, where the conscious principle of Śiva must be totally dissociated from creation. For Maheśvarānanda, the total identification of Paramaśiva with the entire spectrum of the *tattva*s provides the necessary conditions whereby they may be made known by an awareness that is itself another mode of Śiva's being.

This consubstantiality that Maheśvarānanda adopts from the Sāṅkhya *satkārya* doctrine exists alongside another equally foundational impulse at work in the *tattvaviveka*, towards proliferation and multiplication. If the first can be thought to provide

a vertical axis to the *tattvaviveka*, the common structure that unites all of the hierarchically ranked levels, then the second accounts for the horizontal axis within each, that is, the expanse that each of the *tattva*s may be said to contain. Without trying to make too close an identification, we may broadly correlate these two tendencies with the fundamental terms of Maheśvarānanda's ontology. For the Śaiva nondualists of the Pratyabhijñāśāstra, the world ultimately consists only of Śiva's awareness, but within this plentitude two poles can be distinguished, usually referred to by the terms *prakāśa* ('Illumination') and *vimarśa* ('Representation'). Prior to the discussion of the reality-levels, the *Mahārthamañjarī*'s argument focuses on shaping preliminary definitions of these two principles. In the case of *prakāśa*, much of Maheśvarānanda's early efforts at definition play upon the punning identification of the principle with the name of his teacher, Mahāprakāśa.[20] In the ontological-cum-epistemological perspective of the *śāstra*, *prakāśa* is at once the manifest appearance of the world (*viśvavilāsa*, p. 10) and the luminous power of the individual consciousness to disclose that appearance.[21] Maheśvara is less explicit in defining *vimarśa*. He tends towards imagistic description rather than outright definition: *vimarśa* is 'the wick of the auspicious lamp that is *prakāśa*' or, more pregnantly, it is described as

[20]These are translated and discussed in Chapter 4.

[21]See p. 14: *ihātmaiva hi prakāśasvabhāvatvād viśvavyavahāre nibandhanaṃ, 'mamāvabhāsate,' 'mayāvalokyata' iti pramātṛprakāśopaśleṣeṇaiva stambhakumbhādīnāṃ prakāśamānatvāt*, 'In this world it is the Self alone, inasmuch as it consists of Illumination, that is the motive cause of all activity, since it is only by virtue of their involvement with the Illumination of a percipient that [objects such as] pillars and pots are manifest [*prakāśamāna*°]. [We know this from such everyday expressions as] "It appears to me," and "I see it."' Note here the reliance on ordinary language (as conceived of within the circumscribed range of Sanskrit usage); the argument for Illumination is thought self-evident on account of the pervasive use of verbs with a sense of 'shine,' 'illuminate', 'be manifest,' *etc.* in sentences that express acts of perception and of knowledge more generally.

the action (*kriyā*) that underlies the meaning of the verbal root $\sqrt{}$*bhū* ('to be', 'to become'), where *prakāśa* is the agent (*kartṛ*).[22]

Within the longer history of the *śāstra*, the understanding of these two principles is of central importance. Glossing the *maṅgalācaraṇa* that opens most of Abhinavagupta's major Tantric works, Sanderson characterizes these two poles very elegantly (2005, p. 94):

> This union [of Śiva and his *śakti*] is presented as the inseparability of the manifest (*prakāśaḥ*) and its representation (*vimarśaḥ*). Śiva, the manifest (*prakāśaḥ*) is consciousness as the constant and totality of manifestation seen without reference to its modes. Representation (*vimarśaḥ*), his power, is that by means of which the ever-manifest consciousness appears in those modes, representing itself variously as the differentiated reality of common experience (*bhedaḥ*), as the aesthetic synthesis of that plurality within the unity of self-awareness (*bhedābhedaḥ*), and, ultimately, as the state of absolute potential (*visargaḥ*) in the core of consciousness...that contains all these modes in a timeless simultaneity.[23]

One can see how these two poles are suggestive of the twinned approach Maheśvara take in his presentation. The vast and multiform domain of phenomena and of perceiving subjects, all ultimately consubstantial with Śiva, that are captured by the single term *prakāśa* form the underlying theoretical argument to what I call the horizontal or the exhaustive-enumerative mode. Here, long quotative and copulative construc-

[22]For the first of these, see *gāthā* 10: *maṃgalapaīpo...vimarisadasā*°; there is a pun here (drawn out in the *Parimala*) between the two meanings of *dasā* (=Skt. *daśā*), 'wick' and 'state, condition.' This echoes the MM's second introductory verse, where *mahāprakāśa*/Mahāprakāśa is described as *vimarisaviccuriaṇiccalujjoo* ('having a light that is stainless, anointed with *vimarśa*'); on this verse see pp. 210 below. For the second, see *gāthā* 11 and *Parimala ad loc.* Part of this latter discussion hinges on a linguistic analysis of the participle *saṃto* (= Skt. *san*), see p. 191n.

[23]Compare here Torella's description, based on Utpaladeva's foundational ĪPK: *prakāśa* is "the motionless cognitive light that constitutes the basic fabric, the founding structure of reality, of the 'given'", while *vimarśa* is "the spark that causes this luminous structure to pulsate by introducing self-awareness, dynamism, [and] freedom of intervention" (2002, p. xxiii). Torella's introduction also provides a helpful survey of the synonyms used for these terms by the Pratyabhijñā authors themselves, as well the various translations in English, French, German, and Italian that have been proposed for them by contemporary scholarship.

tions and a highly paratactic syntax convey the multiplicity and internal diversity of the *prakāśa* pole, while the density of assonance, alliteration, and internal rhyme used by Maheśvara attempts to convey the subjective richness that phenomenal reality is supposed to possess.

Correlatively, the stylistic domain of *vimarśa* is that of the vertical axis of presentation, concerned chiefly with tracing the continuity that unites apparent diversity. Counterpoised with the exhaustive-enumerative style, this can be seen in Maheśvarānanda's penchant for drawing homologies and making connections between disparate domains of experience and awareness. In this other, synthetic mode, through predicative constructions and other techniques of identification–by–juxtaposition, Maheśvarānanda seeks to collapse the diversity of experience into its ultimately singular and self-identical ground. Śiva's awareness, even (or especially) his apperceptive realization that he is experiencing an awareness, is all that really exists; in inculcating this, our author frequently takes recourse to a dazzling if involuted syntax, where A is proven to be A only through the most complex peregrinations.

These two stylistic tendencies should not, however, be dichotomized any more than the two principles that they seem to embody. Recall the metaphor of lamp and wick, mentioned a moment ago: Maheśvarānanda is emphatic that *prakāśa* and *vimarśa* can only be separated virtually, never in fact.[24] Seen more abstractly, these

[24]See *gāthā* 28, discussed below (pp. 180ff.). Maheśvarānanda draws metapragmatic attention to his own use of metaphor and paronomasia at the conclusion to his comments upon *gā*. 10 (the lamp-wick verse cited above): noting the use of metaphor and *śleṣa*, he writes (p. 33): *upamādyalaṅkāreṇa vākyavaicitryaṃ tadarthasya hṛdayaṃgamīkaraṇāya*: 'The linguistic complexity [that results] from the use of tropes such as simile [is employed] in order to render its content more interesting.'

two interlinked principles are at the heart of the entire deeply self-conscious enterprize of the MM as a whole. The act of self-reflexive textual composition that can be seen in the tailoring of style to matter is itself bound up in *vimarśa*, in the fundamental self-reflexivity that is the basis of all being, awareness, language, and of course writing. The raw material of literary creation, the world from within which an author crafts a representation—the world of objects like pillars and pots, but also that of other texts and other readers—can as easily be assimilated to *prakāśa*. Writing within the consensually-inhabited world thus becomes a play between these two poles. This sort of worldly understanding can plausibly be seen as forming the background Maheśvarānanda's tacit theory of text-making.[25] It is with this in mind that we can understand his technique of matching form to content, what we may call his stylistic intention.

The exhaustive–enumerative prose style connected with the *prakāśa* pole can be seen in Maheśvarānanda's characterization of the highest of the thirty-six realities, the *śivatattva* (13: 1–9):

> The *śakti*-s [mentioned in the *gāthā*] consist of the way in which the world appears extending from earth up until the *śakti*[*tattva*] and [consists also of] the manifestation of the diversity of knowable objects, as the *yoginī*s and *yogin*s are worshipped in the several streams [of the Śaiva revelation], including [*anyathā ca*] "will, knowledge, and action" [in the Trika], "knowledge, memory, and negation" [in the Pratyabhijñā], [and] "creation, maintenance, destruction, the Nameless, and Light" [in the Krama]. [These *śakti*-s] are experienced in this and that place and in this and that manner. They

[25] On the 'worldly,' see Said 1983. For Said, worldliness is an inescapable feature of texts, as works of language possessing "ways of engaging with the world that are both numerous and complicated" (1983: 35). In part, the great critic saw this feature of textuality as a bulwark against an unlimited critical license, that "texts [are] objects whose interpretation—by virtue of the exactness of their situation in the world—*has already commenced* and are objects already constrained by, and constraining their interpretation" (*ibid*, p. 39 emphasis Said's). Beyond this admonition, there is a constructive dimension to the idea of worldliness, that textualized language by its very nature recreates its own prehistory as spoken language without being merely parasitic upon and secondary to speech and that such language as embodied in particular texts bears stipulable intentions directed towards its initial context of creation.

> are infinite even when examined in their individual instantiations, not to speak of the perspective of a synthetic awareness of the whole.
>
> To explain: there are many kinds of will first of all, because of its being differentiated into the will to know and the will to act, to give only two examples. So too knowledge has infinite modes, among them memory, experience, doubt, error, and imagination. And action also, is endless because of its divisions such as going, sitting, lying down, and speaking. Each of these, in turn, is further differentiated by the positing of divisions and subdivisions, and so, with hyperbole born of their exceptionally great number, 'thousands of *śakti*s' was said [in the gāthā].[26]

The Prakrit verse upon which this comments might contain a deliberate echo of *Tattvaprakāśa* v. 33.[27] But this sort of rhetoric raises potentially troubling questions about the horizontal proliferation of the *prakāśa* mode. Every possibility of a knowable object is swallowed up by the experience of the *śivatattva*. While this mirrors the sort of non–dual awareness that it the raison d'être of Maheśvarānanda's Krama theology,[28] it would seem to render the other thirty-five reality-levels unnecessary. Śiva is, on this understanding, the totally self-sufficient producer and observer of all of the content of experience, something that is highlighted by a number of the quotations from Pratyabhijñā authors adduced here. Paradoxically, Maheśvarānanda has set himself to the task of validating this theory through a description of the singular nature of each of the individual *tattva*s, when it is the precisely that singularity that is in constantly on the verge of dissolution into an all-encompassing Absolute. This

[26]This passage is discussed from the point of view of textual history in the Appendix C.1.4.

[27]Bhoja asserts that the *śivatattva*, while actually singular, is "studded" with its hundreds of diverse *śakti*s (vs 33ab: *tattvaṃ vastuta ekaṃ śivasaṃjñaṃ citraśaktiśatakhacitaṃ*), a passage that posed considerable interpretative difficulties for Aghoraśiva *ad loc.* In magnifying this claim, making the *śivatattva* to be *sattisahassāṇaṃ ĕkka saṃghaṭṭo*, "the single conglomeration of thousands of *śakti*-s," Maheśvarānanda might have sought to multiply the embarrassment of his Siddhāntin opponents: this in turn might account for his self-conscious acknowledgement of the hyperbole (*atiśayenoktam*) contained in the *gāthā*.

[28]Note the introduction here for the first time in the MMP of the characteristic set of five functions *sṛṣṭi, sthiti, saṃhāra, anākhyā,* and *bhāsā*, seen again *ad gāthā* 19.

presents Maheśvarānanda with an equal and opposite problem to that of Aghoraśiva. The Siddhāntin had to reconcile God's total removal from the world with the necessity of his intervention to set it in motion; Maheśvarānanda by contrast needs some means to posit a point of inception, where Śiva's absolute plentitude is able to overcome itself and allow for apparent diversity.

The inception of this overcoming is seen in the next *gāthā*, at the reality-level of *śakti*. This initial movement is linked by Maheśvarānanda to the notion of Śiva's *aunmukhya* or expectancy. Glossing this *gāthā*'s *so ccia...sattisahāvo kahio* ("That very one...His unique nature is said to be *śakti*"), the *Parimala* seems to begin with outright contradiction: "The very same Śiva whose unique nature has just been described, 'His unique nature is said to be *śakti*"'. It is in explaining this seeming incoherence that the rhetorical significance of *aunmukhya* becomes clear (13: 1–5):[29]

> *tasyaiva kiñciducchūnatāvasthāyāṃ śaktiśabdavyapadeśa ity arthaḥ. tasya cāyaṃ svabhāvaḥ—yat svahṛdayarūpeṇecchājñānakriyātmakaviśvavikalpaparyāyakoṇatrayasāmarasyalakṣaṇena nityapravṛttacarvaṇotsavatvād antarmagnasaṃvidānandaspandasandhukṣaṇakṣameṇa madhunā māṃsalam atyantabṛṃhitaṃ parivāhakriyārhamahātaṭākāmbhaḥsambhārakalpaṃ 'bahu syāṃ prajāyeya' ity āmnāyasthityā svayam eva svahṛdayodyamavamanopakramātmānam ullāsam āhlādātiśayam anubhavatīti.*

> The meaning is this: when He himself enters into a state of being somewhat engorged, He is referred to by the word '*śakti*.' And this unique nature of His is as follows: the 'liquor' is his own 'Heart', which is characterized as being identical with the 'triangle' that is none other than the conceptual elaboration of the world consisting of 'will,' 'knowledge,' and 'action'. [It is called 'liquor' since it] is the means whereby the celebration that is the savoring [*scil.* of experience] is constantly ongoing [*nityapravṛttacarvaṇotsavatvāt*]. It is capable of exciting the action of Consciousness and Delight that are immersed [within it?]. Of His own accord—in line with the Vedic teaching that"I shall be many, I shall produce offspring"—He experiences the 'splendor' or superabundant happiness—the commencement of His heart's act of projection—that is 'made thick' or augmented by this liquor, [and so becomes] like a mass of water in a great tank, ready to overflow.

[29]Unlike the other references to the *tattvaviveka* in this chapter, I here give the Sanskrit text, as its structure is directly relevant to my argument.

There is much here that is very characteristic of Maheśvarānanda's prose throughout the MMP, especially the laminate structure of grammatical and syntactic subordination: each word properly belonging to the *pratīka* of the verse is simply embedded into the larger sentence, along with the entire upaniṣadic quotation (I have thus chosen to divide the single Sanskrit *vākya* into four English sentences). This structural complexity here is coupled with the medieval Southern love for lengthy, alliterative, rhythmic compounding, as in *ānandaspandasandhukṣaṇakṣameṇa*. The sense of readerly vertigo these effects produce is only augmented by the sentence's emphatic reflexivity (cf. *svahṛdaya°, svayam eva svahṛdayodyama°*), and by the use of typically Kashmirian Sanskrit jargon (*spanda*, *ullāsa*).

Rather than taking this to be mere mannerism, as a hallmark of late style (as some readers would be wont to do), I see in this instance a genuine effort on Maheśvarānanda's part to push at his medium in the service of his larger purpose. Recall that it is precisely Śiva's sense of *expectancy* that Maheśvarānanda is trying to characterize, the motion away from self-contained fullness outward, into the world. The initial protrusion 'outward' in the first sentence and the dizzying introversion of second both attempt to capture this movement. As the latter sentence builds, phrase by phrase, compound by compound, it plays on its hearers' own expectant desire for meaning to emerge. The sentence, as well as the effect it intentionally evokes, build to a climax in the strikingly original, rhythmically charged simile-compound *parivāhakriyārha-mahātaṭākāmbhaḥsambhārakalpaṃ* ("like a mass of water in a great tank, ready to

be overflow").[30] The orchestrated effect of this description of Śiva's *ullāsa*, at once a coruscating energy and a diverting play, then gives way to resolution, to an outward movement that is yet contained within the *tattva*'s absolute plentitude.

As Maheśvarānanda moves further down the taxonomy, the force of his language begins to change emphasis. In the paired realities of Sadāśiva and Īśvara, he continues the attempt at crossing over out of the total fullness that he must definitionally ascribe to Śiva and to Śakti (and so in turn to their respective *tattvas*). Maheśvarānanda's task here is, as I've already argued, one of stylistic adequation, of making language somehow fit to its content, and so it is to the subject of language itself that he turns here. All language is calibrated to the first-person speaker, Maheśvarānanda argues, and thus all language use is imbricated in the I–cognition (*ahaṃtā*, 15:6). This calibration of language and thought then is taken to extend into the realm of action, given the interpenetration of what as conscious agents we think and we do. It is the varying degrees of this interpenetration of subject-centered knowledge and subject-centered action that constitute these two principles of Sadāśiva and Īśvara.

Here, again, the *tattvaviveka* takes a vertiginous turn, as facts of worldly experience—our sense of ourselves as ourselves, the everyday actions we see all around us—find place in the upper reaches of the Śaiva cosmos. As in the swelling horizontal extension of the *śivatattva*, where everything can be collapsed into the one highest reality, so

[30] *Yogasūtra* 4.3 refers to a similar *topos*—*nimittam aprayojakaṃ prakṛtīnāṃ, varaṇabhedas tu tataḥ kṣetrikavat* ("something can act as a proximate cause of [the action] of primal natures, not as their motive cause, but rather through the removing obstacles from it, just like a farmer"). This is understood by Vyāsa and Bhojadeva *ad loc* as referring to a farmer removing a dam from one watered field (*kedāra*) so that the water can flow on its own into another. The importance of this analogy as well as it actual language differs markedly from Maheśvarānanda's usage here.

too the stuff of everyday experience can be elevated into the workings of the upper reaches of the cosmos. It is only a matter of emphasis, as can be seen in the way Sadāśiva shades over into Īśvara, and vice versa (15: 35–37).

The same vacillation continues to hold in the following principle, that of *śuddhavidyā*, 'pure Awareness,' the purity of which consists in the perfect equilibrium which there obtains between subject and object. Although Maheśvarānanda nowhere admits the common Śaiva distinction between the pure and the impure sectors of the universe (the *śuddhādhvan* and the *aśuddhādhvan*), its existence seems to haunt his presentation of the higher *tattva*s. Despite the initial outward movement that he stages in the *śaktitattva*, thought and matter, subject and object remain inextricably bound up with each other. The problem of accounting for the great diversity of our experience while retaining a nondual ontology remains unanswered in the wake of the first glimmer of outward movement.

The crisis finally comes where it must, within the scope of the *māyātattva*. As we saw earlier, in the counterpart Saiddhāntika version composed by Aghoraśiva, *māyā* is presumed to be a substance, uncreated and eternal, adopted by Śiva (or, more precisely, by the demiurge Ananta) as a *parigrahaśakti* in order to set the impure creation in motion. It is, for the dualist, the point where the conditions of our worldly experience have their origin.[31] Maheśvarānanda concedes that this all appears to be

[31]Glossing Bhoja's vs. 38, Aghora writes (p. 70): *sā ca 'sūkṣmā' amūrtā, paramakāraṇatvena śaktirūpatvāt. sā ca 'ekā.' acaitanye saty anekatve 'nityatvaṃ siddham ity ata eketi bhāvaḥ. nityādyantarahitatvāt sṛṣṭisaṃhāraprabandhasya nityatvenāvasthānāt tasyāpy ādyantavirahāt. ato 'vyāpinī' sarvasya kalādeḥ svakāryasya ca. utpattivināśaśūnyatvād 'anādinidhanā' [.] śive tv 'asaktā' asamavetā, upādānatvena binduvat parigrahaśaktitvāt.* '[First of all, *māyā*] is 'subtle' or lacking form, since it is a power [of Śiva's] that acts as the highest cause [of material creation]. Further,

the case, but he parts ways with the Siddhāntin position in seeing *māyā* not as a fund of unformed material but as the deluding power intrinsic to Śiva.[32] This draws him close to the position of the illusionistic Vedāntin, a stance which Maheśvarānanda is as eager to distinguish himself from as he is from the Śaiva dualist (17:1-6):

> That which is in fact the Lord's 'nature,' not held in common [by anything else], having as its nature the appearance of Being-as-such, which is the manifestation of the world, is 'unitary' under logical investigation. [That is,] it abides as the essence of solely that which is beautiful in the actions of one's consciousness and bliss, not as something suited to embracing the inhibitions of conceptual thought [*ex conj.*], since the arguments of the dualists [that underlie such inhibitions] will shortly be refuted.
>
> Even though this is [really] the case, upon that very [nature] [there are projected] conceptual thoughts, such as 'Caitra', or 'Maitra', or 'pillar' or 'pot,' which, even though there is a great deal of apparent difference, as there is in the fashioning of such ornaments as bangles and diadems [out of gold], [these] manifestations of knowable objects continually exist within the heart, engendering a delight at [their own] charm.

Maheśvarānanda here attempts to steer between these two extremes. This passage neatly recapitulates much of the form of the commentary on the preceding *gāthā*s, evoking both the vertical and the horizontal axes. In the long compounded descriptions *viśvasphurattātmakamahāsattollāsarūpo* ("having as its nature the appearance

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it is 'single.' This may be understood in the following way: we have already demonstrated that if something is insentient [as *māyā* is *ex hypothesi* thought to be] and also multiple, then it must be impermanent. For this reason [that is, to avoid a contradiction with what follows], [*māyā*] is single. [*Māyā*] is permanent, i.e. without beginning and without end, since it supports the uninterrupted cycle of the creation and destruction of the world, which is itself beginningless and endless. It follows from this that it is 'the pervader' of all of its effects [the *tattva*s] beginning with delimitation (*kalā[-tattva]*). It neither arises nor is destroyed, and [so is called] 'beginningless and endless.' However, [*māyā*] is 'unconnected' or not inherently involved in Śiva, since it is only a temporary capacity used, like the Singularity [*bindu*, which for Aghoraśiva= *śivatattva*] as a source of material." Aghora's interpretation of this final *viśeṣaṇa* (*śivāsaktā*) appears to be a deliberate distortion: it makes perfect sense to read this to mean 'inherent to Śiva' rather than the opposite. This latter interpretation is noted by Śrīkumāradeva *ad loc*, as a variant reading.

[32] Again, Maheśvarānanda might here be trying to catch Aghora (or another dualist opponent) up in his own words: *mohiṇī sattī* in 17d closely resembles *Tattvaprakāśa* 39d, *svabhāvato mohasaṃjananī*, while Maheśvara's insistence on *māyā*'s being a *śakti* (and thus for the nondualist inherent in Śiva), could be understood as an effort to problematize the dualist claim of *māyā* is at once a *śakti* or power (as in Aghora's statement quoted in the preceding note) and a substance or *upādāna*.

of Being-as-such, which is the manifestation of the world") and *svasaṃvidānanda-parispandasaundaryamātrasāratayā* ("the essence of solely that which is beautiful in the actions of one's consciousness and bliss"), purposefully twinned as the attribute and predicate of the nature (or perhaps 'essence', *bhāva*) of Śiva, set out a complex set of felicities attached to the divine. This acts, then, as a long eulogistic period addressed obliquely to his presumptive Śaiva audience, while retaining the thread of the consubstantiality inherent to the *vimarśa* register. Significantly appended to this long description, the internal cross-reference to the upcoming refutation of the dualist argument (*bhedavādasyāpavādiṣyamāṇatvāt*) integrates the sentence into the larger frame of the commentary.

The second long sentence here employs the exhaustive-enumerative style, marked by the lists of quotative constructions and embedded *dvandva*s within a longer compound. The plurality of phenomena is kept before the audience's mind's eye, while still being incorporated within the projectionist model of consciousness advocated by Maheśvarānanda.[33] Significantly, it is the desirability of these phenomena that is emphasized, set against the illusionist *vivartavāda* of the Vedāntins.

These two sentences seek to set up an implicit contrast between the all-pervasive play of Śiva's many powers, and the satisfying impress of the conventionally real. To reconcile these would seem to require a conjurer's trick (a metaphor to which Maheśvarānanda himself turns, below), something to make the impossible real. And

[33]Note that this theory of projection, a central axiom of the Krama, is emphasized here by the conjectural reading adopted at 17:6 (*hṛdayagatāḥ*) as opposed to the banal *lectio facilior hṛdayaṅgamāḥ* given in the majority of the sources

yet, Maheśvara argues, this simply must be the case: for if the all-powerful Lord cannot do such a thing through the instrument of his *māyā*, then Śiva's power and its correlative, the existence of the world itself, cease to make sense.

The *Parimala* then provides the by-now expected battery of proof–texts affirming this view and echoing parts of Maheśvarānanda's prose. In the regular structure of one of the *Parimala*'s comments, this would be all one might expect. Maheśvarānanda's next move is thus critical (17:36–37):

> How can there be a refutation of the idea of difference, whereby the the nature of the world might [be maintained to possess] a unity of essence?—to such an objection, it is said [in response:] What, indeed, is 'difference'? Is it reciprocal negation of two things, or the uniqueness of properties, or, indeed, is difference the natural state of things?

The objection is very much to the point: how can a nondualist manage to exclude his dualist interlocutor's position while categorically maintaining that every point of view is at least partially true? Beginning with these terse few sentences, Maheśvarānanda's prose completely and dramatically changes. It is worth quoting what follows at length (17:37–57):

> It is not the first [of these possibilities], as surely a statement like "The pillar is not a pot and the pot is not a pillar," arises only through dependence upon an accidental property [*upādhi*], *i.e.* a reciprocal relation [*anyonyatā*]. And this [reciprocality], upon examination, only arises when the alterity of the two things is repeatedly stated. And is that alterity the actual nature of things [*padārthānāṃ svabhāvaḥ*], or is it rather some accidental property dependent on difference? If it be the first, then there would be the problem of there being difference even of things when they are all by themselves [*ekatvākrāntānām api bhedaḥ*]. And if it be the second, then alterity would only make sense when difference already exists. And since difference even at this point has not been proven, therefore there would be [either of two fallacies, *viz.*] begging the question [*ātmāśrayatva*] or circularity of argument [*anyonyāśrayatva*].
>
> Nor is it the second option, [*viz.* the uniqueness of properties.] This uniqueness is something that has the form of [a universal]—pillar-ness, pot-ness, etc.—which the things like pillars possess. With respect to this, if some restriction exists, that, say, pillarness only exists in pillars, and potness only in pots, then difference might make sense. But [*ca*] no sort of restriction is to be seen [in the world] . One might object that there is some differentiator of one thing from another [*tattadvyavasthāpakam*],

> for example, being made of wood [in the case of pillars] and having a broad middle [in the case of pots], but this would be wrong, because there is no cognition [of this differentiator] as unique to these [pillars and pots]. And such a cognition would only make sense when difference already exists. And, [difference] has been placed within the set of things to be demonstrated, and so just as before, there would be the unwanted result of begging the question, etc. Further, [there would be] difference—the uniqueness of one thing from the other—on the part of [these universals like] being made of wood, as well. Thus, when this [problem] is examined all the way down to the level of the atom, there would be an infinite regress, one that is totally fatal [to this line of thinking] [*āmūlaviparāsiny anavasthā syāt*].
>
> It is not the third option either. For, it must be said that by 'natural state' [*svarūpam*], we must refer to the form that is one's own, *i.e.* that is unconnected with the real nature [*svabhāva*] of anything else, as there would otherwise be the unwanted consequence of the contamination of real natures [*svabhāvasāṅkāryaprasaṅgāt*]. And if we examine [the question], "what is the cause of the non-involvement of pillars etc. with the real natures of other things?", in that case also the only answer [*uktiḥ*] that makes sense is [to say], "because of the existence of difference". And so in the current instance also [saying that difference] has a real nature continues to be mere wishful thinking [*manorathāyamānasvabhāvaḥ*], [and] thus this is the same old problem [*prācīna eva doṣānuṣaṅgaḥ*]. Moreover, if one says that difference is the natural state of things, then the presence of error [in certain cognitions]—[for example, saying] "this is silver" [of mother-of-pearl]—would be [dead and gone], its funeral obsequies already given [*dattāñjaliḥ syāt*]. For, in this case, the natural state of the mother-of-pearl is clearly perceived, and it is assessed to be silver. Thus even when one adopts the position that error is not itself something positive [*akhyātivādapadavīprasthāne 'pi*], it must be accepted that it is only the errant cognition that is denied, and not also the usage [/worldly action] to which it gives rise [*tadanuguṇasya vyavahārasyāpi*].

This passage depends upon an obvious change of register: Maheśvarānanda here employs the particularly genred language of the śāstric *vikalpajāla*, the presentation and disproving of the spectrum of possibilities underlying an opponent's argument. The extensive compounds and obtuse syntaxes of the earlier part of the text—what in fact constitute the main stylistic trend in the *Mahārthamañjarī* as a whole—are totally absent here, replaced by a quick, vigorous style of argument. Each option is introduced and disposed of in almost a single breath, with a sub-dilemma like the ontological status of *anyatva*, 'alterity,' as opposed to *bheda*, 'difference,' embedded within the larger three-tiered structure of the refutation. Maheśvarānanda's argument

builds to a rhetorical climax of carefully turned and clever expression, as in the two sentence-final clauses *uktir yuktim ālambate* ("the only answer that makes sense") and *bhrantyullekho dattāñjaliḥ syāt* ("the presence of error would be [dead and gone], its funeral obsequies already given"). These provide a flourish to the end of the refutation, and lend to it an overall sense of measure and design.

Part of the significance of this passage is negative: that Maheśvarānanda can compose at length in this sort of a measured, classicizing register casts his more manneristic writing elsewhere in the *Mahārthamañjarī* into higher relief. It is not as if he writes in such a difficult, involuted style because of it is the only way that he knows how, or because he is merely aping his Kashmirian models. Rather, one sees that he writes the way that he does here and elsewhere deliberately, by tailoring his medium to the material under description.

More to the point, however, is the question of the function of this passage within the structure of the *tattvaviveka*. Precisely where Maheśvarānanda has to acknowledge the apparent presence of duality in the world, he suddenly and pointedly switches to the dialectical style of śāstric argument, complete with imagined interlocutor, objections, and rebuttals. At the point where duality must in some provisional way be admitted, the voice of the text itself divides, generating a provisional duality between two contestants to a debate. That is to say, the form of the śāstric *carcā* itself exemplifies the matter under discussion, the seeming division between subject and object, spirit and matter that we encounter in our worldly lives.[34] That the argument is a

[34]This is not, however, the only occasion where Maheśvarānanda averts to the genred form of the śāstric dialectic. Leaving aside the occasional introduction of a single potential objection (signalled

foregone conclusion (as indeed it always is in the representation of debates in *śāstra*) itself subserves Maheśvarānanda's larger intention: duality, seen from the correct perspective which he offers, is really only the imagined postulation of a state of affairs about reality. It is easily dispensed with, just as one might briefly entertain an idea for the sake of argument, and just as easily reject it.

Throughout the remainder of this discussion (17:58–89), Maheśvarānanda proceeds in much the same way. Some of the particulars of the presentation are unclear—for example, I fail to see how the syllogism *yat prakāśate* etc. (17: 69–70) follows from its premises or how it relates to the larger argument. Yet the form of the passage continues to subserve the larger purpose of the argument for the constructed nature of dualizing thought. At the passage's end, he situates the argument back within the conceptual field of his eclectic tantrism, introducing in turn the three goddesses of the Trika taught in Abhinavagupta's *Tantrāloka* as a gradient between different apprehensions of reality (17: 90–94): the nondual (the state of Parā, *parāvasthā*), difference–and–non–difference (the state of Parāparā, *parāparāvasthā*), and duality (the state of Aparā, *aparāvasthā*). Maheśvarānanda's stylistic intention again asserts itself here in the sentence with which he characterizes the third, lowest state, a stunning return to the *prakāśa* style of exhaustive enumeration (17:92-94):

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with the stereotyped *nanu...iti cet* construction), there are two longer dialectical passages. As discussed above, the defense of the *satkāryavāda* (13:18–27) relies on the arguments and methods of Sāṅkhya in the changed context of Śaiva theism. And in the context of the *upāyas* or soteriologically efficacious means *ad gāthā* 59 (E_V p. 149-153) there is a lengthy *carcā* on the *bimbapratibimbavāda*, the nondualist Śaiva doctrine of the mirror-image relation the obtains between the Śiva's understanding and that of the bound soul (I return to this passage in the next chapter, p. 226). One notes that here as well there is a seeming duality resolving itself in unity through the mediation of the dialectical form.

> *bhedaś ca viśvottīrṇaparameśvaraprakāśaparāmarśaprāgalbhyapallavaparamparāprāyatayā viśvavaicitryaśilpakalpanācitramaṇḍapāyamānavibhramaḥ prasarpatīty aparāvasthā.*
>
> And difference as it spreads all around, containing the allurements that are [as it were] the picture-gallery for the fashioning of the images that make up the world's diversity, as it is itself essentially a series of sproutings of the bold power that is the reflection on the Illumination of the Lord who transcends the world: this is the Aparā [or lower] state.

Here, again, Maheśvarānanda's language does at least as much as it says: sweeping by in a rush of alliterative syllables in an analogue to the great diversity of individual experience. This seeming chaos of experience continues to provide him his theme as he continues on down the line of the *tattvas*.

3.3 Taking the Stage

Maheśvarānanda spends very little time on the set of *tattvas* said to follow upon *māyā*, the five *kañcukas* or 'integuments.' He dispenses with these in a single *gāthā*, despite the fact that these principles are among the most frequently argued over among the various schools of Śaiva systematic thought, occasioning interpretations from both the doctrinal right and left, including a lengthy discussion in the *Tattvaprakāśa* (vss. 41–48). Torella (1998) has done much to clarify the importance of this theological set, thought to encompass the soul, limiting the innate capacities that make it naturally identical to Śiva. On his reading, these principles provide the ontological underpinnings for a general Śaiva Tantric anthropology:

> The cuirasses [Torella's favored translation for *kañcuka*] constitute the most internal and concealed structure of the individual personality. In establishing their existence, Tantric traditions...seem to have been driven by a twofold need: to overcome the dualism and the basic incommunicability of the purely spiritual and the purely material components—*puruṣa/prakṛti* and *puruṣa/buddhi*— and to single out a boundary land within the human being where the *jaḍa/ajaḍa* components almost touch one another, as it were (p. 66).

The motivation for this seeming theoretical lapse on Maheśvarānanda's part can be seen in what follows in the *tattvaviveka*. The following two *gāthā*s on the older Sāṅkhya principles of *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* constitute the climactic moment of the *Mahārthamañjarī*'s presentation of the *tattva*s, and to provide just such a model of the human person that other Śaiva theorists found in the five integuments.

That Maheśvarānanda made the pair of *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* into the centerpiece and climax of the *tattva*–scheme is something of an anomaly, to which the remainder of this chapter is dedicated. He does this through a simultaneous strategy of integration and distinction of his argument within the wider world of Śaiva doctrinal common sense. The stakes of this innovative understanding (for so I believe it to be) can be seen in contrast to Aghoraśiva's equally original understanding of these two reality-levels in his gloss on the *Tattvaprakāśa*. As mentioned earlier, Aghora banishes the *puruṣatattva* from the scheme altogether. He does this with only a grudging admission that *puruṣa* is reckoned within the *tattvakrama*s of any of the scriptural works that he holds as authorities. Their presence in these *tattva*–hierarchies, he claims, should be considered to refer only a figurative acknowledgement of the soul's subjection to

the effects of *karma*, and not to any more durable ontological claim.[35]

This dismissal of the *puruṣatattva*'s place among the principles forms a parcel of Aghora's wider insistence on the utter separation between what is conscious (Śiva and the plurality of souls) and what is not (everything else). Through this, Aghoraśiva signals his insistence on preserving the purity of God's conscious being, and of fundamentally removing that highest good from any commerce with the rest of reality. The most real part of the human individual, for Aghoraśiva, must correlatively also be alienated from the world of experience. By contrast, Maheśvarānanda grounds his argument for not only the existence but the centrality of the *puruṣatattva*, as the point where our human experience of the world can be said to have its inception, on the acceptance of two theologemes shared throughout the wider field of mature Śaiva systematic thought: the ultimate identity of Śiva and the individual soul (the precise motive for Aghora's excision of the *puruṣatattva*), and the *pañcakṛtya*, the set of five cosmological tasks definitionally ascribed to Śiva.

In the first case, he maintains (again, along with Aghoraśiva) the ultimate identity of God and individual soul: the *puruṣatattva* becomes the merely so much costume

[35]As mentioned above (p. 124n.), Filliozat finds Aghoraśiva's arguments here to be casuistic and unconvincing. His interpretation, however, does do some justice to Bhoja's rather strained language in vs. 49:

> *tattvair ebhiḥ kalito bhoktṛtvadaśāṃ yadā paśur nītaḥ |*
> *puruṣākhyatāṃ tadāyaṃ labhate tattveṣu gaṇanāṃ ca ||*
>
> When the soul, impelled by these realities [the *kañcuka*s], is made to undergo [worldly] experience, it comes to be called *puruṣa*, and is itself counted among the realities.

This idea of a mere 'reckoning' rather than a full inclusion of *puruṣa* within the *tattva*-hierarchy is not a hallmark of a dualist ontology: Abhinavagupta himself makes a similar argument in the *Parātriṃśikāvivaraṇa*, cited by Maheśvara at 19: 92–93.

for a role (*varṇakaparigrahamayī...daśā kāpi*, see 19: 86–88), that can barely conceal the actor lying behind them. The source (or better, the inspiration) for Maheśvara's thinking here would appear to be the welter of quotations given early his comment; these themselves must be set within the quite pervasive Śaiva analogy between the fictive world of the drama and the created order. Noteworthy is the beautiful verse *jananaśaiśava etc.* (19: 9–10): this strikes the keynote for much of what Maheśvarānanda will say in his remarks on the old Sāṅkhya *puruṣa–prakṛti* complex. Maheśvarānanda thus begins this key passage by adopting elements of a learned Śaiva common sense.

The same goes for the *pañcakṛtya*, generally reckoned as Śiva's creation (*sṛṣṭi*), preservation (*sthiti*) and retraction (*saṃhāra*) of the world, and the concealment (*tirodhāna* or *tirobhāva*) and favor (*anugraha*) directed toward individual souls. Aghoraśiva, in his own presentation of *pañcakṛtya*, understands the actual identity of the soul and Śiva to be realized in liberation or approached asymptotically in the states closely analogous to liberation, those of the supernatural entities at the summit of the Śaiva cosmos. These entities possess the ability to perform these same cosmological actions (an ability that is negated in the regular human condition by precisely the action of the five *kañcuka*s), but only as they are impelled to do so by Śiva (*vṛtti ad* TP vs. 7: *teṣām api śivapreraṇayaiva pañcakṛtyakartṛtvāt*).[36] By contrast, Maheśvarānanda's position is that of functional identity of the human individual with the deity through-

[36]See Goodall 2004, p. 202n. for references to this set in Saiddhāntika scriptural literature: in these explicit as well as possible references to the *pañcakṛtya*, these functions are assigned to the demiurgic Vidyeśvaras.

out its career on earth. This position is by no means unique to Maheśvarānanda—it is consistent with the doctrinal bedrock of the Pratyabhijñā[37]—but his presentation of this identity is peculiar to the *Mahārthamañjarī*. He begins within the recognizable fold of the projectionist theory of consciousness: the individual's act of beholding an object constitutes the emission (*sṛṣṭi*) of it, parallel with God's emission of the created order. Similarly, the object of perception is maintained during the period when it provides the content of a cognition, and withdrawn when the perceiver's attention leaves off from it, while a fourth state (*turīyasattā*) (19:50) is posited wherein consciousness ceases to engage in this ongoing projection of content. The next step in the argument, an alternate interpretation of the same state of affairs, is significant (19:54–60):

> Or, better still, within [the moment of] a synthetic awareness of something like a pillar, when one focuses upon it as being a pillar, then the fact of it being made of wood (for instance) is suppressed. And when one focuses on its being made of wood, then there is the suppression of its being a pillar. Thus, the creation of one and the retraction of the other can both clearly be seen. However, when one reflects on the combination of properties like 'being a pillar' or 'being made of wood', there is continuity, as neither of the two thoughts is being suppressed. And when there is the cessation of all the various conceptual thoughts such as 'being a pillar', then there is [the state called] the Nameless. When there is reflection upon the Self's radiance, there is 'Light'—thus the modes of creation, [maintenance, retraction, the Nameless, and Light] are to be seen [here].

Note the reference here to the two states of the Nameless (*anākhyā*) and Light (*bhāsā*), previously elliptically introduced in the opening sentence to the commentary on the *śivatattva*, as part of a set of the great diversity of phenomena subsumed within that

[37]Especially the Krama-inflected teachings of Kṣemarāja's *Pratyabhijñāhṛdaya*, the major source that Maheśvarānanda had before him as he composed his commentary on verse 19. See the apparatus to the edition as well as the annotations to the translations for further discussion of his indebtedness to this work.

principle (13:3).[38] The introduction of the pair *anākhyā/bhāsā* is especially important here, as these form part of the distinctive Krama meditative practice taught later in the MM (*cf.* E_V p. 100.3—104 =*Parimala ad gāthā*s 39d–40). Within the structured meditation, these represent the stages where the final remaining traces of objectivizing cognition are eliminated (*anākhyā*) and the contentless radiance of consciousness as such is worshipfully reflected upon (*bhāsā*). These stages, the culmination of the complex series of meditative exercises taught by the Krama, are here introduced as the real substructure of every act of cognition, even outside of the limits of ritual practice.

This seemingly minor point of terminology serves to illustrate the larger stakes of Maheśvarānanda's entire reading of the Śaiva levels of reality, as well as the specific strategies that structure his presentation. As I mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the theory of the realities was something held in common by all Śaivas: it formed a piece of doctrinal common sense. As such it is part of the set of things (along with other theoretical presumptions, ritual practices, and the acceptance of a common postmortem destiny) that can be placed within the set of the *sāmānya-śāstra* or general teachings of the Śaiva religion. These may be contrasted with the details of the restricted (indeed esoteric) terminology and liturgy of Maheśvar-ānanda's Krama *sampradāya*, which present limit cases of *viśeṣaśāstra* or specific teachings. For earlier authorities like Abhinavagupta, this dichotomy allowed them to interpolate details from other, putatively more general sources (*śruti*, *smṛti*, and

[38] The set of five functions here was elliptically introduced in the dramaturgical analogy with which Maheśvarānanda began his comments (19:11).

the primary texts of the Śaivasiddhānta, for instance) within more specialized forms of knowledge, allowing a text like the *Mālinīvijayottara*—Abhinava's *pūrvaśāstra* or 'foundational authority'[39]—to be stretched beyond their limited ambit and to be reimagined as a master-text for the entire Śaiva religion. Maheśvarānanda appears to deploy this same dichotomy in the service of a radically different rhetoric: in his interpretation of *puruṣa* (and in the following presentation of *prakṛti*), he presumes this hermeneutical principle in order to import terms and ideas not held within the stock of Śaiva doxa into seemingly innocuous doctrinal territory.[40] Maheśvarānanda himself gives an intimation of this dialectical relationship between general and specific (19: 71–79):

> As for God's Five Actions, there is no disagreement about the first three, emission, maintenance, and retraction. But as for the latter two, when seen from the perspective of certain benighted bound souls, these becomes a source of disturbance for their minds, comprising [such calamities as] the destruction of religious vows: and when [further], out of His infinite kindness, God redoubles His efforts to help them to comprehend their true nature by way of removing this, their misunderstanding—then, the pair of Actions are referred to as 'concealment' and 'favor'.
>
> But, as it says in the *Tantrāloka*:
>
>> Just like when a canvas is unfurled, and all at once, the picture is revealed,
>> the world is revealed to yogins as being solely a collection of properties.
>
> When the world itself is concentrated upon as being an effect, without any of these distinctions of percipients and bound souls, then the terms for the two Actions are "Nameless" and "Light".

The terminological distinction offered by the esoteric Krama is thus understood to be primary, with the more widely–established terms are only provisionally adopted

[39]Contrast the interpretation given in Vasudeva 2004, p. lii–liii.

[40]The *locus classicus* on the Śaiva hermeneutics of *sāmānya-* and *viśeṣaśāstra* can be found in the *Tantrāloka* 4.246–251 and especially Jayaratha's comments *ad loc* ; see now the discussion of this passage in Sanderson 2005, p. 109n, part of a longer discussion of these hermeneutic principles as they are used in Abhinavagupta's commentarial and expository writings on the *Mālinīvijayaottara*.

to ease the suffering minds of the *Mahārthamañjarī*'s presumptive Śaiva audience. This tension between *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa* is precisely what is in evidence throughout the commentary on the two *tattva*s *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*: Maheśvarānanda uses these principles as the fulcrum by which his presentation of the pan–Śaiva *tattva*–scheme is made to accord with the specifics of his own ontology and soteriology.

This shift in the text's rhetoric occurs in parallel with a significant *formal* shift: the move from prose to verse. The three separate passages in the commentary on *gāthā*s 19 and 20 (19: 112–158, 20: 26–41, and 20: 46–143) are by no means the only parts of the *Parimala* composed in the *anuṣṭubh* meter; they are, however among the longest such passages.[41] The verse composition in these passages is to be distinguished from the practice of appending *saṃgrahaśloka*s or summarizing verses to the end of a discussion, something seen frequently in śāstric writing. What is at work here is a fundamental division of labor between prose and verse. Verse is not used to simply summarize or perhaps parenthetically comment upon a complete prose argument; rather, verse is itself intentionally deployed to introduce new information and to present arguments in ways that are peculiar to it.

Without overdetermining Maheśvarānanda's shift to verse in advance, it is worthwhile to suggest what this formal device might entail. Minimally, we may assert that the shift serves to distinguish the contents of the verse passage from the surrounding

[41] Of these other versified sections of the *Parimala*, several—e.g. E_V pp. 15.21–16.16 and p. 34.12–20— are introduced with the phrase *yad āhuḥ* ('They say that...'), and would seem to possibly be independent compositions of other authors' integrated into the MMP. This could, however, itself be a stylistic ploy of Maheśvarānanda's, one comparable to his adoption of the the third person *āha* ('he says') in the *avatāraṇikā*s to his own root–verses *passim*.

prose: verse, even a quotidian, simple verse form like the *anuṣṭubh*, differs from prose by virtue of its cadence, and by the changed timbre of reading and recitation that it naturally provokes. Thus, the contents of these three passages are *prima facie* cast in higher relief than the surrounding prose. Verse also enforces an external restraint upon expression and, indeed, upon thought. Thus, whereas in the earlier discussion of *māyātattva*, Maheśvarānanda carefully tailored his prose, eschewing the lengthy compounds and complex syntaxes evident elsewhere in the MMP, here he voluntarily binds himself with the external necessity of the meter. And while the contents of a single utterance can indeed be less or more than the thirty–two syllables that make up an *anuṣṭubh* distich, that basic pattern provides the rough foundation or guideline for the individual verse sentence. The presentation of the argument is thus further, if loosely, constrained. Finally—and this constitutes the biggest appeal to hermeneutic charity—each discrete verse passage, made up of any number of these notional thirty–two syllable verse sentences, arguably coheres in the form of a larger sense-bearing structure. Each verse passage constitutes a unit, an argument unto itself contributing to the larger whole of the text.

With these initial parameters in mind, we may turn to the first passage, on *puruṣa*. Locating the passage within the larger context of the comment on the nineteenth *gāthā* and making sense of its internal structure are both necessary preliminaries to understanding what larger work it performs here. As seen throughout the *tattvaviveka*, the basic structure of the *Parimala* is that of a semantic gloss on the individual *gāthā*, a series of quotations from scriptural texts and earlier authorities, followed

possibly (as in *gā*. 16 and 17) by a second interpretation or an independent discussion. It is striking, then, that the metrical passage in the *Parimala* on the *puruṣatattva* falls within the set of adduced quotations: it has the force of a sudden aside, a shift in the author's attention.

This passage comprises twenty-three metrically homogenous verses, with an odd interjection of prose coming between the twelfth and the thirteenth verses, dividing the passage into two halves of roughly equal length. Its structure may be parsed as follows:

- **I. a** ll. 112–114: major proposition. The self/Śiva[42] pervades the entire spectrum of beings, appearing in multiple instantiations but maintaining a unitary nature.
- **I. b** ll. 115–121: examples of actual unity amidst apparent plurality. The soul transmigrates through different bodies, a face is reflected in a multitude of mirrors, oil is present throughout a collection of sesame seeds, sky is split up by the panes of a window, and the taxonomic universal 'Being' is subdivided into different species.
- **I. c** ll. 122–127: *arthavāda*/general comments. The postulation of multiplicity is unnecessary and offends against the rules of parsimony. Difference has already been shown to be incoherent (a reference backwards to the *bhedavādāpavāda ad gāthā* 17). Apparent difference can be provisionally accepted.
- **I. d** ll. 128–129: preliminary conclusion. Because the only shared property between these examples and the soul is their unitary nature, it follows that the self is all-pervasive, something that 'the others' also argue in favor of.
- **I. e** ll. 130–135: first refutation of other doctrines. The Jains here are expressly singled out and criticized for their belief in a soul that conforms in its size to the body of the being it inhabits. Sentience is not be accepted as a *sine qua non* for the presence of a soul.

The single prose sentence is then interposed into the flow of the argument, following which there is:

- **II** ll. 137–158: second refutation of other doctrines. This is divided between a dismissal of the materialist position that the body alone constitutes the self (**II.a** ll. 137–142), a connected

[42] The equivocation here is deliberate: the pronoun *sa* in l. 114 picking up the contextually relevant masculine noun *puruṣaḥ*, while the syntactically parallel *lokottaraḥ prabhuḥ* in l. 117 refers unambiguously to Śiva.

reprise of the theory of agent and effect as that which underlies all phenomena (**II.b** ll. 143–148), and a critique of a presumed Buddhist objection based on the emptiness of all phenomena (**II.c** ll. 149–158).

Within this structure, some significant points emerge. In the sweeping phrase with which it begins ("appearing from the Creator down to the lowliest worm"), and in the main thesis that it initially sets out to prove—that of the *vyāpakatā* that it predicates of both Śiva and the *puruṣa*—this passage is organized along the vertical axis of argument described earlier, the axis that relies on a common unifying element present throughout creation. In this case, the common element is significantly ambiguous: it is either the soul or Śiva or both/and. The importance of this ambiguity rests again on the shared Śaiva theologeme of the ultimate identity of these two; it is here that the conclusion drawn in I. d takes on its significance. It is clear that the *anyair api* in l. 129 can only refer to Maheśvarānanda's presumptive dualist adversaries within the wider Śaiva religion, the Śaivasiddhāntins. For *vyāpakatā*, the all–pervasiveness attributed to singularly to Śiva and to the soul, is affirmed everywhere within the scriptures that both exegetical traditions looked towards. Like the *pañcakṛtya*, it is another element of pan-Śaiva systematic thought that Maheśvarānanda here ventures to colonize with his own interpretative agenda of the radical identity between God and the individual.[43]

[43]Once again, it seems possible that Maheśvarānanda is deliberately hitting upon a point in Aghoraśiva's argument where the latter's interpretation is suspect. In glossing *vyāpakaṃ* among the attributes assigned in Bhoja's text to the *śivatattva* (*ad* vs. 25), Aghoraśiva of necessity is forced to alter the extension of this term (p. 47): *yat prāk śuddhādhvopādānatvena bindvātmakaṃ śivatattvaṃ sādhitaṃ tad 'vyāpakam', śuddhāśuddhātmano jagataḥ nijapariṇatirūpābhir nivṛttyādibhiḥ kalābhiḥ viśvaṃ vyāpnotīty arthaḥ*, 'the śiva-level that has already been established to be the phonic singularity [*bindu*] that is the material cause of the pure universe is [said to be] 'the pervader'. That is to say, it pervades the entirety of the pure and the impure worlds

Seen in this light, the remainder of the passage becomes explicable. The positions that Maheśvarānanda takes up and refutes are not adequate representations of the other soteriologies; rather, they are cartoonish sketches or doxographical shadows of actual positions. Accounting for the positions attributable to the Jain or Buddhist religions or to the long-standing caricature of the Cārvāka materialists does not seem to have been a serious priority. Rather, these three pseudo–opponents present in outline the position–takings opposed to the Śaiva religion in general,[44] and their systematic exclusion here represents a consolidation of the commonly held core beliefs of a Śaiva audience irrespective of sectarian identity, situating the argument within an appeal to doctrinal common ground. As Maheśvarānanda concludes the discussion on the *puruṣatattva*, he furthers the equivocal identification of Śiva and the individual soul (19:159–173). The *puruṣa* becomes a double image, always at once Śiva and the individual. This doubled identity he likens to that of a magician (*aindrajālika*) playing a trick on his audience, in a closing refrain of the dramaturgical metaphor with which he began.

through the [five] phases that are its material transformations, i.e. withdrawal, [tranquility, wisdom, peacefulness and absolute peacefulness.]'. Compare here the straightforward gloss Aghoraśiva gives to Śiva described as *vyāpī* in the opening verse of the TP (p. 6): *vyāpī sarvagataḥ*, "the 'pervader' means omnipresent."

[44] *Cf.* here Aghoraśiva's comment on the first verse of the TP (mentioned in the preceding note), with its ossified refutations, respectively, of fatalism (? *karmakālādīśvaravādinām*, 'those who hold that time and *karma* are God'), the belief in a plurality of Gods (*anekeśvarapakṣa*), the *pravāheśvaras* (a Śaiva soteriology otherwise known from its refutation in *Paramokṣanirāsakārikā* 5), Jains (*kṣapaṇādīnām*) and Buddhists (*bauddhādīnām*).

3.4 Becoming a Person

So Maheśvara turns to *prakṛti* in the twentieth *gāthā*: after acknowledging the presence of the *guṇa*s *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* in equilibrium within the *tattva*, he returns to the exhaustive-enumerative style in a brief passage (20:10–12). However the basic multiple of this enumeration is not three, as one might expect, but rather five:

> [*Prakṛti*] is the stage upon which appear endless thousands of auspicious virtues and inauspicious flaws, upon which wise men [*vipaścidbhir*] have imagined as its manifestations the five varieties of the I-cognition (i.e. the void, intellect, vital breaths, the body, and external objects) and the five phases [of spiritual ascent] (i.e. withdrawal, tranquility, wisdom, peacefulness, and total peacefulness).

This is to prove significant.

The initial description of the *tattva* occasions an aside by Maheśvarānanda on the authority of the Sāṅkhya model of the world, quoting the initial definition (*uddeśa*) from Īśvarakṛṣṇa's *Sāṅkhyakārikā* of their list of twenty–five reality-levels (20:14–15). Maheśvara proceeds to clearly map out the extent of his disagreement with the Sāṅkhyas (20:18–25). Properly speaking his refutation has a wider ambit, as it is directed at "the conclusions of the Sāṅkhyas *and others*" (19:13 *sāṃkhyādisiddhānto*). While this could be a reference to the Yoga system (itself often reckoned with Sāṅkhya in doxographic lists) or a meaningless addition, I would suggest that this is not the case, and that Maheśvarānanda intends to include more than just the atheistic emanation-theory of the Sāṅkhyas within his critique. Pointedly, this occasions the second of the *tattvaviveka*'s verse excurses.

Only eight *śloka*s long, this second passage depends upon the same ambiguity as previous metrical aside on *puruṣa*: once again, we are met with a series of pronominal

anaphoras without an explicit referent. The structure here is as follows:

- **I.** ll. 26–29: The objection put to the opponent: How is it that an entity said to be totally passive can have any effect on the world? How can one even infer its existence?
- **II.** ll. 30–34: The opponent's response: The conscious and passive entity sets primal matter in motion, as there is no other way that creation could begin. It is for this reason that one both accepts the conscious entity's existence, and sets about proving it.
- **III.** ll. 36–41: Rebuttal: The passive uninvolvement of the entity cannot then be accepted. Because it sets in motion other actions, it must itself be active, even if only slightly. Even admitting this slight degree of action, however, falsifies the opponent's contention.

This passage lacks the caricatured quality of the earlier doxographic sketches. While brief, it clearly identifies the problem at hand, presents an undistorted resumé of the opponent's position, and proceeds to critique that position on its own terms. Of course, all of this is a perfectly licit criticism of the Sāṅkhyan *puruṣa*, but I propose that this refutation is directed to a more proximate opponent: once again it is the Śaivasiddhānta, or more particularly the Siddhāntin position defended by Aghoraśiva.

Again, this critique relies on the uncertainty as to what exactly is being referred to here: is it Śiva or *puruṣa*? Maheśvarānanda explicitly understands these two entities to be coextensive, by way of the etymological ambiguity of the name '*puruṣa*' ("who dwells in the city [of the body]" vs. "who burns up the city [of the Daityas]", 19:166–174). But whereas the earlier identification of Śiva with *puruṣa* provided the ontological basis of Maheśvarānanda's understanding of the person, here the same identification is redeployed with a polemic intent. The identification is as it were transitive: the critique of the Sāṅkhya *puruṣa* acts as a place holder in the present context, a pretext for the critique of the Śaiva dualists.

The problem that Maheśvarānanda here associates with the Sāṅkhyas—that their unmoved mover cannot but have some sort of active relation with the world—equally

applies to Aghoraśiva's rewriting of the role played by Śiva in creation. Stripped of its scholastic epicycles, Aghoraśiva's view maintains just such a radical inactivity of the purely conscious Śiva. The necessary postulation of several *parigrahaśakti*s, the forced reinterpretation of the *śivatattva*, the insistence on the demiurgic work done by Śiva's deputy Ananta: all of these are Aghoraśiva's *ad hoc* adoptions in order to rationally defend the extreme separation of Śiva from anything else, and to maintain the pristine purity of Śiva's existence as purely consciousness.

But why should Maheśvarānanda bother with this pretext? On the one hand, the project of Aghoraśiva and his disciples was perhaps the most public and successful theological synthesis of its day, and its framers enjoyed royal support and attention. Openly criticizing it—even its most extreme formulations, as encountered in the *Tattvaprakāśavṛtti*—may have simply been politically incorrect. At the same time, the peculiar concealed form of this attack (if that is what is in fact at work in this passage) bears a certain rhetorical value in the larger structure of the *tattvaviveka* that cannot be underestimated. In criticizing this position under the pretext of a critique of the Sāṅkhya, Maheśvarānanda ostensibly maintains the Śaiva common ground—the affirmation of *sāmānya* or doctrinal commonality—that he has already established. Yet the criticism is clear: he identifies his dualist opponent with what is after all a form of knowledge obviously transcended by the Śaiva dispensation.

Thus Maheśvarānanda's move to meter seems to imply a meta–level of argumentation, wherein the presuppositions and consequences of Maheśvarānanda's *tattva*–theory are explicitly reflected upon in light of this common ground of Śaiva doxa.

Maheśvarānanda seems to use verse especially to resituate the interpretation within the sphere of the larger Śaiva constituencies of the time.

None of the niceties of scope, structure, or seeming coherence that can be seen in the first two versified discussions seem to apply to the third, and considerably longer, passage (20: 46–143). On the contrary, it is unwieldy, structurally awkward, and digressive. It seems at first glance to present a contradictory redescription of both everything that has come before in the *tattva–krama* along with a presumptive reading of the subsequent twenty-three *tattva*-s in an unwarranted and haphazard fashion. Despite this apparent chaos, this passage forms the crescendo of the entire *tattvaviveka*. Again, some initial divisions may be ventured:

- **I.** ll. 46–72: Redescription of the already–mentioned *tattva*s up to and including *prakṛti*. This redescription is based upon enumerating sets of five said to exist in each of the levels.
- **II.** ll. 73–111: The union of *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* as giving rise to the physical and psychic make–up of the individual, as well as the stuff of phenomenal reality. This accounts for the text's theory of the person properly speaking.
- **III.** ll. 112–133: Coda. There is a further pentad of yogic attainments (*siddhi*s, normally reckoned as eight). This is followed by an opaque and confusing set of further pentads (ll. 117–125; I remain uncertain of many of the details here, and omit extended discussion). Finally, there are two closing verses in a more complex meters: the first praising the author and Śiva simultaneously through *śleṣa*, and the second a *phalaśruti* praising the adept who comprehends the text's account of the world.

The first section again relies on the vertical axis of presentation: the organizing principle of each pentad provides a common armature moving downward through the categories from Śiva to *prakṛti*. Some of these pentads are familiar from their earlier mention in the *tattvaviveka* (as can be seen in the close parallels between for instance 16:31–32 and 20:60–65); other, however, seem rather disjunctively out of place. This is especially evident in the pentads attributed to the uppermost *tattva*s, for example

the sudden and seemingly unmotivated inclusion of the pan–Śaiva *brahmamantra*s (otherwise undiscussed by Maheśvarānanda anywhere in the MM) located in the level of *sadāśiva*.[45]

That this list forms a miscellany of the furniture of the Śaiva universe is perhaps the point. In using the set of five as the organizing principle, this passage places all of these varied terms within the overarching rubric of the Krama, Maheśvara's own, decidedly non-*sāmānya* cult. As Sanderson describes it, the initial phase of the classically conceived Krama worship begins with the adept "contemplating various pentads as the structure of his bodily and mental existence and seeing them as emanations of a set of five goddesses representing the cycle of cognition."[46] Thus, in accounting for

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[45] *Cf.* the reference to this set of *mantra*s in the SS, mentioned earlier (p. 66).

[46] Sanderson 1988, p. 696. His source for this presentation is the anonymous *Mahānayaprakāśa*; see for instance the following, from that text's second *ullāsa* (vv. 7–10):

> *yaḥ śūnyaprāṇadhībuddhikarmendriyacayātmakaḥ |*
> *kāyo yaś ca jaḍatvena bāhyena viśayātmanā ||*
> *vyomna ārabhya pṛthivīparyantena vyavasthitaḥ |*
> *anantānubhavādhāraḥ siddhayoginiṣevitaḥ ||*
> *etatsaṃketakasthānam āśritāś cinmarīcayaḥ |*
> *dṛśyante prakaṭaṃ yasmād asau pīṭhakramas tataḥ ||*

°*vādhāraḥ siddha*°] *conj.*; °*vādhārasiddha*° Ed.

> The body consists of [the pentad of] void, vital breath, consciousness, and the senses of knowledge and action. That which is established as [the five elements] beginning with sky and extending through to the earth [appears] as outer, as insentient, and as constituting the objects [of awareness]—this is the substrate of the infinity of experience, which is resorted to by adept yogins. The site where these two come together, where the rays of consciousness are clearly visible, is called the 'Sequence of the Throne'.

Cf. the label *pañcārtha* that Maheśvarānanda repeatedly associates with the core of the Krama teaching (*e.g.* 20:130) In Maheśvara's own liturgical description (*gāthā*s 34–41) the tendency to organize experience into pentads is repeatedly acknowledged, even though in this initial stage of contemplation (the *śrīpīṭha*[*pūjā*]) the organizing denominator is nine. Maheśvara rationalizes this seeming discrepancy (E_V p. 84-85), noting an alternate five-fold scheme (what is in fact the scheme of the *Mahānayaprakāśa*: compare 2.6ab with E_V p. 84, ln. 23) as well as homologizing his set of nine *kalā*s into a more general set of five.

the preceding parts of the *tattva* hierarchy in this way, the primacy of the Krama is encoded in a *sāmānya* or general context, restaging the characteristic initial phase of the Krama worship in a putatively sect-neutral context.

The *puruṣa–prakṛti* dyad acts as the fulcrum of the whole presentation of the levels of reality. It is at the point of their union that the *ātman* is said to emerge, and from this point onward, Maheśvarānanda details the emergence of the human person as the centerpiece of the flowchart of the *tattvas*, and provides a theoretical rationale for the diversity of personality and subjectivity. The materials at his disposal here are traditional—once again, these show Maheśvarānanda's clear indebtedness to the Sāṅkhya, despite his disavowal of it—but his employment of them is original (20: 95–111):

> When the ego acquires the support of these qualities, it tends towards the trifurcation of the types *sāttvika*, etc. Of these, the *sāttvika* ego extends itself into objects of sensation [as their *tanmātras*, *viz.*] sound, touch, form, taste, and smell. The *rājasa* ego, on the other hand, [being] possessed of its own nature, manifests as the five [*karmendriyas*], speech, acceptance, movement, elimination, and pleasure. As for the *tāmasa* ego, [totally] embodied, it stretches forth through the raw materials of the [apparent] world, the simple properties of sky, air, air, water and earth. Further, once the level of the ego is possessed of [this] trifurcation, a threefold extension is acknowledged, because of the abundance of the [particular] set of outer manifestations. Desire for the good, a philosophical inclination, craving for transcendent ends, concentration upon [the appropriate] objects [*vastuṣv adhyavasāyaḥ*]—[that is to say,] auspiciousness—and forthright mind: these are all features of a *sāttvika* man, accustomed to physical and mental control. They say that the power of the *rājasa* man, one who instills [such states as] happiness and fear, lies in his sense-organs: ears, skin, eyes, tongue, and nose. And so the markings [*paricchadaḥ*] of the *tāmasa* man, used to delusion and torpor, are, in order, speech, the hands, feet, anus, and genitals.

With its cataloguing of the various traits of character that are the outward sign of the human constitution, this recalls the Sāṅkhyan tables of characteristics taught in the seventeenth chapter of the *Bhagavadgītā*. However, from the perspective of the classical theory, this passage appears somewhat scrambled: there is no scope given

for the *jñānendriyas* or senses of knowledge (hearing, touching, seeing, smelling, and tasting), and the actual elements are derived from the *tāmasa* ego. In the normative presentation of the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*, a two–fold emission (*dvividhaḥ sargaḥ*) is imagined inclusive of all of the senses as well as the mental organ (*manas*) on the one hand and the qualities (*tanmātras*) on the other. The first set are taken as evolutes of the *sāttvika* ego (there called the *vaikṛta* ego), the latter as the evolutes of the *tāmasa* (or *bhūtādi*) ego, while the *rājasa* (or *taijasa*) ego is thought to act as an auxiliary in the production of both.[47] In this earlier scheme, the actual elements were thought to independently arise from the qualities, something that proved to be a thorny theoretical problem.[48]

In order to properly understand what Maheśvarānanda is trying to account for here, we need to look once again at Aghoraśiva's *Vṛtti* to the *Tattvaprakāśa*. There is however another, perhaps unexpected, source to help clarify the argument at this pivotal point of the *tattvaviveka*: this is Śāradātanaya's *Bhāvaprakāśana*, a verse text on the theory and pragmatics of the theater, close in time to both the MMP and the TPV as well as a text with some perceivable Śaiva elements.[49] Triangulating between

[47]See here *Sāṃkhyakārikā* 24 and 25

[48]See Bronkhorst, *op. cit.*

[49]The *Bhāvaprakāśana*'s learned editor K. S. Ramaswami Sastri in his Introduction to the edition (pp. 72ff.) presents evidence securely dating the *floruit* of Śāradātanaya between the years 1175–1250 CE, i.e. a period later than the career of Aghoraśiva but quite close to the date adopted here for Maheśvarānanda (see Appendix A). It seems certain that Śaradātanaya was a Southerner: in the geographical excursus that ends the BhPr, he gives a list of the sixty–four *janapadas* into which the southern portion of the mythical super-continent of Bharatavarṣa is to be divided (pp. 309ff.). In this list, the three kingdoms of the Tamil country are given pride of place (p. 309.17: *pāṇḍyāḥ sakeralāś colāḥ*), and in the closely following list of eighteen regional languages, he reports the Dravidian languages first (p. 310.10). Neither of these lists inspires too much confidence, but this coupled with the entirely Southern provenance of MSS of the texts led to editor to presume a southern origin of the author and the work. Śāradātanaya's reference to his own natal village Māṭharapūjya,

these two texts and the MMP, we can begin to account for what might otherwise seem to be the muddle of Maheśvarānanda's presentation of *prakṛti*.

The relevant text of Bhoja's TP (vss. 53–54) reads:

syāt trividho 'haṅkāro jīvanasaṃrambhagarvarūpo 'yam |
saṃbhedād asya sato viṣayo vyavahāryatām eti ‖ (53)

sāttvikarājasatāmasabhedena sa jayate punas tredhā |
sa ca vaikārikataijasabhūtādikanāmabhiḥ samucchvasiti ‖ (54)

taijasatas tatra mano vaikārikato bhavanti cākṣāṇi |
bhūtādes tanmātrāṇy eṣāṃ sargo 'yam etasmāt ‖ (55)[50]

Let it be [admitted] that ego is tripartite, as it has the form of the will to live, active desire, and self–regard. This being so, a sensible object can be acted upon [only] through the cooperation [of these three divisions].

Further, ego is three-fold depending on the predominance of *sattva*, *rajas*, or *tamas*, and it [thus] is envivified by the names *vaikārika*, *taijasa*, and *bhūtādi*.

With respect to this [trifurcation], the attention-faculty arises from the *taijasa*, and the senses from the *vaikārika*, and the qualities from the *bhūtādi*: all of these arise from this [ego].

Bhoja also shows some deviation relative to the classic Sāṅkhya doctrine in the order of emission. But it is not the problem of the emergence of further, lower *tattva*s from the three–fold ego that concerns Aghoraśiva. Rather, he addresses himself to a

located in the Merūttara *janapada* (p. 1:12-13) has thusfar eluded identification, although the resemblance of the latter name to the famous north Tamilnadu *brahmadeya* Uttaramērūr has long been noted. The extent of his adherence to or influence by doctrinal Śaivism also remains unsettled: none of his *maṅgala* verses reveal any sort of theological affiliation, while his membership in the Kāśyapa *gotra*, if anything, suggests that his family tradition may have been that of the Vaiṣṇava Vaikhānasa order (the onomasty of his genealogy—Lakṣmaṇa (FFF), Śrīkṛṣṇa (FF), Bhaṭṭagopāla (F)—suggests similar conclusions). There is, however, a persistent notion (dating back to the editor's aforementioned Introduction) that Śāradātanaya was an adherent of the Pratyabhijñā. This derives from his acceptance (p. 181.19ff) of precisely the matter under discussion here, the scheme of thirty–six Śaiva *tattva*s. This passage, along with another noted by Sastri, where the operation of the *kañcuka*s are described and likened to the specific process of the cognition of *bhāva*s (pp. 52–53, this latter notion is explicitly said to be that 'taught by the older masters of the Śaiva scriptures' *śivāgamajñair artho 'yam evam uktaḥ purātanaiḥ*), do argue for a Śaiva source or sources somehow influential upon Śāradātanaya's thinking—though it needn't be specifically Pratyabhijñā–influenced—and this subject would reward further investigation. Note also the specifically Śaiva (though non-Tantric) provenance of the *rasa*–theory described here.

[50]Alternatively, the final *pāda* transmitted to Aghoraśiva might have read *sargakramo 'yam etasmāt*, the reading reported by the later commentator Śrīkumāradeva *ad loc.*

more basic question of nomenclature. In his comment on the fifty–fourth verse, he is extremely laconic: *sāttvikādinām ahaṅkāraskandhānāṃ taijasādīni kramān nāmāni bhavantīty arthaḥ*, "The meaning of the verse is that the names of the varieties of the ego *sāttvika*, etc. are respectively *taijasa*, etc." It is clear from this that Aghoraśiva is actually reading the beginning of the second line of verse 54 as *sa ca taijasavaikārika*° rather than the Sāṅkhya–congruent *vaikārikataijasa*°.[51]

It is only in his gloss on the following verse that Aghora's reasons for this become clear. Against the unambiguous testimony of Bhoja's verse, Aghoraśiva declares that the *manas* and the senses of knowledge arise from the *taijasa* ego (which, as we've just seen, equals the *sāttvika* ego for him), while from *vaikārika* (=*rājasa*) emerge the senses of action. He explains:

> *na ca taijasato mana eva vaikārikakād ubhayarūpāṇīndriyāṇīti vyākhyeyam. mūlavacana-virodhād yuktivirodhāc ca. sattvasya prakāśarūpatvena bodhahetutvam, rajasaḥ kriyā-hetutvam yuktam. uktaṃ ca śrīmanmṛgendre*
>
> > *śrotraṃ tvak cakṣuṣī jihvā nāsā ca manasā saha |*
> > *prakāśānvayataḥ sāttvās taijasaś ca sa sāttvikaḥ ||*
> > *vāṇī pāṇī bhagaḥ pāyuḥ pādau ceti rajodbhuvāḥ |*
> > *karmānvayād rajobhūyān gaṇo vaikāriko 'tra yaḥ ||*
>
> This verse is not to be interpreted to mean that the mental organ alone [arises] from the *taijasa* ego, and both sets of senses arise from the *vaikārika*, as this contradicts the testimony of scripture as well as common sense. It makes sense to say that *sattva*, as it consists of illumination, is a source of knowledge, while *rajas* is a source of action. As it is said in the *Mṛgendratantra* [*vidyāpāda* 12:3-4]:
>
> > The ear, skin, the eyes, the tongue, the nose, as well as the mental organ are related to *sattva* insofar as they are connected with illumination. And that which is related to *sattva* is [called] *taijasa*. The vocal apparatus, the

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[51] This variant is signalled in Śrīkumāradeva's later commentary on the TP (the *Tātparyadīpikā*), when he notes *ad loc*, *kecid vaiparītyam icchanti 'sa ca taijasavaikārikabhūtādika' iti granthapāṭhaś ca ity āhuḥ*, "There are those who prefer to invert the order [here]. They read a different text, viz. '*sa ca taijasavaikārikabhūtādika*'." It is, however, unclear from this comment whether Śrīkumāra was himself aware of Aghoraśiva's text, or indeed whether the emendation was original to Aghoraśiva (and silently introduced here) or was the reading of his version of the *mūla*.

> hands, the genitals, the anus, and the feet all have their origin in *rajas*. That set in which *rajas* predominates because of their connection with action is here [called] *vaikārika*.

We can see at this point that the wider Śaiva adoption of the Sāṅkhya world–picture occasioned a not entirely consistent adaptation and reworking of the older materials.[52] Maheśvarānanda's version is one (not entirely satisfactory) reworking; the materials here would seem to encompass no less than three different versions: that of Bhoja, that of the compilers of the *Mṛgendra* (who seem quite conscious of their innovation vis-á-vis Sāṅkhya, as can be inferred from the phrase *vaikāriko 'tra yaḥ*, "is *here* [called] *vaikārika*"), and that of Aghoraśiva, who takes pains to reinterpret the former in the light of the latter, while somewhat salvaging the letter of Bhoja's text.

The problem for Aghoraśiva is an interesting one that extends beyond the simple harmonization of Bhoja's treatise with scriptural authority. We see that Aghora is subject to the Śaiva common sense that understands *prakāśa* as bound up inextricably with the disclosing power of cognition. This, we may hypothesize, is what led to the terminological impasse in the first place: the compilers of the *Mṛgendra* may have felt the label *taijasa*—with the connotations of brightness and brilliance that it carries over from its etymological connection with *tejas*, 'fiery heat'—could only be applied to the luminous, effervescent quality of *sattva*. As they seemingly rewrote their Sāṅkhya sources out of this intuition, they left their subsequent readers and redactors like Aghoraśiva with an ossified case of linguistic false analogy cast in the authority of scripture.

[52] These passages, along with several others, are also discussed in Goodall 2004, pp. 259–260n.

Maheśvarānanda thus shares with Aghoraśiva what seems to be an eccentric reordering of *sāmānya* material, but the form and the content of his description are completely different. Aghora seems completely indifferent to the contingent details of the human person,[53] while Maheśvarānanda resorts to an exhaustive catalog of the entailments of the emergence of the individual. To understand why, we may turn to Śāradātanaya. In his text's second chapter, in the course of providing an initial overview of the nature and genesis of the aestheticized emotion of *rasa*, Śāradātanaya writes (p. 43, ll. 9–22; p. 45, ll. 14–17):

> *ahaṅkāras tridhā so 'yaṃ sattvādiguṇabhedataḥ |*
> *sattvādiguṇabhedena yo 'haṅkāras tu sāttvikaḥ ||*
>
> *vaikārikaś cendriyādir indriyaprakṛtir bhavet |*
> *bhūtādis tāmasaḥ śabdatanmātraprakṛtir bhavet ||*[54]
>
> *rājasas taijasaḥ so 'pi dvayor upakaroti hi |*
> *ahaṅkārasya vṛttir yā so 'bhimānaḥ prakīrtitaḥ ||*
>
> *sābhimānātmikā vṛttis tattadindriyagocarā |*
> *bāhyārthālambanavatī śṛṅgārādirasātmatām ||*
>
> *yāti tatra vibhāvādibhedād bhedaṃ prayāti ca |*
> *vibhāvā lalitāḥ sattvānubhāvavyabhicāribhiḥ ||*
>
> *yadā sthayini vartante svīyābhinayasaṃśrayāḥ |*
> *tadā manaḥ preksakāṇāṃ rajassattvavyapāśrayi ||*
>
> *sukhānubandhī tatratyo vikāraḥ yaḥ pravartate |*
> *sa śṛṅgārarasābhikhyāṃ labhate rasyate ca taiḥ ||*
>
> ...
>
> *īdṛśī ca rasotpattiḥ manovṛttiś ca śāśvatī ||*
>
> *kathitā yogamālāyāṃ saṃhitāyāṃ vivasvate |*
> *śivena tāṇḍavaṃ lāsyaṃ nāṭyaṃ nṛttaṃ ca nartanam ||*
>
> *sarvam etad aśeṣeṇa saṃhitāyāṃ pradarṣitam |*
>
> Ego is threefold, because of the distinction of the three *guṇas sattva* [*rajas*, and *tamas*]. Through this distinction of the *guṇas sattva*, etc., that [kind of] ego that is connected

[53] At least in this case. The case of the *Pañcāvaraṇastava* presents an interesting contrast. Speculatively, the genre of the TPV (a commentary rather than an independent work) may account for this difference in emphasis.

[54] Note: MS C (the most independent of the sources used in this ed. see p. 8 of the intro) omits this line. *indriyādi* = *ahaṁkāra*, acc. to Apte, p. 387. Also, one must read *sabdatanmātra*° as a *madhyamapadalopī samāsa* for the metrically unexigent **sabdāditanmātra*°.

> with *sattva* is the *vaikārika*, and that ego [*indriyādi*] becomes the basis for the senses. That [ego] connected with *tamas*, *i.e. bhūtādi*, becomes the basis of the qualities of sound [*etc*]. As for the [ego] connected with *rajas*, *i.e. taijasa*, it provides assistance to both of these. The activity of the ego is known as the sense of self. That activity that consists of the sense of self operates within the range of the various senses, as corresponding to outward objects; it transforms into the various *rasa*s, *śṛṅgāra*, etc. Once in that condition, it further differentiates through the distinctions of the various excitant conditions. When pleasing excitants, grounded in their particular significant gestures, are present in the basic emotion through the physical signs of emotional states and the transient affects, the minds of the spectators abide in *rajas* and *sattva*. A pleasant modification [of the mind] connected with this state is begun; it acquires the label '*śṛṅgārarasa*' and is enjoyed by [the spectators].
>
> [There then follows a separate etiology for each of the other seven *rasa*s accepted by Śaradātanaya, closely modelled on this emergence of *śṛṅgāra*.]
>
> And this sort of emergence of *rasa* and ongoing action of the mind was taught to Vivasvat by Śiva in the *Yogamālā Saṃhitā*. The *tāṇḍava*, *lāsya*, *nāṭya*, *nṛtta*, and *nartana* have [also] been described *in extenso* in the *Saṃhitā*.

We see here a triplicated *ahaṃkāra* following the exact order of the earlier Sāṅkhya source, in contrast to our more dogmatic Śaiva authors. This classical theory is however here employed within the rather different context of the theory of emergence of aesthetic awareness on the part of a theatrical audience.[55] This is where, I believe, the connection with Maheśvarānanda's presentation in the *tattvaviveka* comes to the fore. Śāradātanaya attempts to account for the psychic and emotional apparatus that makes the human understanding of art a hard–wired possibility: as we humans are all necessarily endowed with these parts of the Sāṅkhya flow–chart, it follows that the experiences of our emotional lives and their aesthetic applications are held in common.

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[55]Raghavan notes that this Sāṅkhya–inflected model of *rasotpatti* is closely modelled upon that of Bhoja's *Śṛṅgāraprakāśa*, despite Śāradātanaya's claim that this derives from the (otherwise unknown) *Yogamālā*. With evident irritation, Raghavan observes that Śāradātanaya has taken without attribution the core notion of Bhoja's original *rasa*–theory—that the transformation of the underlying *ahaṃkāra* constitutes aesthetic awareness—and filled in the blanks left by the king of Dhārā as to the actual mechanism of its emergence (Raghavan 1978, pp. 485–486).

Maheśvarānanda, in his schematic presentation of the essential make–up of the human personality, harbors similar intentions. His description of the ontological composition of the person delineates a picture of what it is to be a human being, equipped with an inner life and a personality, faced with other such human beings everyday. This returns us to the larger question of the motivatedness of the Maheśvarānanda's stylistic decisions throughout the *tattvaviveka*. The use of verse in the earlier passages, it was argued, signified a shift in the rhetorical stance of the text, a move from the particulars of the theorization of the *tattva*s to a general address to the wider Śaiva constituencies imagined by Maheśvarānanda. This same rhetorical move is in evidence here. However, in the description of the union of *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*, this mode of presentation subtly but recognizably appeals to the distinctive theoretical structure of the Krama, arguing by example that it is this theory that actually accounts for both the diversity of our experience and their ultimate basis in a common existential core. A cocktail of the different constituents, mixed in a particular combination, the human person is for Maheśvarānanda not simply an illusory impediment; rather, the particular person is the necessary ground upon which the process of reflection and ultimately liberation takes place. And this particularity, as it properly emerges at the junction of the two realities of *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*, can best be described—or indeed is always–already circumscribed—by the conceptual ordering peculiar to the Krama's theory of ritual and contemplation.

This long passage, then, effects a synthesis of the horizontal and vertical axes of presentation which, it has been argued, reoccur as a pair of structuring principles

throughout the *tattvaviveka*. The entirety of the range of the thirty–six *tattva*s can be properly surveyed from the perspective afforded by the *puruṣa*/*prakṛti* juncture (in the 'vertical'/*vimarśa* mode),[56] while the phenomenological extension of each of the *tattva*s is definitively redescribed under the quintuple rubric characteristic of the Krama (in the 'horizontal'/*prakāśa* mode). This doubled synthesis between the two stylistic registers and the two ontological principles is self-consciously affirmed in one of the closing verses on *prakṛti*: using multiple layers of *śleṣa*-paronomasia Maheśvarānanda fuses his own process of thought and composition with the ongoing self-contemplation that is Śiva's creation of the world (20:130–131[57]). Our author—in his ingenuity and his irreducible human singularity—is, we are again reminded, nothing more than a mask, a set of stage properties through which we can see the actor beneath.

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[56] *Cf.* the Maheśvarānanda's concluding statement on the *tattva*s (E_V p. 65):

> *tataś ca pṛthivyām anāśritaśivaprabhṛtīni pañcatriṃśad api tattvāni kāraṇavāsanānuvṛttidvārā parisphurantīty anayā bhaṅgyā tatra śivatattve pṛthivyādīni sarvāṇy api satkāryavādamaryādayāvatiṣṭhante. evaṃ prakṛtipuruṣādiṣu madhyavartiṣv apy uktobhayaprakriyayā sarvāṇy apy uparitanāny adhastanāni ca tattvāni saṃmīlantīti sarvaṃ sarvātmakam ity arthaniṣkarṣaḥ syāt*
>
> And so, in the [*tattva*] earth, all thirty-five [other] *tattva*-s, beginning with Anāśritaśiva, shine forth, through the reapplication of the remnants of [the sole] cause. Through this line of argument [*anena bhaṅgyā*], all of the *tattva*-s beginning with earth are established in the Śiva-*tattva*, through the position of the inherence of the effect in the cause [*satkāryavādamaryādayā*]. And so, in the *tattva*-s positioned in the middle, such as Puruṣa and Prakṛti, through both of the arguments just given, all of the *tattva*-s, both higher and lower, are intermingled. Thus one may draw the conclusion each thing contains all things.

This summarizing statement is found repeated word for word in an odd passage of prose inserted after the thirty-sixth verse of the *Gurunāthaparāmarśa*, Madhurāja's eulogy on Abhinavagupta (Raghavan 1980).

[57] See also the annotations to the translation *ad loc.*

It is thus hardly an accident that the *Bhāvaprakāśana* and the *Mahārthamañjarī* read so closely together on the figure of the human. The individual is intuitively as much the object of soteriological theory as it is of aesthetic speculation, at least as it pertains to affective response. It has been argued that in the seminal work of Abhinavagupta, the aesthetic impulse might best be taken as primary.[58] For Maheśvarānanda at least, the two are so bound up with one another as to be inseparable. The individual person, the site of experience and of emotion, is for him the most complex point in the endlessly proliferating Śaiva cosmos, in a way that rhymes with Śāradātanaya's synthetic model of literary affect, itself indebted to some sort of Śaiva theory.

But there is another way in which the accord between the *Mahārthamañjarī* and the *Bhāvaprakāśana* stands to reason. Śāradātanaya's text is meant to be a guide for the working dramatic poet, instructing an interested reader in the ways to craft formally and affectively compelling literary texts. It is thus centrally concerned with the creation of a kind of fiction, something that can equally be said of the *tattvaviveka*, and with it, the entire *Mahārthamañjarī*. Describing the MM in this way is not orientalist hauteur; for his own part, Maheśvarānanda was deeply aware of the constructed and indeed artificial nature of his work. This is something readily on display in the text's deliberate stylistic variation, and its hortatory appeals to its presumptive audience. It is here that we most clearly see the *vāṅmayatva*, the linguistic confection, of the *puṣpāñjali* he has created. When, at the close of the *prakṛti*

[58]See Gerow 1994.

discussion, Maheśvarānanda identifies his conjoined acts of thinking and writing with the cosmogonic actions of his god he is foregrounding or even insisting upon the artifice underlying his work. This artifice links this work of systematic thought with the interests of his dramaturge contemporary.

These two linked concerns with the affective and the formal that we can see at work throughout the *tattvaviveka* point towards a larger priority of the *Mahārthamañjarī* as a whole, the priority of the aesthetic. To be sure, Maheśvarānanda takes the theoretical suppositions and practical details of his religion very seriously, and large segments of his work are directed towards the communication of these suppositions and details. Yet the literary-aesthetic dimension of the text above and beyond the broadly communicative is critical to the *Mahārthamañjarī*; it is in a real sense what makes the work what it is. It is thus to the aesthetic that we must turn in order to understand what exactly Maheśvarānanda is after in his text, and why he felt the need to cast it in such a shifting set of styles and linguistic registers. This is what I will set out to do in the next chapter, when I turn to the question of how the MM works as a whole.

CHAPTER 4
READING AND WRITING FROM KASHMIR TO CIDAMBARAM

4.1 A Trick for the Dread Goddess

At some point not long after 1110 CE, in the waning years of Kulottuṅga I Cōḻa's reign, the poet Cayaṅkoṇṭār premiered a new work. The poem was a celebration of the aged king's victory over his cousin and erstwhile feudatory Anantavarmacoḍagaṅga, narrated from the perspective of the world of the *pēy*s, flesh-eating ghouls and votaries of the goddess Kāḷi who revel in the carnage visited on the Kaliṅga country by the Cōḻa army. It is difficult to measure the degree of Cayaṅkoṇṭār's invention in this, his masterpiece the *Kaliṅkattupparaṇi* (*Ill-starred Kaliṅga*, hereafter KP): from Oṭṭakkūttar's testimony a generation later, we learn that at least two poems of the *paraṇi* genre preceded Cayaṅkoṇṭār's, but nothing survives of these but their titles. And while the *paraṇi* can be found in the catalog of the *pirapantam* genres given in the anonymous *Paṉṉiruppāṭṭiyal*, that text's stipulations read almost like a table of contents to the KP, and there is no compelling reason to suppose that they pre-existed the poem.[1]

We may thus only provisionally suppose that Cayaṅkoṇṭār's framing of his war-poem is an original one, a contribution to the preexisting matrix of the *paraṇi* form. The poem begins with the erotic reverie of the *kaṭaitiṟappu* (the 'opening of the

[1]The *Kaliṅkattupparaṇi* is that rarest of things, a work of medieval Tamil that has been well served by contemporary scholarship, from the time of the historical and philological groundwork of Mu. Irākavaiyaṅkār 1925. Recently, the poem has been treated extensively by Zvelebil 1974, pp. 207–212; Shulman 1985, pp. 276–292; and Ali 2000.

doors'),[2] and—in a sudden and dramatic shift of focus—then presents its audience with a slowly constricting field of vision as the poet describes the blasted wasteland of the *pālai* landscape, the palace-temple of Kāḻi set within it, and finally the figure of the awesome goddess and of her retinue. It is only then that the narrative movement of the KP can be properly said to begin, there in the midst of Kāli's court of ghouls and *ḍākinī*s. The story goes like this:[3] an old ghoul (*mutupēy*), a member of a party that had fallen out of the goddess' favor, is ushered trembling back into the charnel house of her audience hall. Summarily restored to Kāḻi's good graces, the *mutupēy* seeks to further ingratiate himself by offering the goddess an impromptu entertainment (vv. 161–164):

uyntu pōyiṉam uvant' emakk' aruḷa oṉṟoṭ'oppaṉa ōr āyiram
intiracālam uḷ kaṟṟu vantaṉēṉ iruntu kāṇ eṉa iṟaiñciyē

ēṟa niṉṉirutirukkaṇ vaitt' aruḷ cey ik kaiyiṟ cilatutikai pār
māṟi ikkaiyil aḷaikka maṟṟ' avai matakarittalaikaḷ pār

ik karittalaiyiṉ vāyiṉṟ' utiranīr kuṭitt' urum iṭitt'eṉak
kokkaritt' alakai cuṟṟa maṟṟ'ivai kuṟaittalaippiṇam mitappa pār

aṭakkam aṉṟ'itu kiṭakka emmuṭaiya ammai vāḻka eṉa pār
kaṭakkam aṉṟ'apayaṉ veṉṟu veṉṟikoṭkaḷapperumparaṇi iṉṟu pār

"We are sustained by your kindly showing favor to us. We have learnt by heart a thousand magic tricks, each one as good as the last. Pray, please sit and watch," he entreated.

"Now wait just a moment, and be so kind as to set your two lovely eyes here: Look—in this hand, there are some elephants' trunks. Now, I shift them to this hand and...Look! They turn into the heads of bull elephants!

The blood from this elephant's head is drunk up by a goblin, an *alakai*, who hoots and gibbers loud as a thunderclap and staggers around while—look!—headless corpses float by!

And that's not all! Leave all this aside, say long live our Lady and behold! Behold the great *paraṇi* sacrifice held that day on the field at Cuttack, where Apayaṉ won his great victory!"

[2]On this oft-discussed passage see especially Shulman *loc. cit.*

[3]Following the text of the Kaḻakam edition of the KP, vss. 153 ff.

The ghoul's tricks, and his language, grow more heated and more elaborate from here. So tempting is the scene of carnage which he conjures up that the other *pēy*s of Kāḷi's court are ravaged with hunger, stumbling over themselves and snapping their jaws at his illusions. The assembled troop of monsters take refuge in their mistress, and plead that she have the ghoul stop with his teasing. When the old ghoul asks if he can finish his act, the troop explodes into howls of outrage (vv. 176–178):

> *vaṇaṅkatalum kaṇaṅkaḷ elām māyappāvi maṭutt'emmai maṟucūṭu cuṭuvai yākil*
> *aṇaṅk'araciṉ āṇai eṉa aṇaṅkum ippōt' avai tavir eṅk' ivai kaṟṟāy eṉṉa āṅkē*
>
> *niṉmuṉivuñ curakuruviṉ muṉivum añci nilai arit' eṉṟ' imakiri pukk'irunteṟk'auvai*
> *taṉmuṉivum avaṉmuṉivun taviṟka eṉṟu cātaṉamantiraviccai palavum tantē*
>
> *uṉṉuṭaiya paḻavaṭiyār aṭiyāḷ teyva uruttirayōkiṉi eṉpāḷ uṉakku naṉmai*
> *iṉṉum uḷa kiṭaippaṉa iṅku irukka eṉṉa yāṉ iruntēn cilakālam iruntanāḻil*
>
> He paid reverence [to Kāḷi], but all the *gaṇa*s said, "You wicked trickster! You'll only torture us further! Let Queen Aṇaṅku command!" And Aṇaṅku then said, "Put a stop to these, now: where did you learn them?"
>
> "Fearing your wrath, and the wrath of Curakuru, too, I thought that this place had become too risky, so I set out for the Himalayas. There, a lady gave to me a great deal of *mantra*s and spells, telling me that "her wrath and his will be stilled by these."
>
> She was the divine Rudrayōginī, the servant of your ancient servants. She told me, 'There is yet more for you to learn; remain here.' And so I stayed a while. One day..."

We must interrupt the old ghoul in mid-story, as it will take him deep into the past, ultimately recounting the history of the Cōḻa dynasty and the birth and accession of Cayaṅkoṇṭār's patron Kulottuṅga. The boldness of the poet's imagination, the fit between his matter and his command of a gamut of metrical and verbal techniques: even from this brief glance into the text, we can see much of what has earned Cayaṅkoṇṭār's place in the firmament of medieval Tamil court-literature. Especially noteworthy is the light-handed irony with which he portrays the unctuous courtesy of Kāḷi's functionaries and hangers-on. There seems throughout this passage a de-

liberate invocation of the elaborate prestations of the Cōḻa chancellery and of the protocols of the court ceremonial, transferred and inflated into knowing caricature.[4]

At the heart of the scene, though, is the *pēy*'s prestidigitation: the published editions all adopt this as the title of the whole section, *intiracālam* or "The Magic Trick".[5] It is very tempting to see the poet inserting himself into his work in the suitably (if transparently) disguised form of the ghoul-magician, thus prefiguring the 'magic' of the later sections of the poem, especially Cayaṅkoṇṭār's skill with rhythmic tricks and phonaesthesis.[6] Magic becomes a figure through which to understand the process of poetic imagination: Cayaṅkoṇṭār takes it as the defining emblem of his linguistic art, all the while ironically and self-consciously distancing himself (and his poem) from the sort of sleights-of-hand practiced by our monstrous illusionist here.

When, perhaps some three generations later, Maheśvarānanda set about composing his *Mahārthamañjarī*, it seems to me almost certain that he knew and admired the KP's unique verbal magic. As we've already seen in Chapter Two, the ferment of Cidambaram's textual culture in the 1100s saw authors borrowing or even hijacking the inventions of predecessors and contemporaries, irrespective of the boundaries that

[4]Here I must demur from part of Shulman compelling characterization of the text, when he writes that "[Cayaṅkoṇṭār's] text is not a farce; not a satire; not a parodic or carnivalesque extravaganza; not a comic semiotic commentary on the serious life of the court—it is wholly remote from those genres" (p. 279). Perhaps I misunderstand Shulman here (he may simply want to foreclose any reductive reading of the text in terms borrowed from European literature), but I think that the KP may be profitably read in precisely the light of its hyperbolic play with courtly social and linguistic convention.

[5]Daud Ali informs me (in a personal communication of March 28, 2006) that a palm leaf manuscript of the KP which he has examined includes the different chapter titles as marginalia. Whether this reflects an earlier practice or is a contamination from the printed editions is uncertain.

[6]See Zvelebil, *op. cit*, for some examples of the latter.

putatively divided out the two major literary languages, Sanskrit and Tamil. Thus it is unsurprising that Maheśvara might have drawn inspiration from Cayaṅkoṇṭār's work. For all their many differences, the affinities between the two texts are powerful, beginning with the shared figure of the goddess Kālī (/Kāḷi), abiding at the heart of both texts. Still more suggestive are the two *yoginī*s responsible for the texts' inceptions; Maheśvarānanda's toying with the question of dream and wakefulness in his narrative denouement finds a further analogue in the KP's opening reverie, the *kaṭai tiṟappu*.

But of all of these commonplaces, it is the matter of the magic trick, of *indrajāla*, that furnishes the *Mahārthamañjarī*'s readers with a useful angle of vision upon that text. Magic is a trope that Maheśvarānanda, for his part, finds to be an apposite way to describe the world's workings. As he concluded his lengthy presentation on the reality-level of *puruṣa*, he imagined the objection that Śiva, in becoming disguised as an individual soul—that is, in elaborating the *puruṣatattva* out of his own self-identical nature—would be bound up in the travails to which we humans are all subject. Answering this, he writes (19:177-179):

> This is not the case, since in this instance we can compare [Śiva] to a magician [*aindrajālikadṛṣṭāntasya prāptāvasaratvāt*]: though he tricks the entire world, he himself is not tricked by anyone else.

This simile is an apt one, neatly describing the ontological double duty that the level of the *puruṣa* is supposed to fulfill. Maheśvarānanda understood himself, along with the rest of us embodied human beings, to be in some crucial sense just such a trick of Śiva's. Like Cayaṅkoṇṭār, Maheśvarānanda presents himself as an illusionist in the

midst of his greatest act; where he departs from the court poet is in his generalization of this, in the way that all of existence is elevated to just such an elaborate piece of sleight-of-hand.[7]

But whether or not the KP exerted an influence upon the MM is really beside the point. His own *aindrajālikadṛṣṭānta* can provide us with a fit image of Maheśvarānanda not just as an embodied soul but as a creator of texts. In saying this, I mean that in his techniques of writing and of thinking Maheśvara is above all else concerned with a certain kind of illusionistic effect, with the crafting of what seems surprising, even miraculous, at first encounter and which only gradually gives way to a deeper understanding. The best sort of magician, I imagine, always wants his audience to probe beneath the illusions he so carefully creates, only to remain one step ahead, with one more trick yet up his sleeve. This is the magic that Maheśvara performs with such consistent and surprising imagination throughout his text.

This magic is in a real way bound up in the process of autocommentary, in the way that it unveils a determinate meaning out of the deliberate indeterminacy of the root-text. But there is another, and more profound, way in which we can speak of the magic of the *Mahārthamañjarī* and of its author: The MM amounts to an elaborate textual trick, a piece of verbal art that in its intentions resembles perhaps the sort of unsettling effects of the art of M.C. Escher. In both, there is an artifice that sets out deliberately to rearrange its audience's possibilities of seeing and of knowing. In Maheśvarānanda's case, this is a trick played on the text's audience but also one in

[7]The metaphor of the magician is an old and durable one in the Indic imagination dating back (at least) to the *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad*. See Siegel 1991.

which the audience find themselves enlisted, where they become part of the material upon which the author-magician works. Maheśvarānanda's materials also include his acknowledged precursor texts, which are themselves transformed in the course of the *Mahārthamañjarī*. The compound text of Ānandavardhana's *Dhvanyāloka* (DhĀ) and Abhinavagupta's *Locana* (DhĀL) is one of these precursors; the transformation of these will provide one of the major themes in the following pages.

This brings us back to the idea of textual culture and to the ways that the *Mahārthamañjarī* as a supremely executed trick of textualized language allows us to see and to think about the world in which it emerged. It recalls the questions with which I began this dissertation about the role of context both as background and as receptive foreground of works of language cast into the enduring form of texts. These questions will form a continual subtext in this chapter and will be returned to explicitly in the chapter that follows.

For now, beginning this chapter with Maheśvarānanda's invocation of an Escher-like perceptual trick, I will briefly detail how this provides an analogy with Maheśvara's own ideas about the workings of language. This will demonstrate in a preliminary way the contested relationship Maheśvara had with the tradition of Kashmirian literary theory, especially the *Dhvanyālokalocana*. I then turn to the major formal feature of the MM proper, its two languages of composition. Following Maheśvarānanda's own explanation of the formal and semiotic properties of Prakrit and their importance to the basic design of his text, I argue that this is a further testament to the complicated relationship between the MM and the DhĀL. The MM's use of

Prakrit is founded on Maheśvara's own reading of and departure from the practices of reading and interpretation that the work of the Kashmirian literary critics embodies and exemplifies. From here, it becomes possible to attempt a global reading of the MMP, charting some of the ways in which the Prakrit text is made to create a series of interpretative dilemmas that are resolved (or further complicated) in the *Parimala* to achieve a certain deliberate effect. This effect—the text's *sādhya*, what it seeks to produce—amounts to a transformation of the audience's subjectivity, culminating in that state which Maheśvarānanda calls *jīvanmukti*, liberation while still living. It is this transmutation of his worldly readers into liberated Śaiva yogins that forms the MM's central conjuration. The prospect of this magical reordering of consciousness as figured through language—and indeed through reading—forms the substance of the surprising turn that the MM takes in its final pages; in turn, the final section of this chapter attempts a sympathetic reconstruction of what exactly Maheśvarānanda sets out to accomplish in the text's conclusion.

4.2 Bull or Elephant?

In the immediate wake of his treatment of the Śaiva *tattva*s, Maheśvarānanda returns to the hermeneutic importance of the twin principles of *prakāśa* and *vimarśa*, Illumination and Representation. He asserts that even these two fundamental categories are mutually imbricated: an effort to keep them distinct from one another is ultimately only figurative (*aupacārika*). It is in light of this that he introduces his twenty-eighth *gāthā* (p. 71):

ālakkhavisesammi a gaabusahāṇaṃ duveṇa paḍibhāsaṃ |
ekkassiṃ cia atthe sivasattivihāakappaṇaṃ kuṇimo ||

chāyā:
ālekhyaviśeṣa iva gajavṛṣabhayor dvayoḥ pratibhāsam |
ekasminn evārthe śivaśaktivibhāgakalpanaṃ kurmaḥ ||

As in a certain picture, where there is the image
of both an elephant and a bull,
we fashion the division of Śiva and Śakti in a single thing.

In the commentary, he explains this opaque verse (*ibid.*):

> *citrakṛto hi svavaidagdhyaprakaṭanāya gajavṛṣabhādīnāṃ bhinnasvabhāvānām api bhāvānām ekatarasanniveśayuktyaikāvabhāso 'nyatarasanniveśayuktyānyasphuraṇaṃ ca yathā bhavati tathā vilikhantīty avisaṃvādinīyaṃ maryādā. evaṃ sthite yathā gajavṛṣabhobhayākārasamarpake citraviśeṣe gajavṛṣabhayor dvayor api paryālocakapramātṛjanānusandhānadhārādhirohavaiśiṣṭyena kumbhamaṇḍalaśuṇḍākuṇḍalībhāvādiyogāt kakudakūṭaprotha†puṭaudbaṇyādi†kramāc ca pratiniyato 'vabhāsaḥ prakāśanaṃ bhavati.*
>
> Now, artists, in order to show off their ingenuity, draw pictures of distinct objects, such as elephants and bulls, wherein through concentrating on the one thing, it alone appears, and through concentrating on the other, there is the manifestation of the other. This is a practice that cannot be denied. In such a case, in a single picture capable of producing the image of both an elephant and a bull, through the specific application of the continuous mental concentration of a perceiving subject who is viewing it, a determinate image emerges, through either the collocation of the elements of lobes, circle, tusk, and trunk [in the case of the elephant], and the set of the hump, the horn, the snout, and † the dewlap † [in the case of the bull].[8]

In this same way, Maheśvarānanda continues, all phenomena are shot through with the twin principles, homologized in the verse to Śiva (=*prakāśa*) and Śakti (=*vimarśa*). Just as the trained eye can alternately make out either of the two represented animals contained within the single image, so too the mind of the adept can focus upon either ontic appearance (*prakāśa*) or ontological awareness (*vimarśa*). It is all simply a matter of perspective.

[8] *puṭaudbaṇyādi*, the printed reading, is unintelligible, while A_1 (f. 41r.) reads the equally bad *puṭoccandhādi*, in a passage filled with corruptions. Emending to *puṭolbaṇādi*, yields some meaning: the 'fold–membrane, and the rest.' 'Fold-membrane' is hardly a usual way to refer to a dewlap (for which the normal Sanskrit is *sāsnā*), but it is at least conceivably meaningful.



Figure 4.1 Bull and elephant: Darasuram, *ca.* 1170 CE

As it happens, the very thing that Maheśvarānanda is describing here, a duplex image of a bull and an elephant, was in fact being produced in the ateliers of Cōḻamaṇḍalam around the same time that he was composing his text. We can see this in a sculpture found on the inner wall of the Airāvateśvara temple at Darasuram (see figure 4.1). It is easy to imagine Maheśvara's fascination with this carefully constructed perceptual trick, so similar to the sort of thing he sets out to do in the MM. With an obvious delight, he goes on to outdo the clever sculptor using his own endlessly plastic medium of language. Enlisting the authority of the ancient grammarian Patañjali, he asserts that both members of the compound (*gaja* and *vṛṣabha*) may each be understood to refer to the other—a bull may be an elephant, and an elephant a bull, after all—multiplying meanings to the point where his readers are suddenly

faced with two elephants and two bulls.[9] But, he archly says, "this doesn't appeal to some other people, on account of their fear of the chaos that results from abandoning stable forms."[10] For the likes of Maheśvarānanda, who delight in such things, this is exactly what makes language, and thus life, interesting. He uses this example to adduce a more general point (p. 72):

> *etenābhihitānvayavādād anvitābhidhānavādasyaucityam astīty uktaṃ bhavati. tatra hi stambhaṃ paśyetyādau stambhaśabdārthānvitaiva darśanakriyā kriyāpadenābhidhiyate. evaṃ paśyatyarthānvitaś ca stambhaḥ karmakārakeṇety anantaropapāditārthānuguṇyenānvaya ity upapadyata iti.*
>
> To put this another way, [we see] by this the appropriateness of the holistic theory of sentence meaning [*anvitābhidhānavāda*] over that of the synthetic theory [*abhihitānvayavāda*]. In the [former], in such a sentence as "See the pillar", the action of seeing is conveyed by the verb, when and only when it is syntactically connected to the meaning of the word 'pillar'. Similarly, the pillar, connected to the sense of the verb 'to see' [is conveyed] by the syntactic function of being an object. Thus, it stands to reason to say that syntax [arises] through the congruence of simultaneously occurrent meanings.

The *anvitābhidhānavāda* mentioned here is the position of the Prābhākara school of Pūrvamīmāṃsā. It holds that words only make functional sense when they are combined into coherent, well-formed sentences. It is, then, the sentence that is the primary unit of linguistic meaning (hence the translation 'holistic'). For the opposing view of the followers of Kumārilabhaṭṭa, the *abhihitānvayavāda*, words are independently meaningful, and the meaning of sentences arises from the well-formed juxtaposition of these meaningful words. The sentences are thus only the secondary outcome of these more primary meaning-elements (hence 'synthetic').

---

[9]Part of the play here rests in the fact that the noun compound *gaabusahāṇaṃ* does not limit the number of objects to two, as its Sanskrit translation *gajavṛṣabhayoḥ* does, Māhārāṣṭrī having no dual number.

[10]p. 71: *tat tu nānyeṣāṃ śobhate, padārthānāṃ pratiniyatarūpaparityāge pratyavāyabhīrutvāt.*

What is striking about this abrupt turn into the realm of philosophical semantics is that it accords so poorly with Maheśvarānanda's self-conscious adoption of the theory of suggested meaning taught in Ānandavardhana's *Dhvanyāloka* and amplified in Abhinavagupta's authoritative commentary, the *Dhvanyālokalocana*. In one of the verses that close the *Parimala*, Maheśvarānanda is explicit about the influence of these two texts (p. 195):

> *sāhityābdhau karṇadhāro 'ham āsaṃ*
> *kāvyālokaṃ locanaṃ cānuśīlya* |
> *tadvat svacchaṃ labdhavān asmi bodhaṃ*
> *pāntho bhūtvā pratyabhijñāpadavyām* ||
>
> I was a navigator on the sea that is Literature, having mastered the *Kāvyāloka* (=*Dhvanyāloka*) and the *Locana*. Likewise, once I became a wayfarer on the path of Recognition, I obtained pure insight.

Yet Abhinavagupta, as we shall shortly see, is utterly dismissive of the *anvitābhidhānavāda*. That a Southerner like our author would prefer the position associated with the Prābhākara tradition might strike some as unsurprising: what records that survive of school curricula from the South show a marked preference for what we now consider to be the minority tradition of Mīmāṃsā. I would hesitate, however, to let this too-simple explanation stand unexamined. Put simply, the popularity of the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā in the far South provides neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition to explain the position we find here. When well-read Sanskrit authors wished to look further afield for inspiration and substantiation of their ideas, they simply did so; there is no reason to suppose that Maheśvarānanda was unthinkingly repeating his lessons learnt at school. I presume that his reliance on the Prābhākara position was a principled one with specific motivations and consequences for his text.

Beginning with what might appear as the trivial problem of Maheśvarānanda's reference to this controversy in the philosophy of language, we may venture to understand the primary movement within the *Mahārthamañjarī* and the effect towards which the text is directed. Maheśvarānanda evidently wishes his readers to see the *Mahārthamañjarī* as an array of discrete parts, whether parcelled out according to the five-part scheme briefly mentioned in its opening prose sentence or according to the more numerous and diverse contents suggested by its two (slightly different) *anukramaṇikā*s or tables of contents. This integrity is suggested by the metaphor contained in the work's title; a flower-cluster or *mañjarī* is both identical to yet more than the individual flowers that make it up. I presume that there is a higher-order principle of organization at work in the text. Central to understanding this organization, as we shall see, is Maheśvara's adoption and adaptation of certain elements of the literary-critical theory of implicit meaning, the *dhvanivāda*, as expounded in the *Dhvanyāloka* and the *Locana*.

We may enter into the question of the operation of the MMP by way of another, more basic question. This is the question likely to occur to any of its readers: why its curious bilingual structure? The account of the MM's mythic origins provides us with a *prima facie* answer—the MM is composed in Māhārāṣṭrī Prakrit because it was in that language that the yoginī spoke to Maheśvara at the text's visionary inception (as discussed in Chapter 1). This is not, however, the only answer that Maheśvara gives for this decision, and his techniques as author and (auto-) commentator evince a greater self-consciousness about his choice of medium than this deliberately simple,

mythic story would suggest. The Prakrit verses signal a first-order indebtedness to the Kashmirian tradition of literary criticism with which, as we've just seen, Maheśvarānanda explicitly aligns himself and his work. I will turn to the question of how exactly these earlier critics read this Prakrit poetry in a moment. For now, I would like simply to assert its importance in the genesis of Maheśvara's thinking and turn instead to his own independent explanation of the *Mañjarī*'s linguistic form.

Maheśvara ventures just such an explanation in the course of his commentary on the seventy-first and final verse of the text. The verse is itself peculiar: formally distinct from the rest of the MM (it is composed in the Sanskrit lyric meter *śārdulavikrīḍita*), it forms an encomium to the yoginī who inspired the MM's creation. It reads:

> *itthaṃ pāaḍasuttasattaïsamullās'ĕkkasaṃdhāïṇiṃ*
> *jaggattakkhaṇaṇivisesasaviṇ'oiṇṇaṃ païṇṇottaraṃ* |
> *lo'ullaṅghanajŏggasiddhipaavīpatthāṇabaddh'ujjamaṃ*
> *kanthāsūlakapālamĕttavihavaṃ vandāmi taṃ joiṇiṃ* ||
>
> Thus I do honor to that yoginī who, entirely focused upon the creation of [this work] in seventy Prakrit *sūtras*, appeared as dream and waking became one and who, with total devotion to her vows, set her efforts upon the laying-out of the path that leads to the perfection suited to world-transcendence, whose power resides in her ascetic's rags, trident, and skull-bowl.

In the *Parimala*'s commentary, this verse provides the occasion for a lengthy concluding discussion where Maheśvara reviews much of what he's already addressed earlier in the text. In reading this epilogue or afterword, one is reminded of Nabokov's witticism that an author explaining his work "sounds like a conjurer explaining one trick by performing another."[11] In his remarks on the verse's *pāaḍasutta* ('Prakrit *sūtras*'),

[11] In "On a Book Entitled *Lolita*", p. 311. This short essay is now usually printed as the afterword to the novel it discusses.

Maheśvara writes:[12]

prākṛteti. saṃskṛtaṃ hi prakṛtir aśeṣasya bhāṣāntarasya. tatprakṛteḥ saṃskṛtād utpannaṃ prākṛtam ity anena bhāṣāntarātmakavikṛtiśilpavaidagdhyasvīkāraḥ prakṛtisauṣṭhavaparicayāparityāgaś cety ubhayathā camatkāraucityam āsūcyate.

nanu 'na mlecchitavai nāpabhāṣitavai' 'na mlecchitavyaṃ yajñādāv' iti śrutismṛtibhyāṃ saṃskṛtavyatiriktabhāṣā prayojyatāyāṃ pratiṣidhyate. apabhraṃśātmakatvaṃ ca tasyāḥ. saṃskṛtavyatirekeṇānyā sarvāpi bhāṣā hy apabhraṃśa iti

śāstreṣu saṃskṛtād anyad apabhraṃśatayocyate |[13]

ity ucyata iti cen na. svātmaparameśvaraparāmarśam apahāyānyatra camasacaṣālādiparyālocane bhraśyan paṅkilasthalaskhalitakusumakisalayasthānīyaḥ śabdo 'pabhraṃśaḥ. anyādṛśas tu yatkiñcidbhāṣoparūṣito 'pi mantrākṣaravad atyantasauṣṭhavāspadam.

°*tmakataṃ ca tasyāḥ*] *corr.*; °*tmakatañ ca tasyāḥ* A_1; °*tmakatvāt tasyāḥ* E_V • *bhāṣā hy apabhraṃśa iti*] A_1; *bhāṣāpy apabhraṃśaḥ* E_V • *ity ucyata iti*] A_1; *ity uktatvād iti* E_V • *svātmaparameśvaraparāmarśam*] E_V; *svātmaparāmarśam aiśvaryam* A_1 • *bhraśyan paṅkilasthalaskhalita*°] *emend.*; *bhraśyatpaṅkilasthalaskhalita*° E_V; *kliśyan paṅkilasthalakalita*° A_1

prākṛta: Sanskrit is in fact the prototype of any other speech-form. That which has arisen from the prototype of those [other speech-forms], i.e. from Sanskrit, is [called] Prakrit. In this way one may acknowledge the ingenuity that goes into the construction of the derivative (that is, the other language), while at the same time retaining familiarity with the excellence of the prototype. Thus, in both ways it is evident that [Prakrit] is suitable [for evoking] a sense of delighted wonder.

[One might object:] 'Now, in both the revealed texts (*e.g.* "one ought not speak barbarously, one ought not speak incorrectly") and the traditional texts (*e.g.* "in such arenas as the sacrifice, one should never speak barbarously") the use of a speech-form other than Sanskrit is forbidden. Further, [such a speech-form] consists of *apabhraṃśa*, corrupt language. For, any other speech-form by virtue of its difference from Sanskrit is *apabhraṃśa*. It is for this reason that it is said that, "In treatises [*śāstreṣu*], anything other than Sanskrit is said to be *apabhraṃśa*."' [This objection] is incorrect. Leaving aside the reflection upon God and one's true self,[14] a word is *apabhraṃśa* when, like a tender flower-bud that has fallen into the mud, it is debased in the reflection on [for instance] [the use of] the *camasa*-dish or the *caṣāla*-ring [in the Śrauta liturgy]. But the other kind [of word], even though it be stained by some [non-Sanskrit] speech-form, is as much a source of excellence as the syllables of a *mantra*.

Maheśvarānanda begins with a typical and widely-cited interpretation of the name 'Prakrit.' The language used in the *gāthā*s does not represent some radically different

[12]The text of the two quotations given here is that of E_V, pp. 185-186, collated against A_1(f. 109v ln. 4–f. 110v ln. 1). A_2 and the northern sources do not provide the substance of the *Parimala* on this verse: E_K only gives a brief extract from the beginning of the commentary, while A_2 only transmits here quotations and Maheśvara's own verses (as is the habit of its scribe or of the tradition which he reproduces, see C.1.2, below.)

[13]*Kāvyādarśa* 1.36 cd

[14]Perhaps this should be read as a *karmadhāraya* compound, "the reflection on God as one's true self."

means of verbal communication; rather, it is a code that is fundamentally based on Sanskrit. As Kahrs has discussed in a carefully argued paper (1992), this etymology implies a theory of the adequacy and conceptual priority of the analysis made possible through the system of Sanskrit grammar.[15] Maheśvarānanda adds to this the idea of a specific aesthetic or textural effect peculiar to Prakrit, an effect that is only apparent through the lens of the properly cultivated knowledge of the prototype language. This resembles the aesthetic underpinnings of the choice to employ Prakrit made explicit, for instance, in Vākpatirāja's *Gaüḍavaho*.[16]

We may recognize in this a certain realism. Maheśvarānanda or any of his potential readers' understanding of Māhārāṣṭrī would necessarily have been mediated through grammatical literature written in Sanskrit. This is already enough to put to rest the faintly ridiculous idea that Maheśvarānanda's decision to write in Prakrit was

[15]Of the several sources cited by Kahrs where the Sanskrit-as-*prakṛti* theory is advanced, only Dhanika (on *Daśarūpaka* 2.60) is earlier than the date I have proposed for Maheśvarānanda. However, given that Dhanika's is a text on dramaturgy rather than a work explicitly devoted to Prakrit grammar, it is I think legitimate to suppose that he must be drawing upon some earlier authority. Note that Abhinavagupta's superficially similar gloss on *Nāṭyaśāstra* 17.2bc (*prākṛtaṃ prakṛter asaṃskārarūpāyā āgatam*, "Prakrit derives from the natural, unrefined basis of language") entails a wholly different theory of language genesis and hierarchy than Maheśvarānanda's. On this other, competing theory (also found in, *e.g.* the Jaina Namisādhu's comment on Rudraṭa's *Kāvyālaṃkāra*), *cf.* Pollock 2006, pp. 93ff.

[16]As can be seen in *Gaüḍavaho* vs. 65:
ummillaï lāyaṇṇaṃ paaacchāāĕ sakkaavaāṇaṃ |
sakkaasakkār'ukkarisaṇeṇa paaassa va pahāvo ||

In Suru's workmanlike translation (1975):

"The charm of Sanskrit speech blooms in its Prakritic shadow, while the (innate) glory of Prakrit is heightened when touched up by its Sanskritization."

Cf. also vv. 92–95. This translation was questioned by van Daalen (see van Daalen 1991 and Bodewitz–van Daalen 1998 p. 43), who suggested that *paaa* could only underlie skt. *prakṛta* ('subject matter,' King Yaśovarman in Vākpati's poem) and *not prākṛta*. While one must concede that *paaa* is not the standard form found in Prakrit lexica, this might be a pun (*prakṛta/Prākṛta*) allowed under the letter of the grammatical law. I suspect that van Daalen may have missed the point: the verse may in fact be meant to exemplify exactly the *lāyaṇṇaṃ* that 'the shadow of Prakrit' provides.

motivated by a desire to couch his teaching in something closer to the vernacular than Sanskrit.[17] Instead, Maheśvara's choice of medium rests on its potential to express something that is beyond the connotative powers of Sanskrit acting by itself, while necessarily bound up in that timeless, placeless standard of learned culture as a presumed substratum of his audience's understanding.

Maheśvarānanda then turns to the dialectic method of *śāstra*, putting the objection to the medium of the MM in the mouth of an imagined opponent. The use of non-Sanskrit language is to be avoided because of the testimony of certain authoritative quotations from the major classes of the orthodox textual universe, the *śruti* and *smṛti*. This is used to advance a value judgement that languages other than Sanskrit are corrupt or *apabhraṃśa*, a value judgement that is augmented by the *Kāvyādarśa*'s injunction that systematic thought is exclusively the preserve of Sanskrit. Rather than falsifying these arguments, Maheśvarānanda responds by flipping the value judgement on its head: a word may certainly be said to be corrupt if it is abused through use in adjudicating such trivia as the details of the orthodox sacrificial cult. Language may be judged deviant if it is made to subserve pointless ends, not by its adherence to a set of differing grammatical norms. The decision to use a non-standard language thus implies for Maheśvarānanda a promise and a possibility: the ability to speak outside of the constricting norms of orthodoxy. Escaping this constriction, he implies, is itself a form of liberation, an ability to see through its

[17] An idea expressed by Upadhye, an otherwise superb scholar of Middle Indic, in his brief article on the MM (Upadhye 1957). See here Ruegg 1989, pp. 320ff. who sensibly notes the untenability of this claim.

pretense. This stands in what I take as a deliberately paradoxical tension with the principle claim of the Sanskrit-as-prototype model.

This initial defense of the form of the MM rests, then, on two distinct points. Prakrit possesses a glamor that derives from being different from but subsumable to Sanskrit. This aesthetic argument is somewhat at odds with the second point about the significance of the subject matter of the MM. The text is supposed to communicate the understanding of the real nature of things and the means to attain and render certain this understanding. All question of the particular fitness of Prakrit are left aside; it is simply important that we speak of it at all, especially when compared to the degrading, trivializing misuse of language that we see elsewhere in the world. When Maheśvarānanda returns to his theme, these two arguments remain in play, now seen from a more performative point of view:

> *sūtreti. sūcanamātram eva hy artharahasyānāṃ gāthāsv ālocyate. yena parimalāhvayasya vyākhyāgranthasyāvaśyambhāvaḥ. anyathā 'saṃto hiaapaāso' ityādau sannityādeḥ prakṛtipratyayobhayāṃśaprābalyānusandhānād vimarśaparyavasāyinī tātparyakāṣṭhā kathaṅkāram avadhāryeta.*
>
> *prākṛtasūtreti. sūtrāṇāṃ vaiśiṣṭyopanyāsena saṃskṛtād api tattadanekārthatattvasūcanasāmarthyam eṣām astīty āsūtryate. tathā hi 'cittaṃ ṇa lihaï cittaṃ' ity atra citraṃ cittaṃ cittvam ity ālekhyāntaḥkaraṇacaitanyarūpam arthatrayaṃ cittaśabdenocyate. evam 'atthaṃ ĕttāṇa somasujjāṇaṃ' ity atra astram āsthām artham astam iti prāgvyākhyānuguṇyād atthaṃ ity anenānekārtho 'bhidhīyate. evam anyad apy ūhyam.*
>
> *pāaḍety anenānuraṇanaśaktyā prakaṭaśabdaparyāyeṇa sūtrāṇāṃ sūcanaprādhānye 'pi nātyantam avyaktārthatety abhivyajyate.*
>
> *citraṃ cittam cittvam*] A_1; *citraṃ cittam* E_V • *atthaṃ ĕttāṇa somasujjāṇaṃ*] E_V; *atthaṃ yaṃtaṇaṃ somasujjaṇaṃ* A_1 • *pāaḍety anenānuraṇanaśaktyā*] E_V; *pāyaḍety anenānukaraṇaśaktyā* A_1
>
> '*sūtra*': There is in fact only an intimation of the esoteric truths found in the root-verses, thus making the commentary entitled 'The Fragrance' a necessity. How could one otherwise determine, for example, that [the participle] *san* as it occurs in the *gāthā* '*saṃto hiaapaāso*' comes to finally refer to Representation? [One realizes this] through reflecting on the connotative power of both the root and the affix [as discussed in the commentary *ad loc*].
>
> '*prākṛtasūtra*': through mentioning the distinctive property of the sūtras [*i.e.* that they are in Prakrit], it is implied that they are even more capable than Sanskrit at

> hinting at the multiple truths of things. For example, in the verse *cittaṃ ṇa lihaï cittaṃ* there are three separate meanings that are denoted by the the word *cittam* [through interpreting it as rendering Sanskrit] *citra*, *citta*, or *cittva*: 'picture,' 'internal faculty,' and 'consciousness.' Similarly, in the verse *atthaṃ ĕttāṇa somasujjāṇaṃ*, there is a plurality of meaning that is directly denoted by the word *atthaṃ*: in accordance with the explanation given earlier, [it may mean] 'missile' [*astram*], 'support' [*āsthām*], 'purpose' [*arthaḥ*], or 'end-point' [*astam*]. Other examples may also be instanced.
>
> The use of the form *pāaḍa* [*'Prakrit'], which due to its phonetic resonance can also yield [the Sanskrit word] 'manifest' [*prakaṭa*], implies that the *sūtras* do not contain a very great degree of non-apparent meaning, even though, being *sūtras*, they are mainly meant only to hint at things

Maheśvarānanda's two points about the MM—the unique qualities of its medium and the urgency of its message—come together here. For Maheśvara the autocommentator, what is really useful about the Prakrit medium is its indeterminacy. When seen with an eye or heard by an ear attuned to Sanskrit, it does not so much obscure its final meaning as leave its interpretation open, at least initially. The *Parimala* becomes an indispensable supplement to the verses, as it unpacks and regiments the proliferation of meaning that Prakrit allows. Or at least that is what it is supposed to do.[18] There are however points in the text when the relation between the Prakrit text and its Sanskrit elucidation is not nearly so simple. In these cases—and we pass over Maheśvara's examples for now, to be returned to later on—there simply is not a one-to-one correspondence between the two codes. The Prakrit texts yields up a number of possible Sanskrit 'translations,' all of which are not only possible but

[18]In the first example, *saṃto hiaapaāso* (*gā*. 11), this is exactly what happens. The commentary *ad loc.* explains that the assertion contained in the verse's first line ("Existing, the heart's Illumination is the agent") is already implicit in *saṃto*, 'existing,' something that is only evident through an analysis of this participle into its constituents parts. *saṃto*, which is the equivalent to Sanskrit *san*, derives from the verb *asti*, 'to be', while its inflection in the first case marks it as an agent or *kartṛ*. Being suffused with agency, Maheśvarānanda goes on to assert, is what he means by *vimarśa*, Representation or reflective self-awareness. This analysis (conducted perforce entirely in Sanskrit within the *Parimala*) is especially transparent in Prakrit, where the inflectional stem and affix (*prakṛti* and *pratyaya*) are readily apparent; the same cannot be said for the corresponding Sanskrit participle.

simultaneously occurrent. This sort of play is familiar to readers of Sanskrit (and Prakrit) *kāvya* of course, most notable in the figure of *śleṣa* or bitextuality (Bronner 1999). Properly speaking, this most closely resembles *bhāṣā–śleṣa*, bitextuality between linguistic codes. There is however something else at work here. Maheśvarānanda crafted his text in this way not simply out of textual play but out of a desire for a certain kind of mimesis. His *gāthā*s admit of multiple interpretations because he would have his readers know the world itself to be equally indeterminate, to be subject to perspective. It is only through the gradual refinement of our vision that we may arrive at a final understanding, an understanding that allows for the world's many partial meanings within itself.

But to put things so directly overshoots the present context and sells short Maheśvarānanda's subtlety as a thinker and author. It also draws us away from what is perhaps the most important and certainly the most jarring moment in the entire passage. Maheśvarānanda cites and discusses *pāaḍa*, the verse's Prakrit rendering of the name 'Prakrit.' This is one of the handful of such cases in the *Parimala* where he gives the word in its original form, and not in its Sanskrit transformation. We are told that, because of its phonetic alternation with *prakaṭa*, the Sanskrit word for 'manifest,' *pāaḍa* subtly communicates a limitation of the text's potential for polysemy. The word itself points the text's audience to a limit, a governing mechanism that is as it were internal to the language. At the far end of the *Parimala*'s interpretive exercises, we are assured that the text has operated all along within the scope of this inherent limit.

This is an especially complex example of Maheśvarānanda's use of interpretative misdirection. While *pāaḍa* in fact does represent the Māhārāṣṭrī equivalent to *prakaṭa* (for so it is expressly taught by Bhāmaha in his commentary on Vararuci 1.2), there is no rule of grammar or use in literature that warrants us take it to mean *prākṛta*.[19] Yet, here, Maheśvarānanda tells his readers that the Māhārāṣṭrī word unproblematically yields up the latter, while only glancingly implies the presence of the other meaning. Interestingly enough, *pāaḍa* is the reading not only in the edition and A_1 but also in the other South Indian manuscripts (A_2 and M) that I have examined.[20]

Maheśvarānanda would have his readers believe that the ambiguity and polysemy of his Prakrit medium is governed by an underlying tendency to clarity, yet he would have us believe this through relying on an intra-linguistic mechanism that is, by most reasonable standards, patently false. Through a piece of philological sleight of hand (one that he could have expected at least some of his audience to see through easily), Maheśvara strives to show that there is a firm basis underlying the polysemy of his

[19]The usual Māhārāṣṭrī form would be *pāïa/pāua*: see, for example *Gāhāsattasaī* 1.2 (*amiaṃ pāuakavvaṃ paḍhiuṃ*; *cf.* the *Vajjālagga*'s Jaina Māhārāṣṭrī version of the same phrase: *amiyaṃ pāiyakavvaṃ paḍhiuṃ*), as well as the alternate form *paaa* in the *Gaüḍavaho* (cited above, p. 188n.). It is, however, worth considering how Maheśvarānanda thought it possible that *pāaḍa* could yield Skt. *prākṛta*. The real anomaly in the form's derivation lies in the final syllable; there, the rule governing the transformation *ta*→*ḍa* would be Vararuci 2.8, *pratisaravetasapatākāsu ḍaḥ* ("let *ḍ* be the substitute [for *t* as it occurs] in the words *pratisara*, *vetasa*, and *patākā*"). If Maheśvarānanda understood this (or a similar rule in another text) to be an *ākṛtigaṇa* or open list, the form he arrives at would just be possible. This rule shows some tendency towards expansion: Cowell's apparatus (p. 11) shows that his ms. W (which he considers to be "an entire recasting" of recent date, p. vi) reads a slightly expanded list, as do the commentators Vasantarāja and Rāmapāṇivāda (noted in Nitti-Dolci 1972, p. 47). The tendency towards placing more forms within this category is thus not limited to Maheśvara.

[20]Note A_1's addition of an insignificant semi-vowel glide in the *pratīka* quoted above. In its transmission of the verse A_1 reads with E_V. E_K reads *pāïa* in the verse, but its transmission of the Prakrit text is so unreliable as to lend this no probative value whatsoever.

text's meaning, while his very choice of words negates that basis. As in the duplex bull-elephant image, one solid form can blend into the other. Here, however, his process is deliberately interrupted, introducing a gap into the reader's awareness of the cline joining one word to another.

I believe that we have here a sort of straight-faced joke made with completely serious intent, something that could be said of much of the MM. The knowledgable reader is not expected to take Maheśvarānanda's intra-linguistic equation at face value; rather, the suggestion is made in order to gesture towards still deeper affinities. The stuff of language exists beyond and before any of its users, yet it is infinitely pliable to their intentions. Maheśvara both argues for and exemplifies this with his piece of lexical legerdemain. The final punch line to the joke (if such it is) is that the author refuses to play by the rules of his own game of bending language to the work of understanding the real nature of things. This can serve as an emblem for the dynamic that runs throughout the MM.

4.3 Indebtedness and Resistance

Maheśvarānanda calls the mechanism for the intra-linguistic equation of *prākṛta* and *prakaṭa* 'the power of reverberation' or *anuraṇanaśakti*. In so doing, he obliquely points to the authority of Ānandavardhana's *Dhvanyāloka*, where this term is central to the explanation of the varieties of linguistically-grounded suggestion (*śabdaśaktimūladhvani*, 2.20ff.). However the most sustained and significant evidence of Maheśvara's indebtedness to Ānandavardhana's style of literary analysis lies in his use

of the Māhārāṣṭrī *gāthā*. As students of Sanskrit poetics know, it is verses in Māhārāṣṭrī that Ānandavardhana uses as his initial proof-texts for the existence of *dhvani* or literary suggestion, and it is the poems of that language to which the *Dhvanyāloka* returns time and again in the course of its argument.[21] Ānandavardhana employs Prakrit verses to present his initial demonstration that not only do great pieces of literary art contain meanings that are inexplicit yet nevertheless understood by sensitive readers, but that the very capacity for this understanding depends upon the existence of a previously untheorized operation (*vyāpāra/vṛtti*) or power (*śakti*) of language, what he calls suggestion (*vyañjanā*, *dhvani*). Ānandavardhana's object in arguing this point is a foundational one: suggestion becomes for him the criterion that distinguishes poetry from all other sorts of language use.

Maheśvarānanda's adoption of the theoretical line laid out by the Kashmirian figures is marked by significant resistances and departures. This is something that he seems to share with other Southern intellectuals as they attempted to internalize the new criticism. We can thus take as a point of departure the question of what exactly happens in the course of the *dhvani*-theory's acceptance, and we may thereby begin to recognize the ways in which it becomes naturalized within an altogether different literary-textual order than that of Kashmir. The story of the *dhvanivāda*'s Southern reception is a complex one that is beyond the scope of the present inquiry.[22] Prior

[21]See Pollock 2001b. I return to the most famous of these verses below.

[22]Thanks to McCrea's superb study (1998), we now know a great deal about the intellectual world of Kashmirian poetics before and in the wake of Ānandavardhana. The increasingly settled reputation of the *Dhvanyāloka* among Kashmir's intellectual elite was most forcefully secured by Abhinavagupta's *Locana*, as well as by the summary restatement of much of the *Dhvanyāloka*'s matter in Mammaṭa's *Kāvyaprakāśa* (ca. 1050). We know much less about the *Dhvanyāloka*'s early

to Appayadīkṣita writing in the sixteenth century, all the post-Abhinava Southern proponents of the *dhvani*–theory seem to have understood it in the light of his *Locana* commentary.[23] This dependence on Abhinavagupta's interpretation leads to problems like Maheśvara's advocacy of the *anvitābhidhānavāda* theory of sentence meaning, especially so since all references (hostile or otherwise) to this theory are contained within the *Locana* rather than the *Dhvanyāloka* itself. To begin to explain this apparent *non sequitur* in the theory of language contained in the MM, we need to first understand the stakes of the discussion within Abhinavagupta's own argument.

To look, then, at the understanding of the divide between these two Mīmāṃsā positions within the *Dhvanyālokalocana*: early in the first *uddyota* of the text, Ānandavardhana introduces five Māhārāṣṭrī Prakrit *gāthā*s in order to illustrate the operation of suggested meaning at its simplest level. The first such verse famously reads:

> *bhama dhammia vīsattho so suṇao ajja mārio deṇa |*
> *golaṇaïkacchakuḍaṅgavāsiṇa dariasīheṇa ||*
>
> Holy man, you may wander at peace.
> That little dog has just today been killed
> by the ferocious lion that lives in the thicket on the banks of the Godavari.

As has been well explained elsewhere, this verse is to be understood as the clever words

reception outside of Kashmir. Within a century of Ānandavardhana's completion of the text, it was already known (if, one suspects, poorly understood) in the far South. In his commentary on Daṇḍin's *Kavyādarśa* 2.203, the Buddhist ālaṃkārika Ratnaśrījñāna (ca. 950, active in Rāṣṭrakūṭa Karnataka, acc. to Pollock 2005) quotes *Dhvanyāloka* 1.13 only to dismissively incorporate literary suggestion within the scope of the figure *samāsokti*.

[23] This trend reached its apogee in the *Dhvanyālokalocanakaumudī* of Uttuṅgodaya, a minor Malayali king who composed his extensive commentary on Abhinavagupta's text around the beginning of the fifteenth century. The first part of this commentary was published by Kuppuswami Sastri in 1944; the remaining sections of the text are presumably still extant in manuscript but await publication.

of a woman attempting to preserve her trysting–place in a bower along the banks of the Godāvarī, by directing a mendicant towards a house in town (*bhama*, 'wander'), and dissuading him from going to the river.[24] Such is the extent of Ānandavardhana's own understanding of the verse. In his gloss, on the other hand, Abhinavagupta draws upon a host of positions about the nature and function of sentential meaning, including both the Bhāṭṭa and Prābhākara positions. As he presents it,[25] the Bhāṭṭa view of meaning depends upon a nested hierarchy of language functions: first, there is the initial transmission of meaning by the independently effective words (*abhidhā*); then, there is an apprehension of their governing sentential sense (*tātparya*); and only then—and dependent upon the perception of a surface incoherence (*mukhyārthabādha*) of a piece of text—is there the possibility of the operation of some kind of figurative meaning (*lakṣaṇā*). Abhinava deftly and subtly incorporates this Bhāṭṭa theory through an elaborate counterfactual. He admits "for the sake of argument" (*abhyupagamamātreṇa*) that these three levels (*kākṣā*) of language function *might* be able to explain the workings of the Prākrit verse, providing in the process a seemingly sympathetic presentation of the *abhihitānvayavāda*. In the end, he argues that *lakṣaṇā* or figurative meaning, the hierarchically highest function of the Bhāṭṭas, cannot account for our understanding of the verse's implicit sense. This provides the occasion to posit yet another, superordinate function, *vyañjanā* or implication, a synonym of the Ānandavardhana's *dhvani*, thus neatly justifying the existence of

[24]See Pollock 2001 pp. 201ff.

[25]Ed. Pāṭhak, pp. 54–63.

literary suggestion within the terms of the *abhihitānvayavāda*.

The difference in his presentation of the Prābhākara position is striking and immediate. Rather than conciliating his Prābhākara opponent as he does the Bhāṭṭa, Abhinava is interested in subjecting the theory to the considerable force of his sarcasm. In Abhinava's hands, the essential point (and essential problem) is that the Prābhākara doesn't admit any other function than direct denotation, enlisting it to extend further and further "like an arrow" to account for complex pieces of language. This is immediately rejected as incoherent: how can there be a single function producing different results in different contexts? In fact, even admitting that there are different effects exercised by the text of a single verse like *bhama dhammia* amounts to accepting the *dhvanivādin*'s position, since it is illegitimate to postulate different effects from a single cause. Other counterarguments are put in the Prābhākara's mouth only to be summarily cast aside. A single language-function (says the Prābhākara) is all that needs to be posited given the simultaneous nature of our cognition of sentence-meaning. How can this be (replies Abhinavagupta) when conventions do not govern sentences, but only individual words? What if we argue, then, that conventions only apply to the individual words and that final meaning is an effect of those factors? Then, Abhinava responds with a flourish, the *anvitābhidhānavāda* theory falls to pieces, as the word meanings—thought to be subsequent to the sentence-meaning—are now forced to bear a causal relationship to the same sentence-meaning. The Prābhākara (who is mockingly referred to as *śrotriya*, 'learned brahman') might as well accept that he himself is an effect of his own great-grandson

(*nūnaṃ mīmāṃsakasya prapautraṃ prati naimittikatvam abhimatam*). Other jabs follow, but Abhinavagupta's meaning seems clear enough.

Or so one would think. Maheśvarānanda, as we have already seen, sees no contradiction in holding to the Prābhākara semantics while attempting to craft his own work in line with the protocols of the theory of suggestion. Nor is he alone in so thinking.[26] Maheśvarānanda was not simply, then, being idiosyncratic in his thinking. Instead, his emphases reflect a concern with the writerly rather than in the readerly effect of textual language.[27] This is the polar opposite to the focus of the prestigious *dhvani*-theory of Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta. To be sure, the fourth and final chapter of the *Dhvanyāloka* is addressed to the poet rather than the sophisticated reader, but this is a minor theme in a work consecrated first and foremost to the question of literary understanding. Indeed, for all that the argument of the *Dhvanyāloka* and its commentary proceed on the basis of a new and original contribution to the philosophy of language—the consolidation of the idea of the powers or significative capacities of verbal communication, a first millennium 'linguistic turn'—this theory is grounded in a literary pragmatics that is fundamentally

[26]It is telling that Uttuṅgodaya totally reverses Abhinavagupta's rhetorical emphases on these two positions. In commenting on the end of Abhinavagupta's discussion of the *abhihitānvaya* position, he writes (ed. Sastri, p. 118):

> *samprati prābhākaramatānurodhibhir apy anujñeyo 'yaṃ vyañjanavyāpāra iti vaktum ujjṛmbhāṇaḥ kaumarilapakṣapratikṣepaparvaṇi labdhalakṣatām ātmana upakṣipann upasaṃharati.*
> Now, as he begins to explain that this power of suggestion should also be admitted by the followers of the Prābhākara doctrine, [Abhinava] gives the following conclusion, while pointing out that he has achieved his purpose in the course of his rejection of the Kaumārila position.

[27]The distinction follows Barthes 1974.

social. The central figure here is that of the *sahṛdaya*. This literally means the "one with heart", a good hearted person. Within the universe of reference of poetics, a *sahṛdaya* is a man of feeling, a refined sensitive appreciator of art, a connoisseur. The existence of a community of such connoisseurs is the warrant for establishing the existence of suggested meaning or *dhvani*. That is, literary texts can be said to have implicit meaning inasmuch as there are people out there who understand these meanings, the *sahṛdaya*s. Not for nothing is the Ānandavardhana's work often referred to by the name *Sahṛdayāloka*, *The Light upon the sahṛdayas*, foregrounding this social or receptive basis of the theory. While Ānandavardhana nowhere weighs in on what could be called the ontology of a work of *kāvya*—whether the meaning of a poetic text is essentially social or essentially autotelic—he was self-aware enough of the importance he grants to this refined audience for the whole project, and to the problem that it raised. One of the objections that Ānandavardhana imagines to his new theory of literature is that it relies on the faddishness of a literary clique, "these people who dance around with eyes closed, thinking of their false refinement, saying 'oh the *dhvani*, the *dhvani*'," as he memorably put it.[28] Nevertheless, the importance of the *sahṛdaya*s mounts even higher in Abhinavagupta's commentary over a century later; for the *Locana*'s author, the sociocentric nature of literary art does seem to be something that is taken for granted.[29]

Thus, the contrasting emphasis on textual creation in the *Mahārthamañjarī* is

[28] *Dhvanyāloka vṛtti* on 1.1, Ed. Pāṭhak, p. 27.

[29] On the idea of "aesthetic competence" at the base of Ānandavardhana's theory of suggestion, see McCrea *op. cit*, pp. 136–140.

a very significant departure from the earlier criticism, one that is perfectly obvious to anyone with a working knowledge of the Kashmirian tradition. The desire to incorporate the *anvitābhidhānavāda* may have then been motivated by this emphasis on the practical side of a poet's labor with language: text-making, after all, relies on the effect of the whole, on the nuances that emerge from the very specific texture of an utterance, on the meaningful juxtaposition of particulars. This constructive holism might have found congenial the Prābhākara's resolute commitment to the emergence of meaning from words *qua* relata rather than the more atomic scrutiny—the gaze of the literary critic—that the Bhāṭṭa view seems to provoke (and in fact did provoke, as in the fine grained formalism of Abhinava's explications du texte). If the *Mahārthamañjarī* did not set out a new synthesis between the holistic theory of meaning advocated by the Mīmāṃsakas and the Kashmirian literary speculation, it nevertheless was organized around a productive collision between these two very different understandings of the nature of language.

4.4 Interpretation and Deformation

We are now in a position to begin to understand the effect that Maheśvarānanda sought to achieve over the course of the *Mahārthamañjarī*, a work which adopts as its founding intuition that of the *dhvanivāda*—that we may mean much more than we say, and that this meaning can be made subject to analysis and explanation. Maheśvarānanda takes this intuition as a broad theoretical mandate for the creation and resolution of a series of hermeneutical dilemmas within his work. That he does

this in a work purporting to be a religious scripture rather than a work of belles-lettres is very significant, jibing as it does with a wider transformation at work in Sanskritic literary criticism. As Pollock has recently argued, Abhinavagupta's commentary on Ānandavardhana's *Dhvanyāloka* enshrined a peculiar interpretation of the earlier critic's theory of literature, imposing a set of theological priorities that was to dominate much of the conversation within *alaṅkāraśāstra* for centuries to come.[30] While this shift is essential to understanding what Maheśvarānanda sets out to do in the MM, it does not in itself explain the effect he seeks to produce. Instead, we must see in the MM a complementary next step: if Abhinavagupta sought to create a theological poetics, then Maheśvara's text can best be understood as an experiment in a poetic theology, a work serving a particular soteriological end through literary means.

Although it is a point never thematized in their texts, the Prakrit *gāthā* literature acted as a catalyst for the *dhvani* critics and their legatees for reasons deriving from their form as well as their content. We have already seen something of the content-driven interpretation of this poetry in the reading of the verse *bhama dhammia*. At least part of the pleasure that the poems afforded their readers lay in this sort of imaginative reconstruction. They presumed a fantasized world of rural idyll, complete with a dramatis personae and a stock of erotic themes, all of which enabled the refined reader to fill in the contextual details left out of the artfully underdetermined text.[31]

[30] Pollock 1998c, esp. p. 139.

[31] On the reconstruction of this 'social text,' see again Pollock 2001, pp. 207–208.

An especially apt example of this can be seen in the comments that one particular verse (*Sattasaī* 2.73) elicited from both Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta. As transmitted in the *Dhvanyāloka*, the verse reads:

> *sihipicchakaṇṇapūrā vahuā vāhassa gavvirī bhamaï |*
> *gaamottiaraïapasāhaṇāṇaṃ majjhe savattīṇam ||*
>
> The hunter's wife, her ears bedecked with peacock feather, walks proudly in the midst of her cowives, their ornaments made of elephant-pearls.

For both authors, but especially for Abhinava (whose interpretation Martha Selby rightly describes as "probably standard-setting"), this verse vividly conjures up a narrative of a hunter's erotic exhaustion by his new and passionate wife. This is publicly signified by his inability to kill anything but a peacock, while his dissatisfaction with his other women shows in their own shrewishly well-kempt adornments.[32]

Thus, the Prakrit verses provided an exercise in inventive hermeneutics for the new Kashmirian criticism; their sensitive and at times elaborate interpretations stand as emblematic of the whole project of the *dhvani* theory. But the importance of this corpus of Prakrit poetry was not limited to just this sort of narrative reconstruction; rather, the poems' linguistic form provided its own sort of pleasure. Recall that Maheśvarānanda, building upon earlier poetic and grammatical speculation, argued that Prakrit was to be always understood under the sign of Sanskrit, the *prakṛti* or prototype language. This idea lies at the heart of this other formal pleasure that the poetry provided to its Sanskrit auditors and readers. Understanding the under-

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[32] Abhinavagupta comments on this verse when it is first quoted by Ānandavardhana, at *Dhvanyāloka* 2.25; while Ānandavardhana only discusses the verse when he quotes it again at 3.1. On this oft-discussed passage see *inter alia* Hart 1975, p. 190; Dundas 1985, p. 35; Selby 2000, pp. 91-92; and Tieken 2001 p. 58. *Pace* Tieken, I see no reason to dismiss Hart's rather different interpretation of this verse out of hand.

determined phonetic string of a Māhārāṣṭrī verse to be always necessarily shadowed by its transformation into Sanskrit, the reader's intellectual and aesthetic interest is grounded in the very process of arriving at the clarity of the Sanskrit 'translation.' This is something that is hardly ever mentioned in the literature,[33] though Maheśvarānanda himself neatly captures this inter-linguistic movement in one of the *Parimala*'s closing verses (p. 195):

> *gāthānām anubhāṣaṇaṃ tadanu tacchāyā tato vyākṛtir*
> *granthārthagrathanakriyāsu gahano hṛdyaś ca kaścit kramaḥ* |
> *saṃvādoktisahasrasaṅkalanayā tattvārthacarcotsavaḥ*
> *saubhāgyaṃ ca vimarśasampada iti prasthānam adhyakṣyatām* ||
>
> The recitation of the lyrics, then their translation [*chāyā*], then the explanation; and the delightful and mysterious process of diving into the acts of construing the meaning of the text; the festival that is the investigation of the nature of things, with the gathering up of thousands of concordant statements; and attaining the treasure that is Representation: thus should the course [*prasthānam*] be observed.

Here, of course, we are operating under the sign of the MM's particular systematic and soteriological interests, but the process described here is more generally applicable. In constructing his text, Maheśvarānanda took his point of departure from the literary theorists in his explicit invocations of their positions but also seemingly in the performative model that their texts provided.

However, one needs to be nuanced in arguing for the influence of the *dhvani* theorists on the MM. As a student of the theory, Maheśvarānanda was pointedly aware of the condition of being a sensitive and attentive reader or hearer of texts, that is to say, of being a *sahṛdaya*. This consciousness of what it is to puzzle out the meaning of a line of poetry or to ponder a philosophical aperçu conspicuously

[33]But see the references to the *Gaüḍavaho* mentioned in p. 188n.

informs what he sets out to do in the MM. But, as we will presently see, the *gāthās* of Maheśvara's text do not operate in the same way as the *Dhvanyāloka*'s poetry of suggestion; this is a departure rather than a simple adaptation or homage.

Let us turn to the movement at work in the complex text of the *Mahārthamañjarīparimala*, what Maheśvarānanda (in the verse cited a moment ago) calls the text's *prasthāna*. Above and beyond any of its separate arguments, the text consists of an ongoing effort to inculcate in its audience an awareness of the world and of the place of the individual within it. Maheśvarānanda, as we will now see, is an eclectic—almost opportunistic—interpreter of his own text, using every technique at his disposal to elicit a surplus of meaning from the *Mahārthamañjarī*'s root verses. I will therefore not attempt to exhaustively catalog all of the means whereby Maheśvara seeks to produce this transformation of awareness in his audience; instead, I will focus on a number of instances where this intention clearly governs the text's content.

This process begins and has its first explicit articulation with the very first *gāthā*:

> *ṇamiūṇa ṇiccasuddhe guḷuṇo caḷane mahappaāsassa |*
> *gaṭṭhaï mahatthamaṃjarim imiṇaṃ surahiṃ mahesarāṇaṃdo ||*
>
> *chāyā:*
> *natvā nityaśiddhau guroś caraṇau mahāprakāśasya*
> *grathnāti mahārthamañjarīm imāṃ surabhiṃ maheśvarānandaḥ*
>
> Bowing to the ever-pure feet of *guru mahāprakāśa*, Maheśvarānanda binds this fragrant *Flower-cluster of the Great Purpose.*

We (the MM's readers) have already been given a basis of understanding this verse's meaning: Maheśvarānanda reveres Mahāprakāśa (whom we already know to be his teacher from the sixth opening verses of the *Parimala*), and he announces his aim to compose the text we are reading.[34] The commentary on the passage, however,

[34]This meaning-intuition finds support in the *avataraṇikā* or proem appended to the head

frustrates this expectation in a very surprising way (pp. 5–6):

> *iha khalu sarvasyāpi janasyopāsyatayā kācid devatāsty evety atrāvipratipattiḥ. kevalaṃ tasyā nāmarūpādivyapadeśamātre vaiṣamyam. sā ca yuktiparyālocanāyāṃ svātmasaṃvitsphurattāmātrasvarūpeti prakāśa eva viśvopāsyā devatety āpatitam. tasyāś ca mahattvam*
> *sā sphurattā mahāsattā deśakālāviśeṣiṇī |*
> *saiṣā sāratayā coktā hṛdayaṃ parameṣṭhinaḥ ||*
> *iti śrīpratyabhijñānītyā sarvasaṅkocollaṅghitayā sphurattaikasvarūpatvam. sa ca guruḥ gṛṇāti prakāśayati viśvavyavahāram iti niruktyā sarvānugrāhakaḥ. tādṛkprakāśakavyatireke viśvasyāndhabadhiratādiprāyatāpatteḥ. sa ca paryantataḥ paramaśivabhaṭṭārakāparaparyāyaḥ svātmarūpo mahān pramātā. yaduktaṃ śrīśivasūtreṣu gurur upāya iti. tasya caraṇau jñānakriyālakṣaṇaṃ svātantryam* [.] *caryate gamyate prāpyate budhyate cābhyāṃ viśvam iti hi caraṇāv ity ucyete.*
>
> It is widely known that all people take some sort of divinity as their object of veneration: on this point there can be no disagreement. This divinity only differs with regard to the distinctions of name and form. And, under careful examination, this [divinity] is nothing other than the dynamic energy that is the awareness of the Self. Thus it is the case that Illumination alone is the divinity honored by all people.
>
> And the 'greatness' of this is that it consists purely of dynamic energy, transcending all limitations, as it is taught in the revered *Recognition* (=ĪPK 1.5:14): "That dynamism is Being-as-such, unconditioned by space and time, and it is that alone that is taught to be 'the essence,' the heart of the Highest Lord."
>
> And this [Illumination] is '*guru*,' which shows its favor to all, as [can be seen] through the etymological analysis that it 'proclaims' [=$\sqrt{}$*gṝ*]—that is to say 'it reveals'—the workings of the world, since in the absence of such a revealer, the world would devolve into blindness and deafness.
>
> And, in the final analysis, it is the great percipient, the Self, otherwise called Paramaśivabhaṭṭāraka. For, as it is said in the *Śivasūtra* (2.6), "the *guru* is the means".
>
> The 'two feet' of this [Illumination] are the [Power of its] autonomy consisting of [the Powers of] awareness and action. By these two the world is 'approached,' which is to say it is 'gone to,' 'obtained,' 'known,' and 'experienced;' thus they are said to be 'feet' [in the *gāthā*].

Sanskrit commentators as a rule are expansive in their comments on the opening verses of a work; it is a conceit met with in scholia on *kāvya* as well as *śāstra* that a text's opening can be seen as an intimation of its entire meaning. At first glance, Maheśvarānanda would appear to merely be taking this sort of license with his own

of the text (p. 3): *śrīmadanuttarādvaitasiddhihetor dvaitaprathāsatattvapratyūhavyapohadakṣaṃ deśikendrabhaṭṭārakasvātantryam anusandadhānas tantrakṛt tantropanyāsaṃ praty upodghātam udghāṭayati* "The author, in order to establish the supreme doctrine of nondualism, and bearing in mind the Freedom of [his] revered teacher, itself capable of the refutation of the opposed dualist doctrine, [now] unveils the introduction to the exegesis of the *tantra*."

work. But while this is clearly part of what is at work here, it is not the whole story. The direct meaning of the text—Maheśvara bows to Mahāprakāśa and composes his work—is never explicitly mentioned in the *Parimala* at all. *Mahāprakāśa* is only understood as an abstraction ("The Great Illumination") and not as a proper name, despite the fact that Maheśvara has already used the name as such (and will do so time and again throughout the *Parimala*). What the MM's readers are faced with here is not a type of allegory (or *anyokti* or *garbhokti*, to try to match up some sort of Sanskritic category to the term); in the strict letter of the *Parimala*'s reading, there is no patent meaning from which to depart. Of course, the reader understands that the word is in fact the proper name of Maheśvarānanda's teacher, but the text proceeds as if this is not the case, or at least, not what is really important here. As a result, the reader is faced with a swerving away from a reasonable expectation of meaning, what I will call a semantic deformation.[35]

The gloss continues on in this same vein, explaining *nityaśuddhau* ('ever-pure') in terms of the brilliant reflectiveness that the two Powers of awareness and action possess (they are *unmeṣanimeṣavibhāgavyudāsena padārthāntarapratibimbanakṣamau* "able to reflect other entities through their purging of the distinction between manifestation and nonmanifestation"). Maintaining the highly abstract language of the metaphysicians of the Pratyabhijñā, Maheśvarānanda explains that all of the phe-

[35]In speaking of 'swerve' and 'deformation,' I adopt the language of McGann and Samuels 2001, behind which lurk the 'revisionary ratios' imagined by Bloom (1997), especially his first, *clinamen* or 'swerve'. It is perhaps telling that these critics of English literature coined this term as part of a jargon of interpretation rather than composition. Maheśvara's tendency to write through the lens of literary theory constrains my own attempts to categorize what it is he is doing in the MM.

nomena of worldly life are in fact mirrored within the play of these two fundamental properties ascribed to Śiva. These are 'bowed to,' which he explains as *utkarṣa-kakṣyārūḍhatayā vimṛśya*, "reflected upon as though set in an elevated state."

In this somewhat equivocal gloss we are supposed to be reminded of the would-be literal suppressed meaning of Maheśvarānanda prostrating himself at his teacher's feet. With some short digressions, Maheśvarānanda stays with this implicit theme: all of this initial headlong dive into speculative thought remains grounded in the fact of this gesture of ritual submission, this bowing (*namana*) or inclining (*prahvībhāva*) of oneself before a superior. As he proceeds through his gloss of the verse, Maheśvara would have us see this ritual gesture, which by its very performance objectifies its performer and recipient, as an overlay of the deeper consubstantiality between the two.

Every element of the seemingly simple verse is charged with further levels of meaning in a way that is suggestive of (but not entirely assimilable to) the expansive readings that the *dhvani* theorists would claim to find in their proof-texts. Every element, that is, except the figure of our author. Although his gloss of his own initiation name preemptively announces his identity with Śiva,[36] Maheśvarānanda just as quickly reverts to the particular contingent details of his own earthly life: his good fortune to have been the pupil of a gifted master, the battery of initiations he has received, and the great deal of study he has accomplished.[37] That Maheśvar-

[36]p. 6, ln. 4-6: *maheśvarānando nāma...nityānavacchinnaprakāśānandaparamārthasvātantrya-lakṣaṇaḥ paramaśivabhaṭṭāraka eva.*, "Maheśvarānanda is in fact Śiva, God Himself, whose Autonomy is in the highest sense the eternally unimpeded [union of] Illumination and Delight."

[37]*ibid.*, ln. 7–10; as Maheśvarānanda is himself quick to point out, this set of three chimes with

ānanda (or, perhaps *maheśvarānandaḥ*) is the only thing that is not overcoded is important: the author sets himself up as the vanishing point in the text's already-elaborate scheme of homologies and identifications.

While the figure of the author remains stable amidst all of the interpretative transformations of the verse, his text does not. Glossing the verse's central predication, *grathnāti mahārthamañjarīm imāṃ surabhiṃ maheśvarānandaḥ* ("Maheśvarānanda binds this fragrant Flower-Cluster of the Great Purpose"), he resorts initially to a direct interpretation (p. 7):

> *sa ca maheśvarānando mahārthamañjarīṃ grathnāti. viśvataduttarobhayaspandatayā pūrṇāhambhāvasvabhāvasyārthasya arthyata iti vyutpattyā sarvaprārthyasya vastunaḥ śivaśaktyādibhedaprathāprarohe 'pi pāramārthikādvaitaprathāsatattvāṃ sphurattām upadarśayati. granthasandarbhadvārā lokam anubhāvayatīty arthaḥ.*
>
> And it is this same Maheśvarānanda [who] 'binds the Flower-cluster of the Great Purpose.' The 'Purpose' consists of absolute self-consciousness, the vibration of both the world and that which transcends the world. It is that which is sought after by everyone, according to the etymological analysis that 'it is desired' [*arthyate*]. [Maheśvarānanda] shows the Purpose's dynamism, the awareness of absolute nondifference, even when there is talk of the duality of Śiva, Śakti and so forth. Which is to say: through composing a book, he makes people aware of this.

Maheśvarānanda gives a strongly performative spin to his act of creation: the text can bring about the salutary awareness of the real nature of things while allowing for the admission, even the aesthetic appreciation, of the world in all its diversity. But he does not stop there; instead, he goes on to equate the world as it is manifest in everyday experience with "this fragrant flower-cluster of the Great Purpose" (p. 7, ln. 24 *mahārthamañjarīparyāyo viśvavaicitryavilāsaḥ*), and to declare that the world

the tag from the ninth chapter of the Saiddhāntika *Kiraṇatantra*: *gurutaḥ śāstrataḥ svataḥ* (*Kiraṇa* 9.14b). It is likely that Maheśvarānanda only knows this from its labeled quotation in *Tantrāloka* 13.162cd, as he follows Abhinavagupta in reading the title of the *tantra* as a feminine (i.e. *kiraṇāyāṃ* [*scil. saṃhitāyām*]).

can itself serve as a means of this awareness.[38] This sort of perspectival shift will prove to be one of the principle tools for Maheśvarānanda's project in the MM. Bull into elephant: one seemingly solid form resolving into another.

This deformation of the opening verse's meaning is not just an exercise in interpretive license: it subtly enacts the relationship between author, text, and world that the remainder of the MM will serve to substantiate. This is a point which Maheśvarānanda himself makes at the very close of his comments here, when he writes, *upari prapañcayiṣyamāṇāśeṣatantrārthasūkṣmaśarīraprāyeyaṃ gāthā* (p. 9): "Further, this verse is as it were the subtle yogic body of all of the teachings that will be expanded upon later in the *tantra*." We may take seriously his claim that this single verse, which on the surface appears so straightforward, can serve as an icon of the meaning of the text as a whole.

The second *gāthā* extends from this opening, both in its patent content and in its interpretation. We are met with what appears to be another *praśaṃsā* or eulogy of Maheśvarānanda's teacher:

> *vaḍḍhaü mahappaāso vimarisavicchuriaṇiccalujjoo*
> *saṇṇāvisesaṇiṇṇaamattapaattāi jattha satthāi*
>
> *chāyā*:
> *vardhatāṃ mahāprakāśo vimarśavicchuritaniśchalodyotaḥ*
> *saṃjñāviśeṣanirṇayamātrapravṛttāni yatra śāstrāṇi*
>
> May the Great Illumination flourish, its stainless light anointed with Representation, which the *śāstra*s strive merely to describe.

Maheśvarānanda continues with the interpretive overcoding, upsetting his readers' presumption of what the text before them should mean, by initially explaining *mahā-*

[38] Maheśvara grounds his argument for this especially vertiginous identification in the appearance of the deictic pronoun *imām* in the verse. Good (if perverse) commentator that he is, he notes that the demonstrative suggests something that is readily apparent (*prākaṭyotkarṣāt*).

prakāśa very differently from the previously established interpretation: here the "Great Illumination" (or, 'that of which the Illumination is great') is taken as equivalent to the consensually experienced world (pp. 9–10):

> *atra yo 'yaṃ mahāprakāśas tattatpramātṛprakāśāveśādhīnaprakāśamānatāsvabhāvamātrapāriśeṣyāt svarūpaniṣkarṣe kriyamāṇe*
>
> *tattadrūpatayā jñānaṃ bahirantaḥ prakāśate |*
> *jñānād ṛte nārthasattā jñānarūpaṃ tato jagat ||*
> *na hi jñānād ṛte bhāvāḥ kenacid viṣayīkṛtāḥ |*
> *jñānaṃ tadātmatāṃ yātam etasmād avasīyate ||*
>
> *iti śrīdevikākramasthityā prakāśaikasvabhāvaḥ ṣaṭtriṃśattattvasaṃpiṇḍanātmā pratyekatattvaparyālocane 'py anantaprakārāyamāṇo viśvavilāsaḥ sa vardhatām upary upari svasphurattām anubhavatu.*
>
> What is [referred to] here as *mahāprakāśa*—the manifestation of the world as it consists solely of Illumination, the collection of all thirty-six reality-levels which appears endlessly diverse when one examines even a single level (*cf.* here the statement of the *Devikākrama*:
>
> "Awareness shines forth both outwardly and inwardly, appearing as each and every object. Without awareness, things have no reality, therefore the world itself consists of awareness. Without awareness, no objects can be perceived; from this we conclude that awareness and objects are identical."[39])
>
> upon ascertaining its real nature to ultimately be nothing other than the luminosity that is subordinate to the pervasion of the Illumination of each and every percipient—may that 'flourish.' [That is to say,] may it experience its own dynamic nature in ever-increasing ways.

This inversion of the previously established meaning is only given as an initial interpretation (p. 10: *ādyavākyārthaḥ*) of the verse. Maheśvarānanda then returns to the already-established meaning of *mahāprakāśa*—God as the highest percipient—in a second and considerably more lengthy exegesis. The rhetorical force of this initial, seemingly contradictory interpretation is clear enough; again, the stuff of language is so much material for Maheśvarānanda to work with, to assign meaning to as he

[39]These same verses are known to Kṣemarāja (who cites them *ad Netratantra* 21.5 and *ad Śivasūtra* 30; in both cases attributed to the *Kālikākrama*). The former is probably Maheśvarānanda's source here: in the latter quotation (*Śivasūtravimarśinī*, p. 118), these are the beginning of a longer quotation. They are also quoted by Jayaratha (*ad Tantrāloka* 5.80).

wishes, grounded in the underlying ontological identity of all consciousness and all phenomena. One can, after all, assert that a single term describes subject and object, world and God (or, for that matter, bull and elephant), secure in the fact that all of these are radically and ultimately identical.

However, to simply affirm the ineffability of all meaning and the homogeneity of all signification would defeat Maheśvara's didactic and literary purpose. The perspectivalism that lies at the base of Maheśvarānanda's ontology and epistemology becomes the subject of the second half of the verse, and of the balance of the *Parimala*'s second comment here. Drawing explicitly on the eighth *sūtra* of Kṣemarāja's *Pratyabhijñāhṛdaya*,[40] Maheśvara gives a brief doxographical sketch of a collection of doctrinal positions associated with the standard repertoire of philosophical schools, contrasting their querulous contentions (the 'agonizing tumult of their mutual disagreements' *vādinām anyonyakalahakolāhalakleśa*, as he nicely puts it (p. 11)) with the more direct apprehension that he offers. This is grounded in a phenomenological proof of the existence of a undelimited percipient, something that the simplest act of perception inerrably establishes for its perceiver.

There is a productive contradiction at work here: Maheśvara affirms the immediacy of the understanding his work offers, while he himself persistently seeks to interrupt the very process of understanding through the interpretative puzzles and deformations of his text. As the MMP's presentation progresses, these interruptions begin to depend on the Prakrit medium itself, on its pliant capacity to allow multi-

[40] *tadbhūmikāḥ sarvadarśanasthitayaḥ*: "All of the positions of the different philosophical outlooks are [the transmigrating soul's] roles."

ple simultaneous meanings. This linguistically-grounded exegetical misdirection and redirection begins explicitly in the fourth *gāthā* and its commentary.[41] There, continuing the deliberately paradoxical theme of the radical availability of the text's esoteric teaching, Maheśvara again presents his audience with a verse that supports more than one interpretation. Here, however, the plurality of meaning depends upon an ambiguity of the verse's actual language:

> *jaṃ jāṇaṃti jaḷā api jaḷahārīo pi jaṃ vijāṇaṃti |*
> *jassa ccia jokkāro so kassa phuḍo ṇa hoi kuḷanāho ||*
>
> *chāyā*:
> *yaṃ jānanti jaḍā api jalahāryo 'pi yaṃ vijānanti*
> *yasyaiva namaskāraḥ sa kasya sphuṭo na bhavati kulanāthaḥ*
>
> Even the slow-witted know him , and even water-bearers experience him, reverence is to him alone: for whom is the lord of the *kula* not manifest?

The commentary here merits quoting at length:[42]

> *yaṃ vaiśvātmyena prasiddhimantaṃ prakāśātmāno vīreśvarā ivānudriktaprakāśā jaḍā ābhīrādayo 'pi jānanti, yaṃ ca vimarśamayyo vīreśvarya iva vaidagdhyābhasaśālinyo ghaṭadāsīprabhṛtayo 'py avabudhyante. sarveṣām api sthūlo 'haṃ sampanno 'ham ityādeḥ svātmasphuraṇasya sphuṭam evopalabhyamānatvāt. yac chrutiḥ—'utainaṃ gopā adṛśan adṛśann udahārya' iti.*[43] *vimarśaprādhānyāj jalahārījñānaṃ prati vaiśiṣṭyam uktam. jñānaśaktyeva pramātṝṇāṃ kriyāśaktyāpy ayaṃ kroḍīkriyata ity āha 'yasyaiva*

[41]It is just possible that this linguistic manipulation begins with the second verse, though it is not explicitly reflected on in the *Parimala*: in the compound *vimarisavicchuriaṇiccalujjoo*, the first two members of the compound unproblematically transform into *vimarśavicchurita* ("anointed with Representation"); the latter half however could yield either *niścalodyota* ("unwavering light") or *niśchalodyota* ("stainless light"). It is the latter reading that the *Parimala* supports in both of its interpretations, as the world (=*mahāprakāśa*) is said to be that in which 'there is no scope for any such stains that might, for example, give rise to an idea of its being false' (p. 10: *na kasyacit mithyātvopapādakādeś chalasyāvakāśaḥ*), while the soul (=*mahāprakāśa*) is 'that of which the light or dynamism has melted away the stain of any conditioning property' (p. 11: *...niśchalo nirgalitopādhikalaṅka udyotaḥ sphurattā yasya*). The reading *niścala*, however, is that which would occur most 'naturally' to a reader of Māhārāṣṭrī, especially one (like Maheśvarānanda himself) whose reading in the language was mediated through the major poetic theorists; it is in this sense that *ṇiccala* occurs, for example, in *Sattasaī* 1.4, the verse cited in Mammaṭa's *Kāvyaprakāśa svopajñavṛtti* (*ad* 2.7) as an example of the working of suggested meaning.

[42]E_V pp. 17–18, collated against A_1 f. 10, ln. 4r–ln. 3v. The same passage in A_2 (f. 18, ln. 2v–f. 19, ln. 7r) shows no substantive variants. The apparatus here is not fully positive: I have included only the cases where A_1's text can improve that of the edition, or where I have emended.

[43]*Śatarudrīya* 1.8.

namaskāra' iti. jaḍajalahāryādir hi sarvo 'pi jīvavargas tattatphalakāṅkṣayā tatra tatra namaskurvāṇo lakṣyate. sa sarvo 'pi namaskāro yatsambandhenaiva bhavati yathā śrutiḥ—'yasmai namas tacchira' iti. sarvasyāpi svātmaiva devatety agre bhaviṣyati. yataḥ—

tvam evātmeśa sarvasya sarvaś cātmani rāgavān |
iti svabhāvasiddhāṃs tvadbhaktiṃ jānañ jayej janaḥ||[44]

iti śrīmatstotrāvalyām uktam. atha ca jaḍāḥ stambhakumbhādayo bhāvā jaḍahāryaḥ śabdasparśādyādānakṣamā indriyaśaktayas te 'pi yaṃ jānantīti parameśvarasya prākaṭyotkarṣa upapādyate. yataḥ stambhakumbhādayo 'pi tattatpramātṛviṣayīkāradvārā jñānakriyāśrayatayā niścīyante.

prakāśātmāno] A_1; *prakāśātmano* E_V • *iti...jayej janaḥ*] *emend.*; *iti svabhāvasiddhāṃś ca tattadbhaktiṃ janayej janaḥ* A_1 (unmetrical); E_V omits • *jaḍahāryaḥ*] *conj.* ; *jalahāryaḥ* A_1, E_V • *yaṃ jānanti*] A_1; *yaj jānanti* E_V

Even 'the slow-witted,' like the Ābhīras, in whom Illumination is barely evident, know him as the one understood to be universally present. [They know this] as if they were the Masters of Heroes,[45] who consist of Illumination. And even [such people] as pot-carrying serving-women, who possess only a semblance of sophistication, comprehend him as if they were the Ladies of Heroes, consisting of Representation. This is because the awareness of one's own self—for example, thinking "I am fat", or "I am fortunate"—is perceived directly by all people. It is as it says in the Vedic passage: "The cowherds saw him, the water-girls saw him." An exceptional quality was mentioned with regard to the awareness of the water carrying women because of their especially prominent [power of] Representation.

Percipients can take him in through their faculty of action as well as through their faculty of awareness and for this reason he says, "Reverence is to him alone". In fact, any living creature, be they slow-witted man, water-girl or what have you, can be seen to do reverence to someone or other, with the anticipation of garnering some reward. But every act of reverence relates to him alone, as in the Vedic text: "[He is] the head of that one to whom reverence is done." It will be spoken of later that it is the Self that is the divinity [revered] by every being. As it is said in the *Stotrāvalī*: "You alone, Lord, are the Self, the one who bears the passion in every man's soul. One who thus knows devotion to you to be founded in his own nature shall be victorious."

And further, the 'insensate' are objects, such as pillars and pots, and the 'bearers of the insensate' (*ex conj.*) are the powers of the senses, adept at taking up sounds, tactile sensations, etc. These also 'know him': thus is the Lord's absolute self-evidence is propounded, since even pillars and pots for instance can act as the support for activity and awareness, by virtue of their objectification by various percipients.

There is a lot going on in what seems at first glace to be a wildly discordant piece of

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[44] *Stotrāvalī* 1.7. The reading for the second half is secured by Kṣemarāja's comments *ad loc.*

[45] For *vīreśvara*, see *Parātriṃśikā* 16a: *vīrā vīreśvarāḥ siddhāḥ*, part of a longer list of supernatural figures that the *sādhaka* summons during worship. Abhinavagupta *ad loc.* comments (p. 272): *viśvatra pāśavaśāsanayantraṇānirapekṣatayaiva sarabhasapravṛttirūpatvād vīrā buddhikriyendriyākhyās te 'pi siddhāḥ. teṣām api ceśvarāḥ kādivarṇātmānaḥ te 'pi siddhāḥ*, "the senses of action and of awareness are 'the heroes' in that all in cases they function spontaneously, irrespective of the control of worldly commands (*pāśavaśāsana*). They also are [considered] *siddha*s. Equally, the 'lords' of these, the set of the phonemes, are also *siddha*s.'

text. People, things, and abstractions appear to be irrationally juxtaposed in a chaos of confused reference. To begin at the simplest level: Maheśvarānanda asserts that all people have potential access to the reality of Śiva (called *kulanātha* in the verse). The examples he picks—proverbially simple-minded figures like the Ābhīra-cowherds and serving girls—seem drawn from the repertoire of the erotic Māhārāṣṭrī literature, but what would seem to be a gesture towards the world of the *Sattasaī* is swiftly curtailed by the quotation of the ancient Vedic hymn to Śiva, the *Śatarudrīya*, which speaks of exactly these same figures, cowherds and girls bearing water. In the first example of a technique seen throughout the MMP, Maheśvara expressly cites the source from which his verse draws its inspiration, pulling back a bit of the curtain on his own composition.

But this is far from the most extraordinary part of this important passage. That comes instead in the moment of metamorphosis when cowherd and servant suddenly reveal themselves as object and faculty of sense. It is a hallmark of Maheśvara's Krama order that the ongoing process of sensory cognition embeds within it the nature of the world as it is made explicit in their liturgy. Here, at the outset of the MMP, Maheśvara stages an initial version of that ontological intuition through a specific, linguistically-mediated means. *Jaḷā* in the Prakrit *mūla* can refer to either persons ('the dull-witted') or things ('the insensate;' this equivocation is also present in the Sanskrit *jaḍāḥ*), while Prakrit *jaḷahārıō* can at once mean (feminine) 'bearer of water' or (feminine) 'bearer of the insensate,' the (grammatically feminine) *indriyaśakti*s, the powers or capacities of the sense organs.

Thus the simple phonetic collapse of *ḍa* and *la* into Prakrit *ḷa* occasions a internalization of the meaning of the *Śatarudrīya* passage for the MM's readers and author.[46] Maheśvarānanda attempts throughout the *Mahārthamañjarī* to establish just these sort of hidden connections, identifications, and metamorphoses both as sort of entertaining linguistic play and a performative enactment of what he sees as the protean nature of the world of our experience. Indeed these two—truth and beauty—are so closely bound together for Maheśvara to be inextricable.

4.5 Maheśvarānanda on the Methods

Much of the *Mahārthamañjarī* proceeds without these sort of readings of the Prakrit text. There is nothing, for instance, in the lengthy discussion of the thirty-six *tattva*s that depend on any specific ambiguity or play upon the root-text, or in the presentation of the contemplative and liturgical details of the Krama worship. It is immediately after the description of this liturgy that the self-conscious manipulation of language resumes its central importance. Here the linguistic indeterminacy of the Prakrit text provides the means for Maheśvarānanda to create innovative, even radical, theology, and to signal his independence from his Kashmirian forebears. This is found in the section of four verses that the prose *anukramaṇikā* calls the *upāyopadeśa*, the 'Teaching of the Methods' (*gāthā*s 56–59). Again, we find ourselves in a discussion of perspective; there are (Maheśvara tells us) three different means by which the

[46] This is not a phonetic phenomenon limited just to Prakrit; for Sanskrit poets and commentators both, *ḍalayor abhedaḥ*, the pragmatic identity of the two sounds in speech, is often used as a basis for adventitious puns.

individual Śaiva may orient himself in his practice. These *upāya*s or Methods are that which 'pertains to the individual soul' (*āṇavopāya*), which 'pertains to Śakti' (*śāktopāya*), and which 'pertains to Śambhu' (*śāmbhavopāya*). Taken together, these provide a hierarchy of the means of approach to the final goal of gnosis and liberation.

This set of Methods first emerges as an organizing system in *Mālinīvijayottara-tantra* (MVUT) 2.20-23, where they are called *samāveśa*s or 'possessions'; as Vasudeva describes, they are of a piece with the larger synthetic project of that scripture, its attempt to bridge the gap between the disparate textual domains of Saiddhāntika and Kaula Śaivism within the theological ambit of the text's own goddess-cult (2004, p. xli). In the MVUT, the *samāveśa*s are ranked in ascending order, just as they are in the MMP, *āṇava, śākta, śāmbhava*. By contrast, in the *Tantrāloka*—where these are given the name *upāya*s, seemingly for the first time—this order is inverted, even in Abhinavagupta's citation of the MVUT's verses.[47] For Abhinava, this inversion is a principled and deliberate one, as he uses this three-part scheme (with the addition of a fourth and highest term, *anupāya*, the Anti-Method or Absence of Method) as the organizing conceit for his whole long work. Beginning with *anupāya* and *śāmbhavopāya*, both of which treat of the sudden, even unbidden liberation of a select few virtuosi, Abhinava moves on to the purely contemplative practices of the *śāktopāya* and then onto the vast majority of the TĀ's matter, the details of ritual practice, which fall under the sign of the *āṇavopāya*. The reordering of the Methods thereby allows Abhinava to give pride of place to the higher subitist and purely cog-

[47] *Tantrāloka* 1.168–1.170=MVUT 2.23, 22, 21.

nitive mediations enjoined by the Trika and Krama scriptural sources, while allowing for the articulation of a coherent system of ritual practice for the Śaiva brahman householders who provided the core of his presumed audience.[48]

Maheśvarānanda's independence from Abhinavagupta on the ordering of the Methods does not mark a return to the letter of the MVUT text; it signals a different set of priorities altogether. The location of the *upāyopadeśa* in the larger design of the *Mahārthamañjarī* is important; unlike the TĀ's foregrounding of the *upāya*s, Maheśvarānanda's verses provide the transition from prescription and exegesis on ritual and doctrine to his characterization of *jīvanmukti*, the state of liberation in life. The Methods, then, provide the textual juncture between the means and the ends of the teachings of the *Mahārthamañjarī*. The importance of this transition cannot be overstated; it is something that Maheśvara seeks emphasizes through the formal design of the *gāthā*s and their commentary.

To judge from the linking prose *avataraṇikā*s in the *Parimala*, each Method is detailed in a single *gāthā*, with an initial verse serving as introduction. In fact the situation is considerably more complex. At the head of the passage, in the *avataraṇikā* to *gāthā* 56, Maheśvara writes (p. 138):

> *athaivam upapāditam ātmasvarūpasphurattāparāmarśaṃ praty atispaṣṭān āṇavādīn upāyān upadekṣyan prathamaṃ trīn apy ekayāiva gāthayodghāṭayati.*
>
> As he prepares to teach the three completely clear methods (the *āṇava*, *etc.*) for [the attaining of] what has already been explained [in the course of the argument, *i.e.*] the self-conscious awareness of the dynamism that is nature of the self, he first reveals all three through a single verse.

The reader expects some sort of general characterization of these Methods. Instead,

[48] *Cf.* Sanderson 1990, esp. pp. 77ff. and 1995.

the text reads:

> *jaï ṇiahiaüllāsaṃ ṇiṇṇeuṃ ṇiccaṇikkalaṃ icchā* |
> *majjhatuḍī khuḍiavvā atthaṃ ĕttāṇa somasujjāṇaṃ* ||

The *gāthā*'s first line admits of a transparent Sanskrit transformation and an easy translation:

> *yadi nijahṛdayollāsaṃ nirṇetum nityaniṣkalam icchā*
> Should one wish to know the ever-partless play of his own heart...

It is the second line where the complexities begin. The desire spoken of in the first line provokes three different answers and, producing a different Sanskrit text underlying the sequence of Māhārāṣṭrī phonemes each time, Maheśvarānanda accordingly gives three different interpretations of the root-verse, one in keeping with each of his *upāya*s. To roughly map the meaning: in each case the "sun and moon" (*somasujjāṇaṃ=soma-sūryayoḥ*) are said to "be going" (*ĕttāṇa=yatoḥ*) towards something (*atthaṃ*), while they are said to possess (*somasujjāṇaṃ* is a genitive) some other thing (*majjhatuḍī*), which is qualified—in the line's main predication—by the gerundival *khuḍiavvā*. The sense, and even the Sanskrit shape of the Prakrit forms *attham*, *majjhatuḍī*, and *khuḍiavvā* differ in all three descriptions. These exegeses are each quite complex, and I give them only in outline (p. 138–142):

- The phoneme *sa* (=the moon) and the phoneme *ha* (=the sun) are 'going to' (or rather 'attaining,' *aśnuvānoḥ*) respectively 'the missile' (*astra*, i.e. the *visarjanīya*) and 'the support' (*āsthā*, the *anusvāra*[49]). When combined, these syllables possess a *madhyasthā truṭi*, a moment in time in between the successive articulation of the two sounds, which 'should be split asunder' (*kālakhaṇḍaḥ...uttruṭitavyaḥ*), thereby yielding the exoteric Śaiva *mantra* HAṂSAḤ. This in turn calls to mind the more esoteric formula SO'HAM ('He (=Śiva) is me'). Reflecting in this way on a *mantra* is one of the set of external practices (along with breath control, yogic postures, and meditative exercise) constituting the *āṇavopāya*.

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[49]'Support, prop, stay' is given by Monier-Williams as a lexicographer's gloss of *āsthā*. The translation is thus uncertain; Maheśvarānanda's own gloss is obscure: *āsthāṃ svahṛdayasampuṭīkāralakṣaṇam anusvāraṃ*, "*āsthā* is the *anusvāra*, which is the covering over [?] of one's own heart."

- The apparent world of knowable objects (*prameyollāsa*=the moon) and the manifestation of our faculties of willing, knowing, and acting upon these objects (*icchājñānakriyātmakaṃ pramāṇasphuraṇam*= the sun) each 'attain their particular efficacy', i.e. become phenomenologically real (*arthaṃ svāṃ svām arthakriyāṃ yatoḥ prāpnuvatoḥ*). When this is the case (for here Maheśvarānanda is explicit that the phrase *ĕttāṇa somasujjāṇaṃ* is an absolute construction), there is a moment of doubt about the true nature of selfhood (*majjha* = *mama* = *svātmanaḥ*). This doubt should be removed ('the flaw of doubt ought to be broken,' *sandehalakṣaṇo doṣa uttruṭitavyaḥ*), in the fulfillment of the *śāktopāya*, in which one gradually refines away discursive, dualizing thought.

- Exhalation (*apānaḥ* = the moon) and inhalation (*prāṇa* = the sun) move along the course of the body's central axis, from the heart to the subtle point twelve fingers-breadths above the head. When they proceed to *astam*, their resting place or cessation,[50] the point (*tuṭi*) in their midst (again, *madhyasthā*), which comprises the mind's power of reflection, is to be analyzed (*nirnetavyaḥ*). This totally introspective process is identified with the *sāmbhavopāya*.

This kind of interpretative tour de force is possible, Maheśvarānanda tells us, due to the peculiar power of Prakrit language to support such complex strategies of reading (*prākṛtabhāṣāprābalyāt tantreṇoktam*). Again, this is not easily assimilable to the model of reading warranted by the *Dhvanyāloka*. This sort of polyvalence is explicitly distinguished from proper literary suggestion: reading or composing a text *tantreṇa*, through a sort of compositional or hermeneutical ingenuity, is not the way that the sophisticated poetry of allusion is supposed to operate.[51] Yet, it is certain that Maheśvarānanda had the Kashmirian critics' theories in mind, as the remainder of the section readily bears out.

Following upon this moment of semantic syzygy (the most powerful such moment

[50] Also identified with the mythical Mount Asta, the mountain at the end of the world behind which the sun and moon disappear.

[51] For *tantra* in this sense, *cf.* Śabara on *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 11.1.1, where *tantra* is defined as an element in a ritual that may be distributively employed with several separate actions (*yat sakṛtkṛtaṃ bahūnām upakaroti tat tantram ity ucyate*). The word is used by certain opponents of the *dhvanivāda* as a counter-explanation for seemingly implicit meaning: for example, in an anonymous verse given in Jayaratha's commentary on Ruyyaka's *Alaṃkārasarvasva* (cited in Raghavan 1978, p. 140). Raghavan glosses this *tantra* as "clever expression containing double significance as in the case of *śleṣālaṃkāra*."

in the entire text, and thus Maheśvarānanda's favored example in his discussion *ad gāthā* 71, seen earlier), the three other verses of the *upāyopadeśa* are supposed to treat each of the Methods individually. But their deeper identity, once established, cannot be forgotten or overridden, and the collapse of these discrete categories haunts each of the three verses. Maheśvarānanda does not revert to the sort of *tantra*-style linguistic gamesmanship in the subsequent arguments; instead, all three of the verses depend on the *dhvani* theory. The next verse supposedly only treats the *āṇava* Method:[52]

> *thoraaresuṃ vi pĕkkhaha bhūdesuṃ khassa ṇikkalāvatthaṃ* |
> *chattiṃsiāilaṃghī kīrisao hou somaṇāho so* ||
>
> *chāyā*:
> *sthulataresv api prekṣadhvaṃ bhūteṣu khasya niṣkalāvasthāṃ* |
> *ṣaṭtriśikātilaṅghī kīdṛśo bhavatu somanāthaḥ saḥ*||
>
> Behold: the sky's partless state, even in the midst of the most base of things.
> How much greater must that Somanātha be, who transcends the thirty-six?

Much of this verse's power derives from its similarity to certain examples of Prakrit erotic poetry where one also finds an imperative of a verb 'to see' (here *pĕkkhaha*, more often the *deśīya* form *ua* or *uaha*) appended to a verse of pure description or *svabhāvokti* seemingly unrelated to any other meaning.[53] The 'thirty-six' in the verse refers of course to the Śaiva *tattva*s or realities; as a description of the *āṇavopāya*, Maheśvarānanda initially interprets the verse as an injunction to meditate on a visualization of Śiva (p. 142: *dhyānarūpa upāyaḥ*). Then, once again collapsing the numerically distinct Methods, Maheśvarānanda explains how this verse can also de-

[52]Thus the *avataraṇikā* to *gāthā* 57 (p. 141): *evaṃ yaugapadyād upāyatrayaṃ pratipādya tad eva vineyejanahṛdayādhiropaṇahetoḥ pṛthak prapañcayiṣyann ādāv āṇavam ālocayati*, "Now that he has thus presented the three Methods simultaneously, he elaborates on the same [three] in order to install them in the minds of his audience, beginning with a survey of the *āṇava* Method."

[53]*Cf.* for example *Sattasaī* 1.4, 1.75, 5.69, 7.40, and 7.79. Selby 2000, p. 94ff. discusses several of these verses, along with the complex and often surprising interpretations they have provoked.

scribe the contemplative *śākta* and the subitist *śāmbhava* Methods. The mechanism for this sort of reading lies not in some clever way of parsing the verse that is grounded in *abhidhā*, the literal signification of words; instead, this *gāthā* describes two higher *upāya* in addition to the *āṇava* through the *vyañjana*, the mechanism of literary suggestion. Maheśvarānanda describes this, in a passage closely modelled on both Abhinavagupta and Ānandavardhana, as "an operation of language distinct from the widely accepted system of direct denotation, general sense, and figurative meaning."[54]

It is important to bear in mind that the readers of the MM only know that this implicit meaning is present because Maheśvara tells us that it is. He is deliberately crafting a piece of language to contain suggested meaning, and telling his readers what exactly this meaning is: we clearly see at work here once again a writerly rather than a readerly suggestion. Maheśvarānanda proceeds to quote the fourth *kārikā* of the the first *uddyota* of the DhĀ, the keynote verse of the whole work, before begging off of the subject, saying, "But, it is beyond the scope [of this work] to make an elaborate effort at proving this, therefore I will say no more."[55] The very next *gāthā*, however, continues, however obliquely, within the ambit of the *dhvani*-theory:

> *je kulakumbhasuhāsavapāṇamahūsavasuhe paaṭṭanti* |

[54]p. 143: *vyañjanaṃ nāma śabdasya kaścid abhidhātātparyalakṣaṇātmakaprasiddhaprasthānātikrānto vyāpāro 'sti.* This is another case where Maheśvara draws on earlier authorities, but transforms them to suit his particular meaning. There are three passages in the combined *Dhvanyāloka–Locana* text that he seems to draw on here: the first is *Dhvanyāloka vṛtti ad* 1.1 *nāsty eva dhvaniḥ,* ***prasiddhaprasthāna****vyatirekiṇaḥ kāvyaprakārasya kāvyatvahāneḥ*; note that this is the statement of one of the *pūrvapakṣa*s against the existence of *dhvani.* The *Locana*, p. 60 (*ad* 1.4) reads *tasmād* ***abhidhātātparyalakṣaṇā****vyatiriktaś caturtho 'sau* ***vyāpāro*** *dhvananadyotana****vyañjana****pratyāyanāvagamanādisodaravyapadeśanirūpito 'bhyupagantavyaḥ*, while Ānandavardhana, again referring to his imagined opponent, writes *ad* 1.13: *yad apy uktam* ***prasiddhaprasthānātikramiṇo*** *mārgasya kāvyahāner dhvanir nāstīti tad apy ayuktam.* This last place most closely approximates Maheśvarānanda's wording.

[55]p. 144: *etatprasādhanavistaraprayasas tv aprastuta ity alam.*

te khu viappaṅkurarae rasiā uvadaṃdiuṃ paabbhanti ||

chāyā:
ye kulakumbhasudhāsavapānamahotsavasukhe pravartante
te khalu vikalpāṅkurān rasikā upadaṃṣṭuṃ pragalbhante

Those *rasika*s who are intent upon the delights of the celebration of drinking the nectar-liquor from the *kula*–pot are surely able to enjoy the little sprouts of conceptual thought.

In the *śākta* Method, the adept purges himself of dualizing cognition (*vikalpa*) through meditation on the arising of awareness out of the plentitude of Śiva; invoking here the diagnostically Kaula engrossment with worldly experience as a means to enlightenment,[56] Maheśvarānanda's understanding of this process has a markedly rhetorical quality. He mounts a defense of the transgressive ('tantric') means employed towards ultimate ends: one may and in fact should devote oneself to the objects of the senses in order to gain final insight. Once again all of the different Methods can be understood as perspectives that can be adopted within the moment of experience and enjoyment: for instance, during sexual union one may directly apprehend the final understanding of the world through the particularly intense nature of the experience (the *āṇava* Method of instrumental means), through intense reflection on a past moment of sexual pleasure (*śākta*) or through the apperceptive reflection on the

[56]This note is most clearly struck by the *gāthā*'s explicit mention of *kulakumbha*, the '*kula*–pot'. Glossing the first member of this compound, Maheśvarānanda writes, *kulasya ṣaḍadhvasphārātmano vedyollāsasya*, 'of the kula' [means] of the set of all knowable objects, which encompasses the entirety of the six Paths [of Śaiva ontology]'. *Cf.* Sanderson's characterization of the "Kaula reformation...[which] decontaminated that mysticism of the Kāpālikas so that it flowed into the wider community of married householders." Part of this transformation of the esoteric Śaiva religion proceeded by way of a semantic reimagination of the word *kula*, which in its origins only referred to the initiatory 'clans' of the antisocial Kāpālika ascetics. Kaulism "preserved the original meaning of the term *kula* and its derivatives but it introduced a new level of esotericism based on a homonym. For *kula* was also taken to means the body and, by further extension, the totality (of phenomena), the 'body' of power (*śakti*)" (1988, p. 679).

experience of pleasure itself (*śāmbhava*).[57]

It is within this charged rhetorical context that Maheśvarānanda interprets the verse's reference to *rasiā* (=*rasikāḥ*), those who "have *rasa*". *Rasa*, of course, is the key concept for the theory of suggestion. For Ānandavardhana, it is only through the operations of *dhvani* that one may cognise the refined and aestheticized emotional awareness that is called *rasa* and, in so doing, become a *rasika*. On the surface, it would appear that Maheśvarānanda's priorities are very different from, or even at odds with, the thinkers on poetics. Citing the the *Taittirīyopaniṣat*'s *raso vai saḥ* (2.7; "It [=the *ātman*] is surely *rasa*"), he argues for what would seem a totally theologized conception of *rasa*, far removed from the analytical concerns of the earlier critics.[58] This metaphysical gloss on the *rasa*-concept should not, however, render obscure Maheśvarānanda's real debt to the critical imaginations of Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta. Glossing *suhāsava*, the seemingly antithetical 'nectar-liquor' of the verse, Maheśvarānanda lists a series of dichotomies familiar from worldly life (*loka-yātrānubandhī...virodhaḥ*), and declares that these "are not capable of producing any of the agonies of inhibition for those fortunate enough to savor this [*suhāsava*]" (p. 145: *etadāsvādanadhanyānāṃ na kiñcid api śaṅkātaṅkam aṅkurayitum alam*). He

[57]Maheśvara adopts as his authority the late Trika scripture *Vijñānabhairava*, quoting (in order) that text's vss. 72, 69, 70, and 71. In his comments on the first of these verses, he notes its interpretation (as referring to the *śāmbhavopāya*) by Kṣemarāja (p. 146: *ity atra śrīvijñānabhaṭṭārāṃśe eṣā śāmbhavī bhūtir iti śrīmatkṣemarājena vyākhyātam*). This would seem to show that Maheśvarānanda had access to considerably more of the earlier author's commentary than is presently available (Kṣemarāja's printed comment extends only through verse 23).

[58]Though, of course, in line with the tendency contemporary subsequent to Maheśvarānanda's lifetime, as works dedicated to *alaṃkāraśāstra* came increasingly to equate *rasāsvāda* and *brahmāsvāda*. *Cf.* Pollock 1998c.

goes on (*ibid.*):

> *brāhmaṇacāṇḍālādivyavasthāparityāgena...varṇāśramādinaiyatyādinā parisphuran sarvo 'pi pāśaprarohaḥ svahṛdayasaṃvādasaundaryottaraṃ svata evāpahīyate*
>
> Once one gives up such distinctions as that between a brahman and an outcaste [...][59] each and every one of the snares (*pāśapraroha*) that manifest as such things as the fixed order of the estates and life-stages are of their own accord abandoned, leaving in their stead [only] the splendor that is the concord in one's own heart.

The key phrase here is the adverbial compound *svahṛdayasaṃvādasaundaryottaraṃ*. This crucially echoes Abhinava's definition of the *sahṛdaya*, the sensitive reader who is as we've already noted central to the whole project of *dhvani* poetics.[60]

Maheśvarānanda's sudden reliance on the language of the *sahṛdaya* might seem unintentional, simply an echo of the Kashimirian master's words. Against this view, I would argue that this is a deliberate and conscious adaptation of the principle social role delineated in the *Dhvanyāloka* and especially the *Locana*. Suggested meaning can only be said to exist in poetry insofar as properly cultivated people—*sahṛdayas*—are aware of it. In borrowing this model, Maheśvarānanda grounds the MM's teaching in a social logic similar that of the *dhvani*-theory.[61]

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[59]Omitting a quotation from the *Kulārṇavatantra* (13.90, according to Dwivedi's citation index).

[60]Glossing Ānandavardhana's opening description of the act of literary understanding (*vṛtti* to DhĀ 1.1), Abhinava's commentary reads:

> (Ānandavardhana's *vṛtti*): *sahṛdayānām ānando manasi labhatāṃ pratiṣṭhām.*
>
> (*Locana*): *sahṛdayānām iti yeṣāṃ kāvyānuśīlanābhyāsavaśād viśadībhūte manomukure varṇanīyatanmayībhavanayogyatā te* ***svahṛdayasaṃvāda****bhājaḥ sahṛdayāḥ.*
>
> (*vṛtti*): May delight find a place in the minds of the *sahṛdayas*.
>
> (*Locana*): 'of the *sahṛdayas*': Once the mirror of their minds have been polished by constant attention to and study of literature, those who come to possess the ability to identify themselves with the matter under discussion [are called] *sahṛdayas*, those who partake of the concord in their own hearts.

[61]Properly speaking, the social logic of the *dhvani*-theory in Ānanda's text rests on a dyadic relationship between the *sahṛdayas*, those who can understand implicit meaning, and the *mahākavis*/*satkavis*, those poets whose merit is wholly based on the presence of such meanings.

In a departure from the previous verses, Maheśvarānanda does not attempt to extract an interpretation of all three Methods from the text of his final verse within the *upadeśa*; instead, there is a lengthy excursus on the *pratibimbavāda*, the theory of representation through reflection.

> *hanta muhaṃ paḍibimbaü paḍibimbeu taha taṃ pi addāo |*
> *addāo uṇa yassiṃ paḍibimbaï so vi ṇāavvo ||*
>
> *chāyā:*
> *hanta mukhaṃ pratibimbatu pratibimbayatu tathā tad apy ādarśaḥ*
> *ādarśaḥ punar yasmin pratibimbati so 'pi jñātavyaḥ*
>
> Certainly: let the face be reflected, and let the mirror go on reflecting it, but that in which the mirror is reflected—that, too, should be known.

In the commentary, which derives in large measure from the *Tantrāloka*'s third *āhnika*, Maheśvarānanda intends to take his audience literally through the looking glass. As in the earlier discussion of the appearance of duality at the level of the *māyā-tattva*,[62] Maheśvarānanda here enacts a form of worldly division—in this case, the relationship between image (*bimba*) and reflection (*pratibimba*)—through recourse to the dialectic methods of *śāstra*, staging the distinction between the reflection that is the phenomenal world and the underlying fullness of autonomous consciousness through a series of imagined objections and ripostes. This dialectical section marks a significant transition within the work. While the verse and its attendant prose explanation are inextricably bound up in a series of conundrums (reflected even in the repetitive phonetic texture of the Prakrit verse), this all serves to present the

The drift within the *Dhvanyāloka*, however, tends towards an emphasis on the *sahṛdaya* alone, something that Abhinavagupta further ratifies in his comment. On the social nature of this emphasis as figured within the field of literary criticism *cf.* Ānandavardhana's distinction between the earlier *ālaṅkārikas* as *kāvyalakṣaṇavidhāyinaḥ* or *lakṣaṇakṛtaḥ* versus the *sahṛdaya*/*dhvanivādin*.

[62]Discussed in Chapter 3, p. **??**f.

audience with a impression of reality en clair, intimating the final certitude that the text next attempts to convey.

4.6 The Tantric Sahṛdaya

The verses that follow upon the *upāyopadeśa* seek to characterize what *jīvanmukti*, liberation while still living, is actually like. This brings us to the heart of what I have called Maheśvarānanda's intentional project as it is realized in the *Mahārthamañjarī*. It is rather difficult to precisely and adequately characterize this project. In part, this difficulty lies in Maheśvara's style of presentation; as we have seen repeatedly, his manner of doing things with words tends towards showing rather than telling. A further challenge lies in the extraordinary nature of what he's trying to do: hard-wired into his idea of what the text is supposed to do is a claim about the charismatic efficacy of language, its ability to radically transform awareness.

Bearing this in mind, it is essential to at least attempt—however impressionistically—a sympathetic reconstruction of what the *Mahārthamañjarī* was supposed to accomplish. Over a set of six verses (*gā.* 60–65), Maheśvarānanda sketches in the nature of the figure that has been the hidden protagonist of the MM all along, what the Māhārāṣṭrī text calls the *joī* (Skt. *yogin*). The argument in this section is not especially original—the sheer amount of material that Maheśvarānanda's adduces as quotes would seem to argue strongly against that. Instead, the interest here lies in Maheśvara's emphasis on a particular social dimension to his understanding of liberation, linking his concern with the social dynamics at the base of the theory of

suggestion. Within the Māhārāṣṭrī verses, the *joī* is a solitary figure, appearing as the sole actor in the drama of his own enlightenment.[63] In the prose introductions to each of these, however, Maheśvarānanda repeatedly emphasized that it is a group of *yogin*s that he is describing. This can be seen from the first such *avataraṇikā*, to the sixtieth *gāthā*:[64]

> *athettham upadiṣṭopāyaprapañcapratilabdhātmasvarūpaparāmarśamāṃsalollāsānāṃ yoginām atiśayam ākhyāsyann ādāv eṣām antarbahiḥsvabhāvadaśāvicchedavyudāsanir-yantraṇaṃ naiścintyaṃ niścetum āha.*
>
> He now prepares to teach the incredible nature of those *yogin*s whose energies are grown great through that reflection on the real nature of the self, which they have acquired through [recourse to] the spectrum of Methods that have just been taught [in the previous *gāthā*s]. At the outset, he says [the following verse] in order to characterize their fearless calm (*naiścintyam*), freed from the limitations of the [distinction] between inner and outer.

Here, alongside the first mention of the collective of *yogin*s, Maheśvarānanda introduces the main rubric by which he will characterize the liberated state, *naiścintyam*, the absence of fear or concern. This appears to be the only innovation Maheśvara makes to his tradition's doctrine of enlightenment: as far as I am aware, none of his Kashmirian predecessors ever use this term.[65] Elsewhere, when Maheśvarānanda

[63] For example, in *gāthā* 61:

> *joī jāarasiviṇaasosuttaturīaapavvaparipāhiṃ* |
> *cittaṃ via maṇimālaṃ vimarisasutt'ĕkkagubbhabhuvvahaï* ||
>
> The *yogin* bears the array of the the states of waking, dream, deep sleep, and the fourth state as if it were a wonderful jewelled necklace, strung on the single thread of Representation.

[64] See also the *avataraṇikā*s to *gāthā*s 64 (p. 161) and 65 (p. 163). Introducing the sixty-second verse (p. 158), Maheśvara refers to *yoginaḥ svācchandyaṃ*, in the singular.

[65] Interestingly (and perhaps significantly), the one possible source of which I am aware is found in a work of *kāvya*, Bhartṛhari's *Vairāgyaśataka* (verse 91 in the recension commented on by Rāmacandra-budhendra):

> *kaupīnaṃ śatakhaṇḍajarjarataraṃ kanthā punas tādṛśī*
> *naiścintyaṃ nirapekṣabhaikṣam aśanam nidrā śmaśāne vane* |

again mentions this community of *yogin*s united through his text, he is clear that he is to be numbered among them.[66] The *yogin* then is not just an ideality of the text, but is an actually inhabitable social role that emerges from the *Mahārthamañjarī*. One becomes such a *yogin* through the act of writing and reading this text; this idea is strengthened by the second nearly-verbatim quotation of Abhinavagupta's definition of the *sahṛdaya* in the context of the liberation that the text offers as its *summum bonum* (p. 167):

> *ayaṃ bhāvaḥ: śrīmaddeśikanāthakaṭākṣapātasamasamayam eva puṃsāṃ* ***svahṛdaya-saṃvāda****saundaryaśālino jīvanmokṣalakṣaṇasya puruṣārthasyopalambha ity atra na kācid vipratipattiḥ*
>
> The meaning [of the verse] is as follows: at the precise moment when the gaze of the revered teacher falls, souls obtain the final end of human life, liberation while still living, which is replete with the splendor that is the concord in one's own heart. There can be no disagreement about this.

> *svātantryeṇa niraṅkuśaṃ viharaṇaṃ svāntaṃ praśāntaṃ sadā*
> *sthairyaṃ yogamahotsave 'pi ca yadi trailokyarājyena kim* ||
>
> A threadbare loincloth, falling into a hundred pieces,
> an ascetic's cloak that's equally tattered,
> fearless calm, eating without a care as to the food,
> and a night's sleep in a burning ground,
> wandering at will, without anything to driving you along, your heart ever at peace,
> abiding in the joys of *yoga*—if you have this, what good is ruling all of creation?

Naiścintyam here may be a nonce-word coined by the verse's author, who was almost certainly not the historical Bhartṛhari. Kosambi, who rightly consigns this verse to his edition's Group II (the "*saṃśayitaślokas*"), reads *niścintam*, among many other variants (including an entirely different second half to the verse; the apparatus shows that Rāmacandra's reading here is shared by all of Kosambi's Southern sources). Beyond the generically Śaiva character of this verse, which Rāmacandra notes in his commentary, this notably contains the keyword *svātantryam*, a term used everywhere throughout Maheśvarānanda's sources to characterize *jīvanmukti*. We may hypothetically suggest that the presence of the Śaiva keyword may have triggered Maheśvarānanda's adoption of the atypical *naiścintyam* as a description for his *summum bonum*.

[66]See the *avataraṇikā* to *gā*. 65, p. 163: *ittham atyāścaryaṃ naiścintyaśālināṃ yogināṃ svabhāvam anusandadhānas tantrakṛt svātmano 'pi tebhyo vailakṣaṇyābhāvāt tattādṛksvabhāvatāparāmarśamāṃsalam āhlādātiśayam anubhavann etadāveśavaivaśyodriktasvasaṃvidātopagauravoccalaccittavṛttiś camatkārottaram āha*, "The author now reflects on the miraculous nature of those *yogin*s who revel in their fearless calm as [it has been set out here]; *inasmuch as he himself is no different from them* he possesses [*anubhavan*] the even greater delight of the abundant self-aware knowledge as to this nature of their's; with his mind reeling at the magnificence of the sudden expansion of his own awareness, augmented by the all-consuming inrush of that [fearless calm], he speaks of the greatest wonder of all."

This returns us, in a sense, to the beginning of the *Mahārthamañjarī*, where Maheśvarānanda's veneration of his teacher's feet gave way to the preliminary disquisition on the underlying play of Śiva's energies.[67]

Maheśvarānanda has set out to write theology in a way that is attentive to both the style and the content of literary theory: this much can be seen from his use of the form of the Māhārāṣṭrī *gāthā* which he adopts from Ānandavardhana. Questions of literary effect and of one's final destiny are brought together here not out of a misunderstanding of the great things with small, but out of a real, principled attempt to bring these ultimate questions into a visceral, affective dimension. But what is really innovative about the *Mahārthamañjarī*'s relationship to literary theory is Maheśvarānanda's reversal of the social pragmatics of the earlier *dhvani*-theorists, the way that they ground the *dhvanivāda*'s existence in a group of properly sensitive readers. Where the critics relied on the existence of the community of *sahṛdaya*s for the validation of their theory, Maheśvarānanda attempts to produce his own ideal audience, the community of *yogin*s that emerges from his worldly audience's encounter with the text. To read the text, to read it right, is to be remade as the ideal subject that it describes, as the author was himself remade in the course of its composition.[68]

[67]See p. 8, where Maheśvara himself draws this connection between the first and the sixty-seventh verses.

[68]I see now that Maheśvarānanda's transformative understanding of his text is presaged by Abhinavagupta's *Tantrasāra*, as interpreted in Sanderson 2005. Especially pertinent and lucid here are Sanderson's comments on the *maṅgala* common to most of Abhinava's major Tantric works (pp. 93–94):

> Through [his opening verse] Abhinavagupta expresses his own immersion in the true self as the precondition of successful exposition and at the same time prays for enlightenment, both for his own, that its prospering influence may sustain his work,...and that we his audience may attain the same enlightenment in our turn...But the verse

This idea returns in the *Mahārthamañjarī*'s closing verses, which form a hermeneutical coda to the text. The sixty-eighth *gāthā* introduces this theme: it explains how the meaning embodied in the MM, its titular *mahārtha* "great purpose" or "great truth," in fact lies hidden within all the other schools of thought (or 'outer knowledge' *bāhyavidyā*) of the world of Sanskritic culture, just as the nectar of immortality lies hidden within the ocean. Or, as we might suggest, as implicit meaning lies dormant in poetry, waiting for the right reader to come along. To demonstrate this point, Maheśvara turns in the seventieth and last *gāthā* of the text to a reading of that founding civilizational document of the Sanskritic order, the *Bhagavadgītā*:

> *eṇaṃ cea mahatthaṃ jutthārambhammi paṇḍuuttassa* |
> *cholahasahassasattī devo uvadisaï mādhavo tti sivaṃ* ||
>
> *chāyā:*
> *enam eva mahārthaṃ yuddhārambhe pāṇḍuputrasya*
> *ṣoḍaśasahasraśaktir deva upadiśati mādhava iti śivam*
>
> It is this Great Purpose that the god Mādhava, possessing sixteen thousand powers, teaches to Pāṇḍu's son at the outset of the war. *iti śivam.*[69]

> also exists to empower those who undertake to teach or study the work after its completion. We too are to contemplate its meaning in order to experience to the extent of our capacity the non-dual consciousness that alone can hold at bay the powers that would have impeded Abhinavagupta's progress and will now try to impede ours as we attempt to follow him. The reader is invited to re-activate the awareness that inspired and sustained the original act of composition, reading the verse as though it were his own, reaching towards his true identity and praying for the enlightenment of all others, both those who are his contemporaries and those that will follow.

It is this context, incidentally, that Sanderson himself cites the *Mahārthamañjarī* (p. 94n, citing the *Parimala ad gā.* 38).

[69]This last phrase, untranslated here, would normally have the force an auspicious full stop to a Śaiva work. Typical of Maheśvarānanda, he gives it an elaborate and metaphysically loaded interpretation (p. 183–184). He concludes this by taking the first and last words of the entire *mūla* text—*ṇamiūṇa...sivam*—as a *pratyāhāra* (an encoded abbreviation of the sort used in the grammatical tradition) consisting of the words "Having bowed to Śiva." Taking the first and last phonemes of these two words yield a further abbreviation, the word *navam* or 'new'. In a final example of Maheśvarānanda's penchant for deforming his own text, he claims that this acrostic exercise (which he called the *arthatattvatātparyopaniṣat*, 'the hidden teaching of the final meaning of [the work's] teaching') discloses that the newness of an *alaukikasvabhāva* or otherworldly nature emerges from the simplest act of venerating Śiva.

Many are the readers who were and are no doubt surprised to read our author's central claim here that the *Gītā* teaches the essentials of the Tantric goddess cult of the Krama. The way in which Maheśvara goes about this shows this verse to be, in a sense, the pinnacle of the entire *Mahārthamañjarī*, that towards which all else tends. Where earlier the language of the *mūla* was understood to bear multiple possible significations, here the double vision is of another, even more inventive, kind. As he proceeds word by word through the verse, Maheśvarānanda adduces and discusses the passages from the *Gītā* that underlie the Prakrit text. In effect, he reads the *Gītā* as if it were encoded in his own text, with each line of the *Parimala* triggering further chain reactions of associations and connections. So, for example, the use of the name 'Mādhava' in the MM verse (we are told) serves to imply the alliance by marriage as well as kinship (*yaunaṃ sambandham*) between Kṛṣṇa and Arjuna. This context of familial bonds points the readers through the Pāṇḍava hero's dilemma in the early chapters of the *Gītā* (for which Maheśvara quotes *Gītā* 1.27cd-28ab and 1.45–46) and Kṛṣṇa's initial rebuke of Arjuna's *klaibya* or effeminate cowardice (quoting 2.2-3). This then occasions Arjuna's submitting himself to be Kṛṣṇa's pupil (2.7) and Kṛṣṇa's intial teaching of the impossibility of killing the *ātman* (2.19) and—in Maheśvara's Kaula spin on all of this—the hollowness of the moral precepts of worldly life and *bāhyaśāstra*. All of this, again, is said to proceed directly from the mention of the name *mādhavo* in the Māhārāṣṭrī verse, an authorial *dhvani* if ever there was one.

Ṣoḍaśasahasraśakti is an even more of a bravura display: departing from the narrative fact of Kṛṣṇa's sixteen thousand wives in the *Mahābhārata*, Maheśvar-

ānanda plays on the acoustic and (he would have us understand) conceptual rhyme with the Krama *mantra* called *ṣoḍaśādhikā*, a *mantra* associated with the order's central goddess Kālasaṃkarṣiṇī.[70] This leads Maheśvara to the terrible theophany of the *Gītā*'s eleventh chapter—where, he reminds us, Kṛṣṇa says of himself *kālo 'smi lokakṣayakṛt pravṛddho lokān samāhartum iha pravṛttaḥ* (11.32, "I am time, the world-destroyer, grown old, set upon the worlds' destruction"), furthering the identification with the Śaiva goddess.

And so he proceeds incrementally through his entire verse, taking each of its words as an occasion to cite and expound upon verses scattered throughout the *Gītā* text. Elsewhere—as in the quotation of the *Śatarudrīya* in *gāthā* 4 or in the recasting of the *Tantrāloka*'s *pratibimbavāda* in *gāthā* 59—Maheśvarānanda has explicitly cited his source-texts in the *Parimala*, but nothing prepares his audience for the sort of interpretive invention he shows here in the MM's final pages. He composes two commentaries simultaneously: again, bull and elephant alternately dissolve into each other. This builds to the crescendo of his gloss of the word *mahārtha* itself, where all semblance of the cohesion of his source gives way to a kaleidoscopic set of verses drawn from distant parts of the *Gītā* (vss. 4.36, 18.66, 2.40, 18.63, and 4.1–3 are given in rapid succession, p. 180).

All of this proves to be the preliminaries to Maheśvarānanda's final act of legerde-

[70]Both of the occurrences of this *mantra*-name are questioned in E_V (p. 177 and 178; in both cases it should be read in compound). This name ('more than sixteen') is a synonym for what Sanderson (1990, p. 59n.) calls the *saptadaśākṣarī*. As he explains (*ibid.*), this is an expansion of the more basic nine syllable *mantra* of the Krama (*navākṣarī*; mentioned by Maheśvarānanda on p. 84 [quoting *Kramodaya*] and p. 102.).

main. As in the climax to his presentation of the *tattvas*, he again turns to verse to drive home his point, beginning a lengthy excursus (thirty-eight *anuṣṭhubh* verses all told) by turning back to the very beginning of his borrowed scene (pp. 180–181):

> *pārāśaryo mahāyogī dhairyagāmbhīrasāgaraḥ* |
> *bhārate bhagavadgītām adhikṛtyedam abravīt* ||
> *yat kurukṣetram ākramya dhārtarāṣṭeṣu dhanviṣu* |
> *pāṇḍaveṣu ca sajjeṣu saṃgṛhyākṣauhiṇīṃ kṣaṇāt* ||
> *pitṝn pitāmahān bhrātṝn putrān pautrān gurūn api* |
> *hantavyān ātmahastena prekṣya vaiklabyavihvalam* ||
> *trasyantaṃ karmaṇaḥ krūrād avadhūtāhavodyamam* |
> *bībhatsamānaṃ bībhatsuṃ nispṛhaṃ rājyasampadi* ||
> *anusandhāya bhagavān mukundo rukmiṇīpatiḥ* |
> *kāruṇākrāntahṛdayaḥ syandanasthaṃ tam abhyadhāt* ||
> *hanta kiṃ tava saṃvṛttam akāṇḍe kaśmalottaram* |
> *vaiklabyaṃ tyajatām etal lokadvayavigarhitam* ||
>
> The great yogin Vyāsa, Parāśara's son, that ocean of strength and calm, set about composing the *Song of the Blessed One* within the *Bhārata* and spoke of the following: Bībhatsu, Arjuna the terrible, came to the field of the Kurus and, in the midst of the armed sons of the Dhṛtarāṣṭra and his own battle-ready Pāṇḍavas, gathered together his army in the blink of an eye. Looking out upon the fathers, grandfathers, brothers, sons, grandsons and even the teachers there, that he would have to kill with his own hand, he weakened, and he wavered. Fearful of that horrid task, he gave up his preparations for battle. Arjuna was disgusted, and no longer cared for the wealth of kingship—realizing this, the blessed Mukunda, Rukmiṇī's lord, his mind overcome with compassion, spoke to him as he stood in his chariot. "How can it be that this great despair overtakes you now, at the worst possible moment? Give up this weakmindedness, condemned in this world and the next!"

There is a genuinely epic feeling to these lines, though they would be hard to mistake for the work of the *Mahābhārata* poets themselves. Crucial to this passage is its reliance on the extended *kulaka* or multi-verse sequence that supplies its main syntactic thread. Beyond this first block of 4 linked verses, there are two other sequences in the course of the passage, one of five verses and the other of nine and a half (thus accounting for almost half of the passage). The first *kulaka*, quoted above, provides an initial rush into the narrative setting of the epic conversation (a story no doubt known by heart to most of the MM's audience). In the other two cases, the major

revisions that Maheśvara makes to the basic narrative—Kṛṣṇa's consubstantiation with Kālasaṃkarṣiṇī and his transformative teachings of Krama doctrine—are each given in single long sentences that spill over from one verse to the next. The effect is perhaps meant to mimic an enthusiastic *ex tempore* composition building to the climactic moment of revelation.

In this final move, Maheśvarānanda fuses the acts of reading, writing, and interpretation into a single novel mode, overwriting or (perhaps better) writing through the *Gītā* to his own ends. There is an implicit argument here, one in line with the wider project of the MM: Maheśvarānanda would have his readers know that once one's vision has been set aright, constituting one's own values and even rewriting one's textual precursor becomes something natural, as simple and as self-evident as grasping the implied sense of a line of verse. The *svātantryam* that is coextensive with the final goal of the MM finds its performative analog in this bravura compositional and interpretive act.

4.7 Towards a Conclusion

The genesis of the *Mahārthamañjarī* can be seen in a constitutive reaction to the reception of the Kashmirian literary theory associated with Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta. This reaction was in the first instance a form of creative indebtedness, in that the form of the Māhārāṣṭrī *gāthā* and the model of literary communication that can be seen in the MM are more or less direct adaptations. At the same time, Maheśvarānanda's work was marked by departure from and resistance to the earlier

theory. His explicit theories of the communicative and aesthetic potentials of Prakrit mark if not a conceptual break than at least an extension of the *dhvanivāda*, while the understanding of the nature of linguistic communication as such places him outside of the strict interpretation of Abhinavagupta's philosophical semantics. And while the idea of literariness used to serve śāstric ends is thematized in the *Dhvanyāloka* itself (in the course of its celebrated interpretation of the *Mahābhārata*), Maheśvarānanda's effort to actually create such a work extends well beyond what is envisioned by Ānandavardhana.

But what is certainly the most radical of Maheśvara's innovations lies in his understanding of the idea of reception itself, especially in the MM's effort to fashion its own audience into the *yogin*s that are a Śaiva ectype of the *ālaṃkārika*s' ideal reader, the *sahṛdaya*. In the tacit understanding embodied by the MM's theory of *jīvanmukti*, the linguistic text abandons its role as a supposedly neutral, transparent form of communicative mediation to becomes an active participant in the transformation of subjectivity that is its explicit subject matter. Textuality is reimagined as a conduit for a certain kind of charisma, assimilable to the immediate, transfiguring charge that a spiritual master's gaze is supposed to possess.[71] And, in the MM's implicit theory of its own reception, author and audience are at once transformed through their collective involvement with the text, changing in the process the way that any other text is to be understood. An author recreates himself and his audience, and in

[71] This trope is explicitly invoked in *gā* 67 (*desiakaḍakkhapāde*), see also p. 8. Sanderson 1995, pp. 45–46 discusses this idea and the theoretical problems that it created for the commonly held theory of Śaiva ritualism.

so doing transfigures the world of texts that came before him: certain readers might be surprised to hear in this a very old south Indian echo of Borges' Pierre Menard.

This might seem to be so much willful eccentricity on Maheśvarānanda's part, so it is important to note that much of what appears at work in the *Mahārthamañjarī* prefigures or perhaps finds theoretical fulfillment within the world of the *alaṃkāra* works of other Southern authors. One of these is the *Camatkāracandrikā* of Viśveśvara, the subject of a recent study by David Shulman.[72] Shulman takes this text, composed in fifteenth century Telangana, as a starting point for a suggestive rereading of the history of Indian poetics. As with the *Mahārthamañjarī*, the *Camatkāracandrikā* held a fundamentally ambiguous relationship with the literary-critical writings of Abhinavagupta. Reading these works (especially the *Abhinavabhāratī*, Abhinava's great commentary on Bharata's *Nāṭyaśāstra*) through the eyes of Viśveśvara, Shulman sees their aesthetic project to be haunted by a desire to move away from the mechanisms of language towards a speculative psychology. Abhinava, Shulman argues, "wants poetic effects to derive not from language but, ultimately, from experience, even if language provides the necessary trigger." Poetry then becomes "a force working upon the minds or hearts of the audience, collectively and individually" (p. 9).

The tradition of Andhra poeticians exemplified by Viśveśvara, while clearly the legatees of the Kashmirian theory, tried to overcome this deeply paradoxical desire for a poetry somehow outside of language. In so doing, they import into poetics typically Deccani fascinations with the effects, phonic and otherwise, of the stuff

[72]Shulman forthcoming.

of language itself, "a substratum of linguistic metaphysics" (p. 10). This then is the source of the particularly South Indian focus on the sympathetic effects that a phoneme or a metrical foot can have upon the world, especially those at a text's outset.[73] In Shulman's persuasive reading, this resituates the whole project of poetics, with semantics (that is, the domain of meaning, denoted or implied) becoming only one of the potential spheres of concern for the critic.

Again, this jibes well with what we have seen in the *Mahārthamañjarī*. Indeed, much of what Shulman writes about the critics working in early-modern Andhra would seem to apply to Maheśvarānanda (p. 13):

> What happens in poetic language, at least within the domain of such mechanisms and figures [as sound-coincidence and superimposition], is by no means a matter of accident or a rather marginal source of transient amusement. The highest form of *camatkāra*,[74] in short, is here linked to a highly charged use of language which, when properly controlled or mastered by the poet, is capable of astonishing transformative effects.

Shulman's preferred term for these effects is 'sorcery.' His choice of words strikes me as deliberate, an attempt to distinguish the thought-world he sympathetically reconstructs from the chicanery which clings to the notion of magic. While I see the point in this distinction, upheld by Shulman in several pieces of other recent writings,[75] I still prefer the other term, for all its slightly sullied undertones. Magic

[73]In another, distant echo of the textual culture of Maheśvara's Cōḻamaṇḍalam, these effects seem to have first been cataloged in the *Paṉṉiruppāṭṭiyal*. While these effects are also detailed in the *Kavikaṇṭhābharaṇa* attributed to the eleventh century Kashmirian author Kṣemendra (discussed in Shulman *op. cit.* pp. 4–5), as I hope to demonstrate elsewhere, this work is almost certainly misattributed, at least as it is currently constituted. To note only one suspicious feature, the work begins with invocatory verses dedicated to the Tantric Śaiva goddesses of the Trika, something that seems highly unlikely to be from the pen of the Vaiṣṇava Kṣemendra.

[74]This term, a sort of delighted astonishment, is the key to Viśveśvara's text and to Shulman's argument. It is also a favorite word of Maheśvarānanda's. Among many others, compare the mention of the *camatkāraucityam* that Maheśvarānanda attributes to the use of Prakrit (p. 186).

[75]See Shulman 2001 and Handelman and Shulman 2004

seems to best fit the flash and misdirection characteristic of Maheśvarānanda's style, but it also points to a larger, and more significant point about the text. When Maheśvarānanda turned in the final moments of his work to reread the *Gītā* with fresh eyes, to read it—in a real way—perversely, he effects a further conjuration, one in which the textual culture is itself transformed.

This conjuration discloses a possibility, that of a cultural voluntarism. Above all else, the MM testifies to a highly sophisticated self-aware understanding of the pragmatics of language, especially the language of texts. Maheśvarānanda (and he was certainly not alone) was able to create genuinely new possibilities of acting and of belonging within what we normally consider a fundamentally conservative social (and textual) order. And he was able to do this very self-consciously through language, because the ability that language provides us to imagine new and different forms of collective and individual life, and to render these acts of imagination durable and portable through inscription and textualization.

It is this voluntarism, this belief that intention concretized into text is capable of enduringly transforming the world, which furnishes the deep magic of Maheśvarānanda's writing. It is at once a sort of faith and an ambition, an ideal charter for what language can do. But its effects are not limited to the performance that the entire long text constitutes. As Shulman also notes,[76] allowing the possibility of

[76] *op. cit*, p. 20: "We began with *camatkāra* in its most general sense, as an aesthetic reaction akin to other forms of pleasurable surprise, and we have finished with a notion of *camatkāra* as bound up with the interplay of objective energies unleashed by language in any of its various modes, with or without a link to meaning. Are we still within the same *śāstra*? Can we still recognize this *śāstra*'s history?"

radical transformation and reimagination carries with it the dangerous admission of a historical instability. A work like the *Mahārthamañjarī*, in the course of incorporating and rewriting earlier texts, bends the contours of history, textual or otherwise, around itself. In reading the *Mañjarī*, the *Gītā* is changed, in a sense rewritten, as are the works that Maheśvarānanda draws on in creating his work. But so for that matter is the *Kaliṅkattupparaṇi*, or the *Tattvaprakāśavṛtti*, or Cēkkiḻār's *Periyapurāṇam*. Literary history and the wider history of culture are changed and themselves made new by the possibilities of knowing and acting disclosed in the *Mahārthamañjarī*. And in this we may see the *tantrakṛt*-conjurer's last and greatest trick of all.

CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS

Throughout the long centuries for which we have evidence, the movement within southern Asia's circuits of textual culture appears to have been both intensive and extensive. Massive amounts of textual material were produced and maintained in circulation, while distant textual cultures were linked through lines of transmission and reciprocation. Within this global order and beginning perhaps in the early eleventh century, biographical and bibliographical evidence indicate the emergence of a specific pattern to this movement, in which many of the resources of the local Sanskrit textual culture of Kashmir transferred to the southern peninsula. This largesse included works of diverse genres and styles, and its spread was accomplished due to the efforts of itinerant poets and intellectuals of various affiliations. Especially prominent among these however were the Sanskrit texts of the Śaiva religion; the movement of these texts can be directly correlated with that of the lineages of that religion's textual virtuosi, which appear in successive waves in the Deccan and in the Tamil country.

This movement forms the backdrop to the career of one south Indian brahman, Gorakṣa, son of Mādhava, called Maheśvarānanda. His *Mahārthamañjarī* testifies in practically every sentence to the formative influence of Śaiva theological speculation emanating from Kashmir, while the impress of Ānandavardhana's theory of literary suggestion, in many ways the Valley's signature textual export, is equally evident. This is not to say that Maheśvarānanda was merely an epigone of earlier northern authors. On the contrary, his *Mahārthamañjarī* incorporates these materials into a

novel textual form: Maheśvarānanda himself characterized his work as a *tantra*, a scriptural work. This is an unusual, not to say peculiar, description. Occasional passages aside, the MM shares none of the formal or generic features of other works so called; its root-text cleaves closely to the form of Prakrit erotic and court poetry, while the lengthy autocommentary resembles an independent śāstric treatise as much as anything else. In making the *Mahārthamañjarī* in the way that he did, Maheśvarānanda was attempting to create some new sort of textual object out of the mass of material that was his acknowledged background, and he signalled this innovation by claiming for his work an authoritative generic identity.

This decision can be better understood in light of the particular textual culture in which Maheśvarānanda moved, that of Cidambaram in the waning years of the Cōḻa imperial polity. Although the MM contains enough references to localize its production and initial circulation in this city, there is no other evidence to place Maheśvarānanda within its institutions. It is thus a presumption, although not a very big one, to see him as a stipendiary living in one of its many surrounding *brahmadeya* villages. As such, he would have been witness to the public dissemination of a wide variety of texts in a range of fora of production and reproduction. The efflorescence of Cidambaram's textual culture beginning in the early decades of the 1100s provides us with the central body of evidence for the transformations undergone by the city and its central Śaiva temple during this period. In a way that is relatable to if not concomitant with the changing state of the Cōḻa polity, Cidambaram, for centuries the site of a significant if isolated Śaiva shrine, witnessed a rapid urban intensification.

It is in this period that the first texts localized in Cidambaram begin to appear: these are documentary as well as expressive, composed in Sanskrit as well as Tamil. All of these texts, whatever their form or language of composition, were in differential ways participants in the city's textual culture, as were their creators and users.

The unifying thread of a common textual culture allows us to see these individual texts in new and productive ways. A text like Cēkkiḻār's *Periyapurāṇam*, to give only one example, might appear (and for other readers has appeared) to belong to an entirely different literary-textual order than something like the MM. The Śaiva religious epic has famously been read as a kind of proto-nationalist charter, "the story of a perfect spiritual democracy" with deep roots in a specifically Tamil cultural sensibility.[1] While the PP certainly advanced an explicit social project, it did so by drawing on resources from throughout the cosmopolitan world of texts available to Cēkkiḻār, theological texts as well as poems and again in both Sanskrit and Tamil. Through this compositional process, Cēkkiḻār's work, like Maheśvarānanda's, blurred and reconstituted generic and formal possibilities, becoming a recombinant textual object, a Tamil text claiming the entire world as its intended ambit.

The same logic of the creative recombination of the resources of textual culture is apparent in the other Cidambaram texts, from epigraphic charters to self-consciously localizing Sanskrit narratives. Where the PP and these other Cidambaram works might appear to differ from the MM most acutely is their social register: these are, as I have argued, public texts, pieces of language which by virtue of their form, their

[1]The quote is from the great historical linguist and philologist T. P. Meenakshisundaran, quoted in Zvelebil 1973, p. 187. Zvelebil, for his part, is rightly cautious of this sort of interpretation.

contents, and their method of dissemination, were meant for wide audiences. This is not something that could seemingly be said of the MM, with its difficult style and esoteric subject matter. But just as the constructive logic of these works is highlighted when they are juxtaposed to the MM, so too its own public and social dimensions are foregrounded by locating it within the same textual order: the MM can be understood as every bit as invested in fashioning its community of reception, and in negotiating public knowledge. This can be seen most directly in its disputation on the Śaiva reality-levels. The *tattva*s were a central part of the broadly shared armature of Śaiva speculative thought, and to present an interpretation of their nature was to make claims that extended beyond the sphere of theological dialectics. Their presence, for instance, within the (non-theological and only tangentially Śaiva) *Bhāvaprakāśana* and their mention by Cēkkiḻār are enough to attest to their place as a form of elite common sense in this time and place. In what is perhaps the clearest evidence of his engagement with the world of his local textual culture, Maheśvarānanda's interpretation hinges in part on the dialectical overcoming of the *tattva*-theory of Aghoraśiva's *Tattvaprakāśavṛtti*, while at the same time advancing the systematic and aesthetic strategies particular to the larger structure of the MM. On this reading, the *tattvaviveka* represents a deliberate effort to speak to a number of constituencies simultaneously: a general Śaiva audience, a polemical interlocutor, and the adherents of Maheśvarānanda's own Krama order.

Our understanding of Maheśvarānanda's project needs to be situated within these multiple levels of dialectical engagement and circulatory intent. In adopting the

Kashmirian literary critics' *sahṛdaya* as the figure for his own ideal reader, Maheśvarānanda imagined his text to form a part of the apparatus of Sanskritic culture whose adherents pervaded the entire world known to him. At the same time, the adoption of the style of the Sanskrit cosmopolitan was a rhetorical strategy with ramifications for his own local world. There is nothing markedly South Indian or Cōḻa in, say, the details of Maheśvarānanda's reimagining of the *Bhagavadgītā* as teaching the core of the Tantric goddess-pantheon that he revered. Yet in overcoding such a founding document of the Sanskritic cultural order, Maheśvarānanda acted in a way that is similar to the anonymous compilers of the *Sūtasaṃhitā* or Cēkkiḻār in their texts' reconfigurations of their precursors. In Maheśvarānanda's case, this is carried a further step forward, as both textual background and receptive foreground are explicitly imagined as so much raw material to be reworked at their intersection, the nodal point of the *Mahārthamañjarī* itself.

Despite Maheśvarānanda's occasional claims to the contrary, the MM's Prakrit root text really exists for the sake of its commentary, while the *Parimala* commentary for its part cites and discusses the very source-texts used by the author for composing the basic verses.[2] The conjoint text of the MMP thus acts as a formal meditation on the process of textual composition and circulation. For this reason, it is interesting to reconstruct as much as we are able the worldly existence of the *Mahārthamañjarī* after it left Maheśvarānanda's hands. This history of reception is not lacking a certain irony: the MM transmitted back to Kashmir, where it was copied in great numbers,

[2]As for example the *Śatarudrīya* verse cited *ad gāthā* 4 (see p. 215, above).

closing the circle of textual influence that made it possible in the first place. But it did so in a severely redacted version, one that short-circuits its author's explicit intent: it was probably one or more of the MM's later copyist-readers who thought to neaten up the unruly prose and verse bulk of the *Parimala* in order to make the MM's *mūla* so to say more user-friendly. And so Maheśvarānanda, in seeking to bend the workings of textual culture to his own ends, was in the end caught up in its inescapable facts of dispersion and variation.

The strange fate of Maheśvarānanda's work points to the inescapably social nature of textuality, the ways that the creation of works of language is always the realization of a collective project. But this is something that the text's content as well as the history of its reception powerfully calls to mind. The MM, this strange hybrid of intellectual disquisition, commonplace book, instruction manual, and screed, is in an important way a text about textual culture. It is for this reason that it provides such a useful entry point into the problem of the historical approach to textual study, both in the limited circumstances of late twelfth century Cōḻamaṇḍalam and more generally. 'Textual culture' is really only my overly portentous name for the world of texts and of that practices of reading and writing that the MM presumes and enables us to see.

The idea that we can inductively reconstruct the nature of an historically distant cultural system based on the testimony of a limited number of witnesses is not without difficulties. These are problems that have been with philology and cultural history more generally for a long time, and they don't seem to be going anywhere anytime

soon. Still valuable in this context are Leo Spitzer's observations about the productive circularity of literary and linguistic study, of what he terms the "fro voyages" embarked upon by the student of the text: beginning from the smallest linguistic or stylistic detail of an individual work, the philologist shapes hypotheses about its larger forms and structures of meaning, which in turn allow her to ask questions that transcend the singular instance, all the while prompting a return to the initial, formative datum.[3]

Much more recently, the literary historian Franco Moretti has polemically argued that the domain of the particular could best be jettisoned from the study of texts entirely, in favor of what he calls "distant reading," a second order literary scholarship concerned with formulating the general rules and models of a historical sociology, and of which the "ambition is now directly proportional to the *distance from the text*...[allowing] you to focus on units that are much larger and much smaller than the text: devices, themes, tropes—or genres and systems."[4] Such ambition is totally called for in accounting for the very different world of South Asian premodern texts, although the hope of sundering ourselves from the spadework that this sort of study requires is, for now at least, a very distant goal: for better or for worse, the indologist is like the legendary king Triśaṅku, stuck in the middle between the particular and the general. In the remaining pages of this conclusion, I will attempt one of Spitzer's "fro voyages," moving beyond the details (however interesting) of this one text to

[3]See for instance Spitzer 1988 (originally 1948), esp. pp. 22–23. This passage has been approvingly cited in Said 2004, pp. 64–65.

[4]Moretti 2000, p. 57, emphasis his. This paper is well-discussed from a (modern) South Asianist perspective in Orsini 2002, esp. pp. 78ff.

frame some larger questions about the ways that we study premodern South Asia, about the way that we segment the many centuries of the Indian past, and about the loose congeries of techniques and guiding presumptions that we call philology.

First off, a word about periodization. Looking back through the substantive chapters of this dissertation, I notice that I have said nothing to justify my use of the word 'medieval' in its title. This is a label used for a vast amount of premodern time in South Asia—at its greatest extremes stretching perhaps from the era of the Gupta kings of the fifth and sixth centuries to that of the Mughal emperors eleven centuries later—and it is quite reasonable to wonder whether it has any descriptive or explanatory value whatsoever.[5] While the slicing up the historical record into the discrete chunks we call periods is something that falls outside the focus of this dissertation by a wide margin, it may be useful for me to explain in passing what I mean. To do this, I rely on what I think to be the most interesting and productive metahistorical theory about the Indian past to emerge in recent years, that of the agrarian historian David Ludden. Ludden's model is of interest not only for the patterns of historical change that he proposes internally stratify the first and early second millennia of the common era, but also for the challenging perspective that he brings to the study of cultural history or, as he would polemically put it, civilization-history.[6]

For Ludden, the idea of civilization—the totalizing social and cultural complexes associated with the elite literary traditions of the premodern world—obscures and

[5] A point made by Christian Wedemeyer, in conversation.

[6] Here I follow the brief presentation in Ludden 1994; this theory provides much of the structuring argument in Ludden 1999, esp. Chapters Two and Three (pp. 60–166).

even occludes the patterns of past human practices that should properly provide the content to the disciple of history. The world of civilizations remains a pregiven lading list, of which Indian civilization is one, European civilization another, and (telling categorical slippage) Islamic civilization a third. In the process of interrupting this still dominant understanding, Ludden proposes that the centuries of middle-period south Asia be understood not as the collision of irreconcilable civilizational blocks but as a series of transformations in the channels of movement that linked both state elites and ordinary people both within the Subcontinent and across Eurasia:[7]

> Early-mediaeval states partitioned southern Asia into political regions and also increased the value of mobility among regions. . . In the tenth and eleventh centuries, [the political integrity of inland south Asia] appears again in data that mark the overlapping ambitions of the Ghaznavids, Hindu Shahis, Candellas, later Kalacuris, Paramaras, and Ghorids. . . [Whereas] the Guptas had revolutionized the politics of southern Asia from its eastern end, the second mediaeval revolution in the ancient inland zone moved in the opposite direction, at the end of the first millennium. . . Élites inside early mediaeval core regions, who left us many texts in Sanskrit, experienced the second mediaeval revolution as foreign invasion and conquest. . . But historians must interpret these events in a world of data of our own making, and the perspective provided by Sanskrit texts, brahman experience, and élite culture in mediaeval states has attained a privilege in the frameworks of civilization that it does not deserve in history.

The participants in southern Asia's textual cultures would appear to play a significant if relatively minor role in the narrative laid out by Ludden: "brahman state élites in early medieval core regions" were responsible for the creation and propagation of "cultural technologies of territorial control and integration" and above all a regionally inflected "historical civility—an aesthetic and tradition of wisdom that became as much a part of each civilising state as its armies, capitals, monuments, and administration."[8] Such cultural elites are for Ludden emblematic of the sedentary sectors

[7] Ludden 1994, pp. 9–12.

[8] *ibid.* pp. 12, 19.

of South Asia's historical agents, in contrast to the diffuse worlds of pastoralists, seafarers, Adivasis, pedlars, bards, and other groups whose historical identity was determined by their mobility, not by their location in or near the core.

Ludden urges that we see the emergence of this civility as a contingent, historical project, responsive to the lifeworld of the civilizers' own times and places. And he is surely right to use this argument as a means to drive a wedge into the historical normal science that understands Central Asian traders, state elites, military forces, and Sufis as an exogenous alien element entering into the Indic civilizational space. Ludden's argument is thus a tool that helps falsify this notion of a clash of civilizations in early second millennium southern Asia, and he is at his best when he draws attention to the historical forces and agents left out of the picture putatively drawn by the civilizing discourse. But from my perspective, where the dichotomy between mobile peoples and sedentary literati runs into trouble is I think obvious. Speaking strictly empirically, the idea that the producers and the products of the literate cultures of early India were fundamentally sedentary is, I think, demonstrably false. Texts, ideas, peoples, languages all travelled, and travelled far and quickly. The stark contrast between a settled civilized order and a world on the move simply does not hold up under scrutiny.

Civilizational study is a problematic that has long been in place within indology; several academic generations ago, it passed under the rubric of the study of India as a Great Tradition. The label we use for this idea of a complex and historically long-term cultural and social ensemble, however, is less important than the fact that we try to

conceptualize and to theorize this sort of ensemble at all. In taking Ludden's thinking as a point of departure, we gain the ability to see historical civility as itself mobile, contingent, and subject to change. And bearing this in mind—and so foregrounding the historicity of textual culture—we become able to ask: what in fact did the world look like 'inside' of civilization at any given point in time?

From Ludden's perspective, the creators of textual culture in Sanskrit were occupied by two themes: the rationalization, extension, and consolidation of state power, and the expression of a semi-historical ressentiment at the supersession of their sedentary civilizational order. This is, of course, a caricature: Sanskritic textual culture was far more polyvalent than this, and its participation within the wider domain of historical mobility was not limited to the reactive role that Ludden assigns it. Instead, we may extend his ideas of period and historical change in a way that incorporates the mobility of textual culture itself. If the period around the turn of the second millennium witnessed a transformation in the kinds of political power exerted over southern Asia—highly mobile martial lineages replacing static dynasties—it also was marked by the changing ways that texts were created, reproduced, and circulated.

Much of the detail of this may be subsumed under Pollock's vernacular transformation, with its many localized projects of the adequation of regional languages to the translocal standard. Parallel with this, and cutting across the divide between Sanskrit and the *deśabhāṣā*s within the global system of South Asia's many textual cultures around the turn of the millennium, there is a turn towards what I would call antiquarian philology. Sanskrit or old Tamil (to pick the most relevant examples)

were of course always learned languages, and their users were perennially invested in their commentarial and exegetical apparatus. I mean something different than this when I refer to this new philology of the second millennium. This was not the sudden *ex nihilo* creation of a fundamentally new way of relating to text artifacts: the literati of the second millennium were the legatees of centuries of prior philological labor. Instead, this period was marked by a new vigor in the cultivation, preservation, and propagation of texts. This may in part be due to the growth of the sheer amount of textuality and the pervasion of textualized language within the sectors of society to which we have evidentiary access.

As mentioned earlier,[9] the surviving documents of the Cōḻa polity point towards the presence of a quotidian textual culture on a massive scale, clearly attesting to the rising significance of textuality within a single local order. Another indicator of this quantum increase in textuality—one that seems to participate in a cultural logic of trans-Eurasian dimensions—is the new encyclopedism of these centuries. From the *dharmanibandha* literature to the voluminous works produced at the court of Bhoja of Dhārā to Abhinavagupta's *Tantrāloka*: these are just leading indicators of a massive census, consolidation, extension, and application of textualized knowledge, emblems of widely cultivated practices of writing and reading.

Philology, with its bibliographical habits of learned reference, citation, and gloss, might appear to an outside observer to mark the shift from creativity to involution, the final stages of a literary or intellectual tradition. This is not a good way to approach

[9] See Chapter Two, p. 113.

the philological innovations of the second millennium. The use of writing and fixed textual media seems to increase in absolute terms in this period; more speculatively, the distance and the rapidity of the circulation of text-artifacts seem also to grow precipitously. But both of these trends were only subordinate, contributory causes to the real achievements of this period, the heightened reflexivity and interpretative rigor of the new antiquarian philology. It is no coincidence that the first surviving commentaries in Sanskrit *kāvya* date from this period (along with the editions of their root-texts that these embody), as do the earliest scholia on Tamil works. New forms of literary criticism, the hermeneutic reflection on extra-Vedic scriptural writing, the rise of literary experiments like the *dvisaṃdhānakāvya* or double-meaning poem: all of these point to the ways in which textual virtuosi began to reflect on their media in new and critically original ways, consolidating and in a real sense constituting the world of textuality that preceded them.

To return to the materials surveyed here, the *Periyapurāṇam* is again exemplary. As much the earliest surviving set of glosses on the *Tēvāram* hymnal as it is an independent narrative text, Cēkkiḻār's work is at once poetry and philology, and innovative in both. This is something that could equally be said of the *Mahārtha-mañjarī*. Grounded in an extensive corpus of predecessor texts—including perhaps most formatively the *Tantrāloka* itself, a work centrally concerned with assembling and forensically weighing the evidence of a body of prior textual materials—Maheśvar-ānanda's creation was at once summary, exegesis, and overwriting of these sources. Taken as a whole, it is an extended essay on and demonstration of the possibilities of

a Śaiva philology.

Maheśvarānanda's notion of what his text was designed to accomplish is clear enough: the *Mahārthamañjarī* is meant "to explain the method whereby one may reflect on God as nondifferent from the real nature of individual identity." And his philological method is fundamental to what he sets out to do, self-reflexively using other people's language as well as his own to effect what he conceives to be a transfiguration of his readers' subjectivity. But, it is fair to ask, so what? Does what this elite intellectual set out to do centuries ago tell us anything worth knowing about how we now go about philological study, or how we should go about it? The MM's philology could be taken as a warrant for the idea associated with the hermeneutic reflection on the human sciences, that all textual scholarship can or should only be somehow internal to the tradition that produced it. I would argue strongly against this idea, following Maheśvarānanda's own lead. When he set about rereading to *Gītā* by his own lights, he did so in a way that was brilliantly perverse, and this is only the most explicit example of his own insistence on willful appropriation and interpretation. And so, knowing full well that our interests and priorities as scholars differ radically from someone like Maheśvarānanda, what can be learned from both the method and the results of his ways of reading and writing?

As I was writing the final sections of this thesis, Sheldon Pollock's *The Language of the Gods in the World of Men* at long last appeared. Other than making me hastily rewrite footnotes scattered throughout this dissertation, the publication of my teacher's *magnum opus* gave me the impetus to reflect on the presumptions that

have guided my dissertation since its inception. Running like a leitmotif throughout Pollock's great work is the story of the creation around the year 1140 CE of Hemacandra's grammatical masterpiece, the *Siddhahemacandraśabdānuśāsana*. According to Prabhācandra's later account, but answering to details of in work itself, this was written at the behest of the Jain savant's first royal patron Jayasiṃha Siddharāja.[10] Hemacandra had his king send a delegation to Kashmir to collect earlier grammatical works; upon the completion of the trilingual grammar, Jayasiṃha pointedly sent a copy back to the Sarasvatī temple there whose collection he had drawn upon. This is only the first stage in Jayasiṃha's massive dissemination of the new grammar: at huge expense, we are told, the king had scribes prepare copies and saw to the distribution of Hemacandra's work throughout the Indic world.

With its circuits of text-artifact circulation and dissemination (connecting to Kashmir, even), and centered on a text that forms a summarizing palimpsest of earlier authorities, there is much in this narrative of the world of textual culture as well as the new philology;[11] the fact that the Jain polymath probably lived about a generation before Maheśvarānanda makes this all the more striking. But the contrasts between the narratives of Hemacandra and Maheśvarānanda are just as notable. If the story Prabhācandra tells is at all close to the truth, Jayasiṃha's interest in the *Siddhahemacandra* is at very least partly responsible for its wide dissemination and

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[10]The relevant passage in Prabhācandra's *Prabhāvakacarita* (*ca.* 1278 CE according to Krishnamachariar 1989, p. 295) is translated in Pollock 2006, Appendix A (pp. 588–590).

[11]As Pollock notes in his discussion of the text's appendix word-list, the *Deśīnāmamālā*, there is new antiquarian substance to Hemacandra's methods, especially as relates to the philology of Prakrit and Apabhraṃśa (*op. cit.* pp. 402–405).

later significance. This is certainly Pollock's understanding of the story—he notes the explicitly political ambition underlying the Caulukya king's patronage, his desire to unseat Bhoja's earlier royal grammar, the *Sarasvatīkaṇṭhābharaṇa*. And the story, which has Jayasiṃha giving away a fortune in coin to hire scribes to copy the text in all the scripts of the Subcontinent, is certainly a good one. But I wonder whether Prabhācandra's tale of grammatical virtuosity, regal generosity, and textual mass-production gains something in its hyperbole, and whether it might be a rule-proving exception to the larger world of premodern textual culture.

For Pollock the connection between the king and his pandit is exemplary and fundamental. While far subtler in his understanding of the instrumentality of culture, Pollock's view of the social position of textual virtuosi in premodern India shares something with Ludden's. If Ludden's view of these elites can be called a statist one, where their historical significance is tied to their rationalization and propagation of state power, Pollock's view is, to coin a term, 'courtist.' The real interest of textual production for Pollock (especially the expressive textuality of *kāvya*) lies in its constitutive relation with political power. *Kāvya* does not simple justify the force on which political control rested; rather, the contours of early Indian cultural history are founded on the the ways that authors writing in Sanskrit and the vernaculars transformed the understanding of power for both rulers and ruled. And it is the apex institution of the royal court that provided the site for this consequential interaction between culture and power. Pollock is of course sensitive to the world of manuscript culture outside of the court, but it is telling that the examples he discusses at any

length of non-courtly textual circulation are of works produced in the early modern period, in vernacular languages, and expressive of the popular religious imagination of *bhakti*.[12] The court provides the real focus of his interest; explicitly, it is there and there alone that *kāvya* attains an object commensurate with its formal sophistication and where the immensely important transformation of the vernacular languages takes place.

All scholarly work is selective in its object, and I do not wish to seem to be simply finding fault with my teacher's very persuasive argument. But in reading Maheśvarānanda—and thus reading the works of his predecessors and contemporaries in the new light that he affords—we can glimpse the world of reading and writing, textual preservation and dissemination that was beholden neither to royal authority nor to communities of popular religious sentiment. To be certain, Maheśvarānanda was a member of the elite, and we should not try to see him as an oppositional or marginal figure, at least not in a way where those words retain their usual meaning. And, certainly, the *Mahārthamañjarī* was written with a specific soteriological intent, and its distribution may have participated in the ramified networks of certain sectarian disciplinary orders. All the same, this should not divert us from what is perhaps the most interesting and valuable lesson to be learned from Maheśvarānanda's philology: its independence. Maheśvarānanda had no patron, royal or otherwise, because he did not need one: in the *brahmadeya*s of the Cōḻa country creating a text required

[12]These texts are the *Caitanyacaritāmṛta* and the *Rāmcaritmānas*, works whose unusual logic of dissemination made for apparently little and minor variation over time; on these texts, see Pollock forthcoming. Pollock also briefly calls attention to the exceptionally wide (and seemingly completely decentralized) distribution of Aṇṇaṃbhaṭṭa's *Tarkasaṃgraha*.

only the will to do so and the leisure to see it through to completion. Nor did his text require a massive centralized project of production and distribution. Instead, its many manuscript witnesses descend to us through the labors of one copyist at a time, men who found the text deserving of their own will and leisure to read and to reproduce. The history of this one work, one that is admittedly little-known today outside of a small circle of readers, provides us with a single case of one of the most remarkable cultural achievements of the premodern world, South Asia's culture of manuscript textuality.

The *Mahārthamañjarī*'s independence, however, can be seen not just in the history of its production and transmission, but in its content. For all that the MM was meant to teach the theological and liturgical details of the Krama order, its appeal lies in its formal and expressive ingenuity and its eminently erudite and cosmopolitan linguistic play. As much as it was meant to teach, it was meant to beguile and to delight; it was a text that required an audience "which could smile at its wit, and appreciate its serious intention."[13] Seen from within civilization at this point in time, philology—as reading and writing both—formed the principle technology of culture, in which learning and pleasure were equally operative, and equally valued. The *Mahārthamañjarī* gives us, its far distant readers, a glimpse of this world of civility outside of or parallel with the domain of the court and its insistent logics of the representation and transformation

[13]The phrase is Collins', regarding the intertextual references to the Pāli *Vinaya* found in the *Aggañña sutta* (Collins 2001, p. 17). As a measure of the MM's success at reaching its intended audience, one thinks of the great Madras Sanskritist V. Raghavan, whose enthusiasm for the *Mañjarī* (attested to in references to the text throughout his long career) bespeaks an engagement that had nothing to do with sectarian identity and everything to do with the interest and the sheer enjoyment it provided.

of royal power. This glimpse is all the more valuable for the impetus it gives our own philological practice: for it is only through reading and listening, closely, attentively, and above all historically that we can possibly hope to disclose these traces at all.

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

MAKING A TANTRA IN MEDIEVAL SOUTH INDIA: THE MAHĀRTHAMAÑJARĪ AND THE TEXTUAL CULTURE OF CŌḺA CIDAMBARAM

VOLUME 2

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO
THE FACULTY OF THE DIVISION OF THE HUMANITIES
IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

DEPARTMENT OF SOUTH ASIAN LANGUAGES AND CIVILIZATIONS

BY
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CHICAGO, ILLINOIS
DECEMBER 2006

APPENDIX A
THE PROVENANCE OF THE *MAHĀRTHAMAÑJARĪ*

The location of the text's composition can be easily settled. In the closing verses of the *Parimala*, as Maheśvarānanda evokes the reasons why he composed the text, he writes:

> Thus Maheśvara, out of his affection for his pupils, has composed this *Fragrance* of the *Flower-Cluster of the Great Sequence*, through the oral teachings of his master [*gurumukha*], tradition, and his own reason, so that *just as when he wondrously dances in the midst of the Golden Assembly*, the lord Śiva, who is replete with Representation, might readily be made manifest here. (p. 194)

The image of Śiva dancing within a golden hall is especially associated with the great temple center of Cidambaram. This image, coupled with Maheśvarānanda's explicit declaration that he was a man of 'that ever-joyous country of the Colas' (*colās te satatotsavā janapadāḥ*) in a verse following thereupon establishes strong *prima facie* evidence for placing the author and his text in the Cidambaram ruled by the Cō<u>l</u>a emperors of Tañcāvūr.[1] This supposition is corroborated by several other references scattered throughout the final pages of the MMP.[2] Further, as we have already seen,

[1]The town along with the temple that is still today its heart is known by a number of names. Citamparam (the Tamil orthography for the name) is today the name of the town (as well as the surrounding taluq) in which the Naṭarāja temple—generally referred to by Tamil Śaivas simply as *kōyil*, '*the* temple'—is located. Historically, the town was called either Tillai (named after the thorny shrub *exoccaria agallocha* that thrives in the vicinity) or Puliyūr (in Cō<u>l</u>a times, Perumpa<u>rr</u>appuliyūr). The name Cidambaram/Citamparam is itself by no means unproblematic: though the Sanskrit designation is taken to be meaningful (*viz.* the 'space of consciousness') it is almost certainly a pious transformation of the Tamil *ci<u>rr</u>ampalam* or 'little shrine,' one of the several such shrines within the temple compound, distinguished by the presence of the Naṭarāja image. Throughout the current study, unless citing a primary source employing a different name, I have retained the recognizable name and spelling Cidambaram, as here.

[2]Most obviously in *naṭeśasyeva tannṛttam asya granthasya gauravam* (p. 195): "The grandeur of this book is like that dance of Naṭeśa [=Naṭarāja]". See also p. 188: *bhagavān bhairavo...saṃvidākāśam āsthāya mahāntaṃ maṇimaṇḍapam*, where *saṃvidākāśa*=Cidambaram, as noted by Sanderson 1990, p. 55 and Smith 1996, p. 190. Further, *maṇimaṇḍapa*, 'the jeweled

Maheśvarānanda hastened to his teacher's house in wake of that momentous night's events, in order to receive counsel. His teacher Mahāprakāśa then presumably lived nearby. Among the works from his pen—now only extant in the quotations contained in the *Mahārthamañjarī*—Maheśvarānanda quotes a hymn of praise, the *Ānandatāṇḍavavilāsastotra*, a work that by its very title refers to Śiva's dance of bliss, the paradigmatic Śaiva myth of Cidambaram.[3]

While one may thus speaks with relative certainty about the composition of the *Mahārthamañjarī* in Cidambaram, it is an altogether more difficult question to accurately date it. There are no early MSS of the *Mahārthamañjarī* which survive, and the only citations of the text known to me all date from centuries later.[4] Both Navjivan Rastogi and Alexis Sanderson have sifted through the available evidence, reaching somewhat different conclusions: Rastogi (1979) dates Maheśvarānanda to the period 1175–1225, largely on the basis of his dating of his guru's guru Śivānanda. Rastogi's proposal for the earlier man's date, however, rests on his assumption that he was the author of the anonymous *Mahānayaprakāśa* (his arguments for this attribution, laid out pp. 204–5, are a series of *non sequiturs*) and thus for a quotation of the latter

pavilion' is echoed as another name for the Cidambaram temple itself by a later Tamil poem, the Iraṭṭaiyār's *Tillaikalampakam* (ca. 14th C?): *tillai maṇimaṉṟiṉ muṉṟil iṭaiyē* (4.2); "...in the midst of the courtyard of the jeweled assembly of Tillai." This latter reference is taken from Shulman 2004, p. 171; the translation differs from that of Shulman, who writes, "in the open space within Tillai," eliding the (for my present purposes) crucial *maṇi*. The identification of Cidambaram as Maheśvarānanda's place of residence, to my knowledge, was first made by Raghavan 1965.

[3]Cited on p. 160, the single verse from this *stotra* yields no additional information about its author, or about Naṭarāja for that matter. Adduced in the context of a discussion about the *yogin*'s (=the Krama adept's) ability to take delight in supposedly objective experiences as projections of his own consciousness, the verse's meaning is unclear (indeed, it may be corrupt).

[4]The MMP is quoted by the Kashmirians Śivopadhyāya (ca. 1760 CE) and Lakṣmīrāma (18th C) and by the southerners Rāmeśvara/Aparājitānandanātha (ca. 1830 CE, see Sanderson 1990, p. 81n.) and Kaivalyāśrama. These testimonia are all recorded by Rastogi (1979, p. 219).

text by the Kashmirian Jayaratha in his *Tantrālokaviveka* to provide a *terminus ante quem*. While this cannot be accepted, there are many other portions of Rastogi's relative chronology of Krama authors that are well-founded, and his proposal is thus not to be lightly dismissed. Sanderson (in an email dated 6/3/2001) has noted that the latest datable works cited by Maheśvarānanda are Arṇasiṃha's *Mahānayaprakāśa* (ca. 1050; N.B. this is a different work than the one just mentioned), Śrīvatsa's *Cidgaganacandrikā* (in part a recast of Arṇasiṃha), and the *Lakṣmītantra*, in a passage that betrays the influence of the Kashmirian author Kṣemarāja (*fl.* 1000-1050). This final text is especially interesting, as it seems to be possibly the earliest citation of the work (otherwise the earliest author to quote from it is Vedāntadeśika). Sanderson, in his review of the evidence, notes that Śivānanda, in his *Ṛjuvimarśiṇī*, cites the *paddhati* of Somaśambhu, which was completed in 1096 CE. To this he adds:

> Śivānanda (the author of the *Ṛjuvimarśinī*) was [Maheśvarānanda's] paramaguru (GG). One of the Gurus of Śivānanda was Svātmānanda, who was also the Guru of Trilocaneśvara, who was the parameṣṭhiguru (GGG) of Puṇyānandanātha, the Guru of Amṛtānandanātha [the author of the *Yoginīhṛdayadīpikā*]. If these generations are approximately parallel, which is a large assumption, then Maheśvarānanda, whose upper limit is, as we have seen, around the middle of the twelfth century, will have been roughly contemporary with Amṛtānandanātha's paramaguru (GG) Keśaveśa. This situates Amṛtānandanātha's upper limit towards the end of the 12th century. An approximate lower limit is provided by the fact that the *Kāmakalāvilāsa* of Amṛtānandanātha's Guru Puṇyānandanātha is cited by Lakṣmīdhara (1497-1539). Puṇyānandanātha, on the same assumption that the generations of collateral lineages are roughly contemporary, will have been in the generation after Maheśvarānanda. So the absolute limits of Maheśvarānanda visible to me are the middle of the 12th century and the generation of, or immediately after, Lakṣmīdhara (1497–1539).

I can add nothing decisive to the work of these two scholars. But beginning from their common starting point for Maheśvarānanda's *floruit* in the second half of the twelfth century, I can perhaps provide some additional, circumstantial evidence.

As I will argue at length in Chapter 3, the *Mahārthamañjarī* appears to contain a polemic directed towards another Śaiva intellectual resident in Cidambaram, the Śaivasiddhāntin Aghoraśiva, whose *Kriyākramadyotikā* was completed in 1157 (see Goodall 1998, p. xiii n.). While Maheśvarānanda is deeply and critically aware of the arguments of orthodox Advaitavedānta,[5] he takes no notice of the Śivādvaita taught in Śrīkaṇṭha's *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*, another work seemingly composed in Cidambaram (at some point after Rāmānuja's *Śrībhāṣya* and prior to Śivaliṅgabhūpa, who was active sometime between 1350 and 1450; see Suryanarayana Shastri 1930, p. 62, 68). This is negative evidence, but not without value.

Bearing all of this in mind, I presume that the composition of the *Mahārthamañjarī* occurred sometime around the turn of the thirteenth century, possibly a decade or two earlier or later.[6]

[5] See for instance the polemic found in E_V p. 130.

[6] Note that this is approximately the same estimate as that of Rastogi given above.

APPENDIX B
THE INTRODUCTORY VERSES TO THE *PARIMALA*

(The following sources have been collated for the text of these verses: the editions of Vrajavallabha Dvivedi (E_V)and Mukunda Rāma Śāstrī (E_K) as well as two Grantha script manuscripts bearing the sigla A_1 and A_2. For the details of the MSS, see C.1.2. Note that Śāstrī's edition only transmits verses 2, 12, and 13; the absence of its readings is not reported in the apparatus that accompanies the other individual verses. Only substantial variants have been reported: solely orthographic variation (including gemination and the occasional dropped *visarga*) have been passed over silently, unless these occur within a variant deemed significant.)

namo nālayate śuṇḍāṃ viṣāṇena mṛṇāline |
pratyakkamalakandāya karṇābhyāṃ parṇaśāline ‖ 1 ‖

A_1 omits (see footnote 5).

Obeisance to that one, who makes a stalk of [his own] trunk,[1]
and possesses a lotus-fiber[2] through his tusk, to that root of the inlying lotus,[3] who has the petals [/dwells in the hermitage?[4]] through his two ears.[5]

[1]I do not know of any other occurrences of the denominative *nālayate* (from *nālam*, 'a hollow stalk'), but its meaning seems clear from the context. Ordinarily, one would prefer a *parasmaipada* form for a denominative verb of transitive meaning (*cf.* Whitney §1058.c), the long vowel of the ending is here necessary for the *pathyā* cadence.

[2]*mṛṇālin* may possess the straightforward meaning of 'lotus' (thus Apte, p. 1286, with no attestation); here, however it is preferable to understand it 'etymologically' as (*mṛṇāla* + possessive –*in*.), parallel with *parṇaśāline* in the final *pāda*.

[3]I have found no parallels for *pratyakkamala*, but K. Srinivasan informs me (personal communication) that this is a way to refer to the heart, figured as a lotus. This noun compound, then, provides the key to the remaining *viśeṣaṇa*s of the verse: Gaṇapati is metaphorically identified with the heart-lotus, each of his several characteristics are then transformed into parts of the lotus.

[4]*parṇaśālā* is widely attested as 'hermitage' (especially so, it would seem, in the *Rāmāyaṇa* and its satellite texts); I find it difficult to accommodate that sense here, but it is just possible that some sort of pun is intended. As in *pāda* b, I think it most in keeping with the thrust of the verse to understand *śālin* as "having, possessing," in the service of the expected identification of Gaṇapati's ears with the petals of the lotus.

[5]This verse—as can be seen from the amount of annotation its translation has required—is by no means straightforward. Technically, this is a specimen of *upamālaṃkāradhvani*, a suggested simile. In A_1 (as well as Appendix C's M and a Telugu-script ms. from the Adyar library (no. 69587) not otherwise collated), this verse is substituted by the following:
guruṃ gaṇapatiṃ durgāṃ vaṭukaṃ śivam acyutam |
brahmāṇaṃ girijāṃ laksmīṃ vāṇīṃ vande vibhūtaye ‖
'For the sake of success, I pay homage to my teacher, Gaṇapati, etc.'
Given the utter banality of this substitute verse, and its lack of either doctrinal or aesthetic

jayaty amūlam amlānam auttaraṃ tattvam advayam |
spandāspandaparispandamakarandamahotpalam || 2 ||

jayaty amūlam amlānam] A_2E_V; *jayaty amūlam arddhāntam* A_1; *jayaty āmūlamanthānam* E_K • This entire verse is repeated as the closing benediction of the MMP as a whole (E_V p. 196).

Victorious is the non-dual reality of the Northern [transmission[6]], lacking ground, free of impurity, a great lotus full of the nectar that is the action of *spanda* and *aspanda*[7] [which is without a root and unfading[8]].

kāruṇyāmṛtasindhor uditam ivāvartam īkṣaṇāpāṅgāt |
mauktikamayaṃ dadhānā tāṭaṅkaṃ jayati gauravī mūrtiḥ || 3 ||

Victorious is the form of the *guru* that bears a pearl earring,
like a whirlpool arisen from an ocean of the nectar of compassion,
which is the end of her long eye.[9]

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content, it is evidently secondary, a scribal *maṅgala* that has accidentally found its way into the transmission. The question remains how this invocation to Gaṇeśa, if authentic, could have been supplanted by such an inferior replacement. Harunaga Isaacson (personal communication) suggests that such an invocation to Gaṇeśa is anyway out of place in a Śaiva work, where one expects the opening verse to be directed to the author's *iṣṭadevatā*. Lacking any explanation for this discrepancy, it seems quite possible that this verse also is not original to Maheśvarānanda's text. I give it here nevertheless due to its inclusion in the Dwivedi edition.

[6]The most straightforward interpretation of *auttara* (as a *taddhita* derivate adjective from *uttara*, 'north') refers to the *uttarāmnāya*, the 'northern' Kaula goddess cults of which the Krama is a part (see Sanderson 1988, p. 682 ff.). However, it seems likely that Maheśvarānanda is being deliberately polysemic in his usage. Here, and in the closing verse passage of the *Parimala*, he uses *auttara* repeatedly, without clearly delineating his meaning. The interpretation of this seemingly straightforward usage is indeed quite difficult: for an earlier attempt see Rastogi 1979, pp. 18–19. Maheśvara elsewhere uses this expression or an equivalent as a shorthand for the teaching of the *Mahārthamañjarī* as a whole (*cf.* p. 177: *athāsmatprasādhitam auttaratattvam...*, p. 189 *svacchandabhairavaḥ...babhāṣe tattvam auttaram*). However, as Rastogi has pointed out (*op. cit*), the northern origins of the Krama/Mahārtha tradition is something that is present even among Kashmirian authors such as Jayaratha and was inherited from them by Maheśvarānanda's southern *sampradāya* (with Kashmir now understood as 'the North'). Elsewhere, Maheśvarānanda creates perhaps a portmanteau coinage when he refers to *arthatattvaṃ...auttarāmnāyasaṃvidām*, 'the nature of reality of those possessed of the consciousness of the *auttara* transmission' (p. 189).

[7]This interpretation of *spandāspandaparispanda*° as a *tatpuruṣa* rather than as a three-term *dvandva* compound I owe to a suggestion by Isaacson, who directed me to several parallel uses of *spandāspanda*° in the Kashmirian *Mokṣopāya*. There are a cluster of occurrences of the compound in the *Utpattiprakaraṇa* of that work (9.61cd : *spandāspandātmako yasya svabhāvo nirmalo 'kṣayaḥ*; 9.62 abc: *spandāspandamayī yasya pavanasyeva sarvagā | sattā...*; 9.64: *yad aspandaḥ śivaṃ śāntaṃ yat spandas trijagatsthitiḥ | spandāspandavilāsātmā ya eko bharitākṛtiḥ||*). In all cases, these detail different characteristics of the Absolute as conceived in that text. Following the (18th c?) commentator Bhāskarakaṇṭha *ad loc*, *spanda* and *aspanda* may be understood as respectively as the active and the inactive phases or aspects of a single dynamic reality.

[8]Understanding *amūlam* and *amlānam* as the cruces of a *śleṣa* between *tattva* and *mahotpala*.

[9]Though the verse is itself ambiguous, I take this to be indirect praise of Maṅgalādevī(/-dīpti), the divine figure associated with the first earthly propagation of the Krama teachings (E_V p. 95).

sphūrtaye viśvaśilpasya śrīśivānandamūrtaye |
nityonmeṣanimeṣāyai nistuṣāyai namas tviṣe ‖ 4 ‖

Reverence to the stainless light, which becomes manifest as the edifice that is the world,[10] eternally appearing and disappearing, incarnate as the revered Śivānanda.

yasmād anuttaramahāhradamajjanaṃ me
saubhāgyaśāmbhavasukhānubhavaś ca yasmāt |
tat svātmacitkramavimarśamayaṃ gurūṇām
ovalliyugmam uditoditavīryam īḍe ‖ 5 ‖

tat svātma°...īḍe] $E_V A_2$(reading *evalli°*); *tasyātmaviśramavimarśamayaṃ purāṇam aṃghridvayaṃ [ni?]miṣitoditaviśvam īḍe* A_1

I praise the ever-increasing power that is the pair of lineages[11] of masters, containing the Representation on the sequence of the Self's intellection, [both] the one because of which I am immersed in the great lake of the Anuttara, as well as the one from which arose the joy that is the Saubhāgya–Śāmbhava.[12]

If this is in fact that case, the structure of these opening verses becomes clear: after the (possible) invocation to Gaṇapati–as–lotus, and an initial mention of the nondual reality that is the *raison d'être* of his entire tradition, Maheśvara begins to enumerate the series of masters with which his tradition was said to begin: Maṅgalā (here) and Śivānanda (in the following). In so doing, Maheśvarānanda stages in the form of these verses one of the distinctive features of the Krama *sādhana*, the worship of the series of teachers and disciples that constitute the lineage as a whole.

[10]Understanding *sphūrtaye viśvaśilpasya* as the counterposed predicate to *nistuṣāyai...tviṣe*

[11]On *ovalli*, see *Tāntrikābhidhānakośa*, vol. 1, p. 258. I presume the variant second half given in A_1 to be an attempt to rewrite the verse by an editor-scribe unaware of the meaning of this rare *pāribhāṣika* word.

[12]With these references to two (actually three) other lineage traditions congruent with but distinct from the Krama, Maheśvarānanda gives a precise picture of his inheritance within the complex and interconnected domain of nondual Śaiva doctrine. The first of these is the tradition of the single goddess Parā as expounded in Abhinavagupta's *Parātriṃśikāvivaraṇa*; its influence can be marked by Maheśvara's frequent references to that text, a parcel of the wider influence of the Anuttara in the far South after the eleventh century (*cf.* Sanderson 1990, p. 80). The second of these appears to be a composite tradition, melding the cult of Śrīvidyā/Tripurasundarī (=Subhagā, hence *saubhāgya*) with the variant of the Kubjikā cult centered on her consort (=*śāmbhava*, see Sanderson 2002 p. 3, n. 23; note that Sanderson takes *anuttara* to here refer to the Krama). The influence of this latter, pronouncedly 'masculine' sub-tradition can be detected, albeit obliquely, in the mention late in the MM of Manthānabhairava ('Bhairava the Churner;' *gāthā* 68 and *Parimala ad loc*, pp. 170–173). This is the 'archaic' form of the deity revered by the Śāmbhava variant of the Krama (*cf.* Sanderson 1988, pp. 671, 687).

It may be noted that these two other Tantric systems are here subordinated, grammatically as well as doctrinally, to the Krama, the MM's declared subject matter (implicit in *svātmacit**krama**-vimarśa*). These are to be understood, it would seem, as theoretical auxiliaries to the principle teaching. In speaking of the Saubhāgya–Śāmbhava composite, Maheśvara refers to the tradition inherited from his teacher Mahāprakāśa's teacher Śivānanda (N.B. a different man than the subject

namo nikhilamālinyavilāpanapaṭīyase |
mahāprakāśapādābjaparāgaparamāṇave ‖ 6 ‖

Reverence to the atoms of dust[/pollen] upon the lotus feet of Mahāprakāśa, highly adept at eliminating all impurity.

gorakṣo lokadhiyā deśikadṛṣṭyā maheśvarānandaḥ |
unmīlayāmi parimalam antargrāhyaṃ mahārthamañjaryām ‖ 7 ‖

mahārthamañjaryām] A_2E_V; *mahārthamañjaryāḥ* A_1

Known to the world as Gorakṣa, [but] Maheśvarānanda in the eyes of my teacher, I now unveil the *Fragrance* that can be grasped within the *Flower-Cluster of the Great Purpose.*

svakriyāyā api vyākhyāṃ svayam eva prayuñjmahe |
upary apy ātmasaṃrambhasambhogāmreḍanotsukāḥ ‖ 8 ‖

Though it be my own work, I now undertake the commentary upon it, even more excited to revisit the pleasures of my own passionate interest.[13]

yad vā vineyajanacittacamatkriyārtham
atrodyamo 'yam udito 'stu tad etad āstām |
saṃkṣepavistaravibhāgaviviktaśobhaḥ
puṣpāñjalir bhavatu vāṅmaya eṣa śambhoḥ ‖ 9 ‖

Or indeed, it may be that this effort is undertaken here for the sake of the wonder that it will bring to the minds of those in need of instruction— let this be put aside. [Rather] let this [work], which has a particular brilliance through its brief and lengthy sections,[14] be a flower-offering, consisting of language, to Śambhu.

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of verse 4, above). This label seems to describe his known works rather precisely: he is the author of a *Śambhunirṇayadīpikā*, a commentary on a Śāmbhava scripture (unpublished but extant, GOML no. 14695/R No. 3203 c,d),* as well as a *Subhagodaya* and a *Saubhāgyahṛdayastotra* (these last two are quoted by Maheśvara on pp. 13, 70, and 127). It is unclear whether he was also a proponent of the Anuttara system, while the surviving extracts of Mahāprakāśa's works in the MMP (all *stotra*s) give no information about his relation to these teachings, either. However, the wording of the present verse might seem to indicate that Maheśvarānanda inherited the Anuttara from some other source. Lacking any firm information, I may simply report the existence of the independent Anuttara tradition of the *Parātriṃśikātātparyadīpikā*, which expressly identifies itself as being composed at Cidambaram (vs. 531, cited in Sanderson 1990 p. 33). If we follow Sanderson's tentative suggestion that this may be the work of Kṛṣṇadāsa/ Varadarāja, the son and pupil of Madhurāja, a direct pupil of Abhinavagupta (*op cit.* p. 80), then this work and the tradition it embodies would have been available to Maheśvara as he composed the *Mahārthamañjarī*.

*Maheśvarānanda quotes a *Śambhvaikyadīpikā* twice (pp. 18, 160) and a *Śāmbhavadīpikā* once (p. 115), although he doesn't identify either of these are being from his teacher's teacher's hand.

[13] My interpretation of *ātmasaṃrambhasambhogāmreḍanotsukāḥ* is very tentative.

[14] On *saṃkṣepavistara*, *cf. Nyāyamañjarī*, p. 11: *ādisargāt prabhṛti vedavad imā vidyāḥ pravṛttāḥ,* ***saṃkṣepavistara****vivakṣayā tu tāṃs tāṃs tatra tatra kartṝn ācakṣate*, "Ever since the creation of the universe, these forms of knowledge [i.e. the orthodox *vidyāsthāna*s] have existed, just like the Veda.

avagataśivadṛṣṭiḥ pratyabhijñārthatattva–
kramasaraṇirahasyollāsasarvasvavedī |
gurucaraṇasaparyācāturīcidghano 'ham
gahanam api hṛdantarvyoma tad vyākaromi ‖ 10 ‖

°*śivadṛṣṭiḥ*] $A_1 A_2$; °*śivadṛṣṭi*° E_V • *pratyabhijñārthatattva*° $E_V A_1$; *pratyabhijñātatatvaḥ* A_2^{pc}

I have comprehended the *Śivadṛṣṭi*, and know all that there is to know of the esoteric nature of the Krama path, the true meaning of the Pratyabhijñā [school].[15] Possessed of a consciousness intent upon the worship of my masters' feet, I shall now analyze the void which lies within the heart, though it be unfathomable.

iha mahati rahasyonmīlane maṅgalāya
prabhavati mama saṃvidyoginīnāṃ prasādaḥ |
api tu kulasaparyābimbasaṃbandhavandyāḥ
sakṛd api matimanto nainam udghāṭayantu ‖ 11 ‖

°*bimbasambandhavandyāḥ*] *emend.* °*bimbasaṃbandhavandyā* A_2; °*saṃbandhyavandhyāḥ* E_V; °*bindu-sambandhavarjye* (?) A_1

As this great secret is here unveiled, the favor of my Mind's yoginī-s is sufficient to be auspicious. Even so, let not the wise, those who are commendable in their connection with the inner core [?*bimba*/*bindu*] of the *kula* worship, reveal this even a little.

However, [learned people] declare that certain men are the authors of these [works], through [the author's] desire to treat them either briefly or at length." Elsewhere, this pair occurs in the places similar to that of the MM, either at a text's inception, laying out its intentions, or in the apologia at its close. *cf.* *Aṣṭāṅgahṛdaya*, vs. 5ab: *kriyate 'ṣṭāṅgahṛdayam nāti**saṃkṣepavistaram*** ("The *Aṣṭāṅgahṛdaya* is composed without either excess concision or prolixity") and the penultimate verse of Mahimabhaṭṭa's *Vyaktiviveka*: *pratipādyabuddhyapekṣau prāyaḥ* ***saṃkṣepavistarau*** *karttuḥ* | *tena ca bahubhāṣitvaṃ vidvadbhir asūyitavyaṃ naḥ* ‖ ("For the most part, we have composed either concisely or at length depending on our understanding of the matter under discussion, and so may any diffuseness of expression on our part be forgiven by learned people."). K. Srinivasan (personal communication) informs me that *saṃkṣepavistara* is considered one of the desiderata of traditional Sanskrit-medium education even today: a student is expected to be able to use either approach on demand.

[15]This is one way to understand *pratyabhijñārthatattvakramasaraṇirahasyollāsa*, which admits of several interpretations. At the outset, it is unclear whether by *pratyabhijñā*, Maheśvarānanda here refers to the intellectual tradition of that name, or if he is more specifically referring to Utpaladeva's ĪPK. Construing the compound as I have done (as a *karmadhāraya*) seems to make the most pragmatic sense: the restricted, secret teachings of the Krama (*ullāsa* having, as it often does, a very weak meaning) are understood as underlying the more 'public' Pratyabhijñā. This interpretation is congruent with, *e.g.* that of Kṣemarāja's *Pratyabhijñāhṛdaya*, a text that Maheśvarānanda draws on heavily.

Alternatively, the compound could be understood as a *dvandva*, *i.e.* 'I know all there is to know of the true meaning of the Pratyabhijñā [school/the ĪPK] as well as the esoteric nature of the Krama path.'

svapnasamayopalabdhā sā sumukhī siddhayoginī devī |
gāthābhiḥ saptatyā svocitabhāṣābhir astu samprītā ‖ 12 ‖

svocita°] $A_1A_2E_K$; *svāpita°* E_V • *samprītā*] $A_1E_VE_K$; *samprotā* A_2

May that beautiful lady, the siddhayoginī who was perceived in dream-time, be gladdened by these seventy gāthā-s, in the language that was suited to her.

vardhatāṃ deśikaḥ śrīmān saṃvinmārgaś ca vardhatāṃ |
māheśvarāś ca vardhantāṃ vardhatāṃ ca maheśvaraḥ ‖ 13 ‖

deśikaḥ śrīmān] A_1E_V; *daiśikaḥ śrīmān* E_K; *deśikakra*⌣ ⌣ *s* A_2

Long live [my] glorious teacher, and long live the Path of consciousness; long live the Māheśvaras and long live Maheśvara.[16]

[16] *maheśvaraḥ*: the reference seems to be deliberately ambiguous, at once an invocation to Śiva and a sort of *ātmastuti* through a truncated version of our author's initiation name. Elsewhere, Maheśvarānanda studiously maintains this same ambiguity: see Appendix C 20.130-31 (=E_V p. 60): *prakāśayām āsa maheśvaraḥ svayaṃ paraṃ parāmarśamayīm ahaṃsphurām*, 'Maheśvara himself completely revealed the vibrancy of the 'I' (/the manifestation of his self?), which consists of contemplation.' Here there seems to be a deliberate double-vision created between the author and the deity (this passage is discussed further in Chapter Three). Elsewhere, however, Maheśvarānanda clearly refers to himself by this shorter name, without any intended double meaning: (p. 194) ...*mahākramamañjarīparimalam imaṃ śiṣyapremṇā babandha maheśvaraḥ*, 'Maheśvara composed this *Fragrance of the Flower-cluster of the Great Sequence* (*sic*) out of affection for his pupils.'

APPENDIX C
A SPECIMEN EDITION OF THE *MAHĀRTHAMAÑJARĪPARIMALA*, *GĀTHĀ*S 12–20

C.1 Introduction

C.1.1 Rationale for the Edition

Early on the course of my research into the *Mahārthamañjarī*, after I had decided to take the advice of my dissertation committee and make it the key text in this dissertation, I thought that a close examination and translation of a single long passage from the text would benefit the argument of the project as a whole. Reading through Maheśvarānanda's detailed examination of the Śaiva reality-levels (what I am calling here the *tattvaviveka*), I was struck not only by its careful and deliberate rhetorical structure, but by the implacability of some of the readings found in the edition of Vrajavallabha Dviveda. I summarily decided that I had found my passage; after a fortuitous visit to the Ecole Française d'Extrême-Orient, Pondicherry, I set to collecting manuscripts of the text.

Predictably, I suppose, things did not proceed as smoothly from this beginning as I might have hoped. In almost every case of my initial confusion, the fault lay with my understanding and not with Dviveda's edition: most of those once-puzzling readings now stand unobtrusively in the text I have constituted. More to the point, however, I found myself faced with an embarrassment of riches: the *New Catalogus Catalogorum* card files at the University of Madras turned up around fifty possible MSS held in libraries from Trivandrum to Bikaner, while Alexis Sanderson alerted me

to the existence of at least two dozen more.[1] My first venture into textual criticism was beginning to look like a life's work.

My compromise—made as much from necessity as from any decision of my own—is the present specimen edition. I mean something specific in my label: while I have collated a number of sources, weighed the possibilities of the various readings, and have provided an apparatus to show my work, I think it would be doubly pretentious to claim that I have produced a 'critical edition' of the MM. First of all, only a small section of the text has been presented here (and other parts of the text might therefore invalidate some of my decisions), and this is based only on a minority of the total extant witnesses. Nevertheless, I think that my decisions are sound within these working parameters, and that this version of a portion on the MM tells us something significant about the text.

Beyond the strictly pragmatic level of an exercise in textual criticism, there are three purposes that are met by this edition. First, it occasions a close reading of the text and thus acts as a critical armature to its accompanying translation: the particular features of structure or the idiosyncrasies of the author's style became much clearer once his text had been examined on a word by word or even syllable by syllable basis.[2] Second, even such a short and modest exercise examines the worth of

[1] Email message dated September 15, 2002.

[2] *Cf.* West 1973, p. 8: "When scholars argue about whether Aristophanes wrote $\delta\varepsilon$ or $\tau\varepsilon$ in such-and-such a passage, the debate may seem trivial to the point of absurdity, and indeed the sense may not be effected in the least. But by asking the question, "Which in fact did the poet write?", scholars may be lead to inquire into the usage of particles and the habits of Aristophanes more closely than it would have occurred to them to do otherwise. In the same way, by asking such questions all the way through the text, they may learn all kinds of things that they did not know and never wondered about, sometimes things that were not known to anybody."

the existing published editions, allowing the interested reader to assess their reliability and critical merit. The third and final purpose is closely related to the second: the edition enables us to enter (for the first time, to my knowledge) into the question of the MM's textual history, that is, the relations between its extant versions and what that can tell us about its reception in the centuries since its composition.

C.1.2 Sources

I have constituted the specimen edition on the basis of the following sources:

E_V The edition of Vrajavallabha Dviveda (Vārāṇasī, 1992). This reproduces the text of the edition of Gaṇapati Śāstrī (Trivandrum, 1919), with Dviveda's lengthy Sanskrit introduction and eight new appendices, but without reprinting the relatively few variants cited in the Trivandrum edition. In his introduction to the earlier version, Gaṇapati Śāstrī explains that his edition was based on three Malayalam-script MSS, then in private hands. The section collated here includes pp. 34–60.

E_K The edition of Mukund Rām Śāstrī (KSTS no. 11; Bombay 1918). The editor gives no details of the sources he uses; judging from his notes, he relied on three MSS (*ka*, *kha*, and *ga*); he also occasionally supplies additional notes and parallel passages in the footnotes. The collation includes pp. 35–53.

A_1 Adyar library, Chennai, accession number 72866, *Descriptive Catalogue of Sanskrit Manuscripts* no. 966. Palmleaf, Grantha script, written in a very small

but clear and beautiful hand. The text includes the entire *Mahārthamañjarī*; the collation extends from f. 20r to f. 34v.

A_2 Adyar library, accession number 71990, D.C. no. 964. Palmleaf, Grantha script, written in a sloppy and inattentive hand with frequent cross-outs and corrections. This ms. contains many solecisms and metrical errors; I suspect that the scribe did not actually know Sanskrit. Collations extend from f. 31r to f. 44v. At f. 39r, ln. 5, the text reads *vyakhyāsaṃgrahaḥ* (*sic*, read *vyākhyāsaṃgraha*) *itaḥ param*, 'from here, a synopsis of the commentary' (see apparatus *ad* 16.1); after that point the text only gives metrical material, both quotations and Maheśvarānanda's own verses.

M Oriental Research Institute, Mysore, accession number E.40300 B 887 (this ms. is unlisted in the NCC card files). Paper, quarto bound, Grantha script, written carelessly in a large, rolling hand (the complete text runs 595 pages) with a large number of corrections. Certain prefixed vowel-markers (for instance, the markers for -*e* and -*ai*, and first half of the marker for -*o*) are written at the end of a line, with their consonant written on the next line; this jarring practice suggests that the manuscript was almost certainly copied from an exemplar the scribe had before him, rather than one that was being recited. This manuscript's binding was broken in the process of photocopying; both the separate leaves of the original and a second copy are now held at the ORI. Unfortunately, during the process of copying, the text from the opposite pages bled through, making

the copy difficult to read. Collations from p. 98 to p. 169.

B_1 Benares Hindu University, accession number unknown.[3] Paper, quarto bound, Śāradā script, clearly and carefully written, with some marginalia in a later hand. Does not include the Prakrit text of the *mūla*, giving only the Sanskrit *chāyā*. Collations from p. 21 to p. 29.

B_2 Benares Hindu University, accession number unknown. Paper, quarto bound, Śāradā script, fairly written. A later Śāradā hand includes copious annotations and marginalia; unfortunately, the same hand has thoroughly emended the readings of the ms., bringing it in line (I suspect) with Gaṇapati Śāstrī's edition (the corrections thus date to some point after 1918). The redactor has blotted out the original readings, which are only rarely discernable, thus making the ms. practically useless as an independent witness. Like B_1, only gives a Sanskrit *chāyā* for the *mūla*. Collations from p. 14 to p. 19.

L University of Lucknow library, accession number 45778.[4] Paper, *pothi*-style quarto bound, Kashmiri Devanāgarī script, nicely written with occasional transcriptional errors (for instance, *u* written for *ta*, 14b) characteristic of a Śāradā exemplar at some indeterminate point in its transmission. *Mūlamātra*, gives

[3]Neither of the photocopies in my possession of B_1 and B_2 bear any cataloging information. When Andrew Nicholson (whom I would like to thank for going to the trouble of obtaining these xeroxes for me) first sent the copies to me, he included a note with their serial numbers. Sometime in the series of moves I made between 2002 and 2004, I misplaced the note. In the list of manuscripts that Sanderson provided me (see above), he lists the following MSS held at BHU: MSS 14/7766–14/7771 (C3961, C191, C4044, C898, C4597, C4326). These two are presumably part of that set of six; I can not at present be any more specific.

[4]My thanks to Bali Sahota, who supplied me with his own very clear photographs of this ms.

the Prakrit text along with a Sanskrit *chāyā*. The colophon and thus the catalog wrongly report that the ms. contains the *Parimala*. Every two pages are numbered (comprising an upper and a lower block of text); collations from p. 10 to p. 15.

C.1.3 Relations between the sources

Given the limited number of sources collated here, it would I think be unproductive to draw up a *stemma codicum* for the edition. There are, however, some significant conclusions that can be drawn about the relationship between these several sources which provide grounds for an induction about the transmission of the MM as a whole. Globally, the sources divide into two groups, which may for convenience's sake be referred to as the northern (**N**=$E_K B_1 B_2$L) and the southern (**S**=$E_V A_1 A_2$M). This regional distinction appears borne out in the mentions of the other MSS in the published catalogs of Indian libraries I have consulted: MSS affiliated with the **S** group are extant in Telugu and Malayalam scripts as well as Grantha, while the **N** group seems exclusively to comprise texts in Śāradā and Śāradā-influenced Nāgarī.

Within the **S** texts examined here, A_1 and M form a distinct sub-group.[5] These MSS systematically concur in their readings, as a glance at the apparatus to any page of the edition will testify. Neither, however, is a direct copy of the other (nor is the presumed palm leaf ms. of which M is an apograph): they both contains independent errors, and their shared lacunae are in neither case the result of physical damage.

[5] A third Telugu-script manuscript from Adyar (no. 69587), not collated here, is also clearly part of this sub-group.

There is a single sentence-length lacuna (12: 26–27) found in A_1 but not in M, while M omits a brief phrase (17:7) that is found in A_1. A_2 is more eclectic and altogether a less reliable source than A_1M or E_V. Note that A_2 and M occasionally read together against A_1 (*e.g.* 14.4, 14.8, *gā*. 17c, 20.36); this suggests possible contamination in M, which also contains enough independently bad readings to make it a less valuable witness than A_1 overall.

With the **N** texts, affinities are more difficult to determine. The biggest problem here is the relatively scant amount of material collated from these sources. This is followed closely by the contamination seen in B_2: it is nearly impossible at times to reconstruct what the original scribe wrote. Neither B_1 nor B_2 transmit the Prakrit text at all; as a result L's evidence is very important for the conclusions that I draw about **N**. L reads in close harmony with E_K's Prakrit text, a fact that is all the more remarkable given that their transmission is for all intents gibberish: the scribes who bothered to transmit the Prakrit text at all seem to have done so with a naïve faith in its intelligibility. For this we may be grateful: it is this credulousness that provides a critical piece of evidence for the history of the text. For **S** and **N** are not just handy genetic groups that we can discern through stemmatics: they represent radically different versions of the *Mahārthamañjarī*.

C.1.4 The Two Versions

We have seen that its possible to divide the text's transmission into two geographical groups **S** and **N**, of which the two editions published in the early twentieth century

are representative. These two branches of the tradition transmit very different texts under the title *Mahārthamañjarī*. The text of the *Parimala* found in all the **N** sources is a succinct gloss of the meaning of each of the *gāthā* verses; by contrast, the **S** *Parimala* is diffuse, gathers together a massive amount of quotations not adduced in **N**, and is full of asides and ancillary discussions unconnected to the matter of the *Mahārthamañjarī* root-text. To give only a single example: consider the following sentence describing the *śivatattva* as it appears in the **N** paradosis:

> *tena tena prakāreṇānubhūyamānānām śaktisahasrāṇām ekaḥ saṃghaṭṭa aikyam anubhavann eva sṛṣṭisaṃhārādyanyonyaviruddhakriyāyaugapadyabhūmir bhavati.*
>
> The 'single conglomeration' of 'the thousands of *śakti*s' that are experienced in this or that manner, while experiencing its own singularity, serves as the ground for the simultaneous occurrence of [seemingly] contradictory actions, such as creation and destruction.

Now consider the same sentence as it appears in **S** (14:1–9; material common to both versions is in **bold**):

> *pṛthivyādiḥ śaktiparyanto yo 'yaṃ viśvasphuraṇaprakāro yaś cecchā jñānaṃ kriyeti jñānaṃ smṛtir apohanam iti sṛṣṭiḥ sthitiḥ saṃhāro 'nākhyā bhāsety anyathā ca tattatsrotontareṣu pūjyamānā yoginyo yoginaś ceti vedyavikṣobhollāsas tanmayīnāṃ śaktīnāṃ* ***tena tena prakāreṇa*** *tatra tatr****ānubhūyamānānām*** *ekaikavyaktiparyālocane 'py ānantyaṃ kim uta kārtsnyānusandhāne.*
>
> *tathā hi—icchā tāvaj jijñāsācikīrṣādibhedād bahuprakārā. jñānaṃ ca smṛtyanubhavasaṃśayaviparyayotprekṣādivaicitryād anantaprakāram. kriyāpi gamanāsanaśayanabhāṣaṇādibhedād anantā. teṣām api pratyekaṃ bhedaprabhedavikalpavikṣobha ity ānantyotkarṣātiśayenoktaṃ* ***śaktisahasrāṇām*** *iti.*
>
> *teṣāṃ ca ya* ***ekaḥ saṃghaṭṭa aikyam anubhavann eva sṛṣṭisaṃhārādyanyonyaviruddhakriyāyaugapadyabhūmir bhavati.***
>
> The *śakti*-s [mentioned in the *gāthā*] consist of the way in which the world appears extending from earth up until the *śakti*[*tattva*] and [consists also of] the manifestation of the diversity of knowable objects, as the *yoginī*s and *yogin*s are worshipped in the several streams [of the Śaiva revelation], including "will, knowledge, and action" [in the Trika], "knowledge, memory, and negation" [in the Pratyabhijñā], [and] "creation, maintenance, destruction, the Nameless, and Light" [in the Krama]. [These *śakti*-s] are **experienced in this and that** place and in this and that **manner**. They are infinite even when examined in their individual instantiations, not to speak of the perspective of a synthetic awareness of the whole.

> To explain: there are many kinds of will first of all, because of its being differentiated into the will to know and the will to act, to give only two examples. So too knowledge has infinite modes, among them memory, experience, doubt, error, and imagination. And action also is endless because of its divisions such as going, sitting, lying down, and speaking. Each of these, in turn, is further differentiated by the positing of divisions and subdivisions, and so, with hyperbole born of their exceptionally great number, **'thousands of *śaktis*'** was said [in the gāthā].
>
> The One who is **the 'single conglomeration' of these [thousands of *śaktis*] even as He is experiencing His own singularity serves as the ground for the simultaneous occurrence of [seemingly] contradictory actions, such as creation and destruction.**

For the critic faced with this sort of a situation, the intuitive solution is to consider the longer text to be secondary, the result of interpolation and textual growth. A great many examples of this process can be adduced: the tendency for texts to become inflated in the course of their transmission is practically considered a fact of nature within textual criticism. Against this commonsense view, however, I argue that **S** is in fact the superior text, the work closer to that which Maheśvarānanda intended to circulate.

The first demonstration of the superiority of the **S** text can be easily seen in the Prakrit *mūla*. The text presented by E_K and L is consistently consigned to the rejected readings given in the apparatus. The transmission of Prakrit tends to be poor and so the texts' faultiness is not notable in itself. It is instead the consistent pattern of error that is remarkable: time and again, the errors present in the **N** text are symptomatic of misunderstandings that arose from the transcription of a south Indian hyparchetype. Diagnostic of this is the error arising from a peculiar feature of southern scripts when realizing Prakrit; this requires a brief detour into the details of South Indian paleography. Grantha, along with the modern Malayalam script called *āryalipi*,

employs an unusual graphic convention when representing Prakrit: a relatively large circle written on the line with the other *akṣaras*—the same sign that would normally indicate *anusvāra* or nasalization when writing Sanskrit—represents the gemination of *the following consonant*, nasalization being signalled by a smaller circle written above the line of the text.[6] This is an orthographic feature that is represented with perfect regularity in A_1A_2M; the text that appears in the northern sources resulted, I propose, from an ignorance of this convention, with both signs interpreted as markers of nasalization. The resulting text is an overly nasalized gibberish that violates the phonetic and morphological features of Māhārāṣṭrī. Again, a single example will suffice to show what I mean (the reader will find many more by perusing the apparatus to the *mūla*). For *gāthā* 17, on *māyā*, the **S** texts produce the following, in more or less correct Māhārāṣṭrī:

ĕkkarasammi sahāve ubbhāveṃtī viappasippāīṃ |
māetti loavaïṇo paramasaantassa mohiṇī sattī ||

While E_K reads:

ekarasaṃmi sahīve uṃbhāveṃtī viaṃvasiṃpāīṃ |
māyeti loavalaṇo paramasuantasa mohiṇī saṃttī ||

[6] To the best of my knowledge, this has heretofore only been noticed in Malayalam, especially by the editors of plays current in Kerala's Kūṭiyāṭṭam tradition. Particularly noted has been the special case of Prakrit *ayya/ajja* (Skt. *ārya*), usually rendered in Malayalam MSS as the two short vowels *a a* with the gemination marker between them. Here the marker exceptionally stands for both members of a geminate cluster, making it impossible to decide which is in fact the correct consonant. Harunaga Isaacson kindly provided me with the following references to discussions of this phenomenon: Pischel 1981, §284; Anujan Achan 1925; Steiner 1997, pp. 175–176. Isaacson also drew my attention to Pisharoti 1929, a *pūrvapakṣa* to my argument here: Pisharoti claims that both signs (the big circle and the smaller superscript circle) represent nasalization and reflect the pronunciation habits of Malayalam-speaking actors delivering lines in Prakrit. Pisharoti's argument (directed at the proponents of the Bhāsa's authorship of the Trivandrum plays) asserts but does not prove anything— while Malayali actors may have heavily nasalized their Prakrit text, that they did so strengthens rather than diminishes the present argument: other users of texts have made the same errors that I propose effected the **N** tradition of the MM.

This is at least metrical. Even worse for wear is L:

> *ekarasaṃsi sahīvaṃ uṃbhāvaṃttī vīaṃvasiṃpāroṃ |*
> *māyeṃti loavalaṇo paramasaatasa mohiṇī saṃttī ||*

Almost all of the deviations here can be accounted for paleographically: E_K's **viaṃvasiṃpāiṃ* for the correct *viappasippāiṃ*, for example, is the result of a collision between the orthographic confusion just mentioned and the substitution of *va* for *pa*, an error that can be easily made in Grantha, where the two *akṣara*s are almost identical, while both **N** texts' **loavalaṇo* for correct *loavaïṇo* depends on the closeness between Grantha *i* and *ḷa*. Many other examples could be easily added: the net effect of this all serves as a warning against placing too much stock in the northern version's root-text, which amounts to so much nonsense.

Much more important, however, is the case of the vastly differing texts of the *Parimala* in the two versions. Here again, **S** is clearly superior. This judgement rests on two criteria:

Cross-references In two cases in the course of the *tattvaviveka*, the **N** paradosis retains cross-references to materials that it does not include. At 13:17, *paramasvacchanda iti prāgvad viśvottīrṇa evocyate* ("'*paramasvacchanda*': this exclusively means 'transcending the world,' as aforesaid") refers back to 12:56 (*paramaśiva iti uktarūpaṃ cāsya svātantryaṃ viśvottīrṇatvamātre viśrāmyati*), lacking in all the **N** texts.[7] At 17.3, the forward-pointing reference *bhedavādasyāpavadiṣyamāṇatvāt* ("since the arguments of the dualists will be refuted

[7] At this point in E_K (p. 39), the editor includes a footnote where he attempts unconvincingly to link this reference with the opening *gāthā namiuṇā niccasuddhe*, *etc.*.

later") is found in **N**, while the extended passage to which it refers (17.36–92; the tag is explicitly echoed at 17.36, *nanu kathaṃ bhedavādāpavādaḥ*) is not.[8]

Labelled quotations by Mahāprakāśa and Maheśvarānanda Within the *tattvaviveka*, there is one quotation of the *Manonuśāsanastotra* by Maheśvarānanda's guru Mahāprakāśa (17:14–17) found in all MSS. This same text is quoted two more times in the long version (E_V p. 12, 91); the long version also includes quotations from two other works of Mahāprakāśa's,[9] all introduced by the stereotyped prose tag *yad uktam* (or *yac coktam*) *asmadgurubhiḥ* with the text's title in the locative ("as my revered guru said in X"). Outside of the text edited here (and thus taking E_V and E_K as representative), this can be extended to Maheśvarānanda's labelled quotations of his own works: E_K p. 24 records a quotation of the *Saṃvidullāsa* also found at E_V p. 22; this same text is quoted with an identical prose introduction in E_V twelve other times. E_K p. 73 has a quotation from Maheśvara's *Komalavallīstava* found on E_V p. 76; the text is given labelled quotations in E_V five other times.[10]

Faced with this, to accept that **S** is an inflated version of **N** we have to imagine that a later interpolator not only corrected the author's compositional mistakes but also included forged references to works that were demonstrably written by the author and the author's teacher. This would require a pseudepigraphical conspiracy theory to

[8]The variant seen at 17.3 in B_1B_2 *bhedabhāvasya* ('the essence of duality') may be a secondary attempt to remove this discrepancy.

[9]*Mātaṅgīstotra* quoted on E_V p. 42, *Ānandatāṇḍavavilāsastotra* quoted *ibid*, p. 159.

[10]See Dviveda's citation index, pp. 199, 201.

account for the data, a presumption that is both unwarranted and unnecessary. Given this relationship between the two versions, we are left with three possible scenarios to account for the existence of the inferior short version:

1. The transmission to the north of a single lacunose manuscript of the complete MM, from which all the **N** texts have descended.

2. The intentional abridgement of the long text by a more or less knowledgable copyist-editor (or series of copyist-editors).

3. A shorter authorial version of the MM—essentially a rough draft—that found its way into circulation and which became the only text to eventually transmit to Kashmir.

The first of these scenarios is patently impossible: the coherence of the short text (the unanswered cross-references notwithstanding) does not appear to possibly be the result of textual degradation or corruption. To imagine that a coherent sentence like the **N** version of 14:1-9 could have been eked out from a damaged or otherwise unclear exemplar begs credulity, and it is only one out of hundreds of similar passages. The third option—in which the MM becomes a sort of South Indian tantric *Leaves of Grass*—has a certain appeal, especially given my larger interest in questions of textual assembly and reception. There is, however, no evidence to substantiate this theory. So we are left with the second scenario, with a subsequent scribe taking massive liberties with Maheśvarānanda's diffuse but brilliant text, and leaving little more than a modest *ṭīkā* in his wake.

As counterintuitive as this may sound, it is not unheard of. In his Introduction to the edition of Bhartṛhari's *Subhāṣitatriśatī*, Kosambi notes the existence of two parallel redactions of Rāmacandrabudhendra's commentary on the text, both of which he takes to be authorial,[11] while Isaacson has observed that Bhaṭṭa Vādīndra's commentary on the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* was reduced by nearly a factor of ten into an opusculum glossing only the text's *sūtrapāṭha*.[12] It might be argued that these texts are just scholia, workaday texts that their users saw fit to tinker with in order to increase their use-value. The subsequent editor or editors of the MM seem to have treated the *Parimala* as if it were, in fact, just another commentary, trimming out its obscurities and asides to make a more accessible guide to the meaning of the *Mahārthamañjarī*'s verses, in the process obliterating almost everything that is really interesting and distinctive in Maheśvarānanda's complex text.[13]

C.1.5 Principles of the Edition

We can thus properly speak of the **N** text as a separate recension of the MM, and as such it should ideally be edited separately.[14] Since the present edition serves to estab-

[11]2001, p. 1–2; Kosambi implies that the shorter version in the earlier of the two, which Rāmacandra had "expanded...when the first edition had proved successful." There is no necessary reason for this to be so; the earliest manuscript of the short text dates from the late eighteenth century.

[12]Isaacson 1994, pp. 766–770, esp. pp. 769–770nn. As Isaacson notes, he is here building on Thakur's earlier opinion of the two texts.

[13]Compare here the decision of some scribe in the tradition of A_2 to transmit only material in verse. We can see here the beginnings of a third MM version.

[14]*Cf.* West *op. cit*, pp. 16, 70: "Commentaries, lexica, and other work of a grammatical nature were rightly regarded as collections of material to be pruned, adapted, or added to, rather than as sacrosanct literary entities. When the rewriting becomes more than superficial, or when rearrangement is involved, one must speak of a new recension of the work...In the case of a work that survives in more than one recension, the editor must either give each recension separately or choose one as representative. He must not conflate them into a hybrid version that never existed (though he may use one to correct copyists' errors in the other.)."

lish the existence and the relations of these two MM texts, I thought it worthwhile to retain the data of the secondary recension; $E_K B_1 B_2$ proved themselves to be of marginal value, but there are cases where they helped to decide readings. In general, I have tended to be conservative in my editing. Knowing full well that Gaṇapati Śāstrī and Dwiveda's understanding of Sanskrit grammar and usage far exceed my own, I have tended to let E_V's readings stand if the other option is indifferent from the point of view of the sense. Where I have adopted another reading or chosen to emend, my principles have been cheerfully eclectic: at times I read what seems to be better attested in both branches of the tradition (*e.g.* 14:8, 15.12, 16.2, 17.10); elsewhere, when A_1M have pointed towards a more doctrinally or stylistically appealing wording, I have either adopted their reading (*e.g.* 12.5, 12.11, 16.14, 16.21, 19.127, 20.133) or taken their evidence as the basis for conjecture (*e.g.* 16.28, 17.6, 17.80). In one passage (19.61–65), I have attempted to speculatively reconstruct Maheśvarānanda's argument, following the lead of A_1M as well as an unacknowledged source text, although the resulting constituted text resembles none of these exactly. I have offered some tentative conjectures based on the evidence of *tantra*s known to Maheśvarānanda in one case (20: 123–124) where I suspect the transmission has become incoherently corrupt. Finally, in one exceptional case (17.13), I have adopted the reading found only in the highly unreliable B_2, where I think the copyist and his later annotator working in concert happened accidentally onto a solution to the two different and equally unsatisfactory readings found in the other witnesses.[15]

[15]See the translation *ad loc.* for my rationale for this decision.

All told, this might seem like a lot of work for rather limited results. While I would certainly concede that the edition has required an intermittent investment of thought and labor over the course of several years, this has been time and effort well spent. Minimally, this edition has validated to my satisfaction the cautious use of E_V as the base text for the rest of this dissertation: the published text can (like all human things) be improved, but nevertheless provides a good guide to Maheśvarānanda's thought and language. The text-historical conclusions laid out in this Introduction I think demonstrate an interestingly counterintuitive instance of transmission and recension that may prove a useful case study for other textual scholars and cultural historians. We can see that the flow of texts from north to south that first brought the textual largesse of Kashmir to Cidambaram was not a one-way process: readers in Kashmir were interested enough in Maheśvarānanda's text to copy it, indeed to copy it many times over, as there seem to be many more extant MM manuscripts of the inferior version or of just the root-verses. This one text wending its way up the length of the subcontinent serves to remind us yet again that the process of text-making in premodern India was a complex, polyvalent, and cosmopolitan one, with a story to tell us that runs deep into the second millennium.[16]

[16]I mention this because of the still dominant scholarly consensus that understands the Sanskrit culture of southern India as only a recipient of outside (read: Northern) influence. To pick only a single example: in a recent paper Hiltebeitel, drawing on the work of T.P. Mahadevan, argues that "based on the correspondences between the Kāśmīrī-Śāradā and Malayālam manuscripts of the [*Mahābhārata*] and the likelihood that the latter were brought south by Pūrvaśikha Brahmans before the Gupta dynasty, the Guptas cannot have been responsible for the dissemination of any 'normative redaction' of the Epic" (2004, p. 206). To be fair, Hiltebeitel is a scholar whose interests do not touch upon the history of the transmission of medieval Sanskrit texts; still, how better of an understanding might be garnered for even major classical monuments like the Epics should they be seen as part of the long history of textual culture in South Asia, rather than as isolated singularities subject to their own special (and very implausible) conditions of worldly existence.

C.1.6 Conventions of the Edition

The edition was created using Franz Velthuis' Devnag for TEX and the EDMAC macros designed by John Lavagnino and Dominik Wujastyk.[17] At its greatest depth, the apparatus contains four registers. These are, in descending order:

- The variant readings for the *mūla*, both Prakrit and Sanskrit. These are preceded by the *gāthā* number and a indicator of the *pāda* (a,b,c, or d; breaking each *āryā* distich after the third *caturmātra*); the sigla for the Sanskrit *chāyā* are followed by a single inverted comma: thus **16.c** refers to the beginning of the second line of a Prakrit verse, **16.c'** to its unmetrical Sanskrit rendering.

- Lacuna found in any of the sources. Given the brevity of the **N** text, and A_2's abbreviation from *gāthā* 16 onwards, these sources drop in and out of the apparatus regularly; as indicated, the register notes the word *after which* the text either drops out or resumes. When the lacuna is obviously due to one of the typical copyist errors (homoearchon, homoeoteleuton, etc.) I have marked this out with the generic label "(eyeskip)"; the same label is given in the bottom register for shorter mistakes.

- Quotations. When a traced quotation corresponds entirely to its source text, or when the level of variation is trivial, I have only indicated the relevant text and text-place. Where I consider the variation to be non-trivial, I have supplied

[17]For more details on the format of the edition, the interested reader is directed to Goodall 1998, pp. cxxi–cxxiii.

the quotation in full, preceded by an approximate sign (≈). The register's data is limited to what published works I have managed to track down; many more of the untraced references can no doubt be located in manuscript, or in published texts of which I am unaware. I have also included in this register what unacknowledged quotations and recastings I have identified; I am certain that further study will elicit many more of these.

- The variant reading of the *Parimala*. This is the largest and most unwieldy, but also the most important layer of the apparatus. As in the readings of the *mūla*, the apparatus is fully positive, supplying both the reading accepted into the text as well as the rejected variants. Every entry is identified by *gāthā* and line number and followed by a lemma sign ( ]). The variant readings are then listed by source and separated by semicolons; where I have constituted the text in a way that differs from E_V, I have grouped the sources in order of their closeness to the accepted reading. Unreadable text in a witness is identified as "(unclear)," damaged text is marked out by "---", short omissions "*om.*" Emendations and conjectures when they occur are marked by "*em.*" and "*conj.*", respectively.

C.2 Text

C.3 The Analysis of the Levels of Reality

[*avatāraṇikā* to *gā* 12:] It is certain that the activity of the world [*viśvavyavahāra*] exists as externally perceivable objects, how then can it [in fact] be Representation that is the nature of the Self? Taking up this question, he says,

> **Within the range of Paramaśiva and earth, of which Illumination is the highest reality, mutual distinction is nothing other than the heart's disclosure of Representation.** (12)

Certainly, in this system [*iha*], each and every relation that is connected with the activity of the world turns out to be solely the relation of cause and effect. And it should be acknowledged that the cause is ultimately an agent, Paramaśiva, given that [relations of] contact and coextension, as well as any other relation connected to them, even granting the existence of some other, more proximal agent such as a connector, are ultimately subordinate to the will of God, and are experienced as effects of that Agent alone. Otherwise, should one declare that a relation is simply [*eva*] two objects' mutually reaching each other [*anyonyaprāpti*°], how could this [proximal agent], once he has totally used up his potential [?] with respect to one of these things, be capable of even touching the other?[1] Given that [the proximal agent] must act equally with

[1] *katham ekatropakṣīṇāśeṣaśarīrabhāro 'yam anyad vastu spraṣṭum api pragalbheta*] The interpretation of this phrase is somewhat uncertain. Another possibility would be to understand the antecedent of *ayam* to be *sambandha*. In either case, the argument seems to postulate an infinite regress: if the proximal agent (or, the relation) can come into contact with one of two objects that are to be joined in a relation of contact or *saṃyoga*, then the capacity to conjoin has already been used up in relating the agent with thing *x*. Another relation would have to be posited to relate the agent to *y*, and still another (and another...) to relate the two things.

regard to two things, how could the relation [then] not amount to a non-relation, since it is [thus] been divided into two? On the other hand, in cases like that of coextension, where no normal agent is perceived, God alone should be understood as the agent. Coextension, though eternal, does not escape having the Lord as its agent, since the logicians themselves,[2] when they declare that "it exists for an instant without qualities" have taught that substances, upon their arising, lack qualities for an instant. Therefore [*tat*] the ability to join and disjoin these [substances and qualities] belongs to Him alone. This stands proven.

Moreover, it has to be acknowledged that these relations such as contact and coextension do not exist in any place other than their own appropriate range, because otherwise an overextension [would result]. And when one examines the question of the form of this appropriateness, some other reality needs be posited, one which exceeds the natures of all such relata as qualities and substances. We strenuously declare this reality to be God's autonomy, and therefore there is no disagreement as to the fact that each and every thing is an effect of His.

Further, things like universals, though eternal by worldly standards, are only effects with respect to the Lord, as a result of which space, though considered eternal, is taught to be an effect by the *śruti* passage, "from that, from this Self, was space created." And this is merely an instance [*upalakṣaṇaṃ caitat*; *i.e.* standing in for all putatively eternal entities].

[2] *tārkikair eva*, taken to include the proponents of both Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, since it is the latter who propose coextension or *samavāya* as one of the basic forms of ontological relation.

And so the effect that is the world has God as its agent, thus indirectly it has in fact been taught that the relation of cause and effect is actually the relation of action and agent. Under examination, it fails to make sense that insentient things can act as causes since, for instance, if a potter remains indifferent a pot cannot be created even when there is the collection of things such as earth, the stick, and the wheel. But in such cases as "the shoot arises from the seed", even though a specific agent is not seen, there is not, first of all, this sort of capacity on the part of the shoot, as it [i.e. the shoot] does not yet exist at that point.

It might be suggested that the seed possesses this capacity: this would be incorrect. How can it be said that "the shoot arises" [but] the seed, being a different locus, has the capacity? Further, the seed causes [either] an already-existing shoot to arise, or a non-existent one. If it be an already-existing one, what is this 'causing to arise,' in this case, given that the existence of it [*i.e.* of the seed] has already been declared? And if it be a non-existent one, how might existence and non-existence not be contradictory? Or, should we accept that, how might it not be an overextension?[3] Therefore, created things require some non-insentient cause. And its non-insentience is none other than its status as an agent.

Additionally, in certain cases like that of the agenthood of such people as potters: there too, in line with the saying of the *Pratyabhijñā*:

> In this way, in accord with God's specification, a potter brings a pot into being by gradually bringing out the propensities of the clay and the rest.

[3]That is to say, why wouldn't a seed produce the sprout of a different plant, or a hare's horn, or some other nonexistent thing?

these people [potters and the like] conform to the restriction— *i.e.* that a pot comes only from clay and a cloth only from threads—and they can not act otherwise, on account of the autonomy of that One who alone is the agent. Thus, even though there is a certain sentience of potters and the like with respect to [their effects] such as pots, yet with respect to the Lord, they are only insentient. So it is well-said: every relation is that of cause and effect, and the cause [means] an Agent alone.

This being so, there is no appearance of an agent higher than Paramaśiva, and there is no arising of an effect beyond earth. There is a set of reals [*arthaḥ*] that abides in the midst of these two, that consists of the collection of the *tattva*s as they are successively encountered (i.e. drawn out by the mind) in every existing thing [*pratipadārthaṃ*].[4] It is accessible through perception and other grounds of valid knowledge and ultimately it has Illumination as its true nature, in as much as it revivifies [*anuprāṇanatayā*].[5] It is specified through both positive and negative concomitance, as otherwise there would be the problem that even in the presence of the assemblage of the sense-organs, these [*tattva*s] would not shine forth. As it is said in the *Nareśvaraviveka*:

> What lacks extension cannot extend, what isn't white cannot be white.

And, as in the *Tantrāloka*:

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[4]Here Maheśvarānanda returns to the words of the *gāthā*, in particular to the key term *paccāhāre*/*pratyāhāre*. Elsewhere in the text, he is quite explicit, providing *pratīka*s of the Sanskrit version of the root-text. His method is more oblique here, as he etymologically analyzes each constituent element of the word: *prati°*=*pratipadārtham*, °*ā*°=°*ānupūrvyena*, and °*hāra*=*vyava***hrīya***māna*.

[5]Again, this is analysis of the words of the *gāthā*, in this case the compound *paāsaparamatthe*/*prakāśaparamārthe*. The element *paramārtha* is not repeated here, but is implied by the nearly synonymous *svabhāva*.

> That which lacks Illumination can't be illumined, nor even exist.

And that is why it is the internally existing Illumination of the Self alone that shines outwardly as the things of the world, which are to be illumined—this much must be accepted at the outset. And it follows from this that, because all thirty-six realities share without distinction the common essence of Illumination, one cannot speak of them as distinct, one from the other, such as [in the case of saying] '[this is] earth' [and] '[this is] water'. And [yet] we see that this distinction is in fact used by ordinary people, as otherwise there would be the unwanted consequence of an absence of restriction regarding the pragmatic value [*arthakriyā*] of such things as water and dry land.[6] And this distinction arises because of the power of Representation that dwells within the heart. And arising eventuates in identity, as it has been said: "Whatever is born from something, is that thing."

In using the word 'disclosure', he says the following: the dynamism of the variegated nature of the world is, as it were, the shoots and flowers of the tree that is the Representation of the Self. By this, it is explained that Illumination and Representation envivify [both] the higher and the lower cognizers and that ultimately these two are identical.

The one [spoken of with the word] 'Paramaśiva' [in the *gāthā*] possesses the autonomy which has already been described, [and] which concludes in world-transcendence alone, but not in the imperial power that is the attainement of complete autonomy,

[6] That is, without some sort of distinction, all worldly action would be impossible—people would try to stand on water and drink earth.

which both transcends the world and consists of it. Further, since it would be inappropriate to have one possessing this sort [*i.e.* the latter sort] of a unique nature be drawn together [*pratyāhārānaucitya*]; it is rather the case that His nature is precisely that of the drawer-together.

[*ava.* to gā 13]: Now , in order to substantiate the [notion of] Representation, while rationally justifying the difference, one from the other, of the thirty-six *tattva*s in the order of their emission, he first examines the *śivatattva*.

> **The single conglomeration of thousands of *śakti*-s that appear in different ways, the one called Śiva, who is the effort of one's own heart, the most autonomous, exists.**[7] (13)

The *śakti*-s [mentioned in the *gāthā*] consist of the way in which the world appears extending from earth up until the *śakti*[*tattva*] and [consists also of] the manifestation of the diversity of knowable objects [*vedyavikṣobhollāsaḥ*][8], as the *yoginī*s and *yogin*s are worshipped in the several streams [of the Śaiva revelation], including [*anyathā*

[7]This translation is quite awkward—generally, one would understand *hoi/bhavati* simply as a copula. This is however necessary to capture Maheśvarānanda's intended meaning, as will be seen in the commentary.

[8]This compound provides a clear case of the difficulties in translating Maheśvarānanda and other authors of his tradition. At times, literal translation would seem to do him a disservice—what sounds downright incoherent in English is clear enough in Sanskrit. By the same token, an interpretive translation—for example, 'phenomenal reality' or 'objects as we experience them' in the present instance—do violence to the style and the intent of our author (among others) who depends on a certain lapidary effect of certain often reiterated, nearly synonymous expressions (*e.g.*. *sphurattā, vilāsa, vijṛmbhaṇa, vikṣobha*, etc. etc.). We will be faced with this problem continually throughout the present translation. My policy—while trying to be as literal as possible within the limits of good English style and syntax—will be to indicate the Sanskrit original in cases where the translation strikes me as potentially ambiguous or one that a knowledgable reader might judge to be overly interpretive. I will also indicate other possible translations when, as in the present case, they might legitimately suggest themselves. Other interpretations here might include "the flashing forth of the energies of knowable objects," or "the delight [arising from] the agitation of knowable objects."

ca] "will, knowledge, and action" [in the Trika], "knowledge, memory, and negation" [in the Pratyabhijñā], [and] "creation, maintenance, destruction, the Nameless, and Light" [in the Krama].[9] [These *śakti*-s] are experienced in this and that place and in this and that manner.[10] They are infinite even when examined in their individual instantiations, not to speak of the perspective of a synthetic awareness of the whole.[11]

To explain: there are, first of all, many kinds of will since it is differentiated into the will to know and the will to act, to give only two examples. So too knowledge has infinite modes, among them memory, experience, doubt, error, and imagination. And action also is endless because of its divisions such as going, sitting, lying down, and speaking. Each of these, in turn, is further differentiated by the positing of divisions and subdivisions, and so, with hyperbole born of their exceptionally great number, 'thousands of *śakti*s' was said [in the *gāthā*].

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[9]In this difficult sentence, the appearance of the world of everyday experience is understood to be subject to the ontological theories of the different nondualist Śaiva systems. In the three cases here given, the result of the analysis is the dissolution of the phenomenal world into the interaction of a set of abstract forces that are in turn hypostasised into female divinities or grammatically feminine abstract energies (*yoginī*, *śakti*). Thus in the Trika, the three powers of *icchā*, *jñāna*, and *kriyā* ascribed to Śiva are identified with the triad of goddesses Parā, Aparā, and Parāparā whose worship is the acme of the tradition. The set of cognitive actions *jñāna*, *smṛti* and *apohana* are drawn from the proof of the existence of God in Utpaladeva's ĪPK 1.3.7cd (Maheśvara's closeness to Utpala's exact wording here led me to include this passage as a parallel in the apparatus). The inclusive of *anākhyā* and *bhāsā* in the final set clearly registers it as a Krama position: see 19:58–60 in the edition) and E_V pp. 95–104.

All of the elements in these three lists either are or contain feminine members (with the Pratyabhijna cognitive events being considered as *śakti*s). They can thus be equated to the *yoginyaḥ* in Maheśvarānanda's text. What—or rather who—then are this *yoginaḥ*? The Trika goddesses are assigned male consorts, but I'm uncertain how this can be made to fit with the other cases.

[10]As in the previous passage (see notes 4 and 5 above), Maheśvarānanda is silently glossing the words of the root-verse. "Are experienced" (*anubhūyamānānāṃ*) represents the *gāthā*'s *dīsaṃtāṇaṃ/dṛśyamānānāṃ*, while "in this and that place and in this and that manner" expresses *taha taha/tathā tathā*.

[11]Or, if one reads with the MSS against E_V, 'a synthetic awareness of [their] effects' or 'of the Effect [*i. e.* the world].'

The One who is the 'single conglomeration' of these [thousands of *śakti*s] even as He is experiencing [*anubhavann eva*] His own singularity serves as the ground for the simultaneous occurrence of [seemingly] contradictory actions, such as creation and destruction. He is also experienced as the action of one's own heart, in accord with the saying of the *Śivasūtra*-s:

> The effort is Bhairava.

He[12] is completely different from any other reality, owing to His ability [°*yogāt*] to partake of the wonder that is the commonality of [opposed] pairs of things, in the manner that has been mentioned [just now],[13] and thus experiences the extremely elevated 'autonomy', or freedom, the absence of a need to look to anything else [*ananyamukhaprekṣitvalakṣaṣaṃ*]. Thus is [his nature?] specified [*ity avadhāryate*], since other *tattvas*—*puruṣatattva* or *prakṛtitattva* for instance—in fact attain autonomy when set against other, lower *tattva*s, and are subordinate with respect to the higher *tattva*s.[14]

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[12] *sa ukta*°] I have accepted, as syntax and sense seem to demand, the reading of A_1M here, despite the strong presence of the variant *yaś ca/ yaś cokta* in both the northern and southern versions of the text (including both published editions). The relative–correlative construction, besides being what the rules of Sanskrit composition dictate, seems in this case necessitated by the reading of Maheśvarānanda's *mūlagrantha*: the two relative clauses correspond respectively to *ĕkka saṃghaṭṭo/ekasaṃghaṭṭaḥ* and *niahiaujjamarūvo/nijahṛdayarūpo*, while the correlative clause answers for the verse's main predicate *paramasacchaṃdo/paramasvacchandaḥ*. Adopting A_1M's reading here does not make for good stemmatics; however, it seems likely that a scribe at some point earlier point in their transmission had chosen (correctly) to emend an error shared by both main versions of the MMP.

[13] *uktaprakārārthadvitayasāmarasya*°] This refers back to the *anyonyaviruddhakriyā* mentioned in 13:10–11.

[14] Or, reading with $A_1$and M: 'There are others within our tradition who hold that the mode (emending to **prakāraṃ*) of [the middle] tattvas beginning with *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* is that of autonomy when set against the prior [tattva-s] and subordination with respect to the subsequent [tattva-s].' *N.B.* that the readings *pūrva* and *uttara* would presume that these 'others' (whoever they might be) are following the *pravṛttikrama* or order of resorption, in contrast to M.

'Most autonomous'; this exclusively means 'transcending the world,' as aforesaid. The other, however, the one who both transcends the world and has the same nature of the world, the one called Paramaśivabhaṭṭāraka, will be explained later.

Such a one 'called Śiva exists'. This is what is meant: through the Autonomy that consists of both disclosure and concealment, which is unattainable by any other *tattva*, [there arises] an expectancy [*aunmukhya*] towards the adoption [*parigraha*] of the ever increasing succession of *śakti*s beginning with Will, Action, and Knowledge, which are totally encompassed by the essential unity [*sāmarasya*] of the pair of *śakti*s called Consciousness and Delight. Because of this [expectancy], there is a particular cognizer, Śivabhaṭṭāraka, whose essence is the manifestation [*parispandasāra*] of the state of marshalling [His own] consciousness, which is powerful enough [*pragalbha*] to produce the miracle that is the blossoming forth of the multitude of the infinite cycles of outwardly existing *śakti*-s: this, in fact, is the setting in motion [*vikṣobha*] of the world, as according to the position of the *Śivasūtra*-s that "the world is a collection of His own *śakti*s."

As it is said in the *Śivadṛṣṭi*:

> Śiva is nothing other than the Self within all entities, shining forth, tranquil-minded and omnipresent, the [power] of His will extending unimpeded, and the [power] of His knowledge and action spreading forth.

As in the *Vijñānendukaumudī*:

> The ground of the state of being all-pervasive, accepted to be knowerhood and agenthood, consisting of the wonder at His own manifestation—[so] is the condition of Śiva taught to be.

"Exists" [in the *gāthā*]: The lordly power as it has just been characterized is entirely equivalent to Being-as-such, [what is in fact] His unique nature [*svarūpasattā*]. And

this [Being] does not deviate from being conscious; this has already been stated, when it was said that,

> What is consciousness is said to be Being alone, and that very Being is called consciousness.

And that [Being] [ought] to be recognized as

> The dynamism, Being-as-such [*mahāsattā*] that is unqualified by [the limitations of] space and time.

And as a result of that Being's constant presence, there is the use of the present tense [in the verb *bhavati*].

[*ava.* to gā 14:] Now, he examines *śaktitattva*, which comes next in order:

> **When that very One turns expectantly towards the world, to will it, to know it, and to make it, He is said to be one whose unique nature is *śakti*, his splendor grown thick with the liquor that is the triangle of the Heart.** (14)

The very same Śiva whose unique nature has just been described, 'He is said to be one whose unique nature is *śakti*.' The meaning is this: when He enters into a state of being somewhat engorged [*ucchūnatāvasthāyāṃ*], he is referred to by the word '*śakti*.' And this unique nature of His is as follows: the 'liquor' is his own 'Heart', which is characterized as being identical with the 'triangle' that is none other than the conceptual elaboration of the world consisting of 'will,' 'knowledge,' and 'action'. [It is called 'liquor' since it] is the means whereby the celebration that is the savoring [*scil.* of experience] is constantly ongoing [*nityapravṛttacarvaṇotsavatvāt*]. It is capable

of exciting the action of Consciousness and Delight that are immersed [within it?]. Of His own accord—in line with the Vedic teaching that"I shall be many, I shall produce offspring"—He experiences the 'splendor' or superabundant happiness—the commencement of His heart's act of projection—that is 'made thick' or augmented by this liquor, [and so becomes] like a mass of water in a great tank, ready to overflow.

It has been said in the revered *Stotrāvalī*:

> You emit everything, while shining forth yourself; while thinking [your own] form, you think the world. As you yourself quiver with your inborn *rasa*, so the circle of entities shines forth.

And therefore, in accord with the view of the *Śivadṛṣṭi*

> When [His] gaze is turned on the beginning of the waveless waters, moving towards the state of being full of waves, that is indeed understood as expectancy.

when He 'turns expectantly towards' outwardly generating the just-mentioned nature of things [*arthatattva*][15] that abides within his own heart, he is referred to as '*Śakti*.' And expectancy exists along with His will, knowledge, and action.[16]

'Is said to be': He is proclaimed to have this sort of a unique nature in many of the scriptures. Thus the *Śivadṛṣṭi*:

> In this way Śiva consists of awareness, and He alone is the highest tranquility. [This tranquility] alone goes to the state of being expectant, which consists of His will, knowledge, and action. [This expectancy] alone is the state of [all possible kinds of] existence beginning with [the state of] one whose body consists of Śakti, and extending down to a denizen of hell .

[15]This refers back to the spectrum of the *tattvas* discussed in the commentary on *gāthā* 12.

[16]As will become clear in the quotations cited below, Maheśvarānanda is here following an alternate tradition, that admits *aunmukhya* among the fundamental potencies of Śiva, along with will, knowledge, and action. This tradition is most clearly and significantly championed by Somānanda's *Śivadṛṣṭi*, but is clearly also adopted by the *Pūjārahasya* (a work otherwise unknown to me) in the quotation given below.

and so forth.

And also in the revered *Kulamūlāvatāra*, beginning with [the verse]:

> From the highest cause, peaceful Śiva, lacking beginning and ending, the Power of Will did proceed outward, then Knowledge, then Action.

and ending [with the verse]:

> She produced all creatures, [and] the fourteen worlds, and as for everything made of language, it has its origin in Mātṛkā.

And as it says in the *Gloss* on the revered *Pratyabhijñā*:

> The Autonomous One, Whose form is consciousness, possesses the will to exist as the world. [It is this] alone that is his status as a cause, *i. e.* His agenthood.

Thus the revered *Tantrāloka*:

> The god who is *akula* has the highest Kaulikī Śakti, having the ability to stretch forth creation: the Lord is inseparable from Her.

As in the revered *Mālinīvijaya*:

> That *śakti* of the creator of the world is said to be inseparably connected [with him]; it is none but She who is [the goddess/ oh lady][17] accepted as the faculty of will of [God when] He desires to create. When, within this world, She causes one to know some knowable object with total certainty, thus: 'it is this way, and not otherwise', she is known as the Power of Knowledge. But when, having thought 'Let this thing be thus', making that object here [in the world], she is called [the Power of] Action. And so, though she has these [three/two][18] form , through the force of circumstances, the Goddess appears in infinite different ways, like a wishing-stone."

And thus also in the *Parāsūkta*:

[17] Depending on whether we accept the version of the text constituted by Vasudeva, or that transmitted in the *Mahārthamañjarī* MSS.

[18] Vasudeva's edition reads *dvirūpāpi*, surprisingly with no attestation of *trirūpāpi* in any of his sources. It seems clear that Maheśvarānanda, at least, must have had the latter reading in front of him.

> Oh Lady, it seems [*kila*] that those learned in the scriptures describe as 'will' that expectancy towards Your actions beginning with creation, which come naturally to You and are constantly stretching forth. It is because of this [expectancy] that you know and you create every object.[19]

And in the *Pūjārahasya*:

> This set of four—expectancy, will, knowledge, and action—is the movement of the God of Gods, having the form of Bodhabhairava. The expectancy of the great lord comes about through the casting aside of uninvolvement, that this entire world might be—surely there is no arguing about this."

[*ava.* to 15]: Now, he examines Sadāśiva and Īśvara:

Of the pair knowledge and action, when there is the flashing forth of the first, it is the god Sadāśiva. When the second is prominent, it is the second, that one called Īśvara. (15)

It is in fact knowledge that is the unique nature, established through introspection, of all living creatures, consisting [as it does] in the shining forth of one's own self-awareness. And action—that which is connected with hands, feet, and so on—appears [*parisphurati*] [as] it conforms to anyone's direct perception.[20] In this respect, just as in [the case of statements] like "I know" and "I act," so too in the case [of statements like] "I know," it is only the sense of the word "I" that appears as the meaning/referent [*artha*] of the word "you" on the analogy with (for example) looking in a mirror. Further, in this same way, just as—when [someone named] Caitra is speaking—[he

[19] Is this the same text as the *Parāstotra* elsewhere quoted by Maheśvarānanda as one of his own works? If so, he seems to register different opinion as to the relation between the three generally accepted *śakti*s of Śiva and the *aunmukhya* under discussion here. There is also a *Parāsūkta* attributed to a Sahajānandanātha that is cited in one of the commentaries to the *Paraśurāmakalpasūtra* (see Sanderson 1990).

[20] Or, alternately, 'any direct perception.'

might for example say] "Caitra bows," it is precisely self-awareness [*ahambhāva*] that is understood as being [expressed as] the third person [or some other grammatical person], through the use of distancing [*vyavadhānopadhānena*].[21] Thus, in every case it is I-cognition alone that is the [underlying] reality of the self.

As it is said:

> All verbs are based on [the verb] 'to be', a contributory factor [*kārakam*] is based on the [grammatical] agent, grammatical number is based on the singular, and grammatical person culminates in the first person.

Further, the sense of the world 'knowledge' consists mainly of self-awareness [*ahantollekha*]. In this way, it may be [further] specified that, given the fact that the final meaning of such [uses of language as] "you do" and "he does" is in fact "I do", action also (just like knowledge) is totally pervaded by self-awareness. It is solely because of the predominance of the object-awareness [*idambhāva*] that the conventional difference [*bhedavyavahāra*] of action is experienced.

And in this way, with respect to these two types of activity [*bhāvau*], knowledge and action, when there is the predominance of the first, *i.e.* knowledge, and so there is necessarily [*arthāt*] the subordination, i.e. the obscuration, of the second [*i.e.* action], [then] there is said to be the *tattva* called Sadāśiva. One called Sadāśiva is worshipped as the overlord of this [*tattva*], in the same way that Viṣṇu, Rudra and [other deities are worshipped].[22] And he is a 'god', i.e. capable of a synthetic awareness of many

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[21]By *vyavadhāna* or 'distancing,' Maheśvarānanda refers to the sort of circumlocutory use (not at all uncommon in Sanskrit) of third person grammatical forms for a speaker referring to him- or herself. For example, *ayaṃ janaḥ kṣamyatām*, literally 'let this person be forgiven' is a common way to say 'Excuse me'.

[22]This is possibly a jab at the liturgical centrality accorded to Sadāśiva by Maheśvarānanda's Saiddhāntika opponents.

objects [such as] play, discourse and so forth [*krīḍāvyavahārādyanekārtha*][23] because of the abundance of the Power of knowledge [*dṛkśakter aulbaṇyāt*] and the non-existence of [the Power of] action, owing to its extreme diminution. Further, 'god' [*deva*] was said in order to point out, from this point onward [*etadupakramam eva*], the shining [*dyotana*] of the Lord, Who is indistinguishable from His own *śakti*, which is the desire to create the world as it consists of the *tattvas*. As was said by the revered master Abhinavagupta:

> We venerate that cycle of the *tattvas* that is Śiva, that radiates within [the range] that has a glorious beginning in the revered Sadāśiva[-tattva] and ends in the earth.

However, the designation of Śiva and Śakti as *tattvas* is not really literally meant; rather it is a figure of speech, on account of the trace connection with [an as yet overcome] dualizing cognition [°*vikalpasaṃsparśamātrāt*] , *i.e.* the idea of there being a creator [*nirvāhakatā*] of the further group of *tattvas* beginning with Sadāśiva. Since both Śiva and Śakti are called *tattvas*, albeit figuratively [*upacāreṇāpi*], there is no problem whatsoever with the fact of there being thirty-six *tattvas*.

The 'second' of these [in the *gāthā*] is action, and when it is 'prominent,' *i.e.* there is a profusion of it, what may also be called its dynamism [*sphuraṇāparaparyāye*], and consequently there is a quiescence [*staimitye*] to knowledge, 'it is that one called Īśvara': It is traditionally taught that there is a *tattva* called 'Īśvara', and its overlord is some cognizer who is himself called 'Īśvara'. This amounts to saying [the following]: of the set of knowledge and action— the subjective and the objective [domains of

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[23]This is a *nirvacana* or etymology, deriving the word *deva* from the verbal root $\sqrt{div}$: among the meanings assigned to this root are 'play,' 'shine,' 'wager,' 'go,' 'ask,' 'delight,' and 'lament.'

experience, respectively]—when there is a preponderance of the first, there is the *tattva* called Sadāśiva, the essential nature of which is the state of being a cognizer of the world as both manifest and unmanifest, like a picture that is [as yet] incomplete [*anunmīlitacitranyāyena*].[24] Through the converse of this, when there is the blazing forth of the Power of action, there is the *tattva* of Īśvara, having the form of one capable of a synthetic awareness of the world as it is manifest [only].

'Flashing forth of the first' [in the *gāthā*]. It is clear that disclosure and concealment [together] are the motive principle [*spandatattvam*] that is the highest Autonomy of the Lord. And with regard to this, when there is disclosure of the subjective, there is concealment of the objective and when there is disclosure of the objective there is concealment of the subjective. Thus, the other pair of names by which these two *tattva*s are known in certain other scriptures is also indicated [in the *gāthā*], in line with the teaching of the revered *Pratyabhijñā*:

> Īśvara is the outward flashing forth, Sadāśiva is the inward concealment.

Through saying 'the second' [in the *gāthā*], [and so] illustrating the absence of any interruption [between the two], even granted that there is a dissimilarity of Īśvara from the Sadāśiva *tattva*, it can be seen that even though the teaching is of a series [of instances] of the difference of the several [*tattva*s from each other] [*tattadvailakṣaṇyaprabandhopanyāse 'py*], [nevertheless] throughout the entire spectrum of the

[24]The source of Maheśvarānanda's *nyāya* here may well be *Kumārasambhava* 1.32a *unmīlitaṃ tūlikayeva citraṃ* '[Parvatī's beauty was made manifest by adolescence] like a picture is manifested by a ink-brush.' The exact import of *anunmīlita* would appear in the present case to mean, 'unfinished, incomplete' like a picture that has yet to be colored in. Note however that there is a *pāṭhabheda* here: the northern MSS read *unmīlitacitranyāyena*, 'like a picture that has [just ?] been completed.

tattvas, one should be aware [*anusandheya*] that there is a gradual involvement of the subjective [pole of experience] [*ahantānusyūti*]. As it said in the revered *Pratyabhijñā*:

> But, after that, when there is the focus upon externality, there is the Pārameśvara [*tattva*].

And because the subjective consists of the pair Śiva and Śakti, manifestation of it [*i.e. idaṃtā* or the objective] is appropriate in precisely here [in these two *tattvas*]. Through this, the complete semantic potential [*pūrṇopādāna*] of the *gāthā* has been explained.

[*ava.* to *gā.* 16:] Now, he explains Pure Awareness [*śuddhavidyā*]:

> **That Self is the knower, and worldly activity consists of the objects of knowledge. That place where there is union of these two, having a single rasa, that, surely, is the stainless Awareness.** (16)

God is the Self, which though capable of awareness is divided in its self-consciousness [*vibhinnāhaṃbhāva*].[25] And worldly activity—which is [in fact] His alone [*tasyaiva lokavyavahāraḥ*]—is [at once] actually identical [with God] and able to be encompassed by [His] power of cognition. [It consists] of such acts as accepting and rejecting, actions are intentionally directed towards the apparent diversity [of the world], which is based on manifestation and reflexive awareness,[26]

[25] That is, divvied up into the pluralities of apparent selves.

[26] *sphurattāparāmarśānuprāṇanasya*] In the current instance, the first two elements to this compound appear to be a *dvandva* acting as a synonym for the much more frequently encountered pairing of *prakāśa* and *vimarśa*.

These two enter into 'union'—that is, they are cognitively inseparable: this state [*yo 'rthaḥ*] is the 'stainless' or 'pure' Awareness. And this union 'has a single *rasa*'. That is, the Awareness has a 'single', *i.e.* undifferentiated, locus that is perceived/savored [*rasyamānam adhikaraṇam*] as the receptacle of the sense of wonder already described, which is unobtainable in any other *tattva*. And, so, this amounts to saying that:

> Real Gnosis is the coordination of the awareness of 'I' and the awareness of 'that.'

As my revered teacher said in his *Mātaṅgīstotra*:

> My lady—I praise your two breasts, full, heavy with ambrosia, lovely and equal to each other in their beauty. Oh Suvidyā, these [breasts] of yours, set in even order [*samānābhikṛtau*] and equal to each other, shine forth as 'I' and as 'that.'

Among the cognizers subject to *māyā*, an uncoordinated relationship is generally accepted between these two, *i.e.* [they are understood] as 'I' with respect to the knower and as 'that' with respect to the knowable. But here it is not like that and so the coordination [between these] is announced by the phrase 'having a single *rasa*.' On the other hand, the 'purity' of this [Gnosis] [consists in the fact that] the awareness that 'I [am that]' towards all objects of knowledge, though they appear to be external [to consciousness] is natural and appropriate to it. Among ordinary people, however, this [awareness] is referred to as 'that.' As it says in the *Paryantapañcāśikā*:

> Purity is the immersion into the I-awareness of outwardly manifested objects.

And in the *Tantrāloka*:

> When awareness differentiates among these things, even though they consist of consciousness, it is called the highest impurity; purity is the destruction of this.

Now, there are others who think that the purity of [the Gnosis] is as follows: there is a consciousness that contains the identity of 'I [am] that' [that is present] in the higher *tattva*s beginning with Sadāśiva. Here [in *śuddhavidyātattva*] it is impossible to remove the 'that'-portion, which consists of Māyā, even though there is the commonality of *rasa* owing to coordination [of 'I'and 'that']. Because of that, and also because Sadāśiva and the rest [of the denizens of the higher *tattva*s] are innocent of the ways of *māyā* [*māyāvārttānabhijñatvāt*], this 'that'-portion is retained by this [Gnosis] as something that is cognized just like I-cognition, since the flaw of its connection with Māyā [*māyīyatādoṣa*] has been eliminated. However, it is in the absence of this cognition that coordination alone might be experienced.

The meaning is as follows: Because of God's desire to show his favor towards certain cognizers yet bound as He would towards Sadāśiva [or any other being], there exists Pure Gnosis, a Power of the autonomy of consciousness, which brings about the recognition of one's true nature, made manifest through the wiping away of the stain of impure gnosis. Depending upon this [*śuddhavidyā*] there is a great diversity of cognizers: the Vijñānākalas, Rudra, and Agni.

By [the use of the word] 'that' [in the gāthā], isolate emancipation [*kaivalyaṃ*] is revealed, that which is obtained through an awareness of the substitution and replacement of self-awareness, in order to draw attention to the fact that [self-awareness], as an object included within the objective [pole of experience] is [in fact] entirely within the other category [*i.e.* the subjective].[27]

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[27]Here, Maheśvarānanda seems to imply that his verse has a further meaning arrived at through secondary signification or *lakṣaṇā*. Saying 'that self' (*so appā/sa ātmā*) causes a listener to become

'That, surely' [in the gāthā]: this is employed as it illustrates just how widely known [*śuddhavidyā*] actually is: all the [different] divinities of the bodily constituents, such as Ḍākinī and Rākinī,[28] all the different means to achieving human life-goals such as religious observance and ritual action, all the different sorts of initiation such as Śāmbhava and Śākta, all of the different states of awareness such as waking and dreams, these are each severally so called only because they are modes of Vidyā's appearance [*asyā eva vibhūtiparispandatayā*].

'Where' [in the gāthā]: this is an indeclinable particle employed in the place of a declined form.

[*ava.* to *gā.* 17]: Now, he unveils *māyā*:

> **She who gives rise to the constructs of conceptual thought upon the actual nature, itself unitary,[29] is called Māyā, the deluding Power of the lord of the world, the Most Autonomous.** (17)

That which is in fact the Lord's 'nature,' not held in common [by anything else], consisting of the Being-as-such [*mahāsattā*] that is the manifestation of the world, is 'unitary' [*ekarasaḥ*], when examined logically. [That is,] it abides as the essence of solely that which is beautiful in the actions of one's consciousness and bliss [*svasaṃvidānandaparispandasaundaryamātrasāratayā*], not as something suited

aware of a surface incoherence [*mukhyārthabādha*], *i.e.* that the self (actually being unitary and, as Maheśvarānanda said in 16.1, identical to God) cannot be speciated into 'this self,' 'that self,' 'yonder self,' *etc.*

[28]See 20: 65–66 and the translation there. Note that, as in that case, A_1M here present an alternate reading, substituting *sākinī* for *ḍākiṇī*.

[29]Or, alternatively reading a locative absolute, 'although the action nature has a single savor,'

to embracing the inhibitions of conceptual thought [*ex conj.*], since the arguments of the dualists [that underlie such inhibitions] will shortly be refuted.

Even though this is [really] the case, upon that very [nature][30] [there are projected] conceptual thoughts, such as 'Caitra', or 'Maitra', or 'pillar' or 'pot,' which, even though there is a great deal of apparent difference, as there is in the fashioning of such ornaments as bangles and diadems [out of gold], [these] manifestations of knowable objects continually exist within the heart, engendering a delight at [their own] charm [*cārutvacamatkārakāritayā hṛdayagatāḥ santo*]. [That which] 'gives rise' to these over and over again, and so confounds even the liberated man with the fear of bondage and confounds even the bound man with the mistaken notion of liberation is 'a Power called Māyā,' since God is [called] the 'Most Autonomous.' For, it is this alone that is the highest level of His autonomy: the fact that He has the ability to produce the great variety of differences and subdifferences even though the world as it [actually] exists is nondifferent from the manifestation of His Self. It is because of this that the Lord is declared to be the one who can accomplish the most difficult of tasks. And for this same reason, He is 'the Lord of the World', the master of the variety of phenomena such as bodies, sense faculties, worlds, etc.

Without Māyā, the variety of phenomena, which is really the manifestation/extension of difference [*bhedaprathā*], would cease to exist. And were it to cease to exist, the power of the Lord, its correlative, wouldn't make sense, and thus absolutely nothing

[30] *evaṃ sati tatraiva*] Note the ambiguity of Maheśvarānanda's own gloss of his *gāthā*: he appears to understand the locative in the verse to be both part of an absolute phrase and as a locus.

else could become manifest.[31] Thus, this thing called Māyā is the highest form of [God's] autonomy. As my revered teacher said in his *Manonuśāsanastotra*:

> I worship the world's bliss, one it has dissolved into that consciousness that is its very essence, because of the dissolution of the insentient stuff of Māyā, what is also called Autonomy.

And as in the *Paramārthasaṃgraha*:

> The Lord's greatest autonomy, which accomplishes the most difficult of tasks, is the goddess Māyāśakti: this is the Lord's own disguise.

And in the *Śacīmatam*:

> You are my power of autonomy, the accomplisher of the most difficult of tasks, you are renowned as Māyā, the one who makes me, your Lord, appear as the universe.

Also, in the *Stotrāvalī*:

> No only was there absolutely nothing[32] differentiated that was created, there was also nothing that was not bliss fashioned , yet [the world seems to be full of] suffering and difference in every imaginable way: [in this] it is the site of an unimaginable wonder—praise be to you.

Also, in the *Tantrāloka*:

> That which has this autonomous nature: what could there possibly be that he does not make wondrously diverse.[33]

[31] In the edition, I have adopted the reading given in the otherwise highly contaminated and corrupt B_2; the reading found there is actually the result of a correction *secunda manu*. Rather than this being a remarkable survival in an otherwise unreliable source, the presence of the reading *ujjṛmbheta* would appear to be a happy accident: in correcting the ms. readings to agree with the E_V version, the subsequent reader blotted out the verbal stem seen in the edition's other two northern sources, but retained the (I believe) correct optative ending. This form supplies the necessary counterfactual sense, something the indicative form *ujjṛmbhate* found in the southern sources fails to convey.

[32] *[na ca...] kiñcid apy*] *kiñcid asty* Ed. Note that the text given here diverges from the published version. This is one of the several cases (as in the following quotation of TĀ) where Maheśvarānanda appears to transmit better readings than those available to the editors of the KSTS. As is the case here, however, one must be eclectic: the KSTS's reading *na nirmitam* is superior to the *vinirmitam* found in all the MMP MSS collated for the edition here.

[33] *vicitrayet*] *vicintayet* Ed. Maheśvarānanda's quotation of the *lectio difficilior* appears to be almost certainly correct, as it seems to be the reading available to Jayaratha, as can be gathered from his *avataraṇikā* to this verse in his *Tantrālokaviveka*: *evaṃ* ***vaicitryasya*** *kiṃ nimittam ity āśaṅkyāha* (I thank Harunaga Isaacson for pointing this out to me).

The cognizers who depend upon Māyā are extensive: the Pralayākalas, Viṣṇu and Sūrya. Even though it says in the *Parātriṃśikāśāstra* that

> There are four Concentrations: Wind [= ya], Fire [=ra], Water [=la], and Indra [=va].

and therefore it is appropriate to group Māyā together with the limited power to act [*kalā*], [impure] awareness [and *rāga*]; nevertheless, [in the same work], [the *kañcuka*s and *māyā*] are spoken of separately, viz.

> Making it extends through the body of Brahmā, beginning with Kālāgni and ending in Māyā.[34]

[In this case] this is only employed for the sake of the manifestation of the first element of the seed-syllable of the Goddess Parā (*i.e.* the *sa* in the mantra SAUḤ).

How can there be a refutation of the idea of difference, whereby the the nature of the world might [be maintained to possess] a unity of essence?—to such an objection, it is said [in response:] What, indeed, is 'difference'? Is it reciprocal negation of two things, or the uniqueness of properties, or, indeed, is difference the natural state of things?

It is not the first [of these possibilities], as surely a statement like "The pillar is not a pot and the pot is not a pillar," arises only through dependence upon an accidental property [*upādhi*], *i.e.* a reciprocal relation [*anyonyatā*]. And this [reciprocality], upon examination, only arises when the alterity,[35] of the two things is repeatedly stated.

And is that alterity the actual nature of things [*padārthānāṃ svabhāvaḥ*], or is it rather some accidental property dependent on difference? If it be the first, then

[34] See here Torella 1998, pp. 72ff

[35] 'Alterity' is an awkward choice to translate *anyatvam*, but is necessary here to distinguish Maheśvarānanda's choice of words here from *bhedaḥ* ('difference') and *anyonyatā* ('reciprocality').

there would be the problem of there being difference even of things when they are all by themselves [*ekatvākrāntānām api bhedaḥ*]. And if it be the second, then alterity would only make sense when difference already exists. And since difference even at this point has not been proven,[36] therefore there would be [either of two fallacies, *viz.*] begging the question [*ātmāśrayatva*] or circularity of argument [*anyonyāśrayatva*].

Nor is it the second option, [*viz.* the uniqueness of properties.] This uniqueness is something that has the form of [a universal]—pillar-ness, pot-ness, etc.—which the things like pillars possess. With respect to this, if some restriction exists, that, say, pillarness only exists in pillars, and potness only in pots, then difference might make sense. But [*ca*] no sort of restrictor is to be seen [in the world] . One might object that there is some differentiator of one thing from another [*tattadvyavasthāpakam*], for example, being made of wood [in the case of pillars] and having a broad middle [in the case of pots]. But this would be wrong, because there is no cognition [of this differentiator] as unique to these [pillars and pots]. And such a cognition would only make sense when difference already exists. And, [difference] has been placed within the set of things to be demonstrated, and so just as before, there would be the unwanted result of begging the question, *etc.*[37] Further, [there would be] difference—the uniqueness of one thing from the other—on the part of [these universals like] being made of wood, as well. Thus, when this [problem] is examined all the way down to the level of the atom, there would be an infinite regress, one that is totally fatal [to

[36] Or, reading with A_1M, "difference does not come into existence even at this point."

[37] Or, again if we read with A_1M: 'the problems, such as begging the question, return.'

this line of thinking] [*āmūlaviparāsiny anavasthā syāt*].[38]

It is not the third option either. For, it must be said that by 'natural state' [*svarūpam*], we must refer to the form that is one's own, *i.e.* that is unconnected with the real nature [*svabhāva*] of anything else, as there would otherwise be the unwanted consequence of the contamination of real natures [*svabhāvasāṅkāryaprasaṅgāt*]. And if we examine [the question], "what is the cause of the uninvolvement of things like pillars with the real natures of other things?", in that case also the only answer [*uktiḥ*] that makes sense is [to say], "because of the existence of difference". And so in the current instance also [saying that difference] has a real nature continues to be mere wishful thinking [*manorathāyamānasvabhāvaḥ*], [and] thus this is the same old problem. [*prācīna eva doṣānuṣaṅgaḥ*]. Moreover, if one says that difference is the natural state of things, then the presence of error [in certain cognitions]—[for example, saying] "this is silver" [of mother-of-pearl]—would be [dead and gone], its funeral obsequies already given [*dattāñjaliḥ syāt*]. For, in this case, the natural state of the mother-of-pearl is clearly perceived, and it is assessed to be silver. Thus even when one adopts the position that error is not itself something positive [*akhyātivādapadavīprasthāne 'pi*], it must be accepted that it is only the errant cognition that is denied, and not also the usage [/worldly action] to which it gives rise [*tadanuguṇasya vyavahārasyāpi*].

[38] As Isaacson notes (personal communication), this seems to be an idiosyncratic phrase of Maheśvarānanda's, instead of the more common *mūlakṣayakāriṇy anavasthā*. In either case the meaning is the same: the infinite regress in this case is vicious, and undermines the basis of the opponent's argument. The use of *paramāṇvantaṃ*, which I am interpreting to be an adverb, is peculiar: I can for the moment adduce no parallel usages (although *e.g. paramāṇvanto vibhāgaḥ* 'a division extending all the way down to the atomic level' is relatively common, *e.g. Nyāyavarttika ad* 4.2.16). It seems clear that Maheśvarānanda is speaking metaphorically here, as not even the most diehard philosophical realist would accept that universals consist of atoms.

Further, this difference which appears among objects is itself either different from those objects, or it isn't. If it is not, then there is only non-difference. If it is different, then, this difference also, when being examined as to "how [can this be]?" produces an infinite regress, because of the proliferation of the set of successive differences [that must be posited]. And, by its very nature [*prakṛtyā*], this difference either would pertain to an object that is different or to an object, even though it is not different. If to a different [object], what is the point of this adventitious difference? Further [*ca*], in this [possibility] there would be a great fault, superfluousness. If [it pertains to] a nondifferent thing, then there would be an obvious contradiction.

And furthermore [the following] needs to be considered. We speak of difference in terms like, "the pot is different from the pillar." In [such statements] it is necessarily the case that one takes both of the two things together in a single gaze [*ekahṛdayakroḍīkāryatayā bhāvyam*],[39] in order to speak of difference [at all]. And, when this is so [*tathābhāve*], it is only the nondifference of the two that remains, because it is the real nature of the difference between things [*vastubhedasvabhāvatvāt*],[40] as in the verse:

> The inner, true nature [of things][41] is like the act of pointing out with one's finger that 'here, this is different from that': it affirms the actual nondifference of the two.

[39]More literally, 'It must surely be that both of the two things are to be brought together by a single heart.'

[40]Or, should the variant of A_1 and M be adopted, 'because [it is] the actual nature of things.'

[41]This verse can possibly be taken rather differently: "one's internal feeling [*antargatasvabhāva*] that 'here, this is different from that' is like the act of the pointing with one's finger..." I thank Harunaga Isaacson for this suggestion.

The formal syllogism [*prayoga*] of this is as follows: anything that is luminous [*yat prakāśate*] consists of a single illumination, due to the fact of its being luminous, as in the case of the awareness of 'I.' Giving an explanation of the elimination of all additional causative properties [*upadhi*[42]] would only add to the length of the work: these desperate efforts [to fulfill] the morbid cravings of the doctrine of difference are pointless indeed.

Now, if one were to ask how there are such completely distinct usages such as "pillar" and "pot", I would reply: "due to our conventional understanding [*maryadā*] of difference-and-non-difference." For God's illumination evenly reveals itself everywhere throughout the expanse [of creation], because of the autonomy that is His alone. And, as in the case of the waves upon the ocean, it makes sense to speak of separate objects like pillars and pots. But then, one might object that there is partially [*aṃśataḥ*] the undesirable occurrence of the problems [that inhere to] the theory of difference here as well. But this is not the case, because it is only pure difference that undergoes such a refutation. Here, on the other hand, as it has the good fortune of being incorporated within non-difference, difference also remains unflawed, as something consisting of [nondifference], just as there is saltiness of all [water] upon its entering into the ocean [*lavaṇākarāvagāḍhasarvalāvaṇyanyāyena*]. This is because

[42]In technical sense employed here, *upādhi* refers to a property that pervades the *probandum* but not the *probans* in a syllogism. In the typical case *parvato dhūmavān agneḥ*, 'there is smoke on the mountain because of [the presence of] fire,' the dampness of the wood that is aflame on the mountain, which is causally related to the production of smoke from the fire, is called an *upādhi*. As there are cases where fire exists in the absence of wet wood, and accordingly an absence of smoke, as for example in a ball of red-hot iron, the presence of smoke cannot in all cases provide the basis for a reliable judgement as to the presence of fire. An attempt to offer such a syllogism (taking the form 'where there is fire there is smoke') is forbidden because of the presence of an *upādhi*, see for example *Tarkasaṃgraha*, pp. 60–62.

we maintain that the world's difference is only based in *division* [*vibhāganibandhana eva*], but is not conditioned by actual *distinction* [*pṛthaktvopādhika*] since, of these two options, only the second is in contradiction to nondifference.

But, it might be objected that the converse [to the above] might be the case, *i.e.* that due to its misfortune of being associated with difference, non-difference would also be flawed. This is not the case, as the archetype maintains the ectype, and here it must be accepted that non-difference is the archetype and the other the ectype, since things, even though they are different, possess a unity that cannot be refuted, by virtue of their respective individual natures [*prātisvikena rūpeṇa*]. It is this in fact [what we call] non-difference; thus there is nothing illogical in saying that precisely this nondifference is the actual real nature [*vāstavasvabhāvo*] of the manifest appearance of the world, given that there are an endless number of *upaniṣad*s extant on precisely this subject, *e.g.* "Brahman is indeed one without a second" and "With respect to this, there is no diversity at all". If one were to object: is it not contradictory [to say] "[both] difference and non-difference"?, [we would say:] with all due respect, you have forgotten what was said at the outset, as it was thus accepted that there is an extremely great Power, called Māyā, possessed by the Lord, in order to accomplish such [otherwise] impossible tasks.

Through this, nondualism alone is the settled conclusion that is the basis of everything else. And this, as it is the uttermost basis, is the Parā [or, ultimate] state. On the other hand, difference-and-non-difference, while undergirding all our actions [*vyavahārasarvasvaṃ nirvahan*] manifests itself as the relation between the world and

that which transcends this world: this is the Parāparā [or, intermediate] state. And difference as it spreads all around, containing the allurements that are [as it were] the picture-gallery for the fashioning of the images that make up the world's diversity, as it is itself essentially a series of sproutings of the bold power of the reflection on the Illumination of the Lord who transcends the world: this is the Aparā [or lower] state. In these three states there is successively a gradation of yogins, the completely enlightened, the enlightened, and the unenlightened. And, in all these [states], there is at no point any disparity [one from the other]: they are all equally shot through with the Lord's Illumination. Thus it is implied that this is our position, the correct one, that is only to be taught by [or: to] the most skillful.

As it says in the *Paryantapañcāśikā*:

> Though it takes on so great, so infinite a form, entering into one's own unitary awareness, one will not give rise to conceptual thoughts.

These same three states are worshipped as deities by those undertaking rituals. As in the *Tantrāloka*:

> Parā is [white] like the moon, and the goddess Parāparā is red and that Aparā, the highest Kālī, appears savage, as a furious yoginī.

A secret: reflecting on the nature of Māyā in this way is liberation-in-life.

[*ava.* to 18:] Now, he examines the set of five [*tattvas*], beginning with limited action [*kalā*], which are the powers of Māyā, from the point of view of their function [*arthadvārā*, *i.e.* rather than their names].

There are five Power through which the all-powerful, all-knowing,

complete, eternal and unlimited Lord is made to seem to be the opposite. (18)

God is fundamentally [*prakṛtyā*] [both] the creator of the world, and [its] knower. For this reason, owing to His autonomy, He is 'complete' and, because of the absence of any need, He is satisfied in himself. Since it is impossible for there to be any sort of entity that is different from him and capable of limiting him, he is 'eternal', [*i.e.*] he transcends any temporally prior or subsequent negation. And therefore He is free from any sort of control [that might be a] limitation. Though He is like this, because of certain Powers which [appear to] act as causes [*śaktibhir nibandhanībhūtābhiḥ*] He appears as the opposite—as being connected with qualities like limited agency. There are five of these Powers. As it is said in the *Kramodaya*:

> Passion, Māyā, diminution, ignorance [or, 'knowledge'], binding fate and time: all of these are grounded in the five functions, and are called 'bond.'

And these are said to be the limited power to act [*kalā*], impure awareness [*aśuddha-vidyā*], passion [*rāga*], time [*kāla*], and binding fate [*niyati*]. The limited power to act is the cause of His limited agency; ignorance the reason for limited knowledge; passion the attachment to objects; time consists of the sequence of the appearance and disappearance of events; and binding fate is the source of such restrictions as 'this is mine' [and] 'this is not mine.' This set of five is called a 'carapace' [*kañcukam*] in the scriptures, because all five of them surround one's true form. For, were they not to exist, the individual soul [*puruṣa*] would become either like God, possessed of a far-stretching power of awareness, or else would be like a stone, having a lordly

power that is utterly diminished.

And, with respect to this, since the soul removes [these] by entering entering into [them] from highest to lowest (in the following order: Passion, Māȳa, ignorance, limited power to act, and time), these [carapaces] are employed as the five elements ([in the order] earth, water, fire, air, and *ākāśa*), with regard to the placing of the soul in the midst of them, just like [the mythical king] Triśaṅku [is set in the midst of the heavens]. It is because of this that these [carapaces] have been called Concentrations [*dhāraṇā*s], as [for example] in the *Parātriṃśikāśāstra*:

> There are four Concentrations: Wind [= *ya*], Fire [=*ra*], Water [=*la*], and Indra [=*va*]

[*ava.* to 19:] Now he explains the nature of the *puruṣa*:[43]

> **This very Śambhu, possessed of pure awareness, who is an actor in the drama of the world, has a wondrous state, a mask that he puts on, that is the *puruṣa*.** (19)

God continually experiences the 'awareness' (*i.e.* the knowledge of the real nature of his own autonomy) that is 'pure' (*i.e.* free from even the suspicion of the stain of limitation) as it is directed toward the delight of the all-encompassing realization of His identity with everything [*vaiśvātmya*°]— that which has the form 'I alone am all.' For this very reason he is called 'an actor', *i.e.* a performer in the 'drama of the world'; as it is said in the *Śivasūtra*:

[43] Elsewhere—in the comment to the preceding verse, for instance—I have translated *puruṣa* as 'the individual soul.' Here I leave it untranslated; when a pronoun is necessary in English, I have used the masculine.

> The Self is a dancer.

As it is [further] said in the *Naiśvāsa*:

> In one aspect, you are the inner Self, the Dancer, who guards the treasure.

'The world' is the collection of *tattva*-s from earth to Śiva; because it is manifested through the pentad of states beginning with creation and maintenance, it resembles 'a drama' [as it is constructed out of] a pentad of situations beginning with the outset [*ārambha*] and the undertaking [*yatna*].[44] There is a verse on this—

> Though performing the drama of being a person,[45] through each and every one of the junctures—birth, childhood, youth, maturity, and death—at the final curtain I am Śiva, best of dancers.

As Bhaṭṭanārāyaṇa put it,

> The drama of the three worlds contains many good *bīja*-s and *garbha*-s,[46] Having begun it, oh Hara, what poet other than you can complete it?

And He [is called] 'Śambhu'; this may be analyzed as follows [*iti kṛtvā*]: the pleasure [*śam=sukham*] of the experiences of sounds, touch *etc.*—which are to be savored [as] those *rasa*-s such as *śṛṅgāra* and *karuṇā* by the spectators that are the senses—comes into being [*bhavati* from $\sqrt{}$*bhū*, hence -*bhuḥ*] from Him. When He becomes involved [°*unmukhasya*] in performing in the play that is the world, [Śiva] comes to possess a

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[44]On these dramatic *avasthās*—which in addition to the two given by Maheśvarānanda here, also include *prāptisambhava* (the possibility of attainment), *niyataphalaprāpti* (certainty of attainment) and *phalayoga* (successful completion)—see *Nāṭyaśāstra* 19.8ff

[45]*abhinayann api pauruṣanāṭakam*] Only E_V here gives a reading that conforms to the scansion of the *drutavilambita* meter—the scribe of A_2 doesn't seem to realize that the passage is metrical at all, while A_1 and M depart from the correct form in the third *pāda*. E_V (or the earlier edition of Ganapati Sastri) may be silently correcting here to repair the metrical solecism.

[46]*nisṛṣṭānekasadbījagarbhaṃ*] This may contains a pun—read as a *dvandva*, the *bīja* is an 'germ' of the action of a play and the *garbha* is its resolution, while reading as a *bahuvrīhi* the world is "that which has at its core the many seeds of beings"

state [*avasthā*], undertaken in order to adopt a role: this is *puruṣa*. That is, [Śiva] can rightly be called '*puruṣa*' [at this point]. As it says in the *Sāraśāstra*:[47]

> The lord of the gods binds himself, and free himself alone, he enjoys himself and knows himself and he alone may behold himself.

Out of conformity to this state, *prāṇa* causes inhalation and exhalation; *vyāna* works at [actions like] accepting and rejecting; *samāna* regulates the body; *udāna* digests nutrients; and *apāna* removes wastes such as urine: all of the varieties of [His] various energies can thus be understood. [The *puruṣa*] is unaware of the fact that he is actually God, due to a lack of the infusion of [the Śaiva initiatory] Power; this is what is referred to in a passage from the *Padasaṅgati*:

> The meaning is this: even the potter possesses the state of being the all-powerful Śiva while making of a pot, but failing to realize this, he [remains only] a potter.

While this is seemingly true, nevertheless [*yady api...tathāpi*] when one sees things as they really are, the [*puruṣa*'s] lordly power, as it is laid out in the scriptures, is incontrovertible.

To explain: God possesses a unique and particular nature; this is His ability to constantly perform the Five Actions. This will be clearly described in a moment. [By contrast], the Self as it is delineated by the illusionistic Vedāntins, for instance, ends up being ultimately unreal, [as it] consists of an inability to conceptualize the delight that is its own manifestation, precisely insofar as they fail to accept this.[48]

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[47] As the apparatus shows, this is in fact a quotation from the *Tantrāloka*, although as Abhinavagupta informs his readers two verses prior to the quote, he is himself quoting Śiva's words from the *Sāraśāstra*, another name for the *Trikahṛdayatantra* (TĀ 13.121cd: *śrīsāraśāstre bhagavān vastv etat samabhāṣata*).

[48] Compare here Kṣemarāja's opening to his comment on the tenth *sūtra* of the *Pratyabhijñāhṛdaya*, p. 22 (Maheśvarānanda's source for much of this passage, as indicated in the appara-

And the *puruṣa* [as understood here], even once it has descended along the path of *māyā*, nevertheless constantly performs the Five Actions, as it has been explained in the *Tantrāloka*:

> However, because of His ability to do the impossible, His autonomy, and His purity the Lord is skilled in playing at the concealment of his Self.

This is because the impress [*saṃskāra*] of his awareness is never without purpose in any condition whatsoever—even in states such as deep sleep, the internalized elaboration of some worldly concerns may be subtly noted, due to a synthesizing awareness of a moment of cognition [occurring] at a subsequent time.[49] The only difference is the gradation of the awareness in different states. As it says in the *Spanda*:

> [Self-awareness] never withdraws from its natural state as a perceiver, even when there appears to be [seeming] disruption by waking [sleep, and deep sleep], [as this is really] identical with it.[50]

This will be clarified later, in the *gāthā* [beginning] 'The yogin, in waking, in sleep'.

And so, whenever this [*puruṣa*], [insofar as he] possesses the autonomous power of awareness, is in the process of beholding something—for instance, a pillar—and becomes expectant towards [the act of] beholding [that] pillar, there is creation of it. That is to say [*iti kṛtvā*], creation [takes place] through [the *puruṣa*] alone, in as much as it is perceived to be something dissimilar from [other things, like] a pot. Once it has abided in that same place for two or three instants, it [can be said to]

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tus to the edition): *iha īśvarādvayadarśanasya brahmavādibhyaḥ ayam eva viśeṣaḥ, yat...sadā pañcavidhakṛtyakāritvaṃ cidātmano bhagavataḥ* "Here we see the sole difference between Śaiva nondualism and the Vedāntins, that the Lord who consists of consciousness alone is constantly performing the Five Actions."

[49] As K. Srinivasan explained in conversation, one realizes after a good night's sleep that one has had a good night's sleep.

[50] My interpretation of this verse follows that of Rāmakaṇṭha's *Spandakārikāvivṛti*, *ad loc.*

have continuous existence, since continuous existence [*sthiti*] is the label given to the endurance of the particular forms held by objects [*padārthānām*].

And when the focus shifts to another entity, for example a pot, then there is the destruction of the pillar and the emission of the pot. But, where there is the intermediate state between leaving off the pillar and settling on the pot, there is the fourth condition, as this consists of pure awareness, devoid of involvement with any content. As I said in my *Hymn to Komalavallī*:

> Once the mind has left off one thing that it has perceived and prepares to enter another:
> that intermediate state, oh Mother, is thought to depend on your nondual reality.

Running through all these stages and able to transcend them all, there is the power of consciousness that exists within the Self, [called] Pure Light [*bhāsā*].

Or, better still, within [the moment of] a synthetic awareness of something like a pillar, when one focuses upon it as being a pillar, then the fact of it being made of wood (for instance) is suppressed. And when one focuses on its being made of wood, then there is the suppression of its being a pillar. Thus, the creation of one and the retraction of the other can both clearly be seen. However, when one reflects on the combination of properties like 'being a pillar' or 'being made of wood', there is continuity, as neither of the two thoughts is being suppressed. And when there is the cessation of all the various conceptual thoughts such as 'being a pillar', then there is [the state called] the Nameless. When there is reflection upon the Self's radiance, there is 'Light'—thus the modes of creation, [maintenance, retraction, the Nameless, and Light] are to be seen [here].

And, with respect to this same example, when [the *puruṣa*] perceives a pillar as delimited by space, time, and form, he is not [merely] the would-be creator of its delimited manifestation. Nor is he [merely] the would-be retractor of its delimited manifestation as it is *not* delimited by [these particular coordinates] of space, time and [other factors]. On the other hand, [*tu*, *ex conj.*] [the *puruṣa*] is not [merely] the would-be sustainer of universal properties, for instance "pillar-ness." [The *puruṣa*] does experience the Fourth [Condition] when perceiving [some object] without conceptualization, and also [*punaḥ*] shows favor when revealing [phenomena] to be unified in their essence [*prakāśaikyena prakāśane*].[51] Thus the Puruṣa's real appeal is

[51]In this paragraph, I have exercised more editorial license than elsewhere; the passage I have constituted remains highly conjectural. I have chosen in the first instance to adopt the variants *sraṣṭṛtābhāsa etc.* found in A_1 and M: the fact of the two MSS read together against E_V is not itself especially probative given their overall closeness, yet the consistency of the variant in all three sentences along with the difficulty of explaining how this could have arisen from the reading recorded in E_V influenced my decision. It seems probable that an editor-scribe in the tradition represented by E_V emended away the sentence final °*ābhāsa*s, either because he suspected a dittography, or because he was familiar with the parallel in the *Pratyabhijñāhṛdaya* (a text widely disseminated and studied in the South).

That parallel—which would ordinarily provide strong *prima facie* grounds for any editorial decision—in this case presents problems of its own. Whatever the correct reading here, it is clear that Maheśvarānanda has recast his source-text: I presume that he has altered the sense and the wording, but not the grammatical construction (with each abstract noun construing with °*ābhāsāṃśe* in the locative). Kṣemarāja's sense in this passage seems reasonable clear; I understand him to say, "[Once the pure consciousness that is Śiva becomes embodied], when he manifests an object—a patch of blue, for instance—as delimited by space, time and [other factors], He creates the particular manifestation-elements of space, time, *etc*, [while] He destroys the manifestation-elements of other [possible] space-time coordinates. He maintains the manifestation elements [of the properties of the object, such as] the color blue [in the patch of blue]; through the interruption [of His attention] [Śiva] dissolves [any of these] manifestation-elements, [while] He shows favor in revealing [these] to be unified in their essence."

The question thus becomes: why did Maheśvarānanda feel the need to depart from his source? I believe that—as is born out in 19:34–36—Maheśvara is particularly concerned with the simultaneous ongoing performance of these five actions for the embodied soul. In each of the first three cases (creation, retraction, and continuation), it is not that merely the individual (=Śiva) is performing a discrete action; rather, all three are constantly in play—hence the negative construction as well as the compound final *ābhāsa*. This latter use of the word is thus arguably closer to its negatively-valenced usage in Nyāya (*hetv-ābhāsa*, *vyāpty-ābhāsa*, *etc.*, thus 'would-be X' in the translation), rather than the neutrally-valued *ābhāsa* as "manifestation."

established [to be] that lordly power that is simultaneously performing the five tasks beginning with creation without any restriction whatsoever.[52]

It is for precisely this reason that though he possesses a limited nature he is called "the *puruṣa*," as he is actually unlimited. As in the *śruti* passage:

> All is made full by this *puruṣa*.

And, in the *Cidgaganacandrikā*:

> To that one, who has gone to the state of being a *puruṣa*, because of its being full.[53]

As for God's Five Actions, there is no disagreement about the first three, emission, maintenance, and retraction. But as for the latter two, when seen from the perspective of certain benighted bound souls, these becomes a source of disturbance for their minds, comprising [such calamities as] the destruction of religious vows: and when [further], out of His infinite kindness, God redoubles His efforts to help them to comprehend their true nature by way of removing this, their misunderstanding—then, the pair of Actions are referred to as 'concealment' and 'favor'.

But, as it says in the *Tantrāloka*:

> Just like when a canvas is unfurled, and all at once, the picture is revealed, the world is revealed to yogins as being solely a collection of properties.

when the world itself is concentrated upon as being an effect, without any of these distinctions of percipients and bound souls, then the terms for the two Actions are "Nameless" and "Light". But enough with this digression.

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[52]Again, reading with A_1 and M, and understanding *vināpi niyamaṃ* as an emphatic; *cf.* Speijer 1990, §182.

[53]In both cases, the *nirukti* connection is between puruṣa and the root $\sqrt{}$*pṝ*, "to fill".

And as concerns 'an actor': someone appears to be Rāma (for instance) by virtue of [playing a] role: while this man is seen by spectators to be the locus of a cognition different from correct knowledge, error, doubt, or similarity, someone indifferent [to the performance], say a learned Brahman, sees him only as an actor.

[The use of the words] 'This very' [in the verse] reveals the need to reflect upon the ultimate identity of the God described in the *purāṇa*s and the *āgama*s with us. [Further]—once this realization has become manifest—this shows that the [seeming] difference extending between the *puruṣa* and the God is [nothing more substantial than] a piece of cloth tossed about by the wind.

By [the use of the words] 'A mere costume' the pitiable state of the *puruṣa* is implied: even though actually consubstantial with God, on account of lacking any insight into his real nature and thereby misconstruing his place within the domain of sensory content, the *puruṣa* is surely utterly deluded.

As it is said in the *Parātriṃśikāśāstra*:

> Oh pious lady, the *tattva*-s beginning with earth and extending through the *puruṣa* are successively [placed within] the groups of consonants, *ka* through *ma*."

The revered Abhinavaguptanātha explained this passage as follows: "The *puruṣa*-[*tattva*] is counted among the set of sensory data insofar as it is limited by the thought of being only a percept."

Further, because it is connected with the body and the vital breaths, [the *puruṣa*] also be considered multiple, as in the statement from the *Virūpākṣapañcāśikā*:

> 'I am rich' 'I am thin' 'I am in love' 'I am happy' 'I breathe' 'I am nothing': in these six phrases, ego is apparent.

This is because there are different kinds of percipients that appear to depend upon this *tattva*: Brahmā, the Moon, and the Sakala-s. It through this that we may understand the coherence of the *puruṣa*'s undergoing [such destinies] as [birth in] heaven or hell. This accords with the *Śivadṛṣṭi*:

> Out of play, God [even] takes up the bodies that dwell in the depths of the ocean of Hell, vessels for suffering, agents of [evil] *karma*s that have yet to undergo their fruits.

There are times, furthermore, when the power of delusion is such that the *puruṣa* mistakenly imagines the dynamism of the Self to be [such things as] the agitations of the body or the senses. This is not the understanding of things as they really are. As it is said in the *Svacchanda*:

> Just as a tongue of fire is seen on a brightly burning flame, not in the sky, so the Self, set in the body and breaths, comes to rest in its place.[54]

Conversely, the understanding of things as they really are [is that] even the dynamism of the these comes to rest in the Lord alone. As it is said in the *Ajaḍapramātṛsiddhi*:

> Although the commerce with worldly objects [*arthasthiti*] is bound within the living being, itself fettered up by its breaths and the subtle body, even there it abides in the Highest Self.

Furthermore:

[54]This verse presents a number of problems. The readings *dṛśyeta*, *hy ātmā* and *līyeta* (all given in A_1 and M) are supported by the text of the *Svacchanda* published by Dwivedi. Kṣemarāja's commentary on this verse, however, doesn't seem to support any of these reading, while it lacks the negation found in all the manuscript sources quoted here, and would therefore seem to support that edition's reading *cāmbare* rather than the *nāmbare* given here. This former reading, moreover, seems to yield better sense in the context of the fourth chapter of the *Svacchanda* where this verse is found. The translation in that case would be "Just as when a fire is burning brightly, and [its] tongue can be seen in the sky, so the self, set in the body and vital breaths, might come to rest in its [=*unmanaṃ jñānaṃ*'s, see 4:364] place." However the sense of the verse as it is deployed here would be a negative one (to be countermanded by the following *vāstavī tu*), and so the reading *nāmbare* should therefore stand. I remain uncertain whether it is advisable to adopt the readings found in A_1M.

He shines forth, remaining singular while taking on many different apparent states, appearing from the Creator down to the lowliest worm. Even when there is a profusion of bodies, the Embodied is not split up, just like a man seeing his face in a profusion of mirrors. As there is oil even in a coarse heap of sesamum, so there is a single transcendent Lord among the manifestation of the world. [And] just as there is not really difference in the space set in each pane of a window, so too should one look upon the Self. As there is only a single universal, Being, that is suited [to become] cowness and so forth, so too this Self is singular—why would anyone saying this not accept it? Since the ongoing existence of the world [can be] proven only [by reference to] this single Self, does not the supposition of multiplicity become an unnecessary assumption? Further, we have already shown that difference has no purchase anywhere—because of this, too, how can there be multiple selves [accepted] in this nondualist theory? Even though there is a contingent differentiation of [selves], [we know of any of a number of] Vedic passages [such as the one beginning with] 'the two birds,' [and therefore] the different experiences such as pain and pleasure [undergone by different individuals] makes sense.

The [single] self—precisely because of its unity—endures in all of its several instantiations. It is for this reason that [we can] establish its pervasiveness, something that others also argue. And for that reason, the Jain theory [of the self] should be abandoned—that the condition of the

> self accords with the size of the particular body, like that of an elephant versus an insect.
>
> However, the [other position] that they argue, that 'if the soul does pervade everything, then there would be consciousness in rocks just as there is in bodies' [needs to be refuted in a different way:] [our] reply is that there is in fact a trace of consciousness in rocks, but it doesn't manifest itself, as it lacks the assistance of the vital breaths, etc.

And as for those who say that the body [and its constituents] alone [is the Self], they are the biggest fools of all. To explain:

> Further, the singular point of the origin of consciousness [simply] could not be the body. If someone tried to object to this [one could reply that in that case] a corpse would still be seen to move about like it did before [the moment of death]. Pillars, pots, rivers, rocks, deer, birds, and men: What reason do the materialists have for this gradation? Likewise, the [source of consciousness] is not the senses, since there is no apprehension of embodied creatures' consciousness when they are in deep sleep, even when there is [the potential] for sense contact [with objects of perception].[55] [Things like] the body and the senses must have a agent [guiding them], and this agent is necessarily the Self. What other rationale is accepted

[55]This is a difficult verse, and I am uncertain if I have understood Maheśvara's meaning here. I take him to mean that if the senses were the basis of conscious awareness, then contact between a sense faculty and its object would always mechanistically produce a reaction in an individual. Since this is not the case, since consciousness continues to exist even in states of profound sensory unawareness like dreamless sleep or coma, then consciousness must be said to lie elsewhere.

> with regards to the agent of all the spectrum of worldly phenomena? If someone should argue that the Self is partly an agent and partly an effect, [we would reply] which part is the agent of which, and who brings about this state of affairs? Or who would ward off the problem of it [in fact] being the opposite of what you've said? Thus, one must accept that the Self is the way we have described it. To change the subject [*atha*]: the man who claims that [the Self] is empty is faced with a question: Is it empty because of its existence within the world, or is it inherently so? The argument for its inherent emptiness is not even written in his own *śāstra*. [If one accepts] the emptiness of the set of knowables, everyday talk and action [*vyavahāra*] are disrupted. Everyone acts in the world [*vyavaharaty eva*], even [someone who] argues for emptiness. One man says the world is real, another says it's empty: when they try to sit in a carriage, both act the same way. If there is a uniformity to worldly action, what is the point of all this disagreement? And so, the clever man who affirms that all the world is empty ends up with neither a man to debate with, nor his own Self, nor even the debate.

Enough with this long discourse, it is a digression. To return to the main point: the entire phenomenal world is nothing other than the Lord's Illumination, as in the position of the *Spanda*:

> Therefore, there is nothing that is not Śiva in word, meaning or thought.

Once you accept this, how can you oppose the idea of Śiva becoming *puruṣa*? This is the overall point [he seeks to prove here]. As it is said in the *Nareśvaraviveka*:

> And because of [their common] Illumination, all of these percipients are identical to Śiva: omniscient, omnipotent and totally lacking in division.

It is for no other reason than to illuminate this meaning that *puruṣa* is also called 'the *puruṣa*.' Since, there is a difference of kind between of these two, that of the one who 'dwells in the city' [*pure vasatīti*, that is, the individual soul] and the one who 'ignites (*i.e.* burns) the city' [*puram oṣati dahatīti*, that is Śiva]. According to the position of the *Haṃsabheda*:

> Since, on account of ego, the Self dwells in the three cities called Intellect, Breath, and Body, it is known as '*puruṣa*'. Tripurāntaka is the one who burned up this triple city, and so the enemy of Smara is also called '*puruṣa*'.

These names are thus seen to make perfectly good sense [independent of each other]; nevertheless, from the perspective of what is truly real, these two are ultimately coextensive in the way that has been described. This sort of a division is caused by the playful embrace [*upalālana*] of the three Stains, which are just expressions of [Śiva's] own autonomy.

[But one might object that] even if we grant that there is a profusion of only apparent difference [*bhedaprathā*], then should it makes sense to say that these two are identical and, as a result of this, that the bound soul possesses an extraordinary power just like God, [it should also follow that] God, just like the bound soul should, by virtue of this very same identity, be subject to mental affliction due to the delusions of *māyā* in the same way as the bound soul. This is not the case, since in this instance

we can compare [Śiva] to a magician: though he tricks the entire world, he himself is not tricked by anyone else. For this reason, God is called 'an actor' [in the verse].

[*ava.* to *gā.* 20] Now, he expatiates upon *prakṛti*:[56]

> **The three qualities of knowledge, action, and *māyā* are identical to sattva, rajas, and tamas. When these exist in a state of nondistinction, there is the category called Prakṛti, a Power of the Lord.** (20)

'Knowledge' is Illumination; 'Action' is Representation. As for *māyā*, it is the power that determines the I–cognition [in this] it is similar to states of Sadāśiva and Īśvara [*tattvas*], which, even during the emergence of a slight dualizing misapprehension [manifest themselves respectively as] 'I am that' [and] 'that is I'. Even though the three of these are powers of the Lord, they are considered to be 'qualities' [*guṇa*] from the perspective of benighted bound souls. As it says in the *Pratyabhijñā*:

> In the midst of the [apparent] object which are [in fact] consubstantial with Him, God's action and knowledge, along with Māyā [become] the *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas* of the bound soul,

these three become the soul's *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas*. Through these there [arise] the wordly states of happiness, sadness, and delusion. And when these three [*śakti*-s], in the form of these three [qualities], are in a state of total equality, like a scale hanging in the balance, devoid of distinction, 'the category called *prakṛti*', comes into existence through the examination of this [state]. [*Prakṛti*] is the stage upon which

[56] As with *puruṣa*, I've chosen to leave this untranslated, rather than use any of the standard translations (such as 'primal matter,' 'nature' *et cetera*).

appear endless thousands of auspicious virtues and inauspicious flaws, upon which wise men [*vipaścidbhir*] have imagined as its manifestations the five varieties of the I-cognition (i.e. the void, intellect, vital breaths, the body, and external objects) and the five phases [of spiritual ascent] (i.e. withdrawal, tranquility, wisdom, peacefulness, and total peacefulness). It is 'a power *of the Lord*' [*śāmbhavy eva*], and this belies the conclusions of the Sāṃkhyas and others. For, through statements like

> Fundamental *prakṛti* is not a transformation, the seven [*tattvas*] beginning with *mahat* are both bases and transformations; but there are sixteen transformations, and *puruṣa* is neither a basis nor a transformation.

they hold that there is no other category beyond *puruṣa*, that *puruṣa* is passive, and that *prakṛti* depends upon it, that *prakṛti* is eternal and [thus] not a transformation, whereas [*tu*] the [other] sixteen are only transformations.

This is not our position, insofar as there are many reality-levels beyond *puruṣa*, ultimately culminating in Paramaśiva. Further, *puruṣa*, while always omnipotent and omniscient, appears to be limited due to the force of the misunderstanding of the nature of the Self. Also, *prakṛti* is not solely impelled by *puruṣa*, because this sort of ability to impel would be impossible absent God's autonomy. As it says in the *Spanda*:

> [The *puruṣa*] is not the impeller of what is driven by will [alone]; instead, because of the connection with the power of the Self, *puruṣa* can become like [the Self].

And *prakṛti* is always transformed, sometimes it is not transformed [?]. As for the sixteen, they are sometimes transformed while sometimes they are not.

So, those who argue for the passivity of the one whose actions are always

elevated ought to be confronted in this way: if He[57] is always without action, [then] what purpose does He serve for the world, [given] that He is like a [mere] lump of clay? Why would anyone believe [*aṅgīkṛtiḥ*] in Him, or indeed what proof might there be for Him? [Their response might be] that it is this very passivity of that one, consisting [entirely] of consciousness, that excites *prakṛti* and thereby the [further] transformations within the world, since otherwise there would be no such resolute power [available] to *prakṛti*. It is for that reason He [is deemed] one whose glory transcends the world [and thus] there is belief in Him.[58] And this provides the logical grounds for the proof of His existence.

We reply to this as follows [*atrocyate*]: if you conceive of His passivity in this way, you end up the idea that he is in fact not passive at all. As He is utterly different from *prakṛti* and the other [*tattvas*], the action He employs is a subtle one. [If you argue this way] He doesn't lack action: even though such action is subtle, it engenders still greater actions in *prakṛti* and in all the further transformations as well. Even inert things such as bodies, senses, and the world act out their essential natures because of His power—how, then, could He be without action?

[57] The use of the masculine demonstrative pronoun here (*tam, tena, tasya*) is, I believe, deliberately ambiguous, as it might refer to either the *puruṣa* of the Sāṃkhyas or to Śiva as understood by the Śaivasiddhāntins. I have here retained the 'hieratic capitals' that are used elsewhere in this translation when referring to Śiva.

[58] Understanding *viśvātikrāntatejasaḥ* as a *hetugarbhaviśeṣaṇa*, providing a reason for the *svīkṛtiḥ* or belief.

And on this point there is the verse of mine, which wise people [*antarvidbhiḥ*] ought to consider:

> Let the saying be praised that 'when the horses are going, the chariot proceeds.' The one who [rides] in the chariot's center sits comfortably, and takes up another object—Śambhu, what else did the *puruṣa* do?[59]

Furthermore,

> Extending throughout that collection of categories—from Śiva to Prakṛti—that has so far been described, there are five powers [*śakti*s] belonging to Śiva, the transcendent creator: omnipotence, omniscience, eternal superiority, omnipervasion, and plentitude. And so, in the *śakti* that is His will, five rays awaken: the Transmental, the Mental, the Pervading, *nāda*, and *bindu*. There are also five manifestations [*prathāḥ*], originating in the level of Śakti, that are the five world–actions: grace, concealment, destruction, maintenance, creation. Also, in the category of Sadāśiva, the powers are [the five *brahmamantra*s, viz.] Īśāna, Tatpuruṣa, Aghora, Vāmadeva, and Sadyojāta. Thereupon[*tadūrdhvaṃ*], at the level of Īśvara, there is the great [state] of the totally transcendence of form, [as well as] the transcendence of form, form, word, and body.[60] The collection of the powers [*śaktivibhrama*] of Pure Gnosis are the five states of [consciousness]: beyond-the-Fourth, the Fourth, dreamless sleep, dream, and

[59]The upshot here seems to be that the *audāsinyavāda* holds that the *puruṣa* is just like the passenger of the chariot, who is putatively inactive when compared to the horses, or the chariot itself. M's verse claims that the passenger is doing thing both in and via the chariot, and hence is anything but inactive.

[60]These are the four 'immersions' (*samāpatti*) of Kaula yoga; on these see Vasudeva 2004, pp. 215–232. To these, Maheśvarānanda appears to add his own culminating term, *mahat rūpātītottaraṃ*.

waking. That very same [Gnosis] when manifest [*sphūrtiśālinī*] gives rise to the Initiations of Śambhu, of Śakti,[61] and of the individual, and also the purifying and enlightening initiations.[62] And arising from the same [*śuddhavidyā*],[63] there is the creation of the different means of the goal of human life: Illumination without means, knowledge, yoga, action, and practice.[64] From that very same [*śuddhavidyā*], the great power called Hākinī arises, and so too Ḍākinī, Rākinī, Lākinī, Kākinī, *and Sākinī, in that body whose diversity manifests itself.*[?][65] And now [*atha*], the pow-

[61]Emending, as the sense seems to demand, to *śāktiṃ* instead of the reading given in all sources. Elsewhere in the MM (E_V, p. 169), this same form of initiation is called *śāktī*, metrically impossible here. Note also the emendation to *dīkṣāḥ* (for *dīkṣā*). Of these five initiations, the first three are referred to in E_V pp. 169-70, while the first two are mentioned above (with a further variant name, viz. *śākta°*) at 16:32.

[62]I am unable to provide parallels for the *śodhanī* and *bodhanī* initiations.

[63]This is an awkward translation of the phrase *tadutthāyaiva*—reading the emphasis with the former rather than the latter member of the compound—but sense seems to demand that it be taken this way.

[64]Here again, *cf.* 16:31–32.

[65]*sākinīti ca dehe 'smin yadvaicitryaṃ vijṛmbhate*: this perplexing half–verse seems especially suspicious in that it enumerates six figures *ḍākinī* etc. when everywhere else in this passage it is only five things being listed. A nearly identical set of six goddesses *ḍākinī*, etc. is known to the twenty-third chapter of the *Kubjikāmatatantra* (ed. Goudriaan and Schoterman, 23: 91 p. 429), where the Goddess asks Śiva for the mantras of Ḍākinī, Rākṣasī (*sic leg*; Rākinī is given as a variant in 4 MSS), Kākinī, Śākinī (*sic leg*; Sākinī in most MSS, including AB, the editors' professed 'best MSS') , Yakṣinī (=Yākinī?), and Bhrāmaṇī (?). In a *japa* contained in this same *paṭala* directed towards the subjugation (*vaśīkaraṇa*) of the practitioner's enemies, there occurs another similar list of goddesses (after vs. 140, pp. 435-6), viz. *yakṣinī*, *śaṅkhinī* (*sic leg*), *kākinī*, *lākinī*, *rākinī*, *ḍākinī*, respectively connected with the destruction of the enemies' bones, marrow, fat, flesh, blood, and skin. In yet another *japa* contained in the chapter (relegated by the editors to Appendix 2, p. 483), in this case for the protection of the practitioner (*anugraha*), a list is given that is nearly the exact inverse of the preceding, viz. Ḍā., Rā., Lā., Kā, Śā, and Hākinī. Note that this last list is the only one in which Hākinī, given pride of place by Maheśvarānanda (or at least by the tradition represented by E_V) is to be found. The references to the different parts of the body in the *vaśīkaraṇa* rite accords with the earlier mention in the *tattvaviveka* (16:31) of the *ḍākinīrākinyādayo dhātudevatāḥ*, 'the divinities of the bodily constituents, such as Ḍākinī and Rākinī;' this would appear to construe with the reference to *dehe 'smin, etc.* in the present passage. Note, however, that even in this instance the reading *ḍākinīrākinī°* is only that of E_V, while A_1 and M share the order *sākinīrākinī°*.

Given the confusion of the sources in this lemma, a definitive reading seems for the moment out of the question. I hypothesize, however, that Maheśvarānanda—who, elsewhere in the present section

ers of that reality called *māyā*: limitation, ignorance, passion, time, and finally binding fate. *Prāṇa, apāna, samāna, udāna,* and *vyāna* are the collection of powers in the *puruṣa* [*tattva*], weakened by their presence in the body. But in *prakṛti*, the five rays are the qualities *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas* as well as transformation and non-transformation. And so [*atha*], through the emergence [*sphuraṇakriyayā*] of these two, *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*, there is the fashioning of the multiplicity of the world, which will now be described in detail; the modes [of this multiplicity] are also duly described at length. From the coalescence of *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*, the element [*dhātu*] called 'The Self' arises. This is made manifest by the lights that are [its own constituent elements], namely skin, blood, flesh, fat, bone, marrow, and seed, along with wind, bile, and phlegm. It is through the friction of those two alone that one experiences the inner apparatus as three–fold, as attention, intellect, and ego; of these, through the workings of intellect, a spectrum [*vicitratā*] appears: moral knowledge [*dharma*], awareness, worldly indifference, lordly power, and generosity; the opposite of these are accepted as the constructs of the attention[-faculty].[66]

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of the text has evidently tailored the components of his lists to give only five members—*cf.* the list of the Kaula immersions (ll. 56–7), and that of the *buddhiguṇa*s (ll. 81–82)—only gave five goddesses, bearing whatever names and given in whatever order. As this list of *dhātudevatā*s as contained within the Kubjikā/Paścimāmnāya tradition would have been more widely known among South Indian tantrics (on Maheśvarānanda's own cognizance of this tradition, as reflected in his fifth *maṅgalācaraṇa*, as well as its wider Southern reception, see Sanderson 2002, p. 3, n. 23), I suppose the second half verse here to have been interpolated by a later copyist–editor. I have chosen to retain both the half-verse and the translation for completeness' sake, but have marked them out from the rest of the text.

[66]N.B. that in order to maintain the symmetrical presentation of groups of five, the qualities of the *buddhi* known from, e.g. *Saṃkhyakārikā* 23 (cf. also *Tattvaprakāśa* 52 and Aghoraśiva *ad loc*

The outer signs of ego [*ahaṃkārasphūrttāḥ*] are possessiveness, jealousy at the possessions of others, dissatisfaction, stupor, and envy: these are the causes of the appearance of *saṃsāra*. Likewise, through the [further] expansion of those two, the three qualities *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas* are known, as they originate in transformation and nontransformation. Of these, the collection of outer manifestations [*sphuraṇvibhramaḥ*] of *sattva* are beauty, good fortune, noble conduct, charm, and high-mindedness. They say that acts of control, attraction, pacification, promotion and protection attend the quality *rajas*. And so hatred, repulsion, suppressing, deluding, and killing— all these actions that are the collection of the agitation of *tamas*. When the ego acquires the support of these qualities, it tends towards the trifurcation of the types *sāttvika*, etc. Of these, the *sāttvika* ego extends itself [*svena rūpeṇa prathate*] into objects of sensation [as their *tanmātras*, *viz.*] sound, touch, form, taste, and smell. The *rājasa* ego, on the other hand, [being] possessed of its own nature, manifests as the five [*karmendriyas*], speech, acceptance, movement, elimination, and pleasure. As for the *tāmasa* ego, [totally] embodied, it stretches forth through the raw materials of the [apparent] world, the simple properties of sky, air, air, water and earth. Further, once the level of the ego is possessed of [this] trifurcation, a set of actions [specific to each kind of ego] is acknowledged, because of the abundance of the [particular] set

as well as the PĀS, vv. 10–11, and the editors' annotations *ad loc.*), normally reckoned as four, are here inflated with the inclusion of *varadatva*.

of outer manifestations [*vibhūtivibhramotkarṣāt*]. Desire for the good, a philosophical inclination, craving for transcendent ends, concentration upon [the appropriate] objects, [*vastuṣv adhyavasāyaḥ*]—[that is to say,] auspiciousness—and forthright mind: these are all features of a *sāttvika* man, accustomed to physical and mental control. They say that the power of the *rājasa* man, one who instills [such states as] happiness and fear, lies in his sense-organs: ears, skin, eyes, tongue, and nose. And so the markings [*paricchadaḥ*] of the *tāmasa* man, used to delusion and torpor, are, in order, speech, the hands, feet, anus, and genitals.

And so, the great magical accomplishment born from the two [*tattva*s] we have been discussing has five different manifestations [*sphūrjā*] that can be seen among power-seeking adepts; know these modes to be: obtaining a body which one desires, entering into the body of another, teleportation, clairvoyance and clairaudience, and becoming invisible. The wondrous condition of these two [as they tend] towards the creation of the world is said to be His action.[67] Its outer manifestations are valor, majesty, lordly power, the capacity to enjoy and the possibility of generosity. These can be obtained by the fortunate. Thus, at the same point [in the *tattva-krama*?] [there is found] †the channel of consciousness, also known as the

[67] *asya kriyeti*] The reading of A_1A_2M seems clearly preferable to that of E_V, *puṇyakriyeti*. I suspect that *puṇya*° there may be a scribal eyeskip from its earlier occurrence at 20: 105. Nevertheless, I am uncertain of the meaning of the text as its constituted here; understanding *asya* as an *aprakaraṇika* reference to Śiva is only a stopgap. In fact, my understanding of Maheśvarānanda's meaning from this point onward is very tentative.

thread of knowledge; this continually is giving rise within this diversity to the five channels called Picture, Lotus, Śiva, Śakti, and the Self.† In this same way the manifestation of this [channel ?] as it supports the seven subterranean regions should successively be understood as Hāṭaka, Kālāgni[rudra], Kūṣmāṇḍa, †the Tortoise†, Ananta, †the one entwined with *śakti*†, and Kapālīśa.[68] He remains pure, even as [his] unique nature is surrounded by all of what has been described, retaining [within himself] a wealth of profound calm, like a waveless ocean. He possesses the set of five Powers: awareness, joy, will, knowledge and action—Bhairava, the supreme lord, will be described at the end of [this] work.[69]

While elaborating(/explaining at length) the hidden miracle in which the Five Purposes arise, the ground of the diversity of the entire world, Maheśvara(/Maheśvarānanda) himself completely transformed into Illumination(/revealed) his self-awareness, which consists of Representation (/cognition).[70]

[68] This list, irregularly of seven members (one corresponding to each of the seven subterranean regions mentioned in 20.125), has been extensively and conjecturally emended. As is also the case in 20:120–122, the transmission is corrupt beyond my ability to suggest repair. Both Kūṣmāṇḍa and Kapālīśa can be found in the cosmographic lists giving the overlords of the lower *bhuvana*s of the universe, alongside Hāṭaka, Kālāgnirudra, and Ananta. See for instance MVUT 5.1–5.3 and 5.11–5.14 (epitomized in TĀ 8.437–438) and *Svacchandatantra* 10. 238 (Kūṣmāṇḍa and Hāṭaka) 10.346 (Ananta and Kālāgnirudra). These two emendations for the meaningful but contextually irrelevant *kūṭastha* and *kapilarṣi* thus seem reasonably secure. I do not feel confident enough to offer replacements for *kūrma* or *śaktyupaśliṣṭa*.

[69] *Ex conj.* This is a very tentative conjecture; the ligatures °*ttva* and °*ntra* can be easily confused, and I can find no parallel occurrence of the form *tattvānta* (‘at the end of reality’?). The use of the future tense *kathayiṣyate* would seem to support that this is a cross-reference, though I am unable to say what passage in the MM Maheśvarānanda might have in mind here.

[70] While certain that this verse contains a *śleṣa* that depends on the equivalence of Śiva’s creation of

> The hero who ever possesses the I [that exists] within the I, and the valor [that exists] within valor has his own *śakti* as a weapon, whetted by the touchstone of Representation.

Enough, lest the ultimate secrets be revealed too hastily.

the world with the author's acts of composition and interpretation, I remain unclear as to the exact nature of some of the paronomasia. Central to the intent here seems to be the second interpretation of the main predication *parāmarśamayīm ahaṃsphurām...prakāśayām āsa*, where the primary (and intuitive) sense of the finite verb ('revealed, illuminated') is doubled by the possible interpretation of verb as a *nāmadhātu* or denominative ('was transformed into Illumination [*prakāśa*]'). Maheśvarānanda thus deliberately fuses the two ontological poles of the Pratyabhijñā, transforming (or concretizing) ontological awareness into ontic existence.

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Abbreviations

AS/EA *Asiatische Studien/Études Asiatiques*

BhP *Bhāvaprakāśana*

DhĀ *Dhvanyāloka*; DhĀL *Dhvanyālokalocana*

GOS *Gaekwad Oriental Series*

IIJ *Indo-Iranian Journal*

ĪPK *Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā*

JA *Journal Asiatique*

JAOS *Journal of the American Oriental Society*

JAS *Journal of Asian Studies*

JIP *Journal of Indian Philosophy*

KP *Kaliṅkattupparaṇi*

KSS *Kashi Sanskrit Series*

KSTS *Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies*

MM *Mahārthamañjarī*; MMP *Mahārthamañjarīparimala* (E_V Dviveda's edition; E_K M.R. Śāstrī's edition).

NLR *New Left Review*

PĀS *Pañcāvaraṇastava*

PP *Periyapurāṇam*

SS *Sūtasaṃhitā*

TSS *Trivandrum Sanskrit Series*

WZKS *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Sudasiens*

YTGM *Yogatantragranthamālā*

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